Underreaction to Dividend Reductions and Omissions?

Using a sample of 2,337 cash dividend reduction or omission announcements over the 1927 to 1999 period, this study reports significant negative post‐announcement long‐term abnormal returns, which last 1 year only. However, this long‐term abnormal performance is driven by the post‐earnings‐announcement drift. After controlling for the earnings performance and the skewness of buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns, there is no compelling evidence of a post‐dividend‐reduction or post‐dividend‐omission price drift.     

How Did the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut Affect Stock Prices?

We test the hypothesis that the 2003 dividend tax cut boosted US stock prices and thereby lowered the cost of equity capital. Using an event‐study methodology, we attempt to identify an aggregate stock market effect by comparing the behavior of US common stock prices with that of foreign equities and the equities of real estate investment trusts (REITs). We also examine the relative cross‐sectional response of prices of high‐ and low‐dividend‐paying stocks. We do not find any imprint of the dividend tax cut news on the value of the aggregate US stock market. On the other hand, high‐dividend stocks outperformed low‐dividend stocks by a few percentage points over the event windows, suggesting that the tax cut may have induced asset reallocation within equity portfolios. Finally, the positive abnormal return on nondividend paying US stocks in 2003 does not appear to be tied to tax cut news.     

Do Co‐Opted Directors Influence Dividend Policy?

We explore how co‐opted directors affect dividend policy. Co‐opted directors are those appointed after the incumbent chief executive officer (CEO) assumes office. Our results show that co‐opted directors lead to a weaker propensity to pay dividends and, for dividend‐paying firms, significantly lower dividend payouts. We also show that board co‐option has more explanatory power for dividend policy than does the traditional measure of board effectiveness, that is, board independence. Exploiting the passage of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act as a natural experiment, we show that the effect of board co‐option on dividend policy is more likely causal, rather than merely an association.     

At What Age Do You Expect to Retire? Retirement Expectations and Increases in the Statutory Retirement Age

We analyse the extent to which an increase in the statutory retirement age affects individuals' retirement expectations. Understanding how individuals adjust their expectations is crucial to the evaluation of this policy, since retirement expectations directly affect other important decisions such as labour supply, engagement in (further) education and, of course, savings and investments. We consider the 2007 German pension reform that legislated an increase in the statutory retirement age from 65 years to 67. Our analysis is based on a longitudinal study that directly asks respondents at what age they expect to retire. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach, we look at the changes in subjective retirement expectations over time and estimate the extent to which they can be attributed to the 2007 reform. We find that the reform shifted the retirement expectations of the younger cohorts, although there is some heterogeneity in the way individuals adjusted. While there are no significant differences between men and women, lower‐educated individuals failed to revise their expectations. As these individuals usually acquire both lower pension claims and lower private savings, the fact that they have been slower in updating their retirement expectations causes concern regarding their income security after retirement.     

Did the Reserve Requirement Increases of 1936–37 Reduce Bank Lending? Evidence from a Quasi‐Experiment

We analyze the impact of contractionary monetary policy through increases in reserve requirements on bank lending. We compare the lending behavior of banks that were subject to the requirement increases in 1936–37, Federal Reserve member banks, to a group of banks that were not subject to the reserve increase, Federal Reserve nonmember banks. After implementing the difference‐in‐difference estimators, we find that the increases in reserve requirements did not create financing constraints for member banks and lead them to reduce lending. Therefore, the actions of the Federal Reserve concerning the required reserve ratios cannot be blamed for instigating the economic downturn of 1937–38.