Should bank capital regulation be risk sensitive?

We present a screening model of the risk sensitivity of bank capital regulation. A banker funds a project with uninsured deposits and costly capital. Capital resolves a moral hazard problem in the choice of the probability of default (PD). The project’s loss given default (LGD) is the banker’s private information. The regulator receives a noisy signal about the LGD and imposes a minimum capital requirement. We show that the optimal sensitivity of capital regulation is non-monotonic in the accuracy of risk assessment. If the signal is inaccurate, the regulator should use risk-insensitive capital requirements. Given sufficient accuracy, the regulator should separate types via risk-sensitive capital requirements, reducing the risk-sensitivity of bank capital as accuracy improves.     

Bank capital buffer and portfolio risk: The influence of business cycle and revenue diversification

The relationship between macroeconomic developments and bank capital buffer and portfolio risk adjustments is relevant to assess the efficacy of newly created countercyclical buffer requirements. Using the U.S. bank holding company data over the period 1992:Q1–2011:Q3, we find a negative relationship between the business cycle and capital buffer. Our results offer some support for the Basel III agreements that countercyclical capital buffer in the banking sector is necessary to help the performance of the real economy during recessions. We find a robust evidence of inverse relationship between business cycle and bank default risk. Our analysis provides evidence of diversification benefits. The probability of insolvency risk decreases for diversified banks and banks with high revenue diversity achieve capital savings.     

Efficiency and risk in European banking

We assess the inter-temporal relationship between bank efficiency, capital and risk in a sample of European commercial banks employing several definitions of efficiency, risk and capital and using the Granger-causality methodology in a panel data framework. Our results suggest that lower bank efficiency with respect to costs and revenues Granger-causes higher bank risk and that increases in bank capital precede cost efficiency improvements. We also find that more efficient banks eventually become better capitalized and that higher capital levels tend to have a positive effect on efficiency levels. These results are generally confirmed by a series of robustness tests. The results have potentially important implications for bank prudential supervision and underline the importance of attaining long-term efficiency gains to support financial stability objectives.     

Stress testing credit risk: The Great Depression scenario

By employing Moody’s corporate default and rating transition data spanning the last 90 years we explore how much capital banks should hold against their corporate loan portfolios to withstand historical stress scenarios. Specifically, we will focus on the worst case scenario over the observation period, the Great Depression. We find that migration risk and the length of the investment horizon are critical factors when determining bank capital needs in a crisis. We show that capital may need to rise more than three times when the horizon is increased from 1 year, as required by current and future regulation, to 3 years. Increases are still important but of a lower magnitude when migration risk is introduced in the analysis. Further, we find that the new bank capital requirements under the so-called Basel 3 agreement would enable banks to absorb Great Depression-style losses. But, such losses would dent regulatory capital considerably and far beyond the capital buffers that have been proposed to ensure that banks survive crisis periods without government support.     

EFFECT OF FED POLICY ACTIONS ON THE DEFAULT LIKELIHOOD OF COMMERCIAL BANKS

Using a measure of default likelihood based on an option pricing method, we provide evidence that Fed policy actions affect the financial distress of commercial banks. When the Fed increases (decreases) interest rates, the measure of default likelihood increases (decreases). We show that when the Fed uses a tight money policy, the increase in default likelihood is more pronounced for banks that have less capital, have greater financial leverage, are smaller, have fewer growth opportunities, and have lower asset quality. Additionally, the effects on bank default likelihood are more pronounced when the Fed's policy signals less concern about economic growth, as indicated by its bias toward further tightening, and when there is a market expectation of higher short‐term market rates in the future.     

Private equity and regulatory capital

Regulatory capital requirements for European banks have been put forward in the Basel II Capital Framework and subsequently in the capital requirements directive (CRD) of the EU. We provide a detailed discussion of the capital requirements for private equity investments under different approaches. For the internal model approach we present a structural model that we calibrate to a proprietary dataset. We modify the standard Merton structural model to make it applicable in practice and to capture stylized facts of private equity investments. We also implement the early default feature with a fast simulation algorithm. Our results support capital requirements lower than in Basel II, but not as low as in CRD, thereby giving adverse incentives to banks for using advanced risk models. A sensitivity analysis shows that this finding is robust to parameter uncertainty and stress scenarios.     

Improvements in loss given default forecasts for bank loans

An accurate forecast of the parameter loss given default (LGD) of loans plays a crucial role for risk-based decision making by banks. We theoretically analyze problems arising when forecasting LGDs of bank loans that lead to inconsistent estimates and a low predictive power. We present several improvements for LGD estimates, considering length-biased sampling, different loan characteristics depending on the type of default end, and different information sets according to the default status. We empirically demonstrate the capability of our proposals based on a data set of 69,985 defaulted bank loans. Our results are not only important for banks, but also for regulators, because neglecting these issues leads to a significant underestimation of capital requirements.     

Foreign bank subsidiaries' default risk during the global crisis: What factors help insulate affiliates from their parents?

