The Corporate Cost of Capital and the Return on Corporate Investment

We estimate the internal rates of return earned by nonfinancial firms on (i) the initial market values of their securities and (ii) the cost of their investments. The return on value is an estimate of the overall corporate cost of capital. The estimate of the real cost of capital for 1950–96 is 5.95 percent. The real return on cost is larger, 7.38 percent, so on average corporate investment seems to be profitable. A by-product of calculating these returns is information about the history of corporate earnings, investment, and financing decisions that is perhaps more interesting than the returns.     

Postmodern Corporate Finance

One of the core tenets of modern finance theory is that corporations create value by producing operating rates of return on capital that are greater than the cost of capital. “Postmodern” corporate finance, while reaffirming the importance of earning an adequate return on capital, also attempts to restore at least part of the traditional corporate emphasis on top-line growth that prevailed before the intense focus on returns by modern shareholder value advocates. One important reason for the heightened emphasis on growth in addition to returns is that most rate-of-return measures used by companies and investors are based on conservative accounting practices that make old assets look more profitable than new ones, thereby discouraging investments in growth. This article introduces a new return measure called “Gross Business Return” that, when evaluated against a Required Return framework that reflects the level of current stock prices, has a stronger correlation with how companies are valued by the stock market. Moreover, in reviewing historical returns over time for both the market and specific industries, the author's research suggests that the market appears to demand considerably lower current returns than those implied by traditional weighted average cost of capital (WACC) approaches. And to the extent corporate executives rely on WACC, they could be passing up valuable growth opportunities. To help evaluate tradeoffs between growth and return, the author introduces a cash-based measure of corporate economic profit called Residual Cash Earnings. Unlike most traditional return and economic profit measures, Residual Cash Earnings, when expressed as a percentage of sales, provides a way for corporate managers to identify growth opportunities that, while producing current returns lower than WACC, are likely to add value over a multi-year time horizon. These new measures and analytical tools are suitable for strategic planning, budgeting, resource allocation, performance measurement, and rewards. Consistent application of these principles across these management processes provides a framework for constantly rebalancing the emphasis on growth and return to adapt to changes in the economy, industry, and competitive landscape.     

Size effects and economies of scale in European real estate companies

This study investigates scale economies in European real estate companies. We examine the effects of size on revenue, expense, profitability ratios and capital costs using panel data regression. We find that larger real estate companies in Europe are able to generate higher revenue per unit of company size, incur lower costs and produce higher returns. Net Operating Income ratios and return ratios increase while Selling, General and Administrative expense ratios decrease with the size of a company. However, we do not find evidence that larger companies have lower cost of debt or lower weighted average cost of capital. From our analysis, it is evident that particularly small firms can reap substantial economies of scale as they grow. However, the benefits of further growth tend to be much more modest for larger companies. Given REITs are on average larger than comparable non-REITs this may explain why REITs have lower economies of scale in expenses and revenues than Non-REIT real estate companies.     

Creating Value Through Best‐In‐Class Capital Allocation1

With the economy showing signs of recovery, companies are shifting their focus from liquidity and balance sheet concerns back towards capital allocation and value creation. This article provides a comprehensive framework to examine shareholder value creation through capital allocation, and discusses important capital allocation lessons that have re‐emerged over the last few years. Notable among the key lessons are the following:

• ? Growth alone does not guarantee value creation, which suggests that companies should allocate capital based on the economic value of each investment opportunity.
• ? The limits of diversification in a financial crisis should be considered when allocating capital and managing liquidity.
• ? Companies should be conservative with base‐case cash flow projections and incorporate the possibility of downside scenarios into their projections.
• ? It is important to incorporate all forms of capital when managing liquidity.
• ? Whether using a long‐term or current‐market approach, companies should be consistent throughout the cycle in their cost of capital methodology.
• ? Companies should continually rethink investments and allocate capital in an attempt to maintain a competitive advantage.
• ? Evaluate returns relative to risk and cost of capital, and not against the company's average ROIC.
• ? Comparing the IRR of share repurchases to new investments is not an apples‐to‐apples comparison.

Finally, companies should concentrate on the strategic uses and value of particular assets and not allow their decisions to be driven by the value they might receive relative to their initial cost.     

