A New Method to Measure the Performance of Leveraged Exchange‐Traded Funds

We examine the effects of daily return compounding, financing costs, and management factors on the performance of leveraged exchange‐traded funds (LETFs) over various holding periods. We propose a new method to measure LETFs’ tracking errors that allows us to disentangle these effects. Our results show that the compounding effect generally has more influence on tracking errors than other factors, especially for long holding periods and in a “sideways” market. The explicit costs (i.e., the expense ratios) and other factors (e.g., financing costs) can materially affect the performance of LETFs, especially for those with high leverage ratios and bear funds.     

Leverage causes fat tails and clustered volatility

We build a simple model of leveraged asset purchases with margin calls. Investment funds use what is perhaps the most basic financial strategy, called ‘value investing’, i.e. systematically attempting to buy underpriced assets. When funds do not borrow, the price fluctuations of the asset are approximately normally distributed and uncorrelated across time. This changes when the funds are allowed to leverage, i.e. borrow from a bank, which allows them to purchase more assets than their wealth would otherwise permit. During good times, funds that use more leverage have higher profits, increasing their wealth and making them dominant in the market. However, if a downward price fluctuation occurs while one or more funds is fully leveraged, the resulting margin call causes them to sell into an already falling market, amplifying the downward price movement. If the funds hold large positions in the asset, this can cause substantial losses. This in turn leads to clustered volatility: before a crash, when the value funds are dominant, they damp volatility, and after the crash, when they suffer severe losses, volatility is high. This leads to power-law tails, which are both due to the leverage-induced crashes and due to the clustered volatility induced by the wealth dynamics. This is in contrast to previous explanations of fat tails and clustered volatility, which depended on ‘irrational behavior’, such as trend following. A standard (supposedly more sophisticated) risk control policy in which individual banks base leverage limits on volatility causes leverage to rise during periods of low volatility, and to contract more quickly when volatility becomes high, making these extreme fluctuations even worse.     

隐性杠杆约束、流动性风险和投资者情绪

本文以2003—2019年间开放式主动管理型的股票型和偏股型基金为样本,以持仓占比为权重估算基金投组中A股的总市场风险暴露,检验结果表明,该序列上升反映了基金面临的隐性杠杆约束收紧,刻画了市场的弱流动性。内在逻辑在于,流动性收紧时,投资者难以通过融资直接增加杠杆,更倾向于重仓持有高市场风险头寸的股票而间接实现杠杆。本文发现隐性杠杆约束所刻画的风险在股票或基金收益截面上的无条件定价基本失效,而条件定价则依赖于低市场情绪与弱流动性。分解基金持股的敞口,进一步发现,因中小盘基金在流动性收紧时具有更强的流动性偏好,其持股的市场风险头寸能够更敏锐地捕捉到弱流动性风险。     

Leverage,executive incentives and corporate governance

This paper analyses the effect of executive incentives and internal governance on capital structure. Using a large sample of non‐financial US‐listed firms over the period 1999–2005, it is found that managers have different attitudes towards leverage when offered different incentive schemes; leverage initially decreases in bonuses and stock incentives and then increases in these incentives after a certain incentive level, suggesting the existence of the entrenchment–alignment effects under these incentive schemes. In contrast, leverage initially increases in option incentives and then decreases after a certain option incentive level. When all of these incentive schemes are combined together into a single incentive package, the entrenchment–alignment effects prevail. It is also found that leverage increases in internal governance and managers behave differently under different governance regimes such that the entrenchment–alignment effects prevail under weak governance firms, whereas the alignment–entrenchment effects prevail under strong governance firms. The results also suggest that managers’ target leverage ratio is less than the one predicted by theory or preferred by firm shareholders.     

