Bank liquidity regulation and the lender of last resort

Banks can make suboptimal liquidity choices and gamble for lender of last resort (LOLR) support. Endogenous bailout rents are driven by the need to preserve bankers' incentives under uncertain net worth. In equilibrium, banks can herd in risk management, choosing suboptimal liquidity when they expect others to do so. Optimal liquidity can be restored by quantitative requirements, but such regulation is costly. An LOLR policy incorporating bank capital information can reduce distorting rents and allow for a more efficient solution, but may only be possible in transparent economies.     

Can banks default overnight? Modelling endogenous contagion on the O/N interbank market

We propose a new model of the liquidity-driven banking system focusing on overnight interbank loans. This significant branch of the interbank market is commonly neglected in the banking system modelling and systemic risk analysis. We construct a model where banks are allowed to use both the interbank and the securities markets to manage their liquidity demand and supply as driven by prudential requirements in a volatile environment. The network of interbank loans is dynamic and simulated every day. We show how the intrasystem cash fluctuations alone, without any external shocks, may lead to systemic defaults, and what may be a symptom of the self-organized criticality of the system. We also analyze the impact of different prudential regulations and market conditions on the interbank market resilience. We confirm that the central bank’s asset purchase programmes, limiting the declines in government bond prices, can successfully stabilize banks’ liquidity demands. The model can be used to analyze the interbank market impact of macroprudential tools.     

Bank regulatory capital and liquidity: Evidence from US and European publicly traded banks

The theory of financial intermediation highlights various channels through which capital and liquidity are interrelated. Using a simultaneous equations framework, we investigate the relationship between bank regulatory capital and bank liquidity measured from on-balance sheet positions for European and US publicly traded commercial banks. Previous research studying the determinants of bank capital buffer has neglected the role of liquidity. On the whole, we find that banks decrease their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity as defined in the Basel III accords or when they create more liquidity as measured by Berger and Bouwman (2009). However, considering other measures of illiquidity that focus more closely on core deposits in the United States, our results show that small banks strengthen their solvency standards when they are exposed to higher illiquidity. Our empirical investigation supports the need to implement minimum liquidity ratios concomitant to capital ratios, as stressed by the Basel Committee; however, our findings also shed light on the need to further clarify how to define and measure illiquidity and also on how to regulate large banking institutions, which behave differently than smaller ones.     

Optimal Dynamic Capital Requirements

We characterize welfare maximizing capital requirement policies in a quantitative macrobanking model with household, firm, and bank defaults calibrated to Euro Area data. We optimize on the level of the capital requirements applied to each loan class and their sensitivity to changes in default risk. We find that getting the level right (so that bank failure risk remains contained) is of foremost importance, while the optimal sensitivity to default risk is positive but typically smaller than under Basel internal ratings based (IRB) formulas. Starting from low levels, savers and borrowers benefit from higher capital requirements. At higher levels, only savers prefer tighter requirements.     

The joint determinants of cash holdings and debt maturity: the case for financial constraints

We examine the joint choices of cash holdings and debt maturity for a large sample of firms for the 1985–2013 period. We find that there is a positive relation between debt maturity and cash holdings. Our results hold after taking into account endogeneity among leverage, debt maturity, and cash holding. We posit that this positive relationship will be found among firms facing financial constraints and we find support for this hypothesis. Our results are robust after we control for agency problems, international taxation, bank loan liquidity covenants and default risk.     