EFFECTS OF THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION ON INSURANCE BUSINESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Abstract: The European Monetary Union is intended to bring about a number of positive consequences, such as more effectiveness and lower cost in foreign trade, economic growth and – not least – an internationally competitive currency. In the short run, two of these effects are of particular interest, namely reduction of exchange rate risk and transaction cost. The paper first describes the scope of these problems, analyzing bid-ask spreads for EU-currencies and selected transaction costs. The particular prospects of insurance companies in EMU-countries depend mainly on their activities in foreign markets. We will therefore look into present foreign business in insurance and the relevance of the single currency for acquisition of production factors and capital investment decisions.     

EVA AND THE "NEW ECONOMY"

Some have observed that the new economy means the end of the EVA performance measurement and incentive compensation system. They claim that although the EVA system is useful for oldline companies with heavy investments in fixed assets, the efficient management of investor capital is no longer an imperative for newage firms that operate largely without buildings and machinery–and, in some cases, with negative working capital. This article argues that EVA is not only suitable for the emerging companies that lead the new economy, but even more important for such firms than for their “rust belt” predecessors. While there may be a new economy in terms of trade in new products and services, there is no new economics– the principles of economic valuation remain the same. As in the past, companies will create value in the future only insofar as they promise to produce returns on investor capital that exceed the cost of capital. It has made for sensational journalism to speak of companies with high valuations and no earnings, but this is in large part the result of an accounting framework that is systematically flawed. New economy companies spend much of their capital on R&D, marketing, and advertising. By treating these outlays as expenses against current profits, GAAP accounting presents a grossly distorted picture of both current and future profitability. By contrast, an EVA system capitalizes such investments and amortizes them over their expected useful life. For new economy companies, the effect of such adjustments on profitability can be significant. For example, in applying EVA accounting to Real Networks, Inc., the author shows that although the company reported increasing losses in recent years, its EVA has been steadily rising–a pattern of profitability that corresponds much more directly to the change in the company's market value over the same period. Thus, for stock analysts that follow new economy companies, the use of EVA will get you closer to current market values than GAAP accounting. And for companies intent on ensuring the right level of investment in intangibles– neither too much nor too little– EVA is likely to send the right message to managers and employees. The recent decline in the Nasdaq suggests that stock market investors are starting to look for the kind of capital efficiency encouraged by an EVA system.     

Penetrating the Book-to-Market Black Box: The R&D Effect

The book-to-market (BM) phenomenon – the positive association between BM and subsequent returns – looms large among capital market enigmas. Economic theory postulates that the difference between market and book values of companies reflects their future abnormal profits. We capture these abnormal profits for a large sample of science-based companies by estimating the value of the off-balance sheet investment generating those profits – the value of R&D capital – and show empirically: (i) Firms' R&D capital is associated with their subsequent stock returns. (ii) For R&D intensive firms, this 'R&D effect' subsumes the 'book-to-market effect.' (iii) The association between R&D and subsequent returns appears to result from an extra-market risk factor inherent in R&D, rather than from stock mispricing. We thus provide an explanation for the book-to-market phenomenon of R&D companies.     

Expectations‐Based Management

The authors begin by summarizing the results of their recently published study of the relation between stock returns and changes in several annual performance measures, including not only growth in earnings and EVA, but changes during the year in analysts' expectations about future earnings over three different periods: (1) the current year; (2) the following year; and (3) the three‐year period thereafter. The last of these measures—changes in analysts' expectations about three‐ to five‐year earnings—had by far the greatest explanatory “power” of any of the measures tested. Besides being consistent with the stock market's taking a long‐term, DCF approach to the valuation of companies, the authors' finding that investors seem to care most about earnings three to five years down the road has a number of important implications for financial management: First, a business unit doesn't necessarily create shareholder value if its return on capital exceeds the weighted average cost of capital—nor does an operation that fails to earn its WACC necessarily reduce value. To create value, the business's return must exceed what investors are expecting. Second, without forecasting returns on capital, management should attempt to give investors a clear sense of the firm's internal benchmarks, both for existing businesses and new investment. Third, management incentive plans should be based on stock ownership rather than stock options. Precisely because stock prices reflect expectations, the potential for prices to get ahead of realities gives options‐laden managers a strong temptation to manipulate earnings and manage for the short term.     

Are the Best Small Companies the Best Investments?