Leverage constraints and asset prices: Insights from mutual fund risk taking

Prior theory suggests that time variation in the degree to which leverage constraints bind affects the pricing kernel. We propose a measure for this leverage constraint tightness by inverting the argument that constrained investors tilt their portfolios to riskier assets. We show that the average market beta of actively managed mutual funds—intermediaries facing leverage restrictions—captures their desire for leverage and thus the tightness of constraints. Consistent with theory, it strongly predicts returns of the betting-against-beta portfolio, and is a priced risk factor in the cross-section of mutual funds and stocks. Funds with low exposure to the factor outperform high-exposure funds by 5% annually, and for stocks this difference reaches 7%. Our results show that the tightness of leverage constraints has important implications for asset prices.     

Valuation Relevance of Allowance for Funds Used During Construction and Operating Income: The Effects of Regulatory Climates and Deregulation

This study considers the valuation relevance allowance for funds used during construction (AFUDC), operating income (OI), and their innovations across regulatory climates and regulatory reforms. Valuation relevance is assessed by examining the coefficients and R ²s from the regressions of returns on AFUDC, OI, and their innovations. Regulatory climate is predicted to affect valuation relevance of earnings components on the premise that different regulatory regimes enact and enforce policies that differently affect (1) the uncertainty of future earnings, (2) the recovery of deferred assets, and (3) the sustainability of earnings innovations. In an extended analysis, indicators of rate-base valuation method and leverage are added as control variables to isolate their mediating effects on returns for electric utilities. Additional analysis considers the effects of the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 1992 on the valuation of earnings components. The results reveal that AFUDC and OI are valued differently relative to each other and across regulatory climates. The results also show a significant decline in the explanatory power of earnings components after the passage of the EPAct in 1992. Rate-base valuation method has no discernible effects on returns for the utilities. On the other hand, the effect of leverage on returns for the utilities is reliably negative.     

基于资金循环流动视角的结构性杠杆与金融脆弱性——理论框架与中国实践

基于资金循环视角,从杠杆率定义推导出资产收益率是连接微观杠杆率与宏观杠杆率的纽带,进而从理论上论证我国经济部门结构性微观杠杆率差异在于各部门之间的资产收益率的差异。依据该理论考察我国现实杠杆率结构,结果发现:当前我国一些部门与行业的现实杠杆率与理论分析相悖,造成了资金的错配,严重冲击了我国金融体系的稳定性,加大了我国金融体系的脆弱性。因此,在保稳定、防风险政策实施过程中要精准识别不同部门、不同领域杠杆率的性质,科学施策,避免“一刀切”的金融去杠杆。     

On the determinants of SME capital structure in Central and Eastern Europe: A dynamic panel analysis

The purpose of this paper is to test how firm characteristics affect SMEs’ capital structure using a unique dataset of micro, small, and medium-sized firms (SMEs) in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). We carry out a panel data analysis of 3175 SMEs from seven CEE countries during the period 2001–2005, modeling the leverage ratio as a function of firm specific characteristics hypothesized by capital structure theory. By using the cash flow as an explanatory variable, we test some of the predictions of the pecking order theory. According to this theory, firms with more available internal funds should use less external funding. We do find strong evidence in favor of the pecking order theory, given that there is a negative and significant correlation between profitability and leverage. When we control for other firm specific characteristics such as future growth opportunities, liquidity, sales growth, size and assets structure, the cash flow is found to be a strong determinant of firm leverage. We also argue that the determinants of firm leverage may be considerably different depending on firms’ size and age. The empirical results show that cash flow coefficient remains negative and statistically significant only for medium-sized firms, thus suggesting that larger firms with sufficient internal funds use less external funding than comparable smaller firms. We obtain similar results when we estimate the model by firm age; older firms demonstrate similar behavior as larger firms.     

