Don't shoot yourself in the foot! A (real-effort task) experiment on income redistribution and voting

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment that investigates the Meltzer–Richard model of equilibrium tax rates in which individuals are either low or high skilled workers and face a real-effort task that includes leisure at the work place. We find that a large proportion of low-skilled workers vote for the lowest tax rate (the one that gives them the lowest payoff), especially when the alternative tax rate is very high. However, this proportion is significantly reduced in treatments in which the subjects are given extra information about how the tax operates in redistributing income. This result suggests that the lack of information about the role of taxes in income redistribution may be an important factor in explaining the counter-intuitive voting behavior of low-income voters over income redistribution. We also find some support that the prospect of upward mobility and the belief in the negative effect of taxes on productivity make low-income voters support low tax rates, especially when the alternative tax rate is very high.     

A second chance at success: A political economy perspective

This paper characterizes a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following concerning the cost of a second chance. First, when the cost is low, the economy is characterized by high levels of upward mobility and inequality, and a low tax burden supported by the poor with prospects for upward mobility. Second, when the cost is high, there are multiple equilibria with various patterns of upward mobility, inequality and redistribution. Numerical examples show that the shift from a high-cost economy to a low-cost economy may reduce social welfare.     

Income inequality and income bias in voter turnout

In the era of growing income inequality around the world, it remains inconclusive how higher income inequality affects income bias in turnout (i.e., high-income citizens vote more likely than low-income citizens). Using large-scale cross-national survey data, we show that (1) strong income bias in turnout exists in many parts of the world, (2) higher income inequality is related to lower income bias in turnout by demobilizing high-income citizens and mobilizing low-income citizens, and (3) this relationship is partly explained by the pattern that vote buying is more common in societies with higher income inequality and thus mobilizes low-income citizens but decreases political efficacy among high-income citizens. Ultimately, this study suggests that growing income inequality may not exaggerate political inequality, but may challenge the legitimacy of democratic elections.     

Household income mobility in rural China: 1989–2006

This article analyzes household income mobility in rural China between 1989 and 2006. The results indicate that incomes in rural China are highly mobile. The high degree of rank and quantity mobility implies re-ranking and mean convergence in income distribution, but the disparity between them also enlarged with leveling-up and Gini divergence brought about by economic growth. In addition, there exists considerable transitorily poor and rich in positional mobility. Though, transitory movement provides an opportunity for both poor and rich and decreases long-term inequality, it also causes considerable income fluctuations and economic insecurity. Moreover, the equalizing effect of income mobility on income inequality is weakening.     

Intergenerational Mobility: What Do We Care About? What Should We Care About?

Inequality threatens intergenerational income mobility, but different types of inequality threaten mobility in different ways, raising distinct policy challenges. This is why empirical researchers should be agnostic in the choice of statistics they use to measure intergenerational mobility. I argue that Australia is on the whole characterised by a good deal of intergenerational mobility, but that a full picture requires judicious international comparisons across different dimensions of mobility citizens care about, mobility not just of incomes, but also of position and direction, particularly the scope for upward mobility.     

Political ideology and the intragenerational prospect of upward mobility

We re-examine the effect of prospects of upward mobility (POUM) on the support for redistribution. Unlike previous studies, we analyse this relation in an intragenerational context and consider the moderating effect of political ideology through which mobility expectations affect redistributive preferences. We find that the POUM effect is conditional on political preferences. That is, we find that only for right-wing individuals expected upward income mobility negatively affects support for redistribution. Left-wing individuals prefer redistribution, regardless of expected upward income movements.     

Growth versus equity: A CGE analysis for effects of factor-biased technical progress on economic growth and employment

With factor-biased technical progress described as labor-saving and skill-biased technical changes, there are concerns that technological innovation can lead to unemployment and widen inequality in the economy. This study explores impacts of factor-biased technical changes on the economic system in terms of economic growth, employment, and distribution, using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The results show that technological innovation contributes to higher level of economic growth with productivity improvements. However, our analysis suggests that economic growth accompanied by skill- and capital-biased technical progress disproportionately increases demand for capital and high-skilled labor over skilled and unskilled labor. This shift in the value-added composition is found to deepen income inequality, as more people in higher income groups benefit from skill premium and capital earnings. Our results suggest that policymakers should prepare a wide range of policy measures, such as reforms in educational programs and taxation systems, in order to ensure sustainable growth.     