This paper examines the association between the default risk of foreign bank subsidiaries in developing countries and their parents during the global financial crisis, with the purpose of determining the size and sign of this correlation and, more importantly, understanding what factors can help insulate affiliates from their parents. We find evidence of a significant and robust positive correlation between parent banks’ and foreign subsidiaries’ default risk. This correlation is lower for subsidiaries that have a higher share of retail deposit funding and that are more independently managed from their parents. Host country bank regulations are also associated with the extent to which shocks to the parents affect the subsidiaries’ default risk. In particular, the correlation between the default risk of subsidiaries and their parents is lower for subsidiaries operating in countries that impose higher capital, reserve, provisioning, and disclosure requirements, and tougher restrictions on bank activities.     

Time‐Varying Capital Requirements and Disclosure Rules: Effects on Capitalization and Lending Decisions

We investigate how banks’ capital and lending decisions respond to changes in bank‐specific capital and disclosure requirements. We find that an increase in the bank‐specific regulatory capital requirement results in a higher bank capital ratio, brought about via less asset risk. A decrease in the requirement implies more lending to firms but also less Tier 1 capital and higher bank leverage. We do not observe differences between confidential and public disclosure of capital requirements. Our results empirically illustrate a tradeoff between bank resilience and a fostering of the economy through more bank lending using banks’ capital requirement as policy instrument.     

A practical approach to validating a PD model

The capital adequacy framework Basel II aims to promote the adoption of stronger risk management practices by the banking industry. The implementation makes validation of credit risk models more important. Lenders therefore need a validation methodology to convince their supervisors that their credit scoring models are performing well. In this paper we take up the challenge to propose and implement a simple validation methodology that can be used by banks to validate their credit risk modelling exercise. We will contextualise the proposed methodology by applying it to a default model of mortgage loans of a commercial bank in the Netherlands.     

What makes a bank risky? Insights from the optimal capital structure of banks

Assessing the risk of bank failures is the paramount concern of bank regulation. This paper argues that in order to assess the default risk of a bank, it is important to consider its financing decisions as an endogenous dynamic process. We provide a continuous-time model, where banks choose the deposit volume in order to trade off the benefits of earning deposit premiums against the costs that occur at future capital structure adjustments. The bank’s asset value may suffer from shocks and follows a jump-diffusion process.     

Examining the Relationships between Capital,Risk and Efficiency in European Banking

This paper analyses the relationship between capital, risk and efficiency for a large sample of European banks between 1992 and 2000. In contrast to the established US evidence we do not find a positive relationship between inefficiency and bank risk‐taking. Inefficient European banks appear to hold more capital and take on less risk. Empirical evidence is found showing the positive relationship between risk on the level of capital (and liquidity), possibly indicating regulators' preference for capital as a mean of restricting risk‐taking activities. We also find evidence that the financial strength of the corporate sector has a positive influence in reducing bank risk‐taking and capital levels. There are no major differences in the relationships between capital, risk and efficiency for commercial and savings banks although there are for co‐operative banks. In the case of co‐operative banks we do find that capital levels are inversely related to risks and we find that inefficient banks hold lower levels of capital. Some of these relationships also vary depending on whether banks are among the most or least efficient operators.     

Getting the Right Mix of Capital and Cash Requirements in Prudential Bank Regulation*

Cash reserve requirements are useful as a broadly conceived prudential tool, not just as a narrowly focused means of limiting the risks associated with illiquidity. Indeed, illiquidity risk is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for establishing bank liquidity requirements. The primary means of mitigating the systemic costs of bank illiquidity risk is the creation of an effective lender of last resort (LOLR). But instead of focusing narrowly on bank funding risks when designing liquidity requirements, regulators should consider tradeoffs among capital requirements, liquidity requirements, and LOLR policies for achieving the broader prudential goal of limiting bank default risk. When considering the optimal tradeoff between capital ratios and cash ratios as prudential requirements, five “frictions” are identified that favor the use of one or the other: (1) the adverse‐selection costs of raising equity (which favors the use of cash); (2) the opportunity cost of forgone abnormal profits (or “quasi rents”) from lending (which favors the use of capital); (3) the limited verifiability of loan outcomes (which favors the use of cash); (4) the moral hazard that results from costly or postponed loss recognition, given the incentive for risk shifting in bad states (which favors the use of cash); and (5) the prospect of changes in the risk environment (which favors cash since it creates greater option value for maintaining targeted default risk with lower adjustment costs in the face of changing loan risk or illiquidity risk). When viewed from the perspective of achieving the main prudential goal of controlling default risk at a minimum social cost, capital requirements have some limitations that favor liquidity requirements, and vice versa. And thus the optimal regulatory policy will combine liquidity and capital requirements.     