Delayed Expected Loss Recognition and the Risk Profile of Banks

This paper investigates the extent to which delayed expected loan loss recognition (DELR) is associated with greater vulnerability of banks to three distinct dimensions of risk: (1) stock market liquidity risk, (2) downside tail risk of individual banks, and (3) codependence of downside tail risk among banks. We hypothesize that DELR increases vulnerability to downside risk by creating expected loss overhangs that threaten future capital adequacy and by degrading bank transparency, which increases financing frictions and opportunities for risk‐shifting. We find that DELR is associated with higher correlations between bank‐level illiquidity and both aggregate banking sector illiquidity and market returns (i.e., higher liquidity risks) during recessions, suggesting that high DELR banks as a group may simultaneously face elevated financing frictions and enhanced opportunities for risk‐shifting behavior in crisis periods. With respect to downside risk, we find that during recessions DELR is associated with significantly higher risk of individual banks suffering severe drops in their equity values, where this association is magnified for banks with low capital levels. Consistent with increased systemic risk, we find that DELR is associated with significantly higher codependence between downside risk of individual banks and downside risk of the banking sector. We theorize that downside risk vulnerability at the individual bank level can translate into systemic risk by virtue of DELR creating a common source of risk vulnerability across high DELR banks simultaneously, which leads to risk codependence among banks and systemic effects from banks acting as part of a herd.     

Laying off credit risk: Loan sales versus credit default swaps

How do markets for debt cash flow rights, with and without accompanying control rights, affect the efficiency of lending? A bank makes a loan, learns if it needs monitoring, and then decides whether to lay off credit risk. The bank can transfer credit risk by either selling the loan or buying a credit default swap (CDS). With a CDS, the originating bank retains the loan's control rights; with loan sales, control rights pass to the loan buyer. Credit risk transfer leads to excessive monitoring of riskier credits and insufficient monitoring of safer credits. Increases in banks' cost of equity capital exacerbate these effects. For riskier credits, loan sales typically dominate CDS but not for safer credits. Once repeated lending and consequent reputation concerns are modeled, although CDSs remain dominated by loan sales for riskier credits, for safer credits they can dominate loan sales, supporting better monitoring (albeit to a limited extent) while allowing efficient risk sharing. Restrictions on the bank's ability to sell the loan expand the range in which CDSs are used and monitoring is too low.     

Limited liability and bank safety net procedures ∗

A model is presented of bank behaviour which identifies the factors determining a bank's optimal capital/asset ratio, its optimal liquidity ratio, the expected value of non-performing loans and the probability of bank failure. We propose that this last variable can act as an index of bank credit-worthiness. The main factors determining this index are (i) the risk associated with bank asset returns, (ii) the variability of bank deposits, (iii) the costs associated with bank failure and (iv) the implicit or explicit government subsidy involved in depositor protection schemes. The principal general conclusion of the paper is that regulations governing capital requirements, liquidity requirements and depositor protection should be (a) risk related and (b) integrated. Depositor protection can be improved through relatively high capital requirements. However, the optimal strategy is for all bank safety net procedures and incentive mechanisms to be related to the riskiness of individual bank portfolios.     

Liquidity creation,regulatory capital,and bank profitability

We examine the interrelationships among liquidity creation, regulatory capital, and bank profitability of US banks. We find that regulatory capital and liquidity creation affect each other positively after controlling for bank profitability. However, this relationship is largely driven by small banks and primarily during non-crisis periods. It is also sensitive to the level of banks' regulatory capital and how it is measured. Furthermore, we find that banks which create more liquidity and exhibit higher illiquidity risk have lower profitability. Finally, the relationship between regulatory capital and bank performance is not linear and depends on the level of capitalization. Regulatory capital is negatively related to bank profitability for higher capitalized banks but positively related to profitability for lower capitalized banks. Therefore, a change in regulatory capital has differential impacts on bank performance. Our findings have various implications for policymakers and bank regulators.     

Large EU banks’ capital and liquidity: Relationship and impact on credit default swap spreads

This paper explores the interrelations between bank capital and liquidity and their impact on the market probability of default. We employ an unbalanced panel of large European banks with listed credit default swap (CDS) contracts during the period 2005–2015, which allow us to consider the impact of the recent financial crisis. Our evidence suggests that bank capital and funding liquidity risk as defined in Basel III have an economically meaningful bidirectional relationship. However, the effect on CDS spread is ambiguous. While capital appears to have a relatively large impact on CDS spread changes, liquidity risk is priced only when it falls below the regulatory threshold.     

