Private money and bank runs

Abstract This paper studies bank runs in a model with private money. We show that allowing claims on demand deposits to circulate as a medium of exchange can help prevent bank runs. In our model, there exists a unique banking equilibrium where no one demands early withdrawals of real goods and agents in need of liquidity use private money to finance consumption. With private money, the unique equilibrium not only eliminates bank runs but also improves banking efficiency. The implications of our model are consistent with the evidence from the banking history of the United States.     

LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS IN A MONETARY ECONOMY*

This article presents a microfounded model of money with a consumption and an investment market. We consider an economy in which only part of the investment returns can be pledged. A liquidity constraint arises when the pledgeable part of the returns are not enough to pay for investment costs. We show that when the liquidity constraint is binding, agents may make a cash downpayment and money can perform two roles—as a provider of liquidity services and exchange services. The liquidity constraint constitutes a channel though which underinvestment occurs even at low inflation rates.     

MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF LENDER OF LAST RESORT FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF PAYMENTS*

We construct a model to clarify the mechanism by which the lender of last resort (LLR) can prevent bank runs. In our model, a bank has both the function of facilitating payments in which inside money is settled using outside money and the function of financial intermediation using a deposit contract. The deposit contract might lead to a bank run, and might even contribute to an efficient allocation. Therefore, to consider the liquidity supply by the LLR, we introduce the deposit contract as a factor of instability in the banking model. We show that the LLR can assist in the recovery of both the efficiency and stability of the financial system.     

Community banks,money and labour productivity

Does money affect productivity? We examine whether bank deposits, a measure of the money supply that excludes currency in circulation, influence labour productivity. Banks deposits are special in that they facilitate transactions and, in aggregate, add liquidity and credit availability to a region. By exploiting the distribution of community bank deposits across the states, we test the hypothesis that money is an input to the production function under a variety of panel data methods. We find evidence that bank transaction deposits and total deposits along with other production function inputs such as wages, labour and gross state product are cointegrated across the states; however, the economic contribution of money to labour productivity appears limited.     

LIQUIDITY,MONETARY POLICY,AND UNEMPLOYMENT: A NEW MONETARIST APPROACH

We discover a consumption channel of monetary policy in a model with money and government bonds. When the central bank withdraws government bonds (short‐term or long‐term) through open market operations, it lowers returns on bonds. The lower return has a direct negative impact on consumption by households that hold bonds and an indirect negative impact on consumption by households that hold money. As a result, firms earn less profits from production, which leads to higher unemployment. The existence of such a consumption channel can help us understand the effects of unconventional monetary policy.     

Stabilization policy in a Keynes–Goodwin model with debt accumulation

In this paper, we investigate the macroeconomic impact of government's stabilization policy by using an analytical framework of Keynes–Goodwin model of growth cycle with debt accumulation. Formally, our model is formulated as a five-dimensional system of non-linear differential equations. We consider both of private debt and public debt, and we explicitly formulate the budget constraint of the ‘consolidated government’ including the central bank. We mainly study the case of ‘liquidity trap’ under money and debt financing of the government deficit.We study the local stability/instability of the system and the conditions for the existence of cyclical fluctuations analytically by means of the linear approximation method. We show that the sufficiently active monetary/fiscal policy can stabilize the intrinsically unstable economy if the inflation targeting by the central bank is sufficiently credible. We also present some numerical examples, which support our analysis.     

Insights on endogenous money and the liquidity preference theory of interest

It is argued that the debate between “structuralist” and “horizontalist” has long been obscured because of inadequate treatment, in both approaches, of the credit-money supply and of the total money supply. As a result, endogenous money models still have serious limitations today. On the one hand, the bank loan markup and the loan interest rate are exogenous in the horizontalist model, which supposes that they do not depend on the money/liquidity market conditions (as if bank loans did not compete with the existing liquidity). On the other hand, although interest rates are endogenous in the structuralist model, they result from inappropriate treatment of the loan supply and money/liquidity supply. This article aims to remove these shortcomings. It offers a theoretical framework and formal modeling where the creditworthy demand for loans determines the bank loan supply, given the central bank refinancing interest rate, while the total supply and demand for liquidity-money determines the markup and the market rate of interest in accordance with Keynes’s liquidity preference theory. In this framework, the post Keynesian theory of endogenous money and Keynes’s “verticalist” view prove to be analytically complementary.     