Growth,inequality, and poverty reduction in developing countries: Recent global evidence

The study presents comparative global evidence on the transformation of economic growth to poverty reduction in developing countries, with emphasis on the role of income inequality. The focus is on the period since the early-mid-1990s when growth in these countries as a group has been relatively strong, surpassing that of the advanced economies. Both regional and country-specific data are analyzed for the $1.25 and $2.50-level poverty headcount ratios using World Bank Povcalnet data. The study finds that on average income growth has been the major driving force behind both the declines and increases in poverty. The study, however, documents substantial regional and country differences that are masked by this ‘average’ dominant-growth story. While in the majority of countries, growth was the major factor behind falling or increasing poverty, inequality, nevertheless, played the crucial role in poverty behavior in a large number of countries. And, even in those countries where growth has been the main driver of poverty-reduction, further progress could have occurred under relatively favorable income distribution. For more efficient policymaking, therefore, idiosyncratic attributes of countries should be emphasized. In general, high initial levels of inequality limit the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty while growing inequality increases poverty directly for a given level of growth. It would seem judicious, therefore, to accord special attention to reducing inequality in certain countries where income distribution is especially unfavorable. Unfortunately, the present study also points to the limited effects of growth and inequality-reducing policies in low-income countries.     

The microfoundation of macroeconomic populism: The effects of economic inequality on public inflation aversion

Previous work on the politics of monetary policy has focused on the role of distributive motives stemming from individual characteristics such as income or factoral/sectoral interests in citizens' formation of monetary policy preferences. However, the existing literature has paid little attention to how a country's overall distributive context, namely, its level of economic inequality, affects citizens' preferences vis-à-vis price stability and employment. This article argues that as inequality pushes more citizens below a society's average income, there is more demand for redistribution through higher employment and increased fiscal spending, each of which can be better supported by expansionary monetary policy. This means that inequality makes citizens more tolerant of inflation. This study uses the International Social Survey Program, the Integrated Values Surveys, and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, which together include 293,100 respondents from 53 countries between the years 1976 and 2016 to demonstrate that overall, inequality significantly moderates citizens' inflation aversion.     

收入分配不平等、有效需求与经济增长——一个基于中国经济转型期的实证研究

本文从有效需求角度入手,探究中国经济转型期经济增长与收入分配不平等之间的关系,并运用中国1978-2005年间28个省市的面板数据,通过面板数据单位根检验、协整检验与误差修正模型,对中国经济增长与收入分配不平等、有效需求、劳动力、投资、教育以及收入分配不平等和有效需求交互影响之间的长期关系和短期关系进行了研究。结果显示,中国经济转型期经济增长与收入分配不平等、有效需求具有长期的均衡关系,收入分配不平等通过有效需求机制阻碍了经济增长,且在短期内效果也非常显著。     

Misperceiving inequality

A vast literature suggests that economic inequality has important consequences for politics and public policy. Higher inequality is thought to increase demand for income redistribution in democracies and to discourage democratization and promote class conflict and revolution in dictatorships. Most such arguments crucially assume that ordinary people know how high inequality is, how it has been changing, and where they fit in the income distribution. Using a variety of large, cross‐national surveys, we show that, in recent years, ordinary people have had little idea about such things. What they think they know is often wrong. Widespread ignorance and misperceptions emerge robustly, regardless of data source, operationalization, and measurement method. Moreover, perceived inequality—not the actual level—correlates strongly with demand for redistribution and reported conflict between rich and poor. We suggest that most theories about political effects of inequality need to be reframed as theories about effects of perceived inequality.     

WHO SUPPORTS REDISTRIBUTION?*

Using an original data set, we investigated the determinants of individual preferences over income redistribution in Japan. Although income level is negatively correlated with support for redistribution, it does not explain much; there are other important factors that relate to dynamics and uncertainty, such as income risk. Even after controlling for income, both risk‐averse individuals and those who expect to be unemployed in the future favour greater redistribution. Interaction of ageing and mobility prove important. The relatively poor elderly, who presumably have few prospects of upward mobility, strongly support greater redistribution, whereas younger people are less sympathetic to such a policy.     

Positive arithmetic of the welfare state

This paper argues that social security enjoys wider political support than other welfare programs because: (i) retirees constitute the most homogeneous voting group, and (ii) the intragenerational redistribution component of social security induces low-income young to support this system. In a dynamically efficient overlapping generation economy with earnings heterogeneity, we show that, for sufficient income inequality and enough elderly in the population, a welfare system composed of a within-cohort redistribution scheme and an unfunded social security system represents the political equilibrium of a two-dimensional majoritarian election. Social security is sustained by retirees and low-income young; while intragenerational redistribution by low-income young. Unlike unidimensional voting model, our model suggests that to assess how changes in inequality affect the welfare state, the income distribution should be decomposed by age groups.     

