中国电力产业规制效果的实证研究

本文利用1978--2005年相关数据对中国电力规制效果进行了全面的实证检验。计量结果表明，改革开放以来，明确的规制框架、独立规制机构和不断成熟的规制对象在统计意义上显著地提高了电力产业总量和效率，降低了价格水平和垄断利润．但在改善服务质量方面尚未发挥有效作用。总体看，中国电力产业规制效果是明显的．良好的规制设计不仅在理论上有利于电力产业提高绩效，在实践中也是电力产业绩效改善的推动力。     

规制分权化、组织合谋与制度效率--基于中国电力行业的实证研究

产业组织理论中关于规制合谋的研究分为芝加哥学派和图卢兹学派，研究结果均表明，规制机构与被规制企业之间的合谋行为降低了规制效率．降低了社会福利水平。文章主要研究中国当前规制分权化背景下的地方规制机构与被规制企业之间的合谋问题，并且用计量方法对规制的效果进行了检验．结果表明规制分权化没有显著的正面效应，即规制低效率。因此，规制分权化产生的合谋导致了规制低效率．而解决问题的关键是机制设计。     

价格规制合同设计中信息租金与配置效率的协调方式

网络产业所具有的自然垄断特性使政府规制成为必要，但在信息不对称的情况下，被规制企业所具备的信息优势使政府在设计规制合同时必须面对和解决逆向选择问题。本文在考虑了参与约束和激励约束的基础上，通过建立含有信息租金的社会福利最大化目标函数，分析了企业信息租金的存在形式及其与配置效率的冲突关系，并提出了政府如何在提高资源配置效率和减少企业信息租金之间进行选择的协调方式。     

电力产业重组中的规制和放松规制

基于经济学理论,介绍了电力市场建设阶段的竞争和规制理论,探讨了中国电力市场的规制制度和规制效率,有助于更好地理解电力市场建设、审批权等一系列当前电力工业界热门论题的经济学本质,时仍处于探索阶段的中国电力产业重组是具有现实意义的。     

规制定价机制的激励强度权衡与模型设计--以我国电信产业的规制定价总体模型设计为例

自然垄断产业中，由于规制机构与被规制企业之间存在着信息不对称。价格规制政策的实施效果受到制约，而制度背景和经济发展程度是设计一个适合国情的规制定价机制必须考虑的前提因素。本文分析了我国目前的制度特征如何影响我国自然垄断产业规制定价机制激励强度的权衡。在此基础上，尝试提出适合我国目前制度特征的电信产业规制定价总体模型——基于收益率规制并加入动态激励因素的规制定价模型．最后对未来的规制定价机制做出展望．     

不同类型环境规制对产业升级的影响

在环境资源约束下， 环境规制对产业升级具有一定的激励作用。但现有的研究忽略了环境规制的不同类型以及东部与中西部地区的异质性， 因此无法提出有针对性和差异化的环境政策， 从而推动产业升级。本文区分了不同类型的环境规制， 选取动态面板模型检验环境规制与产业升级之间的影响关系。研究结果表明： 不同类型环境规制对产业升级的影响存在异质性， 东部地区志愿型环境规制并未对产业升级形成有效激励， 命令型、激励型环境规制对产业升级的影响分别呈“倒N型”、“N 型” 趋势变化。中西部地区激励型、志愿型环境规制作用不显著， 且命令型环境规制对产业升级的激励效应较明显。研究结论有利于设定科学的环境规制强度和选择合理环境规制类型以激励产业升级。     

基于产业链效率的煤电纵向规制模式研究

本文认为，我国煤电产业链受到内生的纵向外部性和外生的需求强波动性的影响．政府在对其制定规制政策时必须基于这两种特性。同时，在评价规制政策有效性时需要以产业链整体效率为基准。本文归纳了7种煤电纵向价格规制模式，并在此基础上提出了“基于产业链规制”的概念。我们认为，将对电价的规制延伸到对电煤价格的规制是现阶段我国煤电产业链价格规制的最优选择。这不仅可以解决煤炭纵向价格双轨制带来的矛盾，还有利于资源的有效利用。为确保规制延伸的有效性，本文还对相关辅助政策提出了建议。     

规制促减贫:以公用事业改革为视角

减贫是现阶段我国面临的重大而亟待解决的问题。公用事业的民营化与引入竞争等改革措施对贫困人群存在直接与间接影响。为了促进减贫,可以实施恰当的公用事业规制措施,具体可分为亲贫规制与效率规制两类。通过规制促进减贫是一项复杂工程,在实施各规制措施时要考虑它们之间存在的权衡。最后,文章阐释了规制促减贫对我国公用事业改革与规制的启示。     