Previous research finds that large companies previously judged to be excellent growth companies have subsequently been poor investments. We examine small companies selected by Business Week on the basis of multiple criteria used in annual articles featuring highly rated growth companies. We study the investment performance over the three years before eleven annual Business Week publications and the three years after publication. We find positive excess returns in the pre‐publication period, but negative excess returns in the post‐publication period. This reversal in investment performance appears to be due to a mean‐reversion tendency in operating performance, in which the earnings and the past rates of return on capital of such companies subsequently decrease significantly.     

地方公共债务与资本回报率——来自新口径债务数据和三重机制检验的经验证据

资本回报率对于理解我国经济运行具有重要意义。本文通过匹配2006-2015年地级市层面的新口径债务数据和资本回报率数据,实证检验了地方公共债务扩张对资本回报率的影响效应及其地区异质性表现,并从宏观、中观和微观三个角度开展作用机制分析。研究发现:第一,地方公共债务扩张对我国宏观资本回报率产生了负面影响,此影响在经过一系列稳健性检验后依然存在;第二,地方公共债务的扩张通过降低基础设施投资效率、提高房地产业投资占比和挤出企业投资产生影响;第三,上述负面影响在非城市群、非大中城市和土地融资依赖度更高的城市表现更为突出。以上结论为深化地方政府投融资体制改革提供了政策参考,未来应注重债务资金的绩效管理和使用效率,促进经济高质量发展。     

Why EVA Bonus Plans Failed—and How to Revive Them

Most companies rely heavily on earnings to measure their financial performance, but earnings growth has at least two important weaknesses as a proxy for investor wealth. Current earnings growth may come at the expense of future earnings through, say, shortsighted cutbacks in corporate investment, including R&D or advertising. But growth in earnings per share can also be achieved by “overinvesting”—that is, committing ever more capital to projects with expected rates of return that, although well below the cost of capital, exceed the after‐tax cost of debt. Stock compensation has been the conventional solution to the first problem because it's a discounted cash flow value that is assumed to discourage actions that sacrifice future earnings. Economic profit—in its most popular manifestation, EVA—has been the conventional solution to the second problem because it includes a capital charge that penalizes low‐return investment. But neither of these conventional solutions appears to work very well in practice. Stock compensation isn't tied to business unit performance, and often fails to motivate corporate managers who believe that meeting consensus earnings is more important than investing to maintain future earnings. EVA often doesn't work well because increases in current EVA often come with reduced expectations of future EVA improvement—and reductions in current EVA are often accompanied by increases in future growth values. Since EVA bonus plans reward current EVA increases without taking account of changes in expected future growth values, they have the potential to encourage margin improvement that comes at the expense of business growth and discourage positive‐NPV investments that, because of longer‐run payoffs, reduce current EVA. In this article, the author demonstrates the possibility of overcoming such short‐termism by developing an operating model of changes in future growth value that can be used to calibrate “dynamic” EVA improvement targets that more closely align EVA bonus plan payouts with investors’ excess returns. With the use of “dynamic” targets, margin improvements that come at the expense of business growth can be discouraged by raising EVA performance targets, while growth investments can be encouraged by the use of lower EVA targets.     

Why Capital Efficiency Measures Are Rarely Used in Incentive Plans, and How to Change That

Despite the wide acceptance of DCF valuation and its corollary that value is created only by earning more than the cost of capital, very few companies use performance measures that focus on corporate efficiency in using capital—measures such as return on capital (ROC) or economic value added (EVA)—as the main basis for their top management incentive programs. In this article, the authors begin by documenting the surprisingly limited use of such measures in management incentive plans. Next they analyze three often cited problems—difficulty in retaining managers, discouragement of growth investment, and complexity—that could account for the limited use of such measures. Third and last, they suggest a number of adjustments to standard capital efficiency measures that are designed to address these problems and, in so doing, to give corporate directors more confidence in using measures like EVA to reward and hold managers accountable for value-adding performance.
In illustrating the problems encountered when using such performance measures, the article uses case studies of three long-time "EVA companies"—Briggs & Stratton, Herman Miller, and Manitowoc—to highlight the difficulty of using a "bonus bank" (or "clawback") system to hold managers fully accountable for earning a minimum return on capital. After presenting empirical data that shows "delayed productivity" of invested capital, the authors suggest that conventional capital efficiency measures can discourage value-increasing growth.
The article concludes by recommending that although measures like EVA used in combination with negative bonus banks provide the right incentives, EVA capital charges should be phased in gradually to reflect the delayed productivity of capital. At the same time, corporate boards should consider providing bonus bank "relief" when market and industry factors have excessively large negative effects on the performance measures and bonus awards.     

