Differentiation of innovation strategies based on pharmaceutical licensing agreements: Insight from Korean pharmaceutical firms

The paper aims to show how licensing behaviour can be used to differentiate distinct innovation strategies. Information on in-licensing and out-licensing agreements is used to guide the development of a framework that details the licensing firm’s relational preference for internal and external orientation. Using firm-level data of the Korean pharmaceutical firms, the study categorised the distinct strategic orientations of firms based on the proposed matrix model. The results indicated that firms with higher R&D (research and development) expenditures have a tendency to greater external exploitation of technological knowledge than firms with low R&D spending. The study provides potential avenues for targeting of licensing partners from the perspective of firms seeking to in-license or out-license their innovations.     

Technology commercialization intelligence: Organizational antecedents and performance consequences

External technology commercialization, e.g., by means of technology licensing, has recently gained in importance. Despite imperfections in technology markets, out-licensing constitutes a major technology commercialization channel. Although the identification of licensing opportunities represents a significant managerial challenge, prior research has relatively neglected these activities. Therefore, we develop the concept of ‘technology commercialization intelligence’ (TCI), which refers to the observation of a firm's environment with particular focus on identifying technology licensing opportunities. Grounded in a dynamic capabilities perspective, we test five hypotheses regarding organizational antecedents and performance consequences of TCI, drawing on data from a survey of 152 companies. The empirical findings provide strong support for the importance of the TCI concept. The findings deepen our understanding of the discrepancies between successful pioneering firms active in technology licensing and many others being less successful. The results have major implications for technology exploitation in open innovation processes.     

International asymmetric R&;D rivalry and industrial strategy

Profit-sharing licensing is quite a common business practice. In a Cournot duopoly model, we showed that if not subject to any restrictions this kind of technology for equity deal would lead to a decline in industry output and hurt consumers. To avoid the industry output contraction and protect the interests of consumers, the government can intervene in licensing by requiring that the profit-sharing rate specified by a licensing contract should not exceed the percentage difference of involved firms’ equilibrium outputs before licensing.     

Licensing cost-reducing innovations under supply function competition

In this paper, we study the licensing of cost-reducing innovations in a duopoly under supply function competition. We show that the innovator prefers fixed-fee licensing to no licensing if its cost advantage is not extremely large. Moreover, if its cost advantage is not extremely small, the innovator prefers fixed-fee licensing and mixed licensing to revenue-royalty licensing. This second result arises only because of our assumption that the cost functions are quadratic. We show that if the cost functions are linear and royalty payments are per unit of output, the innovator strictly prefers royalty licensing to fixed-fee licensing. We also show that in our model, consumer surplus is remarkably higher under any type of licensing than under no licensing. However, revenue-royalty licensing is slightly superior for consumers to the other two types of licensing and only so if the cost advantage of the innovator is sufficiently large.     

The organizational politics of information technology: Studies from the UK financial servies industry

The article critically appraises two recent contributions to studies of organizational change: processual analysis and the firm-in-sector perspective. These studies argue that managerial practice is intensely political. They also attempt to firmly locate that practice in its organizational and environmental or sectoral context. Drawing upon these studies the article examines the management of information technology (IT) in the UK life insurance sector. This examination uses a case study and sectoral research-in-progress. The article argues that organizational IT use and development is a politicla and social process characterized by tension and conflict between managers. This conclusion suggests that organizational studies of IT use need to develop more sophisticated theories of management and managerial practice. By so doing they may then be able to shed a more penetrating light on the relationships between managers, technologies and organizational change.     

Analyzing occupational licensing among the states

The study provides new evidence of the influence of occupational regulations on the U.S. economy. Our analysis, unlike previous studies, was able to obtain a representative sample of the population at the state level, which allowed us to estimate the cross-sectional effects of occupational licensing for each state. The state-level analysis demonstrates considerable variation in percentage of the workforce that has attained a license, and unlike minimum wages or unionization, licensing shows no regional patterns in the distribution of occupational licensing. The analysis also shows considerable variation in the influence of licensing on earnings across the states. The national estimates suggest that occupational licensing raises wages by about 11% after controlling for human capital and other observable characteristics. Finally, our analysis shows the influence of occupational regulation on wage inequality across the income distribution.     

