Bayesian Fraud Risk Formula for Financial Statement Audits

In this article we extend the work of Loebbecke et al. (1989 ) and illustrate the use of an evidential reasoning approach for developing fraud risk analysis models under the Bayesian framework. New formulations facilitating fraud risk assessments are needed because decision tree approaches previously used to develop analytical models are not appropriate in complex situations involving several interrelated variables. To demonstrate the evidential reasoning approach, a fraud risk assessment formula is derived and illustrated. The fraud risk formula captures the impact of the presence or absence of and interrelationships between the three ‘fraud triangle’ risk factors: Incentives, Attitude and Opportunities. The formula includes the impact of risks and controls related to these three fraud risk factors as well as the impact of forensic audit procedures and relevant analytical and other procedures that provide evidence for the presence or absence of fraud. This formula may be used in audit practice both to help plan the audit and to assess fraud risk sequentially as audit evidence is obtained.     

Internal audit reporting lines,fraud risk decomposition,and assessments of fraud risk

The main purpose of this research is to examine the effects of internal audit reporting lines on fraud risk assessments made by internal auditors when the level of fraud risk varies. Significant emphasis has been placed on the importance of reporting lines in maintaining the autonomy of internal auditors, but the perceived benefits of requiring internal audit to report directly to the audit committee have not been validated or systematically investigated. Results of an experiment involving 172 experienced internal auditors and additional survey findings indicate that internal auditors perceive more personal threats when they report high levels of risk directly to the audit committee, relative to management. Perceived threats lead internal auditors to reduce assessed levels of fraud risk when reporting to the audit committee relative to when reporting to management. This finding runs counter to the anticipated benefits of requirements that the internal audit function report directly to the audit committee, and it reveals potential conflicts of interest and independence threats created by the audit committee itself. We also investigate the effects of fraud risk decomposition on risk assessments made by internal auditors. We find that fraud risk assessment decomposition does not have the same effects on internal auditors as it has on external auditors, and the effects of decomposition do not align with the expected benefits of decomposition.     

Do changes in audit actions and attitudes consistent with increased auditor scepticism deter aggressive earnings management? An experimental investigation

Audits are claimed to not only enhance the detection of fraud but also the deterrence of fraud. This study examines whether different audit procedures and attitudes conveyed to management deter aggressive earnings management that may be fraudulent, and whether such different procedures and attitudes conveyed influence managers’ perceptions about the ethicality of any anticipated earnings management. In an experiment with 171 senior corporate managers, we find that compared to the condition where the audit proceeds the same as last year, managers anticipate that there would be less earnings management when the nature of evidence collected has increased probative value; and when the auditor conveys a more sceptical attitude via more critical inquiry combined with either an increase in the evidence extent (increased sample size) or the nature of the evidence. However, this reduction in anticipated earnings management is not found with either the increased extent of evidence collected alone or more critical inquiry alone, suggesting that a combination of action and attitude changes compared to a change in either action alone or attitude alone better signals to managers the heightened scepticism that enhances the effectiveness of auditor deterrence. We also find, after controlling for the underlying ethical disposition of managers, that the different audit procedures and attitudes conveyed to management affect managers’ perceptions of the ethicality of anticipated earnings management. Interestingly, the conditions that engender greater earnings management also paradoxically increase managers’ perceived unethicality of the anticipated earnings management. Together these findings have implications for how different changes in audit approaches may result in differential managerial responses about their intention to commit fraud and its appropriateness. This study is one of the first papers to provide experimental empirical evidence that specific audit actions conveying heightened scepticism have significant influence on managerial judgments and behaviours with respect to committing aggressive earnings management.     

Fraud dynamics and controls in organizations

This paper develops an agent-based model to examine the emergent dynamic characteristics of fraud in organizations. In the model, individual heterogeneous agents, each of whom can have motive and opportunity to commit fraud and a pro-fraud attitude, interact with each other. This interaction provides a mechanism for cultural transmission through which attitudes regarding fraud can spread. Our benchmark analysis identifies two classes of organizations. In one class, we observe fraud tending toward a stable level. In the other class, fraud dynamics are characterized by extreme behaviors; organizations with mostly honest behavior suddenly change their state to mostly fraudulent behavior and vice versa. These changes seem to occur randomly over time. We then modify our model to examine the effects of various mechanisms thought to impact fraud in organizations. Each of these mechanisms has different impacts on the two classes of organizations in our benchmark model, with some mechanisms being more effective in organizations exhibiting stable levels of fraud and other mechanisms being more effective in organizations exhibiting unstable extreme behavior. Our analysis and results have general implications for designing programs aimed at preventing fraud and for fraud risk assessment within the audit context.     