MONEY,SOCIAL STATUS AND ENDOGENOUS GROWTH IN A GENERALIZED CASH‐IN‐ADVANCE MODEL

This paper analytically examines the equilibrium growth effect of money/inflation in a standard one‐sector AK model of endogenous growth with the most generalized cash‐in‐advance constraint and relative wealth‐induced preferences for social status. We show that on the economy's unique balanced growth equilibrium path, the sign of the correlation between money and output growth depends crucially on: (i) the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption; and (ii) the liquidity‐constrained ratio of consumption to investment expenditure. Moreover, our model economy always exhibits a positive output–growth effect in response to changes of the strength for social status. We also undertake numerical experiments to assess the quantitative importance of our theoretical results under an empirically plausible set of parameters.     

The Theory of the Second Best and the Competitive Equilibrium Model

We study the international transmission of bank liquidity shocks from multinational, Islamic, bank-holding companies to their subsidiaries. Based on a total sample of 120 Islamic and conventional bank subsidiaries, we test whether foreign bank lending for Islamic and conventional banks is determined by different factors. We estimate a model that includes subsidiary and parent bank characteristics as well as host and home country variables. Our empirical findings show that lending is negatively affected by the fragility of conventional parent banks' subsidiaries. Nevertheless, we show that parent Islamic banks do not significantly affect lending by subsidiaries. Finally, we examine the market discipline regarding the transmission of liquidity shocks. We also find that reduction in foreign Islamic bank lending is stronger for those that are dependent on the interbank market. We establish that the depositors react to a deterioration of bank performance and punish their institutions by withdrawing their money. We show that market discipline has a more important role for Islamic banks, whereas liquidity needs determine the change in conventional banks.     

The payment mechanisms and liquidity effects

A general equilibrium model with multiple means of payment in segmented markets is constructed to study the liquidity effects. It is shown that, under certain conditions, stored value – money issued by private entrepreneurs weakens, but does not completely eliminate the liquidity effects that exist when stored value is prohibited. The Friedman rule can be optimal in the regime with floating stored value. The impact of monetary policy now depends not only on the monetary intervention of the central bank, but also on the quantity of the outstanding private money and its velocity.     

Monetary policy and asset prices

The purpose of this paper is study the effect of monetary policy on asset prices. We study the properties of a monetary model in which a real asset is valued for its rate of return and for its liquidity. We show that money is essential if and only if real assets are scarce, in the precise sense that their supply is not sufficient to satisfy the demand for liquidity. Our model generates a clear connection between asset prices and monetary policy. When money grows at a higher rate, inflation is higher and the return on money decreases. In equilibrium, no arbitrage amounts to equating the real return of both objects. Therefore, the price of the asset increases in order to lower its real return. This negative relationship between inflation and asset returns is in the spirit of research in finance initiated in the early 1980s.     

Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs

We study the Diamond-Dybvig [Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity, J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983) 401-419] model as developed in Green and Lin [Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23] and Peck and Shell [Equilibrium bank runs, J. Polit. Econ. 111 (2003) 103-123]. We dispense with the notion of a bank as a coalition of depositors. Instead, our bank is a self-interested agent with a technological advantage in record-keeping. We examine the implications of the resulting agency problem for the design of bank contracts and the possibility of bank-run equilibria. For a special case, we discover that the agency problem may or may not simplify the qualitative structure of bank liabilities. We also find that the uniqueness result in Green and Lin [Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23] is robust to our form of agency, but that the non-uniqueness result in Peck and Shell [Equilibrium bank runs, J. Polit. Econ. 111 (2003) 103-123] is not.     

An empirical procedure to evaluate monetary management under exogenous changes in the money supply

This article proposes an empirical procedure to evaluate central banks’ monetary management in a presence of exogenous changes in the money supply. Monetary shocks deviate the market interest rate from the target, and the monetary authority decides its optimal intervention in the money market, bearing in mind the benefits and costs of re-establishing its target interest rate. According to monetary management theory, typically a central bank will allow for variation in the interest rate within a range around the target interest rate, thereby intervening in the money market when the interest rate trends toward a point outside that range. In this context, we develop an empirical strategy to analyse central bank’s reactions to exogenous money changes by making a statistical comparison of the actual and the estimated intraday shift in the money supply. We also employ our method to test the reactions of the Brazilian Central Bank to liquidity shifts caused by changes in the Treasury Single Account (TSA) balance. Using different metrics of analysis, the applications of our procedure confirms the predictions of the optimal monetary management theory.     

