Innovation contests with entry auction

We consider innovation contests for the procurement of an innovation under moral hazard and adverse selection. Innovators have private information about their abilities, and choose unobservable effort in order to produce innovations of random quality. Innovation quality is not contractible. We compare two procurement mechanisms—a fixed prize and a first-price auction. Before the contest, a fixed number of innovators is selected in an entry auction, in order to address the adverse selection problem. We find that–if effort and ability are perfect substitutes–both mechanisms implement the same innovations in symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, regardless of whether the innovators’ private information is revealed or not. These equilibria are efficient if the procurer is a welfare-maximizer.     

Performance Pay and Offshoring

In this paper, we construct a North–South general equilibrium model of offshoring, highlighting the nexus among endogenous effort‐based labor productivity and the structure of wages. Offshoring is modeled as international transfer of management practices and production techniques that allow Northern firms to design and implement performance compensation contracts. Performance–pay contracts address moral hazard issues stemming from production uncertainty and unobserved worker effort. We find that worker effort augments productivity and compensation of those workers assigned to more offshorable tasks. An increase in worker effort in the South, caused by a decline in offshoring costs, an increase in worker skill, or a decline in production uncertainty in the South, increases the range of offshored tasks and makes workers in the North and South better off. An increase in Southern labor force increases the range of offshored tasks, benefits workers in the North, and hurts workers in the South. International labor migration from low‐wage South to high‐wage North shrinks the range of offshored tasks, makes Northern workers worse off and Southern workers (emigrants and those left behind) better off. Higher worker effort in the North, caused by higher worker skills or lower degree of production uncertainty, decreases the range of offshored tasks and benefits workers in the North and South.     

Education,moral hazard,and endogenous growth

We build an overlapping generations model of endogenous growth driven by human capital formation. Young people differ in their innate abilities, but these differences are not known even by the individuals themselves when they are going through the process of education. So there are no adverse selection problems. The probability of successful completion of schooling depends on both innate abilities and effort level. Moral hazard arises because effort is not observable. Successful students become skilled workers while unsuccessful ones become unskilled workers. A utilitarian government that cares about income distribution within each generation transfers income from the rich (skilled workers) to the poor (unskilled ones). This is anticipated by the young pupils and reduces incentive for hard work. This results in a lower rate of graduation, and has an adverse effect on the growth rate of human capital and output. Comparative statics results across balanced growth paths are derived. The parameters of interest are the students' rate of time preference, their degree of effort aversion and the relative price of the skill-intensive consumption good.     

How to beat the average

Empirical evidence has shown that people systematically overrate own performance relatively to others. This paper investigates production with identical workers where each one believes to be more productive than other workers. In a simple efficiency wage model, we ask how these seemingly incompatible beliefs can be made compatible with one another. We suggest that to compensate for the subjectively perceived productivity gap, each worker chooses an effort level lower than that attributed to others. The latter is estimated as the lowest effort that allows to pass the firm's monitoring test. Since rational agents will not maintain expectations which turn out to be systematically wrong, we introduce a "consistency requirement for false beliefs". Accordingly, predictions based on the "wrong" model must agree with the observations of the "true" model. We show that even with consistency, less effort is supplied than in the full information setting. Hence, the wage-effort relationship gets less efficient from the firm's viewpoint. At a first sight, at the firm-level workers gain from holding false beliefs, while profits unambigously fall. At the aggregate market outcome, however, the firms' labor demand declines, total output falls, and the rate of unemployment rises, decreasing workers utility again.     

Efficient Contests

In their seminal contribution, Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that wages based upon rank induce the same efficient effort as incentive‐based reward schemes. They also show that this equivalence result is not robust toward heterogeneity in worker ability, as long as ability is private information because it is not possible to structure contests to simultaneously satisfy self‐selection constraints and first‐best incentives. This paper demonstrates that efficiency can be achieved by a simple modification of the prize scheme in a mixed (heterogenous) contest where contestants learn their type after entry. If contestants know their type before entering the contest, rent extraction becomes an issue. Implications for optimal contest design are also explored. Finally, the relationship between effort maximizing contests and profit maximizing contests are discussed.     

Division of Labor in Teams

This paper examines the incentive effects of division of labor on worker effort, in the absence of the scale effects studied by Adam Smith. The game-theoretic model gives two results. (1) Suppose workers are identical and risk-neutral, and there is stochastic observation of group output by the firm offering compensations subject to some worker-participation constraint. Then the firm can arrive at the same first-best outcome with or without division of labor. However, if workers are risk-averse, division of labor can give the firm strictly greater profit. (2) A deepening division of labor magnifies this positive incentive effect; but if workers are heterogeneous, or if there are certain informational imperfections in the production process, this incentive advantage of division of labor could be impaired or even reversed. The first result may help explain the emergence of division of labor in the early stages of industrialization without relying on the Smithian advantages, which are also present in some labor deployment schemes without division of labor. The second result throws light on some recent anecdotal evidence of a shallowing division of labor in some areas of modern manufacturing. These factors affecting the efficiency of division of labor are then further discussed in the light of recent empirical findings on division of labor and team work, such as those in Katzenbach and Smith (1993).     