The effects of experience and explicit fraud risk assessment in detecting fraud with analytical procedures

This paper reports the results of an experiment that examined the effects of audit experience and explicit fraud risk assessment instructions on the effectiveness of analytical procedures in detecting financial statement fraud. The results of this study suggest that audit managers are more effective than audit seniors in assessing the risk of fraud with analytical procedures. Additionally, explicit fraud risk assessment instructions resulted in more effective assessments of the presence of fraud. These results have implications for the assignment of auditors to tasks and the structuring of these tasks.     

发挥审计监督职能遏制企业会计舞弊

企业会计舞弊危害深重。企业会计舞弊的成因是多方面的,审计监督不力是重要原因之一。遏制企业会计舞弊,必须充分发挥注册会计师和政府审计的监督职能,采取有力措施解决审计监督中存在的各种问题,构建科学、规范、高效的审计监督制度体系和业务规程。     

Can Bonus‐Malus Allieviate Insurance Fraud?

Traditionally, insurance companies attempt to reduce (or even eliminate) fraud via audit strategies under which claims may be investigated at some cost to the insurer, with a penalty imposed upon insureds who are found to report claims fraudulently. However, it is also clear that, in a multiperiod setting, bonus‐malus contracts (increases in subsequent premiums whenever a claim is presented) also provide an incentive against fraud. In this article, we consider a model in which, conditional upon the client renewing his contract, the only mechanism used to combat fraud is bonus‐malus. In this way, our model provides the opposite pole to the pure audit model. We show that in our simplified setting there exists a bonus‐malus contract that will eliminate all fraud in all periods, while guaranteeing nonnegative expected profits to the insurer and participation by the insured. We also consider the dynamics of the solution, the effect of an increase in risk aversion on the solution, and the welfare implications.     

The Effects of Fraud Risk and Management Representation on Auditors' Hypothesis Generation

Hypothesis generation is considered to be critical to the effectiveness and efficiency of diagnostic processes in auditing. Using a between-subjects experimental design, this work examines the impact of fraud risk and the availability of a non-misstatement management explanation on auditors' hypothesis generation performance. The context is when managers undertake analytical procedures at the planning stage of the audit. The results indicate that auditors are sensitive to increased fraud risk by generating more fraud hypotheses, while the number of misstatement hypotheses generated is not affected by fraud risk. The availability of a non-misstatement management explanation was found not to interfere with auditors' hypothesis generation performance, but facilitated the generation of proportionately more misstatement and fraud hypotheses from the same transaction cycle as that indicated by the management explanation. Together, these findings provide some insights on the sensitivity of auditors' hypothesis generation to fraud risk and whether this sensitivity could be undermined by the availability of management representations.     

Selection Bias and Auditing Policies for Insurance Claims

Selection bias results from a discrepancy between the range of estimation of a statistical model and its range of application. This is the case for fraud risk models, which are estimated on audited claims but applied on incoming claims in the design of auditing strategies. Now audited claims are a minority within the parent sample since they are chosen after a severe selection performed by claims adjusters. This article presents a statistical approach that counteracts selection bias without using a random auditing strategy. A two‐equation model on audit and fraud (a bivariate probit model with censoring) is estimated on a sample of claims where the experts are left free to take the audit decision. The expected overestimation of fraud risk derived from a single‐equation model is corrected. Results are close to those obtained with a random auditing strategy, at the expense of some instability with respect to the regression components set. Then we compare auditing policies derived from the different approaches.     

