GATT第24条关于关税同盟和自由贸易区的实体外部标准解读

GATT/WTO多边贸易体制关于关税同盟和自由贸易区的纪律规定于GATT第24条。该条确立了自由贸易区、关税同盟和旨在建立关税同盟或自由贸易区的过渡性协议三种区域贸易安排的具体表现形式。根据WTO秘书处的研究报告,GATT第24条关于自由贸易区和关税同盟多边纪律,可以概括为三个条件:一是深度区域自由化的义务(内部标准);二是对区域外成员贸易保持中立的义务(外部标准);三是透明度义务。其中前两项为实体标准,第三项为程序性标准。纵观GATT第24条诸款,其第5款普遍被认为规定了自由贸易区和关税同盟的实体外部标准。实体外部标准所关注的是:虽然GATT的缔约方乃至WTO成员有权缔结自由贸易区和关税同盟,这种权利是有限度的,即,关税同盟和自由贸易区要对第三国的贸易保持中立,即不得以建立关税同盟和自由贸易区为名而使第三国的利益陷入不利。本文旨在系统而细致地研究GATT第24条规定的自由贸易区和关税同盟的实体外部标准。     

从GATT第3条的解释看环境税的合法性——基于“平等对待条款”解释的视角

由于环境税会影响一国的产业竞争力,所以采取环境税的国家通常会在相关立法中制定涉外条款来保护本国产业。从GATT/WTO争端解决机制对GATT第3条平等对待条款的解释来看,GATT/WTO争端解决机制倾向于限制各国的环境规制自由,环境保护作为平等对待条款免除对象的可能性不大,环境税涉外在GATT第3条中难以获得合法性地位。     

论环境税在GATT第3条中的法律地位——基于“平等对待条款”解释的视角

由于环境税会影响一国的产业竞争力,所以采取环境税的国家通常会在相关立法中制定涉外条款来保护本国产业。从GATT/WTO争端解决机制对GATT第3条"平等对待条款"的解释来看,GATT/WTO争端解决机制倾向于限制各国的环境规制自由,环境保护作为"平等对待条款"免除对象的可能性不大,环境税在GATT第3条中难以获得合法性地位。     

GATT第24条关于关税同盟和自由贸易区的实体内部标准研究

GATT/WTO多边贸易体制关于关税同盟和自由贸易区的纪律规定于GATT第24条。然而,在GATT缔约之日起,直至如今,GATT第24条一直是人们苦恼和迷惑之源。人们认为,由于充满"模糊"和"含糊其词的用语",该条的规定"极端宽松"、"异乎寻常地复杂"、"充满漏洞";有人甚至批评说该条是"荒谬的"和"自相矛盾的"。GATT第24条诸款中,引起争议最大的莫过于该条的第8款,该款规定了关税同盟和自由贸易区内部深度区域自由化的义务,本文称之为实体内部标准。本文首先探讨了GATT第24条关于区域贸易安排法律制度的逻辑框架和实体纪律。重点就"深度区域自由化的义务"(内部标准)尽可能全面地加以评释。     

WTO的未来（二）——应对新千年的体制性挑战

一、非歧视待遇：关税与贸易总协定(GATT的中心原则。8．GATT的中心原则是非歧视原则，主要体现为GATT第一条最惠国待遇(MFN)条款和国民待遇条款。最惠国待遇条款被认为是GATT及世界贸易体系的核心规则。该条款要求给予GATT任一缔约方在关税和非关税方面的最佳条件，必须自动和无条件地给予任何其他缔约方。     

WTO的未来[二]--应对新千年的体制性挑战第二章对非歧视原则的侵蚀

一、非歧视待遇:关税与贸易总协定(GATT)的中心原则 58.GATT的中心原则是非歧视原则,主要体现为GATT第一条最惠国待遇(MFN)条款和国民待遇条款.最惠国待遇条款被认为是GATT及世界贸易体系的核心规则.该条款要求给予GATT任一缔约方(1)在关税和非关税方面的最佳条件,必须自动和无条件地给予任何其他缔约方.     