The firm''s leverage-cash flow relationship

Two separate strands of the literature on capital structure under asymmetric information consider the relationship between a firm's financial leverage and cash flow. Signalling theory suggests a positive relationship, while pecking order behavior implies a negative relationship. These contrasting theoretical implications appear contradictory. However, both are supported in different bodies of empirical literature. Leverage-changing event studies tend to support a positive relationship while cross-sectional studies typically reveal a negative relationship. This paper proposes that the appropriate pecking order relationship is contemporaneous — between current leverage and current cash flow, while the relevant signalling relationship is intertemporal-between current leverage and future cash flow. A dynamic simultaneous equations model is built which allows the firm's leverage, cash flow, and risk to interact jointly in the same period, as well as across time. Empirical results reveal that, in the same time period, leverage and cash flow tend to be negatively related, while across time leverage is positively related to future cash flow. Thus the apparent contradictions in the theoretical and empirical literature may be reconciled by considering both the contemporaneous and dynamic aspects of the firm's leverage/cash flow relationship.     

Capital Structure Instability

This article summarizes the evidence from the authors’ recent study published in the Journal of Finance that documented the extent of the variation in the capital structures of individual public companies over long time horizons. It also reports the results of an exploratory investigation into the sources of variation over time in leverage ratios—an investigation that included case analyses of leverage instability at 24 U.S. companies that were included in the Dow Jones Industrial Average at some point in their histories. The main finding of the authors’ study is that substantial instability in leverage has been the norm at publicly held nonfinancial companies. “Episodic” cases of leverage stability were observed from time to time, but they were the exception, not the rule. Such cases almost always involved companies with low leverage ratios, and they invariably proved to be short‐lived, rarely exceeding a decade or two. Leverage was found to be “sticky” during periods lasting just a few years, but a company's currently high (or low) leverage became an increasingly poor predictor of whether its future leverage would be high (or low) as the amount of time between leverage observations lengthened. When attempting to explain companyspecific changes in leverage after extended periods of stability, the authors found a strong connection with company expansion and investment. At the same time, they found no systematic relations between company‐specific leverage changes and changes in industry leverage, company profitability, or other determinants of leverage that have been emphasized in previous academic studies. The authors' case analyses reinforced their finding that capital structure changes were often linked to the funding of company expansions, but such changes were also sometimes designed to support established payout policies while preserving financing flexibility.     

ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL FUNDS RATE CHANGES AND VARIANCE PATTERNS

We analyze Fed funds rate changes in GARCH‐in‐mean (GARCH‐M) models and find that daily rate change and variance patterns differ with the timing of the rate observation, but that all patterns are generally consistent with optimal reserve account management. We also find that Fed funds daily and intraday variances exhibit trends and persistence, and that daily variance effects differ when using marginal rates versus daily weighted average rates. Furthermore, we find that conditional variances do not provide information about daily or intraday rate changes. Our results provide support for the use of GARCH models for studies on other financial assets. JEL classification: G21, G28     

Corporate control and shareholder activism in Germany: An empirical analysis of hedge fund strategies

Government-initiated reforms of the German financial system two decades ago shifted corporate control activities from universal banks to capital markets. Hedge funds took advantage of these changes by acquiring stakes in weakly governed firms. For 653 hedge fund interventions between 2000 and 2020, this study analyzes the changes in financial and operating performance and firm characteristics before and after the event. We also assess the probabilities that a firm becomes a target and that an attack creates shareholders value. On average, hedge funds increased returns, with the magnitude depending on the period, level of aggressiveness, institutional ownership, and industry. Crisis and non-crisis results differ, as hedge funds strategies are mostly successful in a rising stock market environment. Typically, hedge funds targeted smaller and more visible firms with higher sales growth, lower leverage, and higher institutional ownership. After the attack, firm profitability and cash holdings decreased, leverage increased, while investments in M&A and capex declined. This research offers new empirical evidence on the success of hedge fund strategies in Germany and on the performance of targeted firms.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Volatility in the Open-End Fund Market: Evidence from China

This paper applies a set of GARCH models to investigate the three characteristics, including time persistence, leverage effect, and risk premium, of the volatilities of the four China Securities Index (CSI) fund indices. This study made the following four findings: (1) a strong ARCH effect exists in the returns; (2) time persistence is significant in all the CSI fund indices, namely, "stock index," "hybrid index," and "bond index" in descending order of significance; (3) the leverage effect is not statistically significant, yet there may be a positive leverage effect on the bond funds; (4) a risk premium effect exists in the open-end fund market, especially in the bond fund market.     