Internal audit,alternative internal audit structures and the level of misappropriation of assets fraud

In recent years, the importance of good corporate governance has received significant public and regulatory attention. A crucial part of an entity's corporate governance is its internal audit function. At the same time, there has been significant public concern about the level of fraud within organizations. The purpose of this study is to assess whether organizations with an internal audit function are more likely to detect and self‐report fraud than those without. In this study, we use a unique self‐reported measure of misappropriation of assets fraud for the first time. The fraud data are from the 2004 KPMG Fraud Survey, which reported fraud from 491 organizations in the private and public sector across Australia and New Zealand. The internal audit data are from a separate mail survey sent to the respondents of the KPMG Fraud Survey. We find that organizations with an internal audit function are more likely than those without such a function to detect and self‐report fraud. Furthermore, organizations that rely solely on outsourcing for their internal audit function are less likely to detect and self‐report fraud than those that undertake at least part of their internal audit function themselves. These findings suggest that internal audit adds value through improving the control and monitoring environment within organizations to detect and self‐report fraud. These results also suggest that keeping the internal audit function within the organization is more effective than completely outsourcing that function.     

The relation between earnings management and financial statement fraud

This paper provides new evidence on the characteristics of firms that commit financial statement fraud. We examine how previous earnings management impacts the likelihood that a firm will commit financial statement fraud and in doing so develop three new fraud predictors. Using a sample of 54 fraud and 54 non-fraud firms, we find that fraud firms are more likely to have managed earnings in prior years and that earnings management in prior years is associated with a higher likelihood that firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts or that inflate revenue are committing fraud. We further find that fraud firms are more likely to meet or beat analyst forecasts and inflate revenue than non-fraud firms are even when there is no evidence of prior earnings management. This paper contributes to the fraud detection literature and the earnings management literature, and can help practitioners and regulators develop better fraud detection models.     

It’s all about audit quality: Perspectives on strategic-systems auditing

We discuss the antecedents of and rationale for what has become known as Strategic-Systems Auditing (SSA). We also describe the conceptual foundation and key elements of SSA. We observe that the auditor employing SSA conceives the audit as a process of evidence-driven, belief-based, risk assessment. We also illustrate facets of this process, including how the auditor, by acquiring a rich understanding of how and how well management is executing its business-model, develops rich (e.g., distributional) expectations of future financial-statement amounts and disclosures. These expectations form a benchmark against which the auditor later compares and investigates management’s asserted financial-statement amounts and disclosures. Finally, we pose and respond to some of the more common questions about elements of SSA and complete the paper by suggesting some educational innovations and high-value targets for research.One salient message is that SSA first emerged in the 1990s as an attempt to enhance audit quality in response to changes in the audit environment. Another salient message is that SSA continues to equilibrate, adapting to more recent environmental changes, especially society’s demand for greater protection from financial-statement fraud. Such adaptation requires ongoing, significant intellectual investments by audit practitioners and audit scholars/educators.     

有效预警上市公司违规的递延所得税异动指标和人工智能模型

2000-2017年,3434家A股上市公司样本中的47.79%至少有一次违规记录,每年平均有17%的公司违规,而监管机构平均需要2.7年查证并通告违规行为。我们用当年数据构建递延所得税异动指标,可有效预判违规,并发现监管机构未能识别这一指标的警示作用,实际激励了违规公司通过操纵递延所得税提高财务指标以规避稽查。进一步构建决策树模型,对违规事件实现样本外精准判别。本文揭示了A股公司大面积违规而稽查过程冗长迟缓这一重要现象,并分析了违规机制,指出了所得税数据在稽查违规中可以发挥的预警作用,为监管者和投资者提供有效预警上市公司违规行为的新指标和方法。     

The Role of Risk Management and Governance in Determining Audit Demand

Abstract:  Most prior research into audit fees has been based on a theoretical model which treats audit fees as the by-product of a production function ignoring potential demand forces that may drive the level of the audit fee. Inspired by prior 'anomalous' results, we take a different perspective by focusing on demand factors that may affect the level of the audit fee. Using data collected from a sample of listed companies in Belgium, we consider both disclosures about risk and risk management and actual decisions about corporate governance to examine whether audit fees are higher when these demand forces exist. In general, we expect that external auditing will increase in situations where there are multiple stakeholders with individual risk profiles who can shift some of the cost of monitoring to other stakeholders. Consistent with our theory and expectations, our results indicate that audit fees are higher when a company has an audit committee, discloses a relatively high level of financial risk management, and has a larger proportion of independent Board Members. Audit fees are lower when a company discloses a relatively high level of compliance risk management. The latter result indicates that controls are only complementary as long as they are voluntary, as mandated controls act as substitutes for non-mandated controls.     

