Increase in home bias in the Eurozone debt crisis: The role of domestic shocks

One of the most striking consequences of the recent episode of sovereign debt market stress in the Eurozone has been the increase in the share of public debt held by the domestic sector in fragile economies. However, the causes and potential consequences of this increase were only given scarce attention in the literature on the Euro area sovereign debt crisis. In order to fill this gap, we first determine the shocks that impact the variation in the share of sovereign debt held at home in an SVAR model on a sample of Eurozone countries between 2002 and 2014, distinguishing between external and domestic shocks. Thanks to several alternative tests, we show that home bias in sovereign debt responds positively to country-specific fundamentals and expectation shocks but we find no evidence that the increase in home bias is destabilizing per se in the short-run. Second, a stylized theoretical model backed by the empirical results predicts that the consequences for sovereign debt crisis depend on the relative impact of domestic initial destabilizing shocks and increased home bias. The analysis suggests that an increase in home bias in times of sovereign debt stress, despite reflecting deteriorating fiscal conditions, may make default less likely.     

Fundamentals and Sovereign Risk of Emerging Markets

We empirically assess the relative importance of various economic fundamentals in accounting for the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads of emerging markets during 2004–2012, which encompasses the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. Inflation, state fragility, external debt and commodity terms of trade volatility were positively associated, while trade openness and a more favourable fiscal balance/GDP ratio were negatively associated with sovereign CDS spreads. Yet the relative importance of economic fundamentals in the pricing of sovereign risk varies over time. The key factors are trade openness and state fragility in the pre‐crisis period, the external debt/GDP ratio and inflation in the crisis period, and inflation and the public debt/GDP ratio in the post‐crisis period. Asian countries enjoy lower sovereign spreads than Latin American countries, and this gap widened during and after the crisis. Trade openness was the biggest factor behind Asia's lower sovereign spreads before the crisis, and inflation during and after the crisis. The results imply that external factors were paramount in pricing sovereign risk prior to the crisis, but internal factors associated with the capacity to adjust to adverse shocks gained prominence during and after the crisis.     

Sudden Stops,Time Inconsistency,and the Duration of Sovereign Debt

We study the sovereign debt duration chosen by the government in the context of a standard model of sovereign default. The government balances off increasing the duration of its debt to mitigate rollover risk and lowering duration to mitigate the debt dilution problem. We present two main results. First, when the government decides the debt duration on a sequential basis, sudden stop risk increases the average duration by 1 year. Second, we illustrate the time inconsistency problem in the choice of sovereign debt duration: governments would like to commit to a duration that is 1.7 years shorter than the one they choose when decisions are made sequentially.     

Monetary policy under a fiscal theory of sovereign default

This paper examines equilibrium determination under different monetary policy regimes when the government might default on its debt. We apply a cash-in-advance model where the government does not have access to non-distortionary taxation and does not account for initial outstanding debt when it sets the income tax rate. Solvency is then not guaranteed and sovereign default can affect the return on public debt. If the central bank sets the interest rate in a conventional way, the equilibrium allocation cannot be determined. If, instead, money supply is controlled, the equilibrium allocation can uniquely be determined.     

Mispricing of Risk in Sovereign Bond Markets with Asymmetric Information

The likelihood that a government will repay its sovereign debt depends both on the amount of debt it issues and on the government's future ability to repay. Whilst the former is publicly observable, the government may have more information about the latter than investors. This paper shows that this asymmetric information problem impairs the market's ability to differentiate economies according to their fiscal sustainability, and can lead to a disconnect between bond prices and default risk. The model can help rationalise the behaviour of Eurozone bond prices prior to the recent European sovereign debt crisis.     

Limits to government debt sustainability in OECD countries

The recent euro area sovereign debt crisis has shown the importance of market reactions for the sustainability of debt in advanced economies. This paper calculates endogenous government debt limits given the markets assessment of the probability to default. The estimated primary balance reaction function to growing debt has the “fiscal fatigue” property (a loosening fiscal effort makes the primary balance insufficient to support rising debt) at high debt levels. The combination of this feature of the primary balance reaction function with the market interest rate reaction to growing debt determines the government debt limit beyond which debt cannot be rolled over. An application to OECD countries over the period 1985 – 2013 with a model-based risk-premium shows that current debt limits are high for most of the OECD thanks to particularly low risk-free interest rates. It also shows for some countries that current debt levels are not sustainable without a change in government behaviour. Most importantly, the framework illustrates the state contingent nature of debt limits and therefore the vulnerability of governments to a change in macroeconomic conditions and to market reactions. Last, computations with an estimated interest rate reaction to public debt illustrate that debt limits are lower in the euro area than in other countries because of a sharper market interest rate reaction to rising debt.     