三螺旋互动下专利联营促进成果转化的许可优势研究

在世界产业竞争格局下,基于许可进行成果转化的专利联营日渐成为高新技术产业竞争和发展的主导范式。传统的纵向结构专利联营由于必要专利权人来源单一,已经出现了许可困境,不利于必要专利的转化,而基于大学-产业-政府三螺旋互动创新的专利联营有利于合理配置资源,有效促进必要专利的转化。对三螺旋互动下专利联营促进成果转化的许可优势进行研究发现,与纵向结构专利联营相比,三螺旋互动下专利联营具备促进成果转化的许可动力优势、许可契约优势和许可市场优势等多维优势,具体表现在：多元来源的必要专利可持久的资本化特性保证了许可动力强劲,契约双方的合作共赢目标保证了许可契约的顺利达成,容易形成事实标准保证了许可市场的有效占领。     

The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology

This study considers licensing of a cost-reducing technology through bargaining between a technology-holding firm and its rival firm in a Cournot duopoly market. To consider the relative bargaining power of both firms, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is applied as our solution. Then, we specify the combinations of lump-sum fee and per-unit royalty that are realized through bargaining, and examine the effect on social welfare of the technology-holding firm’s bargaining power. The principal findings are as follows. Regardless of the technology-holding firm’s bargaining power, pure royalty licensing is carried out, and social welfare is non-increasing in its bargaining power. In our model, licensing through a take-it-or-leave-it offer, which is often assumed in the literature, is regarded as the case in which the technology-holding firm has full bargaining power. Thus, the result on social welfare implies that the take-it-or-leave-it offer licensing mechanism leads to the socially worst outcome.     

Quality differentiation and product innovation licensing

Evidence reveals that there are more than 50% product innovation licensings applied within industries. We study product innovation licensing (quality-enhancing licensing) in both exclusive and non-exclusive schemes each under unit/revenue royalty and fixed fee in a vertically differentiated Cournot oligopoly, where a quality-leading firm is an internal licensor. We show that, under a non-exclusive licensing, royalty licensing is the superior policy for the licensor if quality difference within firms is small, regardless of whether a unit or revenue royalty scheme is offered. Under an exclusive licensing, a two-part tariff is optimal. If fixed fee licensing is practicable, the licensor favors an exclusive licensing. Furthermore, an increase in quality difference within firms increases the optimal rates. Using the simulated results, we examine that licensing improves social welfare in all schemes, and the number of licensees will influence the magnitude of welfare enhancement.     

中层管理者视角下国有企业探索性内创业过程机制研究

从中层管理者视角出发,基于注意力基础观理论,运用扎根理论研究方法,分析构建国有企业探索性内创业过程机制模型,并动态阐述中层管理者推动下国有企业探索性内创业的3个战略阶段：动机形成阶段、制度性筛选阶段和嵌入性销售阶段。研究结果表明,政策红利不再、中层管理者个体创业导向引发国有企业探索性变革;中层管理者根据注意力配置机制,对探索性创业机会进行制度性筛选;通过制度、自我、同侪、高层管理者4个层次,实现国有企业注意力聚合,最终实现探索性内创业。结论不但丰富了企业内部创业相关研究,也为如何激发中层管理者在企业内部创业的管理实践提供了启发。     

基于高管流动的跨企业知识转移研究述评

随着市场经济的发展和成熟,高层管理者跨企业流动的现象已屡见不鲜,高层管理者的跨企业流动对流出企业和流入企业都具有至关重要的影响。高层管理者的流动,对我国知识管理实践提出了挑战,这一现象已经引起学术界的高度关注。基于高管流动的跨企业边界的知识转移,已成为企业获取管理性知识资源、提高企业竞争力的重要途径之一。文章对当前本领域的关键研究议题及其相关理论进展,进行了整理、归纳和评述,并进一步探讨了当前研究的局限和研究方向。通过本文的研究,可以为企业有效利用外聘高层管理者的经验和知识,提供科学的理论指导。     

Determinants of inter-firm technology licensing in the EU

This article investigates the determinants of technology licensing, focusing on how country-specific characteristics affect technology holders’ incentives to sell their proprietary technologies through licensing alliances. An empirical examination of licensing is done using a unique panel data set of licensing transactions involving companies in the EU. The strength of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection, the degree of economic freedom, the level of country risk, and the number of patent granted in the country are found to be important determinants of inter-firm technology licensing. In addition, firms with prior independent experience as a licensor and public companies tend to license technology more.     

Does licensing promote innovation?

ABSTRACT

We analyse the impact of licensing on the equilibrium amount of cost-reducing innovation under several licensing mechanisms in the case of a duopoly model with heterogeneous firms. Under a wide class of licensing mechanisms, we find that as product substitutability increases, the possibility of higher innovation under licensing compared to no licensing decreases. Therefore, firms’ heterogeneity is crucial to assess whether licensing incentivizes or not R&D cost-reducing investments.     