Limited liability and bank safety net procedures ∗

A model is presented of bank behaviour which identifies the factors determining a bank's optimal capital/asset ratio, its optimal liquidity ratio, the expected value of non-performing loans and the probability of bank failure. We propose that this last variable can act as an index of bank credit-worthiness. The main factors determining this index are (i) the risk associated with bank asset returns, (ii) the variability of bank deposits, (iii) the costs associated with bank failure and (iv) the implicit or explicit government subsidy involved in depositor protection schemes. The principal general conclusion of the paper is that regulations governing capital requirements, liquidity requirements and depositor protection should be (a) risk related and (b) integrated. Depositor protection can be improved through relatively high capital requirements. However, the optimal strategy is for all bank safety net procedures and incentive mechanisms to be related to the riskiness of individual bank portfolios.     

Safer ratios,riskier portfolios: Banks׳ response to government aid

Using novel data on bank applications to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), we study the effect of government assistance on bank risk taking. Bailed-out banks initiate riskier loans and shift assets toward riskier securities after receiving government support. However, this shift in risk occurs mostly within the same asset class and, therefore, remains undetected by regulatory capital ratios, which indicate improved capitalization at bailed-out banks. Consequently, these banks appear safer according to regulatory ratios, but show an increase in volatility and default risk. These findings are robust to controlling for credit demand and account for selection of TARP recipients by exploiting banks? geography-based political connections as an instrument for bailout approvals.     

How Accurately Can Z‐score Predict Bank Failure?

Bank risk is not directly observable, so empirical research relies on indirect measures. We evaluate how well Z‐score, the widely used accounting‐based measure of bank distance to default, can predict bank failure. Using the U.S. commercial banks’ data from 2004 to 2012, we find that on average, Z‐score can predict 76% of bank failure, and additional set of other bank‐ and macro‐level variables do not increase this predictability level. We also find that the prediction power of Z‐score to predict bank default remains stable within the three‐year forward window.     

CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions

We analyze how the structure of executive compensation affects the risk choices made by bank CEOs. For a sample of acquiring U.S. banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that CEOs with higher pay-risk sensitivity engage in risk-inducing mergers. Our findings are driven by two types of acquisitions: acquisitions completed during the last decade (after bank deregulation had expanded banks' risk-taking opportunities) and acquisitions completed by the largest banks in our sample (where shareholders benefit from ‘too big to fail’ support by regulators and gain most from shifting risk to other stakeholders). Our results control for CEO pay-performance sensitivity and offer evidence consistent with a causal link between financial stability and the risk-taking incentives embedded in the executive compensation contracts at banks.     

Large EU banks’ capital and liquidity: Relationship and impact on credit default swap spreads

This paper explores the interrelations between bank capital and liquidity and their impact on the market probability of default. We employ an unbalanced panel of large European banks with listed credit default swap (CDS) contracts during the period 2005–2015, which allow us to consider the impact of the recent financial crisis. Our evidence suggests that bank capital and funding liquidity risk as defined in Basel III have an economically meaningful bidirectional relationship. However, the effect on CDS spread is ambiguous. While capital appears to have a relatively large impact on CDS spread changes, liquidity risk is priced only when it falls below the regulatory threshold.     

Bank/sovereign risk spillovers in the European debt crisis

This paper investigates contagion between bank and sovereign default risk in Europe over the period 2007–2012. We define contagion as excess correlation, i.e. correlation between banks and sovereigns over and above what is explained by common factors, using CDS spreads at the bank and at the sovereign level. Moreover, we investigate the determinants of contagion by analyzing bank-specific as well as country-specific variables and their interaction. Using the EBA’s disclosure of sovereign exposures of banks, we provide empirical evidence that three contagion channels are at work: a guarantee channel, an asset holdings channel and a collateral channel. We find that banks with a weak capital buffer, a weak funding structure and less traditional banking activities are particularly vulnerable to risk spillovers. At the country level, the debt ratio is the most important driver of contagion. Furthermore, the impact of government interventions on contagion depends on the type of intervention, with outright capital injections being the most effective measure in reducing spillover intensity.     

Banking Competition and Capital Ratios

Empirical studies provide evidence that bank capital ratios exceed regulatory requirements. But why do banks maintain capital levels above regulatory requirements? We use data for more than 2,600 banks from 10 European countries to test recent theories suggesting that competition incentivises banks to maintain higher capital ratios. These theories also predict that banks that engage in arm's length lending have lower capital ratios, and that shareholder rights and deposit insurance characteristics affect capital ratios. Consistent with these theories, our evidence robustly indicates that competition increases capital holdings. Banks that lend at arm's length exhibit lower capital ratios, whereas banks in countries with strong shareholder rights operate with higher capital ratios. We also show some evidence that generous deposit protection schemes that exclude non‐deposit creditors are associated with higher capital ratios. Our results have important policy implications. First, while the traditional view suggests imposing restrictions on bank activities in order to restrain competition, our analysis indicates the opposite, even after adjusting the regressions for risk‐taking. Second, weak shareholder rights undermine market forces that would otherwise encourage banks to hold higher capital ratios.