有效预警上市公司违规的递延所得税异动指标和人工智能模型

2000-2017年,3434家A股上市公司样本中的47.79%至少有一次违规记录,每年平均有17%的公司违规,而监管机构平均需要2.7年查证并通告违规行为。我们用当年数据构建递延所得税异动指标,可有效预判违规,并发现监管机构未能识别这一指标的警示作用,实际激励了违规公司通过操纵递延所得税提高财务指标以规避稽查。进一步构建决策树模型,对违规事件实现样本外精准判别。本文揭示了A股公司大面积违规而稽查过程冗长迟缓这一重要现象,并分析了违规机制,指出了所得税数据在稽查违规中可以发挥的预警作用,为监管者和投资者提供有效预警上市公司违规行为的新指标和方法。     

The role of audit evidence in a strategic audit

This study examines how audit risk (the probability of false acceptance) and its components change when the auditor obtains audit evidence in an acceptance sampling model. Inherent risk and audit risk increase with audit evidence if the auditee has a sufficiently strong incentive for committing fraud. Detection risk always increases when audit evidence is introduced. If the auditor has a sufficiently strong incentive for avoiding false rejection, audit risk also increases with audit evidence. The analysis indicates that requiring auditors to obtain information is not effective in preventing material misstatements in at least some instances.     

Evidence of Fraud,Audit Risk and Audit Liability Regimes

We investigate the effectiveness of proportionate liability in reducing the probability of fraud and audit risk relative to joint and several liability in two strategic audit settings: one that provides conclusive evidence of fraud and one that provides inconclusive evidence of fraud. In both settings the auditor makes an audit effort choice, but in the second setting the auditor also evaluates the audit evidence. Our results show that when the auditor chooses only effort, a proportionate liability rule with large marginal liability relief decreases audit risk. However, when the auditor also evaluates the audit evidence this result no longer holds.     

Einflussfaktoren für betrügerisches Verhalten von Versicherungsnehmern: erste experimentelle Befunde

Theoretical research examining how to fight insurance fraud is usually based on the assumption that individuals behave purely selfish and maximize expected utility from monetary payoffs. Therefore, this research does not take into account that insurance fraud constitutes an illegal behavior that some individuals never commit, e.g., due to ethical reasons. This article presents experimental findings on factors that influence fraudulent behavior of infrequent offenders. The results show that some subjects never commit fraud in the experiment, although it would have been financially profitable. Deductible contracts lead to an increase of fraudulent behavior. In contrast, information regarding other subjects’ claiming behavior does not have any significant impact on the probability to commit fraud. Therefore, in our experiment social interaction only induces minor changes in behavior.     

Covering or monitoring? Independent director connectedness and corporate fraud in China

This paper examines how independent directors’ social capital, as measured by their social network, affects corporate fraud. We find that firms with well-connected independent directors are less likely to commit fraud, supporting our monitoring effect hypothesis. This result is robust to a battery of tests. Further analyses show that the effect is stronger for firms with a relatively poor legal environment, for firms whose independent directors face strong reputation incentives and when independent directors are audit committee members. Moreover, we explore a potential economic mechanism of the effect and observe that well-connected independent directors are associated with less absenteeism and more dissension. Overall, our findings suggest that independent directors’ social capital plays an important role in corporate governance.     

A Framework for Identifying (and Avoiding) Fraudulent Financial Reporting*

This commentary analyzes the relationship of fraud risk assessments to other risk assessments by auditors. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board notes that this is a problem area of current practice. Effective detection of fraudulent financial reporting requires an integrative accounting/auditing conceptual framework. As a result, this paper is as much about accounting theory as it is about auditing. To simplify the development of such an integrated framework, this paper uses an expanded risk model. This effectively results in a risk perspective on fraudulent financial reporting. There are many potential implications but the major findings are as follows. First, the study identifies the crucial role of benchmarks based on acceptable levels of risk to help differentiate between intentional and unintentional misstatements. Such differentiation is critical to successfully implementing the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99 and international standards ISA Nos. 240, 540, and 700. Second, the paper shows the importance of not allowing the major categories of risks identified here from getting too high. This paper explains the need to set acceptable levels of these risks, either by standard‐setters as a matter of broad policy, or by individual practitioners as part of the terms of specific engagements. I propose that a major factor in the concept of “present fairly” be the acceptable levels of accounting risks that are defined here, especially the risks due to intentional forecast errors. Third, this paper clarifies how the fraud risk of SAS No. 99, and similar international standards, relates to the current audit risk model framework.