WTO与区域贸易组织管辖权的冲突与协调

近年来,区域贸易自由化发展迅速。国家之间通过签订自由贸易协定(FTA)来建立自由贸易区,开展区域经济合作。在WTO与区域贸易安排的关系方面,应遵守GATT1994第24条等条款的规定,也就是说,区域贸易应在WTO的多边框架下发展。但在实践中,FTA与WTO之间不可避免地出现了一些冲突,需要进行协调。本文将就WTO与区域贸易组织争端解决管辖权的冲突与协调进行探讨。     

碳关税合法性研究与应对

当前全球气候变暖的趋势不容忽视,控制碳排放量逐渐成为国际社会普遍重视的问题。碳关税虽于法理上有一定的依据,但并非完全相符于WTO宗旨。在涉及GATT和TBT条款中,在GATT项下,违反了GATT第1.1条的最惠国待遇和第3.4条的国民待遇,是否可援引GATT第20条(b)(g)款的例外规定还有讨论的空间;在TBT项下,碳关税有违反TBT第2.1条和TBT第2.2条的可能,还可能因各国检测技术存在不同,相互承认存在困难而违反TBT第5.1.1条、第5.2.1条、第6.1条。我国在面对其他国家实施的碳关税政策以及未来可能出现的新纠纷时,主动积极地面对问题,解决问题。在考虑到自身利益与国际形势的前提下,合理利用WTO规则和争端解决机制,形成自己的主张。     

WTO有关规则专题讲座(二)

<正> WTO中的非歧视贸易原则指的是最惠国待遇原则和国民待遇原则。 一、最惠国待遇原则 1.最惠国待遇的本质。 最惠国待遇是签署贸易协定的一项法律原则,通常以最惠国待遇条款的形式在贸易协定中固定下来。订立最惠国待遇条款并非为了给予或取得特殊待遇、差别待遇,更非为了给予或获得最优惠的待遇,而是为了保障均等的贸易机会,保证双方或多方在平等的条件下开展自由竞争。 最惠国待遇几乎在世贸组织的每一个协议中都有规定,如GATT1994第一条规定了最惠国待遇原则,“在对输出或输入及     

环境税收边境调整与WTO

环境税收边境调整是征收环境税的国家针对进出口产品采取的一种单边措施,其目的是为了扭转国产品在国际竞争中的价格劣势。但是,这一措施可能会与WTO的最惠国待遇原则、国民待遇原则以及反补贴规则产生冲突。虽然WTO成员方可以援引GATT第20条例外条款,但是否能获得WTO专家小组或上诉机构的认同还是个未知数。对此,各国应同时从国际和国内两个层面寻找出路。     

针对产品生产和加工方法贸易措施的违法性分析

在GATT—WTO体系内部,针对产品生产和加工方法贸易措施的合法性,以及如何规范允许使用的针对产品生产和加工方法贸易措施的讨论甚为激烈,成为最有争议的焦点问题之一。本文根据对WTO协议中的GATT第1条、第3条、第20条,以及《技术性贸易壁垒协议》相关条文和案例的研究,分析了针对产品生产和加工方法贸易措施的违法性及其可能的负面效应,以供进一步的研究参考。     

GATT1994第15条研究——兼论人民币汇率困境之出路

本文在对GATT1994第15条进行文本分析的基础上提出:GATT1994第15条作为设计和规范WTO与IMF之间各自职责与合作关系的平衡条款,没有规定成员方的外汇安排,只要符合IMF协定即可获得对WTO义务的豁免,更没有排斥WTO对汇率问题的管辖权,而在WTO赢得胜诉也无须证明人民币汇率构成倾销或补贴。     

Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes

Developing countries have been increasing their participation in the formal institutions and proceedings of the multilateral trading system. A prominent example is their more frequent involvement as defendants and plaintiffs in GATT/WTO trade disputes. This paper provides an initial economic appraisal of developing country performance in the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system. We measure the economic resolution of these disputes through trade liberalisation gains, and our results suggest that developing country plaintiffs have had more success under WTO disputes than was the case under the GATT. We also document evidence on potential determinants of this success: the capacity for plaintiffs to make credible retaliatory threats and the guilty determinations by GATT/WTO panels. Finally, there is also some evidence that developing countries have recognised the importance of retaliatory threats and have responded by changing their pattern of dispute initiation under the WTO to better take advantage of the instances in which they have sufficient leverage to threaten retaliation and induce compliance with GATT/WTO obligations.     