Buying into the ‘good worker’ rhetoric or being as good as they need to be? The effort bargaining process of new migrant workers

A great deal of attention in the literature has focused upon employers' stereotypical perceptions of Central and Eastern European workers as ‘good workers’, and the impact such views have on hiring processes in low‐skilled employment. Drawing on multiple case studies, this paper examines the good worker rhetoric through the lens of the effort bargaining process and hard HRM strategies that target marginalised workers in the labour market. In particular, the extent to which migrant workers buy into the rhetoric is explored. It is argued that migrant workers do not fully buy in to the good worker rhetoric because of issues such as high levels of education and personal aspirations and importantly, issues related to employers' strategies, bullying, discrimination, and the segmentation of migrant workers in each organisation.     

Use of employees and alternative work arrangements in the United States: a law,economics, and organizations perspective

This paper considers the incidence of employees versus other forms of work in the United States, including temporary agency workers, contract company workers, independent contractors, and self-employment. It does so within a single, unifying framework. The approach takes an economics of organizations focus to consider when it is optimal for the firm to control the work routine instead of the worker. This is critical in defining and determining employment versus other forms of work. The cost of measuring output and monitoring effort and of worker versus firm expertise are important in determining the organization of work. This approach proves fruitful, but it also is important to account for the impact of certain legal restrictions in the U.S. labor market. The empirical findings show that independent contractors are in jobs that require worker expertise and training and for which monitoring of worker effort is difficult. Contract company workers' characteristics are a hybrid between independent contractors' and employees'. Temporary agency workers occur where the firm wishes to legally outsource its low-wage workers yet still maintain a degree of control over their work routine.     

Does more information-gathering effort raise or lower the average quantity produced?

We aim at some simple theoretical underpinnings for a complex empirical question studied by labor economists and others: does Information-technology improvement lead to occupational shifts–toward “information workers” and away from other occupations–and to changes in the productivity of non-information workers? In our simple model there is a Producer, whose payoff depends on a production quantity and an unknown state of the world, and an Information-gatherer (IG) who expends effort to learn more about the unknown state and then sends the Producer a signal. The Producer responds by revising prior beliefs about the states and using the posterior to make an expected-payoff-maximizing quantity choice. We consider a variety of IGs and variety of Producers. For each IG there is a natural effort measure. Our central aim is to find conditions under which more IG effort leads to a larger average production quantity (“Complements”) and conditions under which it leads to a smaller average quantity (“Substitutes”). We start by considering Blackwell IGs, who meet the strong conditions required in the Blackwell theorems about the comparison of experiments. We then turn to non-Blackwell IGs, where the Blackwell theorems cannot be used and special techniques are needed to obtain Complements/Substitutes results.     

Should the firm or the employee pay for upskilling? A contract theory approach

Upskilling involves costly effort on behalf of existing employees to acquire new skills that are required to execute high value-added projects. A firm-financed training scheme allows the screening of applicants but comes with the cost of hidden actions, as some employees might train themselves yet continue working on low-value projects. A policy relying on worker self-training and incentive compatible contracts allows attracting more workers to high-value projects, yet it must grant a positive informational rent to flexible workers. The analysis reveals the optimal contract specific to each of the two training schemes. The profit comparison shows that the training strategy depends on how large is the net value created by upskilling, which is a characteristic of the business or industry.     

Do salaries improve worker performance?

We establish the effects of salaries on worker performance by exploiting a natural experiment in which some workers in a particular occupation (football referees) switch from short-term contracts to salaried contracts. Worker performance improves among those who move onto salaried contracts relative to those who do not. The finding is robust to the introduction of worker fixed effects indicating that it is not driven by better workers being awarded salary contracts. Nor is it sensitive to workers sorting into or out of the profession. Improved performance could arise from the additional effort workers exert due to career concerns, the higher income associated with career contracts (an efficiency wage effect) or improvements in worker quality arising from off-the-job training which accompanies the salaried contracts.     

Explicit representation of the two-dimensional section of a production possibility set

Technical and scale efficiencies of Data Envelope Analysis are associated with a two dimensionalsection (a convex set) representing the amounts by which the input and output vectors of a reference decision making unit, may be scaled and still lie in the production possibility set. We describe a simple algorithm, closely resembling the simplex algorithm of linear programming, to traverse the boundary of this set. Given the output of our algorithm, the scalar efficiency measures and return-to-scale characterization are trivially determined. Moreover, the set may be graphically displayed for any problem in any number of dimensions with only a minimum of additional computing effort.     

