商业银行住房抵押贷款风险管理研究——基于VaR的Credit Metrics模型分析

随着我国各商业银行不同程度地暴露出住房抵押贷款违约风险,关于商业银行住房抵押贷款风险管理的研究逐渐成为热点论题.本文选用基于VaR的Credit Metrics模型来验证该模型在商业银行风险管理中的实用性.     

商业银行个人抵押贷款违约风险管理研究

当住房消费成为新的消费热点后,房地产金融业务的重心也逐渐从房地产开发贷款向个人住房贷款业务转移。任何金融业务的核心问题都是风险问题,个人住房抵押贷款也不例外。本文以研究个人住房抵押贷款违约风险理论为出发点,应用机理分析的方法,借鉴西方发达国家的管理经验,试图发现现阶段中国个人住房抵押贷款违约风险管理中的主要问题,提出完善、提高商业银行防范个人住房抵押贷款违约风险管理水平的对策。     

住房公积金个人住房贷款违约风险及管理对策

住房公积金管理中心所承担的公积金贷款风险主要表现在借款人风险及担保方式风险,当前我国个人住房贷款违约风险管理存在对个人住房贷款违约风险的严重性认识不够、对个人住房贷款申请人的审查缺少一个科学的方法与量化标准等问题。要有效降低个人住房贷款违约风险需要实施有重点的政策倾斜、强化违约风险管理的意识、提高个人住房贷款违约风险管理技术及全面提高从业人员的素养。     

浅析房价与商业银行的信用风险

商业银行的风险管理中首要的是防范信用风险，考察客户的现金流状况来度量银行面对的违约风险。房产商和潜在的购房者都需要银行的贷款支持，对于这两类客户群体，他们的违约风险中有个很关键的因素就是房价，商业银行是否更加倾向于较高的房价还是相反？     

基于期权理论的住房抵押贷款风险概率研究

我国房地产价格走势争议较大,银行业住房抵押贷款违约风险压力也大,这使得对于商业银行住房抵押贷款风险管理的研究逐渐成为学术界和企业界的热点论题。本文选用基于期权理论的KMV模型来验证该模型在商业银行风险管理中的实用性。     

我国银行业抵押贷款违约损失率现状分析及政策建议

抵押作为银行信用风险缓释技术,通过对违约概率和违约损失率的影响发挥缓解信用风险的功能。本文总结了国内外违约损失率的研究概况,分析了当前我国银行抵押贷款业务中存在的问题,并据此给出相关的政策建议。     

银行个人贷款业务风险管理的方法初探

从20世纪90年代末以来我国银行个人贷款业务的发展非常迅猛。银行个人贷款业务的不断发展，使得贷款余额不断的上升，这说明我国银行个人贷款业务开始步入了高速成长期。但是，我国的银行个人贷款业务毕竟属于一种新兴业务，对于如何规避银行个人贷款业务的风险却没有一个可以现行借鉴的模式利用，也没有形成一套完善的风险管理体系，这对于银行个人贷款业务的安全平稳发展是不利的，在这种情况下，建立一套科学合理的银行个人贷款业务风险管理体系是非常急迫的，本文对银行个人贷款业务风险管理的方法进行了探讨。     

商业银行个人住房抵押贷款违约风险管理研究

当住房消费成为新的消费热点后，房地产金融业务的重心也逐渐从房地产开发贷款向个人住房贷款业务转移。任何金融业务的核心问题都是风险问题，个人住房抵押贷款也不例外。本文主要从我国个人住房抵押贷款发展现状出发分析个人住房抵押贷款违约风险原因以及如何更好地完善、提高商业银行防范个人住房抵押贷款违约风险管理水平的对策。     

国家助学贷款中银行与学生的博弈分析

国家助学贷款是国家为解决贫困大学生无法缴纳学费问题所采取的资助政策，但是高违约率使这一资助政策的施行陷入了困境。本文采用完全信息动态博弈的方法建立了国家助学贷款中银行与学生的博弈模型，指出博弈的均衡结果取决于银行对违约学生实施惩罚的成本大小，提出子博弈精炼纳什均衡为（0，0）、（贷，还），最后指出使博弈双方收益最大化的均衡结果为（贷，还）。     