价格上限规制分析

价格上限规制有效地融合了成本降低激励与有效定价激励,能够消除收益率规制带来的A——J效应,具有较强的配置效率激励,其竞争中性特征适应于自然垄断的独立性。整体价格上限可以阻止纵向一体化产业接入定价中的掠夺性定价问题。本文从理论和应用两个层面上分析了价格上限规制的含义与特征,探讨了其在不同业务领域的适用性与局限性。     

建立有效且有限的政府规制机构

在我国转轨的过程中,市场经济还不成熟。此时,自然垄断产业引入竞争的市场化改革成功与否的一个关键问题就是政府规制机构能否真正发挥作用。因此,在自然垄断产业改革过程中,要加快自然垄断产业规制机构改革,建立一个有效且有限的政府规制机构。这个规制机构主要职责是创造良好的市场竞争环境,以充分调动市场主体的积极性,发挥其潜力。     

Incentive pay for non-executive directors: The direct and interaction effects on firm performance

To improve corporate governance and firm performance, institutional investors and influential activists in the US recommend the use of incentive pay for non-executive directors. Policy makers in the UK and Australia, however, recommend against it. Motivated by stark contrast in the recommendations from these Anglo-Saxon countries, this paper investigates the impacts of incentive pay for non-executive directors on firm performance. The findings based on data from 178 listed Australian companies support both recommendations. Firm performance tends to be better when no incentive or high-power incentives are offered to non-executive directors than when low-power incentives are offered. This paper also investigates how incentive pay interacts with monitoring by large shareholders and debtholders to influence firm performance. This paper shows that large shareholder monitoring interacts negatively while debtholder monitoring interacts positively with incentive pay for non-executive directors to affect firm performance. Overall, the findings suggest that governance mechanisms recommended by agency theorists such as performance-contingent pay and monitoring can backfire if they are not designed properly. Both the direct and interaction effects should be considered when practitioners design corporate governance systems.     

企业智力资本与企业资本结构优化

在新经济环境下，如何有效地利用和管理智力资本已成为创造企业竞争优势的重要手段之一。本文试图从智力资本的构成及其综合财务度量指标入手，建立在权衡智力资产创造企业价值的激励制度下的资本结构优化分析模型，通过这个模型的分析和简要案例的剖析得到结论：应用智力资产贡献率和贡献增长率指标在一定程度上可以度量智力资本的贡献；适宜的智力资产贡献激励能够促使代理人优化资本结构；在考虑智力资产贡献激励情况下，企业代理人会寻找更有效的手段（如资产负债综合重组优化）来优化企业资本结构。     

国有控股、最高决策者激励与公司绩效

国内研究认为股权结构、董事会和高管激励对公司绩效有影响，而上市公司“国有一股独大”的国情使前两者不会有实质性作用；对于后者的研究则忽略了最高决策者在公司中的重要性。本文以1993—2002年数据为样本，研究国有股代理人(董事长和总经理)激励对公司绩效的影响。发现董事长是公司最高决策者，除政治激励能显著改善绩效外，最高决策者金钱激励、国有股权性质、两职合一、债权人治理等都和绩效没有显著关系；意味着只有将政治激励所附带的财富效用降低到一定程度，金钱激励才可能成为有效治理机制。     

Managerial compensation and corporate spinoffs

Research summary : This article investigates how corporate spinoffs affect managerial compensation. These deals are found to improve the alignment of spinoff firm managers' incentive compensation with stock market performance, especially among spinoff firm managers that used to be divisional managers of the spun‐off subsidiary, and particularly when the spun‐off subsidiary performs better than or is unrelated to its parent firm's remaining businesses. By contrast, incentive alignment does not improve for the parent firm managers running the divesting companies. This finding appears to be driven by a significant post‐spinoff increase in these managers' incentive compensation, the magnitude of which is inversely related to governance quality in their firms. Together, these results elucidate how spinoffs influence managerial compensation in diversified firms and the companies they divest. Managerial summary : This article explores how spinoffs affect incentive alignment: the correlation between incentive compensation and stock market performance. The incentive alignment of spinoff firm managers improves following these deals. These gains are the largest when spinoff firm managers used to be divisional managers of the spun‐off subsidiary and when the spun‐off subsidiary performs better than or is unrelated to the other businesses in the parent firm. By contrast, incentive alignment does not improve for parent firm managers. Instead, the level of these managers' incentive compensation rises significantly post‐spinoff, and the magnitude of this increase is inversely related to governance quality in these firms. Together, these results shed light on the ways in which spinoffs influence managerial compensation in diversified firms and in the companies they divest. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of technical expertise in firm governance structure: evidence from chief financial officer contractual incentives