Equal-treatment policy in a random search model with taste discrimination

We consider a search model of the labor market with two types of equally productive workers and two types of firms, discriminators and non-discriminators. Without policy intervention, there is wage dispersion between and within the two worker groups, but all wage differences become negligible when the taste for discrimination is small. We analyze the effect of an equal-pay policy, both in combination with affirmative action and without. When equal opportunity of hiring cannot be enforced, wage dispersion increases and wages for minority workers fall substantially relative to laissez faire. Sometimes also the wage gap between worker groups widens in response to the policy.     

On the Virtues of Hiring Lemons

Recruiting high‐ability workers and implementing optimal efforts are among the key objectives of a firm's personnel policy. We show that, if the firm applies a tournament scheme—that is, a competitive career system—selection and incentive issues are strictly interrelated, thus leading to a fundamental conflict: if the firm is primarily interested in balanced worker competition, there will be a rationale for hiring low‐ability workers (‘lemons’). Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Predicting relative forecasting performance: An empirical investigation

The relative performances of forecasting models change over time. This empirical observation raises two questions. First, is the relative performance itself predictable? Second, if so, can it be exploited in order to improve the forecast accuracy? We address these questions by evaluating the predictive abilities of a wide range of economic variables for two key US macroeconomic aggregates, namely industrial production and inflation, relative to simple benchmarks. We find that business cycle indicators, financial conditions, uncertainty and measures of past relative performances are generally useful for explaining the models’ relative forecasting performances. In addition, we conduct a pseudo-real-time forecasting exercise, where we use the information about the conditional performance for model selection and model averaging. The newly proposed strategies deliver sizable improvements over competitive benchmark models and commonly-used combination schemes. The gains are larger when model selection and averaging are based on both financial conditions and past performances measured at the forecast origin date.     

Can a minimum wage increase employment and reduce prices in a neoclassical perfect information economy?

This paper investigates the possibility that the imposition of a minimum wage increases employment in the affected sector, measured in terms of hours of work, and lowers product prices. Unlike related prior theoretical research, I consider a neoclassical perfect information economy. Both labor and product markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Workers choose the number of hours of work and their effort level. Workers can potentially, but not necessarily, differ in their preferences over income, leisure, and effort. Effort is perfectly observable by the employers. The general framework that highlights the channels through which a minimum wage can increase employment and reduce prices is introduced and necessary and sufficient conditions derived. The paper also develops a number of comparative statics and some illustrative examples. The results provide a simple theoretical foundation that explains some recent findings of the empirical literature on minimum wages. Auxiliary results help explain the effects of minimum wage on the entire wage distribution in a way that is consistent with empirical findings. Finally, welfare analysis shows that worker welfare and employment tend to go in opposite directions; in particular, if employment increases after the imposition of the minimum wage, worker welfare will be reduced, though not necessarily vice versa (the opposite is true for consumer welfare). Strikingly, if a minimum wage increases worker welfare, the chief beneficiaries are not the affected workers but those with incomes that exceed the minimum wage.     

Existence of solutions to principal–agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions

We prove an existence result for the principal–agent problem with adverse selection under general assumptions on preferences and allocation spaces. Instead of assuming that the allocation space is finite-dimensional or compact, we consider a more general coercivity condition which takes into account the principal’s cost and the agents’ preferences. Our existence proof is simple and flexible enough to adapt to partial participation models as well as to the case of type-dependent budget constraints.     

Stochastic frontier models with network selectivity

Worker peer-effects and managerial selection have received limited attention in the stochastic frontier analysis literature. We develop a parametric production function model that allows for worker peer-effects in output and worker-level inefficiency that is correlated with a manager’s selection of worker teams. The model is the usual “composed error” specification of the stochastic frontier model, but we allow for managerial selectivity (endogeneity) that works through the worker-level inefficiency term. The new specification captures both worker-level inefficiency and the manager’s ability to efficiently select teams to produce output. As the correlation between the manager’s selection equation and worker inefficiency goes to zero, our parametric model reduces to the normal-exponential stochastic frontier model of Aigner et al. (1977) with peer-effects. A comprehensive application to the NBA is provided.     

Credibility and Monitoring: Outsourcing as a Commitment Device

We analyze an environment plagued by double moral hazard where the agent’s effort level and the principal’s precision in monitoring are not contractible. In such an environment, the principal tends to over‐monitor thereby inducing low effort. To ease the latter problem, the principal may choose to increase monitoring costs by outsourcing the activity. As a result equilibrium monitoring is reduced and incentives become more powerful. This choice is particularly likely when the worker’s effort is an important factor in determining output.     

Partnership markets with adverse selection

Ownership positions in large corporations can be traded on anonymous markets, but professional partnerships and worker cooperatives prohibit members from transferring their positions to outsiders without the consent of other insiders. These contrasting policies can be explained by adverse selection, which implies that the joint payoff of the partners is at least as large when continuing rather than departing members choose the terms on which new partners can join. In a separating equilibrium, or a pooling equilibrium in which only low-quality workers apply for positions, market sorting reduces total surplus. The market can sometimes improve on random assignment of workers to firms when there is a pooling equilibrium in which both high- and low-quality types apply.