GOLBALIZATION, CORPORATE FINANCE, AND THE COST OF CAPITAL

International financial markets are progressively becoming one huge, integrated, global capital market—a development that is contributing to higher stock prices in developed as well as developing economies. For companies that are large and visible enough to attract global investors, having a global shareholder base means having a lower cost of capital and hence a greater equity value for two main reasons: First, because the risks of equity are shared among more investors with different portfolio exposures and hence a different “appetite” for bearing certain risks, equity market risk premiums should fall for all companies in countries with access to global markets. Although the largest reductions in cost of capital resulting from globalization will be experienced by companies in liberalizing economies that are gaining access to the global markets for the first time, risk premiums can also be expected to fall for firms in long-integrated markets as well. Second, when firms in countries with less-developed capital markets raise capital in the public markets of countries (like the U.S.) with highly developed markets, they get more than lower-cost capital; they also import at least aspects of the corporate governance systems that prevail in those markets. For companies accustomed to less-developed markets, raising capital overseas is likely to mean that more sophisticated investors, armed with more advanced technologies, will participate in monitoring their performance and management. And, in a virtuous cycle, more effective monitoring increases investor confidence in the future performance of those companies and so improves the terms on which they raise capital. Besides reducing market risk premiums and improving corporate governance, globalization also affects the systematic risk, or “beta,” of individual companies. In global markets, the beta of a firm's equity depends on how the stock contributes to the volatility not of the home market portfolio, but of the world market portfolio. For companies with access to global capital markets whose profitability is tied more closely to the local than to the global economy, use of the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) will overstate the cost of capital because risks that are not diversifiable within a national economy can be diversified by holding a global portfolio. Thus, to reflect the new reality of a globally determined cost of capital, all companies with access to global markets should consider using a global CAPM that views a company as part of the global portfolio of stocks. In making this argument, the article reviews the growing body of academic studies that provide evidence of the predictive power of the global CAPM as well as the reduction in world risk premiums.     

董事高管责任保险、权益资本成本与上市公司再融资能力

基于公司治理角度,使用2002~2012年沪深引进董事高管责任保险的上市公司为样本,考察了董事高管责任保险、权益资本成本和上市公司再融资能力三者之间的相互关系。研究表明：董事高管责任保险与上市公司的再融资能力负相关,与权益资本成本呈显著正相关关系;权益资本成本在董事高管责任保险和上市公司再融资能力影响机制中发挥中介作用。具体地,投资者因规避责任保险机制庇护下公司高管自利行为可招致的风险,导致上市公司权益资本成本增加,从而降低了公司再融资能力。     

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ROUNDTABLE ON: Enterprise‐Wide Risk Management

For many years, MBA students were taught that there was no good reason for companies that hedge large currency or commodity price exposures to have lower costs of capital, or trade at higher P/E multiples, than comparable companies that choose not to hedge such financial price risks. Corporate stockholders, just by holding well‐diversified portfolios, were said to neutralize any effects of currency and commodity price risks on corporate values. And corporate efforts to manage such risks were accordingly viewed as redundant, a waste of corporate resources on a function already performed by investors at far lower cost. But as this discussion makes clear, both the theory and the corporate practice of risk management have moved well beyond this perfect markets framework. The academics and practitioners in this roundtable begin by suggesting that the most important reason to hedge financial risks—and risk management's largest potential contribution to firm value—is to ensure a company's ability to carry out its strategic plan and investment policy. As one widely cited example, Merck's use of FX options to hedge the currency risk associated with its overseas revenues is viewed as limiting management's temptation to cut R&D in response to large currency‐related shortfalls in reported earnings. Nevertheless, one of the clear messages of the roundtable is that effective risk management has little to do with earnings management per se, and that companies that view risk management as primarily a tool for smoothing reported earnings have lost sight of its real economic function: maintaining access to low‐cost capital to fund long‐run investment. And a number of the panelists pointed out that a well‐executed risk management policy can be used to increase corporate debt capacity and, in so doing, reduce the cost of capital. Moreover, in making decisions whether to retain or transfer risks, companies should generally be guided by the principle of comparative advantage. If an outside firm or investor is willing to bear a particular risk at a lower price than the cost to the firm of managing that risk internally, then it makes sense to lay off that risk. Along with the greater efficiency and return on capital promised by such an approach, several panelists also pointed to one less tangible benefit of an enterprise‐wide risk management program—a significant improvement in the internal corporate dialogue, leading to a better understanding of all the company's risks and how they are affected by the interactions among its business units.     