Implications of bank regulation for loan supply and bank stability: a dynamic perspective

ABSTRACT

We show that internal funds play a particular role in the regulation of bank capital, which has not received much attention, yet. A bank's decision on loan supply and capital structure determines its immediate bankruptcy risk as well as the future availability of internal funds. These internal funds in turn determine a bank's future costs of external finance and its future vulnerability to bankruptcy risks. Using a partial equilibrium model, we study how internal funds affect these intra- and intertemporal links. Moreover, our positive analysis identifies the effects of risk-weighted capital-to-asset ratios, liquidity coverage ratios and regulatory margin calls on the dynamics of internal funds and thus loan supply and bank stability. Only regulatory margin calls or large liquidity coverage ratios achieve bank stability for all risk levels, but for large risks a bank will stop credit intermediation.     

Credit risk spillovers and cash holdings

This paper examines how credit risk spillovers affect corporate financial flexibility. We construct separate empirical proxies to disentangle the two channels of credit risk spillovers—credit risk contagion (CRC), where one firm's default increases the distress likelihood of another; and product market rivalry (PMR), where the same default strengthens the position of a competitor. We show that firms facing greater CRC have weaker subsequent operating performance and must contend with less favorable bank loan terms. Meanwhile, they accumulate more cash by issuing equity, selling assets, and reducing investment and payout. In contrast, PMR generally has opposite, albeit weaker, effects. Our findings suggest that credit risk spillovers, especially CRC, play an important role in corporate liquidity management.     

Countercyclical prudential buffers and bank risk-taking

We investigate the effects of countercyclical prudential buffers on bank risk-taking. We exploit the introduction of dynamic loan loss provisioning in Spain, mandating that banks use historical average loss rates in their estimation of loan loss provisions. We find that dynamic loan loss provisioning is associated with reductions in timely loan loss provisioning. Banks that previously recognized loan losses in a timely fashion exhibit the greatest reductions in timeliness and consequently extend loans to riskier borrowers with lower accounting quality. Our results have policy implications for the debate on the use of financial reporting requirements in mitigating capital pro-cyclicality.     

Credit line takedown and endogenous bank capital

This paper investigates the implications of the uncertain timing and usage of loan commitments for the optimal level of bank capital. We use trended Brownian motion to proxy the stochastic takedown of credit lines. Relying on “time to first passage” mathematics, we derive a probability density function for the time to depletion of the bank credit line as well as the likelihood for the time to exhausting the sources of liquidity that fund the loan takedown. Armed with these analytical results, we solve for the optimal level of bank capital within a simultaneous equation framework in order to capture the interrelationships of the endogenous variables. The optimality conditions produce a system of integral differential equations which refuse to yield reduced form solutions and provide no immediate intuition. Therefore, the maximizing values of the bank’s decision variables were simulated over a host of realistic scenarios. We document the comparative static behavior of the bank’s decision variables when equity is unencumbered by capital requirements and, also, examine the impact of the same parametric changes on bank behavior when equity is a fixed proportion of lending. Further simulations produce the expected time to liquidity depletion under different capital requirement schemes.     

Financial frictions and real implications of macroprudential policies

I model a number of imperfections in financial intermediation that have implications for real economic activity in a production economy with technological risk. Partially opaque firms are financed by both debt and insider equity. Banks have market power over borrowers. There can be a prior bias in public beliefs about aggregate productivity (business sentiment). I investigate the dependence of equilibrium on the biased business sentiment and a prudential policy instrument (a convex dependence of bank capital requirements on the quantity of uncollateralized credit). Loss given default can be reduced by both a monetary restriction and a macroprudential restriction. Real implications of both are very similar in the aggregate, but macroprudential policies are more advantageous for bank earnings. On the other hand, the policies considered here are unable to reduce the number of defaulting firms (default frequency). Economic activity is highly sensitive to ??leaning against the wind?? actions on both fronts, so that using a macroprudential instrument to intervene against an asset price bubble has tangible welfare costs comparable to those of a monetary restriction. The costs can be offset by fine tuning capital charges as a function of corporate governance on the borrower side (specifically, by discouraging limited liability of borrowing firm managers).     