The Dynamics of Exclusion and Fiscal Conservatism

This paper studies the impact of income inequality on fiscal conservatism when an increase in inequality essentially affects the bottom of the income distribution. It is argued that, contrary to what is generally assumed in the economic literature, inequality will then be associated with less, rather than more, redistributive taxation. Furthermore, if the poor are liquidity constrained then the positive association between inequality and fiscal conservatism will increase the persistence in the dynamics of income distribution and possibly lead to multiple steady states. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E62, H2, H3, J24, J62, O15.     

The eye of the beholder. Reconsidering the notions of pro‐poor growth and progressivity,with an application to Vietnam

Both policymakers and economists have tried to find criteria to assess whether economic growth is pro‐poor. In this paper we reconsider the inequality‐oriented approach originally proposed by Jenkins and Van Kerm. They look at the changes in the whole income distribution, and decompose the change in income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, into a progressivity and a reranking component. They define a pro‐poor (or progressive) change as one where the changes in income are more to the benefit of those who are initially poor than to the benefit of those who are initially rich. We challenge this assumption, and maintain that also the point of view of the finally poor and the finally rich should be taken into account when evaluating whether growth is pro‐poor. We suggest a new decomposition method, based on an inequality index of the generalized entropy family, which allows the change in income inequality to be decomposed exactly into a forward‐looking and a backward‐looking progressivity component. Our empirical illustration, using data from household surveys in Vietnam, shows that economic growth in Vietnam has been pro‐poor from a forward‐looking perspective, but not from a backward‐looking perspective.     

Income inequality and economic growth

Despite the extensive existing literature on income inequality and economic growth, there remains considerable disagreement on the effect of inequality on economic growth. Existing literatures find either a positive or a negative relationship. In this paper, we attempt to theoretically examine that relationship with a stochastic optimal growth model. We make the disagreement clear within a single model. We conclude (i) that both are possible – that is, higher inequality can retard growth in the early stage of economic development, and can encourage growth in a near steady state, (ii) that income redistribution by high income tax does not always reduce income inequality. Income inequality can be reduced by higher income tax in a near steady state, but it cannot be reduced in the early stage of economic development, and (iii) that two government polices – rapid economic growth and low income inequality – can be achieved by low income tax in the early stage of economic development, but both cannot be achieved simultaneously in a near steady state.     

Income Distribution and Redistribution

Abstract:

It seems that some observable structural trends in recent decades such as globalization, skills-biased technological advances and level of unionization all over the world have been affected by income distribution, in addition to other economic variables. The latest trends in the 2000s exhibited a widening gap between the rich and the poor not only in some of the already high inequality countries, but also in traditionally low inequality countries. In order to mitigate inequality, many countries have followed redistribution policies (taxes and transfers). In this article, we will mainly focus on the effects of redistribution policies consisting of income taxes and social transfers on income inequality using the micro data in Turkey. Additionally, since financial crises have been becoming more important with increasing frequency of crises all over the world, we also search for the effects of crises on inequality and the degree of mitigation of redistributive policies, especially during the Global Recession.     

Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution

Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.     

Immigration,Conflict, and Redistribution

In this paper, we analyze how the possibility of conflict between natives and immigrants shapes income redistribution in developed democracies. This possibility can generate income redistribution towards immigrants even if they have no voting rights. We show that the threat of conflict between natives and immigrants lowers vertical income redistribution (from the rich to the poor) as the level of immigration increases. The opposite holds for horizontal income redistribution (from natives to immigrants), which increases with the level of immigration. Income inequality weakens the negative effect of immigration on vertical redistribution, but it also reduces horizontal redistribution. These theoretical predictions are consistent with the results of our empirical analysis on data from 29 European countries: larger immigrant populations are associated with more redistribution towards immigrants and lower vertical redistribution.     

Income Mobility and Income Inequality in Rural China

The economic literature has argued for a long time that income mobility could attenuate the degree of cross-sectional inequality by offering people opportunities to improve their socio-economic position. Using the longitudinal data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) from 1989 to 2011, we measure income mobility as the degree to which longer-term incomes are distributed more or less equally than yearly income. Five main results are emphasized. First, there is strong income mobility in rural China that partly offsets yearly income inequality. Second, income mobility has decreased since the 2000s, indicating that income distribution is becoming more rigid. Third, mobility is mainly associated with transitory income fluctuations, particularly in the two tails of the distribution. Fourth, income mobility has an equalizing effect on income distribution. Fifth, we show that non-agricultural income mobility has substantially increased over the period and that its equalizing nature has also recently increased. While the development of the non-agriculture sector in rural China was a crucial factor in explaining the increase in rural inequality until the mid-2000s, we suggest that the large-scale generalisation of such non-agricultural opportunities partly accounts for the decline in rural inequality observed since the mid-2000s.