THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR IMMIGRATION1

Immigration into the UK has increased in response to high labour demand in the recent past. This additional supply of labour has helped keep interest rates lower, and growth higher, than they might have been otherwise. The longer‐term impact of higher immigration may be an increase in trend productivity growth. Although the evidence on such long‐term economic effects is incomplete, there is no reason to believe market principles ‐ or fundamental freedoms ‐ are any less relevant when it comes to flows of people rather than goods or capital.     

Opportunities to work at home in the context of work‐life balance

Discussion of ‘work‐life balance’ and ‘family‐friendly’ employment is much in vogue among politicians and business leaders. Often, but not always, working at home is included within such practices. However, the concepts of work‐life balance and family‐friendly are commonly left ill‐defined by researchers and policymakers alike. In this article we outline formal definitions of these terms, which place spatial issues ‐ and hence working at home ‐ at the heart of the debate. This leads us on to examine working at home through the theoretical lens offered by attempts to explain the rise of work‐life balance arrangements. Twelve hypotheses emerge from the literature and are tested on the management data contained in the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey or WERS98. Many of these hypotheses pass weak statistical tests but fail on stronger logistic regression tests. The article shows that the option to work at home is more likely to be available in the public sector, large establishments and work environments in which individuals are responsible for the quality of their own output. These workplaces are typically less unionised but not especially feminised.     

Why we aren't predicting a global recession

• ? Fears that the global economy is heading into a recession are rising. But while we cannot ignore the risks that a recession could be brewing, our baseline assumption is still for a modest growth slowdown from here.
• ? The global economy is in a similar position to 2012 and 2015, as mounting uncertainties dampen growth. This time, trade tensions are a high‐profile culprit rather than the possible collapse of the eurozone or a China hard landing.
• ? In the previous two cases global growth fell to around 2.5% ‐ around the rates seen in Q2 this year ‐ only to then rebound. Our baseline forecasts assume a similar mini cycle, albeit with only a modest growth rebound.
• ? We also assume that further major adverse shocks won't materialise, and that insurance policy moves by central banks will stop a plunge in investment and households from panicking.
• ? Still, recession fears should be taken seriously ‐ slowdowns can become self‐perpetuating. Once annual GDP growth has fallen by over 1ppt from its peak, the eventual decline typically ends up being much larger ‐ of the seven growth slowdowns since the late 1970s where annual growth slowed by over 1ppt ‐ four resulted in either a global recession or only a narrow escape from one.
• ? With US‐China tensions unlikely to recede and factors like the US yield curve inversion adding to the air of gloom, the latest downturn could gain momentum.
• ? Although reduced macro volatility and anchored inflation have made it easier for policymakers to deliver soft landings, the effectiveness of monetary policy has waned. And with China no longer acting as spender of last resort, it's vital that governments in advanced economies stand ready to pick up the slack

     

Subsampling Inference with K Populations and a Non‐standard Behrens–Fisher Problem

We revisit the methodology and historical development of subsampling, and then explore in detail its use in hypothesis testing, an area which has received surprisingly modest attention. In particular, the general set‐up of a possibly high‐dimensional parameter with data from K populations is explored. The role of centring the subsampling distribution is highlighted, and it is shown that hypothesis testing with a data‐centred subsampling distribution is more powerful. In addition we demonstrate subsampling’s ability to handle a non‐standard Behrens–Fisher problem, i.e., a comparison of the means of two or more populations which may possess not only different and possibly infinite variances, but may also possess different distributions. However, our formulation is general, permitting even functional data and/or statistics. Finally, we provide theory for K ‐ sample U ‐ statistics that helps establish the asymptotic validity of subsampling confidence intervals and tests in this very general setting.     

Has the ECB increased interest rates too soon?