《关贸总协定》第24条的再解读--规则、案例和展望

《关贸总协定》第24条所规定的区域贸易安排是世贸组织框架下最惠国待遇的例外。区域贸易安排一方面有贸易促进的积极作用,另一方面又因其集团间歧视的特征,一旦被滥用,就会侵蚀世贸组织的非歧视原则,背离关贸总协定/世贸组织实现全球贸易自由化和一体化的目标。《关贸总协定》第24条、乌拉圭回合的《谅解》以及土耳其案的专家组、上诉机构的论述都显示了世贸组织对区域贸易安排越来越多的关注,但现有的制度仍有一些不足,文章从对规则的分析入手,从区域贸易安排与世贸组织的关系定位、争端解决机制、区域贸易协定审查委员会的审查等方面对世贸组织框架下区域贸易安排的完善提出若干建议。     

The WTO Agreement on Safeguards: Improvement on the GATT Article XIX?

The Agreement on Safeguards is a revision of the GATT Article XIX, which provided the general rules on safeguards before 1995. The legal relationship between the GATT Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards was subjected to controversy in the recent WTO panel cases, Korea—Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products and Argentina—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear. The panels and the Appellate Body in those cases held that GATT Article XIX still applies to the extent that there is no express conflict with the Agreement on Safeguards. The appropriateness of this decision is questioned since the Agreement on Safeguards contains all the substantive and procedural requirements for the application of safeguard measure.     

Trade skirmishes safeguards: A theory of the WTO dispute settlement process

I propose a framework within which to interpret and evaluate the major reforms introduced to the GATT system in its transition to the WTO. In particular, I examine the WTO Agreement on Safeguards that has amended the GATT escape clause (Article XIX), and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) that resembles a court of law under the WTO. Using this framework, I interpret the weakening of the reciprocity principle under the Agreement on Safeguards as an attempt to reduce efficiency-reducing trade skirmishes. The DSB is interpreted as an impartial arbitrator that announces its opinion about the state of the world when a dispute arises among member countries. I demonstrate that the reforms in the GATT escape clause should be bundled with the introduction of the DSB, in order to maintain the incentive compatibility of trade agreements. The model implies that trade agreements under the WTO lead to fewer trade skirmishes but this effect does not necessarily result in higher payoffs to the governments. The model also implies that the introduction of the WTO court, which has no enforcement power, can improve the self-enforceability of trade agreements.     

Global Market Integration and National Sovereignty

In this paper, we first trace the evolution of the global trading system from the nineteenth century to the present‐day GATT/WTO arrangements, calling attention to the key roles of reciprocity and non‐discrimination, and we note how the system is now challenged by the new paradigm of global market integration. We then consider the recent plethora of free trade agreements (FTAs), including those between industrial and developing countries, and their uneasy relationship with a multilateral system based on non‐discrimination. Thereafter, we seek to identify the boundaries of the WTO and examine how the potential expansion of these boundaries may result in the over‐extension and weakening of the effectiveness and influence of the WTO.     

The WTO Compatibility of the Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and the ACP Countries

The economic partnership agreements (EPAs) to be negotiated between the European Union and six different ACP regions under the Cotonou Agreement are intended to be in conformity with WTO rules, i.e. satisfy GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V. To what extent is this realistic? What would be the effects on the ACP countries?

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This article summarises the following study: A. Borrmann, H. Gro?mann, and G. Koopmann: The WTO Compatibility of the Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the ACP States, Study on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, Eschborn 2005, http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/enwto-epa-acp-2005.pdf.