考虑革新程度认知差异的新产品技术授权研究

建立博弈模型，探讨技术革新认知差异情形下，外部技术创新者向寡占竞争格局的生产企业授权生产新产品专利的最优决策问题。研究发现，创新授权者关于新产品市场的认知劣势使固定收费契约不具备完全优于特许权收费契约的绝对优势；在双重收费契约下，专利人授权对象选择因认知差异影响，由排他性授权向非排他性授权决策转变；认知差异性削弱了创新企业市场势力，从而提高特许权收费契约优势，而拍卖、股权投资等有助于创新企业克服认知劣势。据此，建议创新企业明晰创新专利长期回报，综合搭配应用多种授权契约；以非排他性授权策略配合特许权收费、双重收费和股权投资等契约模式，实现技术交易产业链激励共容下的利润最大化，促进技术创新传播应用，提高社会福利水平。     

融资政策与增长速度:来自企业层面的证据

企业的融资政策对企业的增长速度具有决定性作用,恰当的融资方式安排能够减少股东与经理的代理成本、提高企业发展速度;通过降低资产消耗、提高生产水平、调整企业利润分配政策,企业也能够获得较快的增长速度。但对我国上市公司的实证研究表明,我国上市企业的增长速度与融资政策之间存在高度的依赖关系,从而企业持续快速的增长在现实中不太可能实现,股东和经理人对企业的发展速度和可以达到的规模都应该保持一个合理的预期。     

创造力与员工创新：上下级关系与目标导向的调节作用

创造力如何高效转化为员工创新是管理实践普遍面临的问题。依据社会认知理论，通过对4家国有企业管理者及其下属进行问卷调查，探讨了上下级关系和目标导向对创造力与员工创新的调节作用。结果发现：学习目标导向对创造力与员工创新存在显著的正向调节效应；企业上下级关系显著负向调节创造力与员工创新关系；目标导向与上下级关系交互调节创造力与员工创新，其中学习目标导向减弱了上下级关系对创造力与员工创新的负向调节作用，证明目标导向增强了上下级的负向调节效应。该结果揭示了创造力与员工创新的复杂权变关系，可为组织管理者科学有效管理创造力与员工创新提供理论启示与实践指导。     

Patent Licensing in the Presence of Trade Barriers

We develop a two‐country duopoly model to explore the optimal licensing contract for an outsider licensor in terms of fixed‐fee and royalty licensing by taking into account trade barriers when firms produce a homogeneous product and engage in Bertrand competition in each market. The present paper focuses on the interaction between licensing and trade barriers in two international markets. We show that both royalty and non‐exclusive fixed‐fee licensing can be optimal. Furthermore, exclusive fixed‐fee licensing can be optimal, which is a result that is not discussed in the existing literature.     

Does technology licensing matter for privatization?

In mixed oligopolies, technology licensing from a cost‐efficient firm to a cost‐inefficient firm has been widely observed. This paper examines the relationship between privatization and licensing (by public or private firms) with the consideration of either a domestic or a foreign private firm. We find that (a) in the case of a domestic private firm, public licensing facilitates privatization, but private licensing hinders privatization; (b) in the case of a foreign private firm, both public and private licensing facilitate privatization. Our results yield important policy implications on privatization.     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Technology Licensing*

We consider strategic trade policy when a high‐cost and a low‐cost firm belonging to two different countries compete in quantities in a third country, and technology is transferable via licensing. We characterize the effects of subsidies on (i) licensing payments—a new source of rents, (ii) the decision to license, and (iii) the subsidy bill difference (compared to when licensing is infeasible). We find that, in the presence of licensing, optimal strategic trade policy has several interesting features. For example, even under Cournot competition, optimal policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Also, unlike results in strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs, we find that optimal export subsidies are not necessarily positively related to the cost‐competitiveness of firms. In other words, governments need not necessarily favor “winners” when licensing is possible. Furthermore, there exist parameterizations such that a government, if it can, might ban licensing.     

技术竞争对企业专利许可行为的影响

知识经济时代，知识产权的重要性愈加凸显。基于海量的中国企业专利许可数据，就多种竞争情境对企业对外许可行为的影响进行研究。实证分析发现，随着竞争密度增大，技术市场扩张厚度增加，企业倾向于对外许可其技术，但技术提供数量与专利许可率之间存在倒U型关系，中国仍远未达到拐点；许可过程中科研实力起到决定性作用，实力较强的竞争者对许可行为具有显著的抑制作用，反之，则具有促进作用。当被许可人是同行竞争者时，并没有拒绝或者延迟对外许可。另外，在对外许可中，国有企业的竞争反应较弱，私营企业较敏感。最后，结合中国市场情况提出相应对策建议。