Even though the Eurozone recovery is far from entrenched, the ECB decided to raise interest rates towards the end of 2005 and another hike is expected soon. Those in the ECB who have been looking for a reason to start tightening for some time can point to an inflation rate that remains stubbornly above target as a justification. In this article we find that the price rises of non‐energy industrial goods ‐ particularly those for clothing and footwear ‐ have remained very sticky when compared to the deflation seen in countries like the UK. A lack of competitive forces may be an issue ‐ the impact of China and India on goods prices does not seem to be fully feeding through to consumers. And weak productivity in the distribution sector may have prevented retailers from driving down prices to the same extent as in the UK. Does the current ECB action form the start of a prolonged tightening cycle as seen in the US? Despite worries over asset price and credit growth ‐ and here we argue that the ECB's reliance on monetary aggregates as a signal of impending inflation is misguided ‐ there is a possibility that the ECB has acted at the same time that inflation is finally set to subside. Consequently, we expect a "wait and see" approach to further moves, and unless growth comes in much stronger than the 2.2% we expect in 2006, rates should end the year at around 2½%.     

Meagre house price growth may kill off a UK obsession

• ? Short of an unlikely jump in interest rates or a no‐deal Brexit proving more damaging than we expect, we think that positive but sluggish growth will continue to characterise UK house prices for the foreseeable future.
• ? Mooted reforms to stamp duty could prompt some upward price pressure, although stretched affordability and the end of ‘Help to Buy’ will work in the opposite direction.
• ? Meanwhile, compared to the dominant role interest rates play in driving house prices, fulfilling the government's housebuilding goals ‐ even if these very ambitious target could be met ‐ would make only a modest difference.

     

Bookshelf 2000

Books reviewed: Michael Poole, Employee Participation in Europe: A Case Study in the British and French Gas Industrials Emmanuel Mermet, The Role of Employer Associations and Labour Unions in the EMU‐Institutional Requirements for European Economic Policies Torsten Müller, The Establishment of European Works Councils ‐ From Information Committee to Social Actor Philip James, Prevention at the Workplace Michal Federowicz, Polish Transition Ten Years ‐ Processes and Perspectives Michael Gold, Fundamental Social Rights at Work in the European Community A.V.Jose, Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Italy     

Looser financial conditions carry a sting in the tail

• ? Against a long list of headwinds facing the economy, one apparent saving grace has been a relaxation in financial conditions since the start of 2019. Our UK Financial Conditions Index presently sits at its loosest in 18 months.
• ? Some of the lowest real interest rates in the world and a currency trading close to the weakest on record represent, all else equal, are powerful reflationary forces for the UK. But the fundamental cause of loose conditions ‐ the rising no‐deal Brexit odds ‐ mean they carry a sting in the tail.
• ? Conversely, the likely rise in market interest rates and sterling that would follow our expectation of a Brexit deal implies an overall positive for the economy could be dampened by tighter financial conditions.

     

Alternative policy options for combatting a downturn

• ? With limited scope for conventional monetary policy options, central banks and governments may need to turn to alternative approaches to combat slowing global growth and respond to economic shocks.
• ? Our analysis shows that not only do governments in advanced economies have limited room to cut rates but that doing so has proved less effective in boosting growth in recent years. This increases the need to look at alternatives, such as negative interest rates, renewed QE and fiscal stimulus.
• ? While negative interest rates have helped reduce borrowing costs in some economies, the impact on banks has been ambiguous. Also, lowering rates further into negative territory could be hard without incurring significant costs.
• ? QE in the form practised up to now is also likely to be less effective than in the past due to low yields, narrow risk spreads and high asset valuations. So, a deeper downturn might require more radical QE ‐ buying corporate bonds, bank loans and equities ‐ which comes with significant drawbacks.
• ? Some central bankers are starting to acknowledge the limits of monetary action, with the next step being to consider fiscal action as a more effective alternative ‐ as argued recently by the likes of Larry Summers.
• ? In our view, fiscal policy is likely to be especially effective in a climate of weak growth and low rates, with large multiplier effects. Advanced economies have more scope for fiscal stimulus than often recognised and could finance a large public investment programme by issuing ultra‐cheap long‐dated debt

     

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION: WHAT HAS PAST DECADE'S EMPIRICAL RESEARCH TAUGHT US? A SURVEY

Corruption has fierce impacts on economic and societal development and is subject to a vast range of institutional, jurisdictional, societal, and economic conditions. It is this paper's aim to provide a reassessment and a comprehensive state ‐ of ‐ the ‐ art survey of existing literature on corruption and its causes and effects. A particularly strong focus is put on presenting and discussing insights resulting from empirical research and contrasting recent with older findings.     

