Labor market reforms, job instability, and the flexibility of the employment relationship

We endogenize separation in a search model of the labor market and allow for bargaining over the continuation of employment relationships following productivity shocks to take place under asymmetric information. In such a setting separation may occur even if continuation of the employment relationship is privately efficient for workers and firms. We show that reductions in the cost of separation, owing for example to a reduction in firing taxes, lead to an increase in job instability and, when separation costs are initially high, may be welfare decreasing for workers and firms. We furthermore show that, in response to an exogenous reduction in firing taxes, workers and firms may switch from rigid to flexible employment contracts, which further amplifies the increase in job instability caused by policy reform.     

Industrial Policy and Firm Heterogeneity

Our concern in this paper is with firm-specific industrial policy. When R&D subsidies or taxes are differentiated among firms, the question arises as to which firms in an industry should receive such support. We analyze a situation where firms differ in their R&D technologies in two distinct ways: in the costs of performing R&D activities and in the output obtained from such activities. We find that the optimal firm-specific industrial policy is affected differently by the two sources of firm heterogeneity. Furthermore, a change in a firm's R&D productivity has an ambiguous effect on the optimal policy towards the firm.
JEL classification: O 31; L 52; F 13     

Bank Mergers, Information, Default and the Price of Credit

This paper addresses the impact of bank mergers on the price of firm credit, through an information channel. It is shown that, as bank mergers imply a wider spreading of information among banks concerning firms' past defaults, they may increase the expected revenue from lending. Therefore, interest rates may decline as long as a sufficiently competitive environment is preserved. A fall in interest rates, in turn, reduces the incentives for firms to strategically default, which reinforces the downward effect on the price of credit. The results are a function of the level of information sharing and of the sensitivity of the default probability to the interest rate .     

Coming out of the shadows? Estimating the impact of bureaucracy simplification and tax cut on formality in Brazilian microenterprises

This paper evaluates the impact of a program of bureaucracy simplification and tax reduction on formality among Brazilian microenterprises — the SIMPLES program. We document an increase of 13 percentage points in formal licensing among retail firms created after the program when compared to firms in ineligible sectors. The impact on retailers is robust to a series of tests. We find no impact on construction, transportation, services and manufacturing sectors.     

Who benefits from bilateral information exchange in a retail channel?

Retailers and their suppliers often exchange demand information, which is believed to benefit both firms and consumers. We show how such information exchange can benefit only the upstream supplier at the expense of the downstream retailer and consumers.     

The effectiveness of R&D subsidies

In this paper, the effectiveness of R&D subsidies is analyzed in an oligopolistic model that we apply to the cases of international R&D competition and cooperation. We find that the existence of asymmetric information among firms on whether a rival (or partner) is being subsidized or not may play a key role in explaining whether subsidies are effective or not in increasing R&D investments. In particular, it is shown that if the existence of the subsidy is made public (e.g. because strict information release regulation about R&D subsidies is enforced) and depending on the strategic relationship between the firms’ R&D efforts, an R&D subsidy could even hurt the subsidized firm.     

Selling options

Contracts often take the form of options: oil fields can be abandoned, planning permission may go unused, and acquired firms can be liquidated. We consider a seller who auctions a dynamic option among N agents. After the auction, the economy evolves and the winning bidder chooses both if and when to execute the option. The revenue-maximising auction consists of an up-front bid and a contingent fee, where the latter is chosen in a Pigouvian manner, so the winning agent's choice of exercise time maximises the seller's revenue. This contingent payment is time- and state-invariant, so the seller does not have to observe post-auction information in order to implement the optimal auction. The revenue-maximising mechanism induces a dynamic distortion: the option is exercised later than under the comparable welfare-maximising mechanism.     