商业银行流动性过剩的危害及其解决对策

银行流动性过剩加大了商业银行的竞争风险，增加了商业银行战略转型的难度，已成为当前金融运行中的突出问题。因此，央行应灵活运用各种货币政策工具加大政府投资力度，大力发展资本市场，拓展新的存贷款业务，创新金融产品，解决流动性过剩问题。     

货币需求弹性、有效货币供给与货币市场非均衡模型——解析"中国之谜"与长期流动性过剩

Chinese excessive liquidity problems are more serious than other main countries. The upgrading industrial structure and the increasing opening degree lead to the excessive money demand and higher money demand elasticity. Bad credits weaken money supply effectiveness and lead to illusive increasing money. We set up the money market disequilibrium model under the condition of the excessive liquidity. The imbalance between money demand and money supply is the key of Chinese excessive liquidity problems. __________ Translated from Jingji lilun yu jingji guanli 经济理论与经济管理(Economic Theory and Business Management), 2007, (11): 38–44     

Liquidity risk, economic development, and the effects of monetary policy

Empirical evidence indicates that monetary policy is not super-neutral in many countries. In particular, in high inflation economies, inflation is negatively related to economic activity. By comparison, inflation may be positively correlated with output in low inflation countries. We present a neoclassical growth model with money in which the incidence of liquidity risk is inversely related to aggregate capital formation. Interestingly, there may be multiple monetary steady-states where the effects of monetary policy vary. In poor economies, the financial system is highly distorted and higher rates of money growth are associated with less capital formation. In contrast, in advanced economies, a Tobin effect is observed. Since inflation exacerbates distortions from a coordination failure in the low-capital steady-state, individuals become much more exposed to liquidity risk. Consequently, optimal monetary policy depends on the level of development.     

Limited participation,private money,and credit in a spatial model of money

Summary. The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of private money issue for the effects of monetary policy, for optimal policy, and for the role of fiat money. A locational model is constructed which gives an explicit account of the role for money and credit, and for limited financial market participation. When private money issue is prohibited, there is a liquidity effect as the result of a money injection from the central bank, but this effect goes away when private money is permitted. Private money issue changes dramatically the nature of optimal monetary policy. With private money, fiat currency is no longer used in transactions involving goods, but currency and central bank reserves play an important part in the clearing and settlement of private money returned for redemption.Received: 5 May 2003, Revised: 1 December 2003JEL Classification Numbers: E4, E5.The author thanks seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond and Duke University, conference participants at the Texas Monetary Conference at U.T. Austin, February 2002, and the Conference on Recent Developments in Money and Finance at Purdue University, May 2003, as well as Gabriele Camera, Ed Nosal, Will Roberds, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

论利率管制与货币供给量中介目标之间的矛盾

本文从货币当局无力同时控制利率和货币供给量的角度出发,探讨了利率管制与货币供给量中介目标之间的矛盾;分析了利率管制条件下,以货币供给量为货币政策中介目标,货币政策效果不佳,即实际货币供给量偏离中介目标货币供给量以及实际收入水平偏离最终目标收入水平的深层原因;指出了近年来我国货币供给量中介目标效果不佳,从根本上来说,是由我国客观存在的利率管制和货币供给量中介目标之间的矛盾造成的,是这种矛盾的必然结果.     

Collateral rehypothecation,safe asset scarcity,and unconventional monetary policy

We build a mark-to-market model where commercial banks can enlarge their balance sheets, repledging the available collateral several times to exchange liquidity through the interbank market. In bad times, the fall of risky asset price disrupts the length of the repledging chain due to the increase of the haircut and the decrease of external assets' value. In such a scenario, the central bank can intervene implementing unconventional monetary policies by purchasing a fraction of the banking system's external assets, both safe treasury bonds, and risky asset-backed securities, to inject liquidity. Our results show that a quantitative easing policy that purchases only safe assets is highly ineffective in restoring the intermediation activity to the pre-crisis level due to its inability to sustain the risky asset price and the repledging chain of collateral. Instead, focusing on risky assets only, the monetary authority can sustain risky asset prices, avoiding the freezing of the money market.