Book reviews

Book review in this article THE VERDICT OF PEACE ‐ BRITAIN BETWEEN HER YESTERDAY AND THE FUTURE Corelli Barnett DOES EDUCATION MATTER? MYTHS ABOUT EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH Alison Wolf DEMOCRACY: THE GOD THAT FAILED Hans‐Hermann Hoppe STRAW DOGS, THOUGHTS ON HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS John Gray THE ECONOMICS OF SPORT I AND II Andrew Zimbalist (ed.) IQ AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS Richard Lynn and Tatu Vanhanen HOW ECONOMICS BECAME A MATHEMATICAL SCIENCE E. Roy Weintraub     

Beyond Early Warning Indicators: High School Dropout and Machine Learning

This paper combines machine learning with economic theory in order to analyse high school dropout. It provides an algorithm to predict which students are going to drop out of high school by relying only on information from 9th grade. This analysis emphasizes that using a parsimonious early warning system – as implemented in many schools – leads to poor results. It shows that schools can obtain more precise predictions by exploiting the available high‐dimensional data jointly with machine learning tools such as Support Vector Machine, Boosted Regression and Post‐LASSO. Goodness‐of‐fit criteria are selected based on the context and the underlying theoretical framework: model parameters are calibrated by taking into account the policy goal – minimizing the expected dropout rate ‐ and the school budget constraint. Finally, this study verifies the existence of heterogeneity through unsupervised machine learning by dividing students at risk of dropping out into different clusters.     

THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS SERVING LOW‐INCOME FAMILIES IN HYDERABAD,INDIA: AN AUSTRIAN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE1

It is the intention of government that private schools in Hyderabad are prevented by regulation from exhibiting the basic manifestations of competitive markets ‐ low prices, innovation, good service and so on. However, private schools do, in practice, manifest these features. This paradox is resolved because regulations are not enforced in practice, with the acceptance of bribes by government officials being common. As a result of ‘extra‐legal’ activity, private schools are able to offer a better service to the poor than if regulations had been enforced.     

POVERTY AND RECOVERY: THE HISTORY OF AID AND DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AFRICA

Poor countries are believed to be trapped in a vicious circle of poverty where low incomes lead to low savings and insufficient resources for investments. Foreign aid is supposed to boost investment and link poor countries to a virtuous circle of growth. But real per capita growth has not been present in the modern history of Kenya and Tanzania ‐ even though foreign aid has increased many times over. Does the recent history in Uganda pave the way for new principles of efficient aid, or is it just a rare occasion of aid‐induced behavioural change?     

WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE EURO?

The Stability Pact ‐ intended to make EMU governments run prudent budgets ‐ is losing its credibility. This article asks the question: what will happen if national debts start to rise again and some governments then have difficulty borrowing? It suggests that there will be calls for bailout, that the EU's political structures will not cope well with the resulting arguments over which countries will pay, and that the eventual and painful result will be a return to the principle that currencies and political areas coincide.     

Global growth to 2024: reversion to which mean?