An Alternative Approach to the Institutional Economics of the Eurozone Crisis

I argue that the Eurozone crisis is neither a crisis of European sovereigns in the sense of governmental over-borrowing, nor a crisis of sovereign debt market over-lending. Rather, it is a function of the “sovereign debt market” institution itself. Crisis, I argue, is not an occurrence, but an element fulfilling a precise technical function within this institution. It ensures the possibility of designating — in the market’s day-to-day mechanisms rather than analytical hindsight — normal (tranquil, undisturbed) market functioning. To show this, I propose an alternative view on the institutional economics of sovereign debt markets. First, I engage literature on the emergent qualities of the institutions “market” and “firm” in product markets, concluding that the point of coalescence for markets is the approximation of an optimal observation of consumer tastes. I then examine the specific institution “financial markets,” where the optimal observation of economic fundamentals is decisive. For the specific sub-institution “sovereign debt market,” I conclude that the fundamentals in question — country fundamentals — oscillate between a status of observable fundamentals outside of markets and operationalized fundamentals influenced by market movements. This, in turn, allows me to argue that the specific case of the Eurozone crisis is due to neither of the two causes mentioned above. Rather, the notion of “crisis” takes on a technical sense within the market structure, guaranteeing the separation of herd behavior and isomorphic behavior on European sovereign debt markets. By the same token, the so-called Eurozone crisis ceases to be a crisis in the conventional sense.     

Sovereign default and the sustainability risk premium effect

We analyze the joint determination of interest rate risk and debt sustainability for governments with fiscal imbalances. Because higher interest rates imply increased debt services, they worsen the government's financial situation and increase the probability of sovereign default. Thus, higher interest rates eventually lead to a decrease in the real demand for government bonds, which imposes an additional constraint on government debt sustainability.     

The sovereign spread in Asian emerging economies: The significance of external versus internal factors

This paper investigates the dynamic relations between external factors, domestic macroeconomic factors with sovereign spreads, debt to GDP ratio, etc. in Asian emerging countries. First, we develop a theoretical model that determines the equilibrium debt level, probability of default and sovereign spread and draw empirical implications. We then employ a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model to investigate empirically how the spread of sovereign debt is influenced over time by both external and domestic factors. The empirical results show that variations in sovereign spreads are mainly driven by external shocks, with the term structure of US interest rate and the global risk aversion having the most important role. The findings also indicate that shocks from the US have a direct effect on sovereign spread and an indirect effect via domestic macroeconomic fundamentals. Finally, the evidence produced validates the presence of some response patterns of sovereign spread to the external shocks.     

Self-fulfilling crises with default and devaluation

We characterize optimal debt policy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of defaults and devaluations in which self-fulfilling crises can arise. When the government cannot commit to repay its debt and cannot commit to maintain the exchange rate, consumers’ expectations of devaluation make the safe level of government debt very low. We show that, when the debt is in the crises zone—where self-fulfilling crisis can occur—the government finds it optimal to reduce the debt to exit the zone. The lower the probability that consumers assign to devaluation, however, the greater is the number of periods that the government will choose to take to exit the crisis zone. We argue that our model can help understand events in Argentina in 2001–2002 and throw light on some aspects of the current EMU sovereign debt crisis.     

Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments.     

The perils of debt deflation in the Euro area: a multi regime model

Academic research and policy makers in the Euro area are currently concerned with the threat of debt deflation and secular stagnation in Europe. Empirical evidence seems to suggest that secular stagnation and debt deflation in the Euro area may be rather slowly developing. Yet what appears as major peril is that debt deflation with a lack of economic growth, rising real interest rates and further rising debt may trigger household defaults, defaults of firms and banks, rise of risk premia, and default risk of certain sectors of the economy or sovereign defaults. It is this rising default and financial risk that may lead to a regime change to a slowly moving debt crisis with high financial risk and high financial stress. In order to explore those issues, a macro policy model of Svensson type is introduced, exhibiting a regime of low and high financial stress. Then, a four dimensional multi-regime VAR is employed to an Euro area data set to support the theoretical model and the claim that in particular Southern Euro area countries are affected by debt deflation and financial market stress.     

One crisis,two crises…the subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt problems

This article explores the link between the subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a panel data approach, we estimate the impact of the different government interventions aimed at rescuing financial institutions on the significant increase of the costs of public debts as measured by the interest rate spreads with respect to Germany. We show evidence on the existence of a statistically significant link between the two crises embodied by capital injections and government guarantees. More specifically, the two types of government interventions have a negative impact on the cost of the sovereign debts under study. This empirical result can explain why the sovereign debt crisis immediately followed the subprime crisis.     

Fiscal adjustment and the costs of public debt service: evidence from OECD countries

We use a panel of 21 OECD countries from 1970 to 2009 to investigate the effects of different fiscal adjustment strategies on long-term interest rates – a key fiscal indicator reflecting the costs of government debt service. As Europe’s sovereign debt crisis has shown, governments confronted with high deficits and rising debt may be forced to enact fiscal adjustments in order to avoid increasing market pressure and solvency problems. Over the last four decades, such measures taken by governments in OECD countries have varied in duration, size, composition and in their success to re-establish fiscal sustainability. We find that large and expenditure-based adjustments lead to substantially lower long-term interest rates. Small and revenue-based measures do not have an effect on interest rates. Financial markets thus only seem to value strict and decisive measures – a clear sign that the government’s pledge to cut the deficit is credible.     