Investment Timing for Dynamic Business Expansion

We investigate the timing of business expansion. With an indefinite sequence of growth opportunities that have constant returns to scale, current investment neither displaces nor impairs future returns. In a dynamic setting with expansion restricted to a fraction of firm size, the endogenously determined cost of capital uniformly exceeds the value maximizing return threshold for expansion. Taking this into account, a manager accelerates investment to facilitate larger and more valuable future investments when earnings stochastically improve. This result is the opposite of deferral that the investment literature recommends due to irreversibility. This means that the managerial application of the cost of capital as an expansion hurdle rate is improperly conservative.     

The information content of aggregate profitability

Recently, there has been significant interest in the information content of aggregate accounting profitability. I collect evidence on whether aggregate profitability captures information about changes in the cost of capital as predicted by classical investment theory. Consistent with these predictions, I find that the stock market return is negatively related to future accounting profitability for several years into the future. I provide evidence that this relation is most likely due to a positive association between changes in expected returns which exert a negative impact on stock returns and future profitability. These findings indicate that aggregate accounting profitability reflects significant economic content related to the cost of capital. This study is the first to link changes in accounting profitability to the market cost of capital under an investment-based mechanism.     

投资者教育发挥作用了吗?——来自公募基金个人投资者调查数据的证据

投资者教育是保障资本市场平稳运行、良性发展的重要举措,也是我国资本市场重要的基础性制度建设。本文利用20000多份全国公募基金个人投资者调查数据,分析了投资者教育对基金投资收益的影响,并基于行为金融学框架探究了其背后的作用机制。以往文献研究表明,金融知识水平对投资收益会产生显著影响,本文研究发现,获取金融知识的渠道也会影响投资收益。相对于自己学习金融知识、相关工作经验累积金融知识、向亲戚朋友学习金融知识,投资者教育(如参加金融机构的投资教育活动、接受金融经济类课程或培训)更有助于投资者缓解趋势追逐、频繁交易、处置效应等交易行为偏差,从而获得更高的投资收益。进一步分析表明,投资者教育通过提高“理性程度”来提升基金投资盈利概率、投资总收益率和年均收益率的中介效应分别为19.41%、17.09%和12.75%。此外,不同群体参与投资者教育的积极性和受教育效果存在显著差异,投资者教育要更多采取“分类教育”的形式。本文研究对进一步加强投资者教育、更好地推动资本市场发展具有一定的参考意义。     

Drivers of Shareholder Returns in Tech Industries (or How to Make Sense of Amazon's Market Value)

Earnings according to GAAP do a notoriously poor job of explaining the current values of the most successful high‐tech companies, which in recent years have experienced remarkable growth in revenues and market capitalizations. But if GAAP earnings fail to account for the values of such companies, are there other measures that do better? The authors address this question in two main ways. They begin by summarizing the findings of their recent study of both the operating and the stock‐market performance of 169 publicly traded tech companies (with market caps of at least $1 billion). The aim of the study was to identify which of the many indicators of corporate operating performance—including growth in revenues, EBITDA margins, and returns on equity—have had the strongest correlation with shareholder returns over a relatively long period of time. The study's main conclusion is that investors appear to be looking for signs of neither growth nor efficiency in using capital alone, but for an optimal mix or balancing of those goals. And that mix, as the study also suggests, is captured in a cash‐flow‐based variant of “residual income” the authors call “residual cash earnings,” or RCE. In the second part of their article, the authors show how and why RCE does a much better job than reported net income or EPS of explaining the current market value of Amazon.com , one of the best‐performing tech companies in the world. Mainly by treating R&D spending as an investment of capital rather than an expense, RCE reveals the value of a company that is distinguished by both the amount and the productivity of its ongoing investment—both of which have been obscured by GAAP.