Horizontal Mergers Under Asymmetric Information About Synergies

This paper analyses a situation in which there are three quantity‐setting firms, two of which are considering whether or not to merge. When these two firms have private information about the potential cost‐saving synergies of the merger, they may have an incentive to overstate them. This is because if they succeed in making the non‐merging rival firm believe that the synergies are high, the rival firm reduces output and the merger becomes more profitable. Under some conditions, anticipating that the rival will form such a belief, low‐synergy firms that would never merge under complete information will mimic high‐synergy firms by merging. Such pooling behaviour by the merging firms can have a negative impact on social welfare.     

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative R&D incentives under incomplete information

This paper studies incentives for cooperative research vis-à-vis non-cooperative research in an incomplete information framework. We show that with quantity competition under asymmetric information, the expected payoff from non-cooperative research goes down compared to the case of symmetric information; hence research joint venture incentives of the firms are larger under asymmetric information. In either case, however, the larger is the size of the cost-reducing innovation the lower is the incentive for cooperative research. Finally, in our model, incomplete information does not affect the consumers' welfare, but the firms become worse off.     

Collective vs. individual lobbying

This paper presents a menu-auction model in which firms lobby the government to make an environmental regulation less burdensome. In this lobbying game, industrial interests are opposed by an environmental interest group. We compare political outcomes under two institutional arrangements. In the first, firms must join an organization that represents the interests of the industry. In the second, firms would lobby the government individually. The two arrangements result in strikingly different equilibrium outcomes. Only a small fraction of firms join the lobby group under collective lobbying, but all firms participate in lobbying activities when there is no such group. Thus, an attempt by firms to solve the apparent collective action problem through coordination would effectively backfire. The reason is that coordination among firms would increase the leverage available to the government, to demand high political contributions. We also evaluate the desirability of the two lobbying regimes from the private perspective of individual firms, and from the perspective of society as a whole. This permits us to evaluate possible restrictions on lobbying activities.     

Core equivalence theorem with production

In production economies, the extent to which non-equilibria are blocked depends on the allocation of control rights among shareholders, because a blocking coalition's resources are affected by the firms it jointly owns with outsiders. We formulate a notion of blocking that takes such interdependency problem into account, and we prove an analog of the Debreu-Scarf theorem for replica production economies. Our theorem differs from theirs in using an additional assumption, which we argue is indispensable and is driven by the interdependency problem.     

Learning about compliance under asymmetric information

Over time, inspection agencies gather information about firms’ pollution levels and this information may allow agencies to differentiate their monitoring strategies in the future. If a firm is less successful than its peers in reducing emissions, it faces the risk of being targeted for increased inspections in the next period. This risk of stricter monitoring might induce high-abatement cost firms to mimic low-abatement cost firms by choosing lower emission levels, while the latter might try to avoid being mimicked. We explain firms’ compliance decisions and the inspection agency's monitoring strategy by means of a signaling game which incorporates dynamic enforcement and learning. Interestingly, we show that the ongoing signaling game between firm types might lead to firms over-complying with the emission standard.     

Competitive experimentation with private information: The survivor's curse

We study a winner-take-all R&D race between two firms that are privately informed about the arrival rate of an invention. Over time, each firm only observes whether the opponent left the race or not. The equilibrium displays a strong herding effect, that we call a ‘survivor's curse.’ Unlike in the case of symmetric information, the two firms may quit the race (nearly) simultaneously even when their costs and benefits for research differ significantly.     

Employment growth and innovation at the firm level

We analyze the influence of innovation on growth rates of employment in 859 Dutch manufacturing firms over the period 1983–1988. Whereas the (growth of the) R&D intensity of firms has a slightly negative impact on employment, we find that firms with a high share of product-related R&D (as a proxi of R&D related to industrial activities in an early stage of the life cycle) experienced an above average growth of employment. The same holds for firms which directed their R&D towards information technology. Smaller firms have, ceteris paribus, substantially higher growth rates of employment than their larger counterparts. Against our expectations, R&D cooperation has no significant impact on employment growth. The same holds for activities in the fields of biotechnology and new materials.     