PIGS or Lambs? The European Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Role of Rating Agencies

This paper asks whether rating agencies played a passive role or were an active driving force during Europe??s sovereign debt crisis. We address this by estimating relationships between sovereign debt ratings and macroeconomic and structural variables. We then use these equations to decompose actual ratings into systematic and arbitrary components that are not explained by previously observed procedures of rating agencies. Finally, we check whether systematic, as well as arbitrary, parts of credit ratings affect credit spreads. We find that both do affect credit spreads, which opens the possibility that arbitrary rating downgrades trigger processes of self-fulfilling prophecies that may drive even relatively healthy countries towards default.     

中国主权资产负债表及其风险评估(下)

2000——2010年,中国的国民资产负债表呈快速扩张之势。对外资产、基础设施以及房地产资产迅速积累,构成资产扩张的主导因素。这记载了出口导向发展战略之下中国工业化与城镇化加速发展的历史进程。在负债方,各级政府以及国有企业的负债以高于私人部门的增长率扩张。这凸显了政府主导经济活动的体制特征。对主权资产负债表的风险评估表明:(1)总体上,中国主权净值为正,因而,在相当一段时间内,发生主权债务危机的概率极低;(2)近期的风险点主要体现在房地产信贷与地方债务上,而中国的长期风险则更多集中在对外资产负债表、企业债务与社保欠账上。这些风险大都是或有负债风险,且与过去的发展方式密切相关;(3)主权债务动态的模拟进一步揭示出维持经济增长率与利率之差对于化解债务风险的重要性。因此,转变经济发展方式,保持经济可持续增长,是应对主权债务风险的根本途径。     

可持续公共债务水平下的政府违约问题研究

现实经济中存在公共债务具有可持续性时却发生政府违约的现象,本文在政府未来收支波动具有不确定性的假设下,建立一个政府与投资者的重复博弈模型以分析这一现象,研究发现:公共债务可持续性并不能完全排除政府违约风险,在政府未来基本盈余不确定的条件下,理性投资者愿意持有的公共债务水平远低于可持续的公共债务水平,两者的差异取决于政府对未来基本盈余的控制能力.     

Modeling Guarantees,Over-Indebtedness and Financial Crises in an Open Economy

This work develops a simple framework to analyse how financial intermediaries’ balance sheet problems combined with financial guarantees make an economy more vulnerable to financial crises. A ‘double default’ problem – that is, the default of financial intermediaries on their debt repayments and of the government on its guarantees to bailout intermediaries’ losses – is modelled in this study. The possibility of multiple equilibria, including a crisis equilibrium where the government is not able or willing to honor its guarantees towards the domestic financial sector, arises from the interplay of all the above elements: financial intermediaries’ level of indebtedness, government implicit guarantees and high-risk creditors’ lending. This work also produces predictions concerning the vulnerability to a financial crisis: multiple equilibria are possible only in certain ranges of the fundamentals.     

Effects of asset purchases and financial stability measures on term premia in the euro area

We study the effects of the announcements of ECB asset purchases and of financial stability measures in the euro area in the wake of the global financial crisis and the euro area sovereign debt crisis on 10-year government bond term premia in 11 euro area countries. We find that the term premia of euro area countries with higher sovereign risk, as measured by sovereign CDS spreads, decreased more in response to the announcements of asset purchases and financial stability measures. Term premia of countries with lowest sovereign risk either increased as in Germany, or were not significantly affected or fell slightly, as in the Netherlands and Finland.     

基于可流动性资产负债表的我国政府债务风险研究

政府资产是政府债务顺利偿还的基础,当政府资产低于其负债时,政府债务将面临一定风险,因此基于政府资产负债的视角,本文结合中国实际首先编制了一个简化的政府"可流动性资产"负债表,然后,分析了1998—2008年我国政府仅考虑直接债务时的政府债务风险,并且对2009—2010年的政府债务风险进行了分析。研究表明,2003—2006年因外汇储备急剧增长使我国政府债务风险总体较小且比较稳定,但因金融危机的爆发,我国政府债务风险在此期间前后的两次金融危机中都比较大,金融危机对政府债务风险的影响显著。研究还表明,积极的财政政策对短期降低政府债务风险具有明显效果,且1997年亚洲金融危机和2007年美国次贷危机对我国政府债务风险的影响具有相似性,即金融危机爆发后的几年内政府债务风险会因积极的财政政策而经历"大—小—大"的变化过程。最后,通过引入政府或有债务,分析了具有或有债务时的政府债务风险。本文认为,只要我国政府的或有债务规模不超过24万亿元人民币,则我国的政府债务风险较小。