Liquidity and Credit Risk

We develop a structural bond valuation model to simultaneously capture liquidity and credit risk. Our model implies that renegotiation in financial distress is influenced by the illiquidity of the market for distressed debt. As default becomes more likely, the components of bond yield spreads attributable to illiquidity increase. When we consider finite maturity debt, we find decreasing and convex term structures of liquidity spreads. Using bond price data spanning 15 years, we find evidence of a positive correlation between the illiquidity and default components of yield spreads as well as support for downward‐sloping term structures of liquidity spreads.     

Pricing of time-varying liquidity risk in Finnish stock market: new evidence

Using two recently developed illiquidity measures, we estimate a conditional version of liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model (LCAPM), which allows for a time-varying decomposition of the total illiquidity premium into a level component and three risk components. The total estimated annualized illiquidity premium for the Finnish equities during 1997–2015 is 1.13–1.90% depending on the illiquidity measure. Of the three systematic liquidity risk components, risk arising from hedging of wealth shocks is the most important followed by commonality in liquidity risk, whereas flight to liquidity risk is not significantly priced in the Finnish stock market. Our results show that the liquidity risk is time varying, therefore the models estimating the risk-return relationship should address the issue of conditionality.     

Interbank contagion and resolution procedures: inspecting the mechanism

This paper develops a network model of a stylized banking system in which banks are connected to one another through interbank claims, which allows us to study the diffusion of default avalanches triggered by an exogenous shock under a number of different assumptions on the degree of interconnectedness, level of capitalization, liquidity buffers, the size of the interbank market and fire-sales. We expand upon the existing literature by comparing two alternative resolution mechanisms: (i) liquidations triggered by either illiquidity or insolvency-related distress implying asset sales and compensation of creditors; and (ii) a bail-in mechanism avoiding bank closure by forcing a recapitalization provided by bank creditors. Our model speaks to how contagion dynamics unravel via illiquidity-driven defaults in the first case and higher-order losses in the latter one. Within this framework, we show how the liquidity risk externality can be resolved, and we put forward a macro-criterion to assess the adequacy of the liquidity ratio introduced with Basel III.     

Implications of Debt Renegotiation for Optimal Bank Policy and Firm Behavior

This paper analyzes the problems associated with the renegotiation of debt contracts involving a bank (the lender) and a firm (the borrower) when the latter is operated by a risk averse manager. Firms undertake risky projects with loan capital borrowed from the bank. When a firm cannot pay off a loan it is technically bankrupt. Both the borrower and the lender may however experience a Pareto-improvement in their positions by renegotiating the loan. By renegotiating the terms of the debt the financially distressed firm can avoid the stigmatization of bankruptcy and the bank can avoid the costs of seizing the borrower's assets. However, our main finding is that, from the bank's point of view, renegotiating as a policy of recovering loan payments may be inefficient in practice because of false bankruptcy claims and moral hazard problems associated with exposure of the borrowing firm to the risk of default. We present a solution to the false bankruptcy claim problem that involves a mixe d strategy between asset seizure by the bank and debt renegotiation.     

Self‐Fulfilling Liquidity Dry‐Ups

I analyze a model in which holding cash imposes a negative externality: it worsens future adverse selection in markets for long‐term assets, which impairs their role for liquidity provision. Adverse selection worsens when potential sellers of long‐term assets hold more cash because then fewer sales reflect cash needs, and proportionally more sales reflect private information. Moreover, future market illiquidity makes current cash holding more appealing. This feedback effect may result in hoarding behavior and a market breakdown, which I interpret as a self‐fulfilling liquidity dry‐up. This mechanism suggests that imposing liquidity requirements on financial institutions may backfire.