上证国债指数日收益率的波动特征及对保险投资的影响——基于GARCH模型的实证研究

本文以上证国债指数日收益率的波动为研究对象,通过GARCH和非对称GARCH模型的实证分析,发现上证国债指数对数收益率表现出如下波动特征:一是具有集聚性,过去的波动对当前的波动具有持续的影响.二是存在显著的杠杆效应,利空消息引起的波动比同等大小的利好消息引起的波动要大.国债市场的波动性和风险对保险投资的策略选择具有重要...     

The leverage of hedge funds

Long–short hedge funds are often very highly levered, despite the costs of leverage that became apparent during the LTCM crisis in 1998 and the more recent episode in 2008. This note explores potential market imperfections that may explain the use of leverage.     

A Reconsideration of Tax Shield Valuation

A quarter‐century ago, Miles and Ezzell (1980) solved the valuation problem of a firm that follows a constant leverage ratio L = D/S. However, to this day, the proper discounting of free cash flows and the computation of WACC are often misunderstood by scholars and practitioners alike. For example, it is common for textbooks and fairness opinions to discount free cash flows at WACC with beta input β _S = [1 + (1 ? τ)L]β_u, although the latter is not consistent with the assumption of constant leverage. This confusion extends to the valuation of tax shields and the proper implementation of adjusted present value procedures. In this paper, we derive a general result on the value of tax shields, obtain the correct value of tax shields for perpetuities, and state the correct valuation formulas for arbitrary cash flows under a constant leverage financial policy.     

The effect of financial leverage on real and accrual-based earnings management

Past research has documented a substitution effect between real earnings management (RM) and accrual-based earnings management (AM), depending on relative costs. This study contributes to this research by examining whether levels of (and changes in) financial leverage have an impact on this empirically documented trade-off. We hypothesise that in the presence of high leverage, firms that engage in earnings manipulation tactics will exhibit a preference for RM due to a lower possibility – and subsequent costs – of getting caught. We show that leverage levels and increases positively and significantly affect upward RM, with no significant effect on income-increasing AM, while our findings point towards a complementarity effect between unexpected levels of RM and AM for firms with very high leverage levels and changes. This is interpreted as an indication that high leverage could attract heavy outsider scrutiny, making it necessary for firms to use both forms of earnings management in order to achieve earnings targets. Furthermore, we document that equity investors exhibit a significantly stronger penalising reaction to AM vs. RM, indicating that leverage-induced RM is not as easily detectable by market participants as debt-induced AM, despite the fact that the former could imply deviation from optimal business practices.     

Monetary Policy,Bank Lending,and the Risk‐Pricing Channel

This paper identifies a monetary policy channel through the risk pricing of bank debt in the market for jumbo certificates of deposit (jumbo CDs). Adverse policy shocks increase debt holder perceptions of bank default, increasing the risk premia for some banks, thereby decreasing their external funding of loans. The results show that contractionary policy increases the sensitivity of jumbo‐CD spreads to leverage and asset risk for small banks, and to leverage for large banks. The results also show a distributional and aggregate effect on banking system jumbo CDs and total loans, producing a risk‐pricing (or market discipline) channel. This channel has implications for monetary and regulatory policies, and financial stability.     

Disentangling Sentiment from Cyclicality in Firm Capital Structure

This study examines the relationship between capital structure choices and investor and managerial sentiment, finding that periods of positive sentiment are associated with reduced leverage within firms. We focus on the cyclicality of leverage using non-orthogonalized sentiment indices and find a strong negative relationship. Leverage, therefore, appears countercyclical, implying that the decision to take on debt is a consequence of either Admati et al.'s (2018) ratchet effect or a managerial attempt to time the market. Our findings lead us to question some fundamental capital structure theories, namely, trade-off (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973), and Hackbarth's (2008) managerial traits theory. Instead, we favour the idea that leverage is a consequence of countercyclical market timing behaviour.