我国商业银行运用贷款组合防范信贷风险的探讨

近年来,随着金融的全球化趋势及金融市场的波动性加剧,商业银行的风险管理一直是国际国内金融界关注的焦点。商业银行信贷风险管理的手段和内容发生了很大的变化,现代信息技术在风险管理中发挥着越来越重要的作用。与传统风险管理主要依赖定性分析不同,现代风险管理越来越重视定量分析,大量运用数据来识别、衡量和监测风险,使得风险管理越来越多地体现出客观性和科学性的特征。组合贷款是基于资产组合理论,通过优化信贷组合,在银行风险容忍度以内追求组合风险回报率最大化的新型管理模式。本文主要研究银行风险中的信贷风险,研究的角度是从商业银行的角度出发,以银行的主要信贷业务为研究范围,对银行信贷风险的防范进行探讨。本文介绍了传统信贷风险的测度方法,分析了国外先进的信贷风险度量新方法,结合我国的实际情况,提出我国商业银行科学测度信贷风险的现实选择——通过组合贷款来防范商业银行信贷风险,分析了国内民生银行组合贷款在信贷管理中运用情况的案例,并提出措施。     

Developing a Risk Group Predictive Model for Korean Students Falling into Bad Debt

Using direct loan data for 2012 to 2014 from the Korea Student Aid Foundation, we develop a risk group predictive model for borrowers defaulting on their loans. We used a logistic regression model and the Cox proportional hazards model to develop the risk predictive model. We verified the validity of the models using a receiver operating characteristic curve and a validation dataset. The present study shows that area under the receiver operating characteristic curves is similar for the models and that the major influencing factors for defaulting on their loans are household income, whether a national grant was received, age, whether more than two accounts are overdue, field of study and the monthly repayment amount. The risk group predictive model in this study will be the basis for more efficient management of direct student loans.     

论我国商业银行小微企业信贷风险控制

我国银行对小微企业的信贷风险控制普遍存在着信贷风险评估建设滞后、贷款类型单一、贷款审查制度欠规范、缺乏针对小微贷款风险控制机制等问题,主要是由于信息不对称、微型贷款的成本较高、银行缺乏信贷风险控制思想、小微企业自身的内部控制不健全等原因所造成的。针对小微企业不同的信贷风险类型,运用各种风险防范手段,严格控制小微企业信贷业务流程的创新优化思路,并从经营管理思路、贷款营销、贷前调查、贷款审查、贷款审批、贷后管理方面提出了科学可行的对策。本文对小微企业信贷风险控制进行了系统深入的研究,力求对我国商业银行未来小微贷款的发展起到一定的指导作用,对其他银行发展小微企业贷款也具有借鉴意义。     

Information contents of collateral under heterogeneous borrower qualities on the bank loans market in China

We analyze the risk of default and provision of collateral for bank loans made to firms of varied credit qualities using a unique dataset obtained from a major state-owned commercial bank in China. Both high and low quality borrowers provide collateral more often than medium quality debtors do. Using models that explicitly incorporate heterogeneous borrower qualities, we find a positive relation between collateralization and risk of default for loans issued to debtors with low credit ratings. In contrast, collateral provided by debtors with high credit ratings is negatively associated with the risk of default. These results suggest that low quality borrowers may be required to provide collateral at the bank's request to mitigate moral hazard problem. On the other hand, high quality borrowers may provide collateral willingly to signal quality in order to mitigate adverse selection problem when competing for getting access to bank loans. Our findings shed new lights on different information contents of collateral on the bank loans market of China, and have important implications for banks in screening, contracting and monitoring the risk of commercial loans for clients with diverse credit qualities.     