Buyer Subsidies in an Equilibrium Model of Price Dispersion

Abstract. We present a model of equilibrium price dispersion in which a per-unit subsidy to buyers can reduce average prices. The reason is that subsidies have two effects on average prices that work in opposite directions. First, subsidies raise buyers' willingness-to-pay, and by itself this causes firms to charge higher prices. However, since a higher willingness-to-pay lowers the relative cost of search, subsidies also induce more search. This creates a second effect that puts pressure on firms to reduce prices. We show that the second effect can dominate, thus causing an overall reduction in average price.     

Capturing the real value of patent analysis for R&D strategies

Patent information can be used for strategic planning purposes. Conventional patent analysis has commonly focused on factual information and, in particular, on information extraction, visualisation and interpretation. Less scholarly attention has been devoted to the strategic role of an integrated system of patent intelligence in supporting decision-making in R&D investments. Our paper addresses this gap and explores how patent analysis may benefit those firms that intend capturing the beneficial effects of Open Innovation. We also critically discuss the intrinsic limits of both patent information and patent analysis, which should be taken into account by systems of patent intelligence.     

Lack of commitment to future privatization policies may lead to worst welfare outcome

We investigate the welfare consequences of a lack of commitment to future privatization policies. The government implements a privatization policy after the competition structure is determined by the entry of private firms. We find that in an equilibrium, the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) a public firm if private firms expect that the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) the public firm. This is because an increase in the number of firms entering a market increases the government's incentive to privatize the public firm, which mitigates future competition and stimulates entries. The full-privatization equilibrium is the worst privatization policy among all possible (either equilibrium or non-equilibrium) privatization policies for welfare because it causes excessive market entry of private firms. Partial commitment of a minimal public ownership share may mitigate this problem.     

Heterogeneous producers facing common shocks: An overlapping-generations example

An analytically tractable model of a competitive, full-information economy is provided in which, for some parameter values, entry and exit over the course of the business cycle is concentrated among small firms. This model is intended to make the logical point that the relatively high sensitivity of small firms to business-cycle fluctuations does not necessarily indicate the presence of informational or incentive constraints in financial markets.     

Formula apportionment vs. separate accounting: A private information perspective

In 2002, the European Commission recommended that member countries use formula apportionment procedures to tax multinational companies. This departure from the standard separate accounting (transfer pricing) approach is an attempt to reduce the costs and distortions associated with auditing transfer prices. Unfortunately, apportionment formulas create their own economic distortions and, contrary to popular belief, they do not eliminate distortions due to asymmetric information between the multinational and the national tax authorities. In this paper, I explicitly model the role of private information in two tax competition games: one in which tax liabilities are calculated under formula apportionment and one in which tax liabilities are calculated under separate accounting and transfer prices are audited. Switching to a formula apportionment system affects the after-tax profit of multinationals and the tax revenues paid by both domestic and foreign firms. The direction and magnitude of the changes depend on the accuracy of the auditing technology and non-monotonically on multinational costs. The switch will have different effects on the tax receipts from domestic and foreign firms.     

Use Of Information Network And Organizational Productivity: Firm-Level Evidence In Korea

This paper studies the relationship between the use of various information networks and organizational productivity in Korean firms. To this end, first. the current firm-level usage panems of information networks are explained in the following network categories: (1) LAN (Local Area Network). (2) inter- and intra-firm networks, (3) various types of inter-firm networks, and (4) the Internet and intranet, Second, by deriving TFP (Total Factor Roductivity) from the baseline production function, which augments lT stock into otherwise standard one, the impact of various information networks is investigated. The results show that LAN, the Intemet and intranet have significant impacts on fm-level TFP, while inter-firm network does not. Also, the productivity of firm using the Internet is 8.5 percent higher than the firms using only LAN, and the productivity of firms using intranet is 43.6 percent higher than the firms using just the Internet.