• We expect global GDP growth to average 3.5% per year (at PPP exchange rates) over the next ten years. This is lower than the 3.8% recorded in 2000–14 though not dramatically so. There will be a modest recovery in advanced economy growth ‐ but not to pre‐crisis rates. Emerging market (EM) growth will slow but remain faster than growth in the advanced economies. And with EM's share in world GDP much increased from 10–15 years ago, EMs will continue to provide a large proportion of world growth.
• EM growth is expected to run at around 4.5% per year in 2015–24, well down on the 6% seen in 2000–14. This includes a slowdown from around 10% to 5–6% in China ‐ but China's share in world GDP has risen so much that China's contribution to world growth will remain very substantial.
• Advanced economies are forecast to grow by 1.9% per year in 2015–24, a big improvement from the 1% pace of 2007–14 (which was affected by the global financial crisis) but below the 1990–2014 average. Indeed, the gap between forecast G7 GDP and GDP extrapolated using pre‐crisis trends in potential output will remain large at 10–15% in 2015–24.
• Global growth will remain relatively strong compared to much longer‐term averages: growth from 1870–1950 was only around 2% per year. But a return to such low growth rates looks unlikely; China and India were a major drag on world growth until the 1980s but are now fast growing regions.
• Our forecast is relatively cautious about key growth factors; the contribution of productivity growth is expected to improve slightly, while those from capital accumulation and labour supply fall back. Demographics will be a more severe drag on growth from 2025–40. Overall, risks to our long‐term forecasts look to be skewed to the downside.

     

THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A HIGH‐RISK PRINCIPLE1

The precautionary principle ‐ recently added to the French constitution and part of the draft Constitution of the European Union ‐ aims to protect the public from the risks associated with scientific and technological advance by allowing governments to ban any activity deemed to involve risks, even if those risks are unproven. In reality, the precautionary principle itself poses enormous risks of losing the advantages of projects that are banned, of preventing the development of the means by which risk may be ameliorated and of threatening the private property rights that provide the most effective environmental safeguard.     

Revisiting the Eurozone Phillips curve

• In a recent speech, ECB chief economist Peter Praet emphasised the importance of the Phillips curve ‐ the inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation ‐ when addressing concerns that disinflation (or even deflation) could become a longer‐term problem in the Eurozone. Praet argued that a scenario of a sustained period of disinflation is only realistic if the link between economic slack and inflation is broken. In this article, we revisit the Phillips curve in the Eurozone with the aim of gauging whether there has been a change in the relationship following the global financial crisis and how uniform the curve is among major Eurozone economies.
• We conclude that the Phillips curve is still valid in the Eurozone, although our analysis indicates a weakening of the link in the post‐crisis period. On the whole, our analysis shows that the Phillips curve relationship has been robust in the Eurozone since the creation of the currency union. However, in replicating the analysis for just the pre‐crisis period, we have noticed that the relationship between slack and inflation for the Eurozone was stronger (i.e. the slope of the curve was steeper) before the crisis rather than over the whole sample, since the introduction of the Euro.
• We find that there is considerable heterogeneity in the strength of the link between inflation and slack across the Eurozone economies, which adds to our existing body of work on their different responses to same shocks. Moreover, in contrast to the Eurozone overall, we find that in Spain and Italy the responsiveness of inflation to slack appears to have actually increased since the crisis; this might reflect the effectiveness of the structural reforms undertaken in both countries in order to reduce the rigidity of their economies.
• From 2014 onwards, very low inflation in the Eurozone has led to fears of sustained disinflation and even a deflationary spiral. Our view has always been that these fears were overblown; proving that the key structural relationship needed for ECB to meet its mandate is still in place corroborates our stance. Our forecast is for headline inflation to rise to 0.7% in 2016 (under the assumption that oil prices average US$37pb) and then to 1.7% in 2017 ‐ in line with ECB's target of “close to, but below, 2%”. The Phillips curve we have derived for the Eurozone tells a similar story. However, renewed weakness in oil prices at the start of 2016 presents a downside risk to our forecasts.
• Our bottom‐up CPI inflation model indicates that inflation might average just 0.2% this year if oil remains at around US$30pb. Furthermore, the prospect of external demand weakness derailing the Eurozone recovery poses another risk. This has raised the possibility of further expansion of the ECB's QE programme. However, as we continue to see resilient domestic demand in 2016, our baseline case still remains that the ECB will make no additional substantial adjustments to its QE programme in the near term.