大学生信用缺失与大学生信用评价指标体系建立

国家助学贷款实施以来虽然取得了很大的进展,但仍存在许多问题,主要有贷款需求明显供小于求和贷款违约率不断升高两个方面。本文致力于建立大学生信用评价指标体系,用于预测国家助学贷款风险的等级,并以此作为贷款发放的重要依据。     

高校国家助学贷款诚信机制的构建

在社会信用缺失和相关法律、法规不健全的背景下,国家助学贷款违约风险问题成为制约其健康发展的巨大挑战.传统的助学贷款诚信教育只是从道德层面对大学生的诚信行为进行规范,并以此唤醒他们的诚信意识,缺乏法律、制度等方面的约束.通过分析助学贷款失信的原因,提出构建高校国家助学贷款诚信机制的对策.     

Regulatory Constraints on Performance-Based Managerial Compensation,Bank Monitoring,and Aggregate Loan Quality

This paper evaluates the effects of binding regulatory restraints on the rate of performance-based management compensation within a banking framework in which a primary function of bank management teams is to monitor loans in order to eliminate deadweight default losses. Available management teams are endowed with heterogeneous levels of monitoring efficiencies, and obtaining services from more efficient monitoring teams requires payment of higher rates of performance-based compensation. In equilibrium, a fraction of banks choose to employ management teams that monitor. With or without binding capital requirements, imposing binding restraints on the allowed rate of performance-based compensation results either in lower bank efficiency or in a reduced fraction of monitoring banks and, hence, lower aggregate loan quality.     

Credit rationing of a Bayesian bank with simple screening technologies

This paper deals with credit rationing in bank loan markets. The bank is assumed to act as a Bayesian statistician to improve its subjective distribution of the default rate and its ability to identify risky loan applicants. Credit rationing arises as a result of profit maximization of the bank, which takes into account the expected amount of overall default as well as loans demanded by identified defaulters who are denied credit. The comparative statics depend, among other things, on the relative size of prior and sample means of the default rate, and on the form of the bank's information cost function.     

存货质押贷款中银行对借款人的甄别—分离均衡

抵押贷款仅考虑借款人信用风险,存货质押贷款还应考虑质物价格风险。当银行时借款人事前违约概率具有不对称信息时,在DannyBen—shahar抵押贷款模型基础上,综合考虑借款人信用风险和质物价格风险,证明存在高风险借款人选择（高利率、高贷款价值比）合同,低风险借款人选择（低利率、低贷款价值比合同）的唯一分离均衡。     

Commercial Lenders' Use of Accounting Information in Interaction with Source Credibility*

Abstract. The credibility of individual commercial borrowers, which lenders refer to as “character,” affects lenders' use of accounting information. This effect of source credibility is subtle compared to the effect of external audits on the use of financial statements in other contexts. It is hypothesized that accounting facts must be positive (supporting loan approval) for character facts to influence lenders' judgments and loan decisions. Character facts will not affect judgments or loan decisions significantly when accounting facts are negative (supporting loan denial). This accounting/character interaction is predicted to become stronger as lenders gain experience and develop criteria for evaluating character. In an experiment, lenders read a loan application that contained facts concerning accounting, character, and other information; the accounting and character facts were manipulated to be either positive or negative, resulting in four versions of the application. The lenders recommended approval or denial of the loan and estimated the likelihood that the loan would be fully repaid (a risk estimate). Interactive effects of accounting and character facts on lenders' loan decisions and risk estimates were found, but the accounting/character interactions generally did not vary with experience level. One notable difference was that experienced lenders never approved loans when accounting facts were negative, but inexperienced lenders sometimes did.     

从次贷危机看消费信贷违约防范机制的失灵

本文以美国次贷危机为例,分析了消费信贷市场违约防范机制失灵的问题。本文指出,政府隐含担保的存在是导致消费信贷市场违约防范机制失灵的真正原因,可能使消费信贷市场出现大范围的违约并威胁整个金融体系的稳定。美国次级抵押贷款市场上爆发的危机不是偶然的,恰恰是消费信贷市场上违约风险防范机制失灵的一个集中反应。