We provide evidence that the presence of technical expertise in firm governance structure reduces reliance on contractual incentives to control the potential agency problem for executives whose responsibilities require specialized knowledge. Specifically, we find that firms with financial expertise in the form of a board finance committee, or a chief executive officer with a financial background, tend to use lower levels of incentive‐based compensation for their chief financial officers. Our findings suggest financial experts provide stronger oversight and/or direction with regard to firm financial policies and strategies, thereby allowing firms to reduce reliance on incentive compensation. Our study provides insight into the role of technical expertise and board committees in firm governance, and into the benefits of common functional expertise within top management teams. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance Measure Properties and Incentive System Design

We analyze effects of performance measure properties (controllable and uncontrollable risk, distortion, and manipulation) on incentive plan design, using data from auto dealership manager incentive systems. Dealerships put the most weight on measures that are “better” with respect to these properties. Additional measures are more likely to be used for a second or third bonus if they can mitigate distortion or manipulation in the first performance measure. Implicit incentives are used to provide ex post evaluation, to motivate the employee to use controllable risk on behalf of the firm, and to deter manipulation of performance measures. Overall, our results indicate that firms use incentive systems of multiple performance measures, incentive instruments, and implicit evaluation and rewards as a response to weaknesses in available performance measures.     

Firm‐specific knowledge assets and employment arrangements: Evidence from CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal

Research summary : We argue that firms with greater specificity in knowledge structure need to both encourage their CEOs to stay so that they make investments with a long‐term perspective, and provide job securities to the CEOs so that they are less concerned about the risk of being dismissed. Accordingly, we found empirical evidence that specificity in firm knowledge assets is positively associated with the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation design (indicating the effort of CEO retention) and negatively associated with CEO dismissal (indicating the job securities the firm committed to CEOs). Furthermore, firm diversification was found to mitigate the effect of firm‐specific knowledge on both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal, as CEOs are more removed from the deployment of knowledge resources in diversified firms. Managerial summary : A firm's knowledge structure, that is, the extent to which its knowledge assets are firm‐specific versus general, has implications for both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal. In particular, we find that a firm with a high level of firm‐specific knowledge has the incentive to retain its CEO through the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation. Such a firm is also likely to provide job security for its CEO, leading to a lower likelihood of CEO dismissal. These arguments, however, are less likely to hold in diversified corporations as CEOs in such corporations are more removed from the deployment of knowledge assets. A key managerial implication is that CEO compensation and job security design should be made according to the nature of firm knowledge assets. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

AUTHORITY,RISK, AND PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES: EVIDENCE FROM DIVISION MANAGER POSITIONS INSIDE FIRMS*

I show that performance incentives vary by decision‐making authority of division managers. For division managers with broader authority, i.e., those designated as corporate officers, both the sensitivity of pay to global performance measures and the relative importance of global to local measures are larger, relative to non‐officers. There is no difference in sensitivity of pay to local measures by officer status. These results support theories suggesting that authority over project selection combined with incentives designed to maximize firm performance, as well as induce effort for the division, are important in incentive design for division managers. Consistent with earlier findings, the evidence strongly supports one of the main predictions of the principal‐agent model, that is, a negative tradeoff between risk and incentives.     

Strategic orientations,incentive plan adoptions,and firm performance: evidence from electric utility firms

This study examines the performance implications of the fit between strategic orientations and incentive plan characteristics. Research hypotheses are based on a framework that draws upon managerial discretion and agency theories to identify the links between firm strategy, managerial motivation and control, managerial risk-bearing, and incentive plan characteristics. A pooled cross-sectional, time series research design is used to test hypotheses in a sample of 50 electric utility firms. Consistent with theory, results indicate that annual bonus plans that use cash incentives and accounting measures of performance lead to better performance among firms with Defender strategic orientations. In contrast, firms with Prospector strategic orientations realize performance benefits when they adopt stock-based incentive plans and use market measures to evaluate managerial performance. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

纵向一体化与联合所有权——通用一费希尔公司收购案例研究

纵向一体化可以很好地解决物质资本的专用性问题,然而对人力资本专用性造成的“套牢”无能为力。通过降低交易双方对一般性投资的激励,从而提高专用性投资的激励,联合所有权使得“套牢”的收益最小而成本最高。因此,联合所有权不仅可以解决物质资本专用性问题,也是解决人力资本套牢问题的有效途经。