Earnings Management Vehicles for Korean Firms

We investigated the vehicles that Korean firms use when the firms manage earnings. We partitioned our sample into low, mid and high accrual sub‐samples based on discretionary accruals. Low accrual firms are defined as income‐decreasing firms whereas the high accrual firms are considered income increasing firms in this study. We decomposed accounting earnings into cash from operations and various components of accruals in a systematic way. Next we examined the types of accruals individual firms use when the respective firms increase reported earnings. The empirical results of the study indicate that there are clear discrepancies in the earnings management vehicles firm use when the firms manage earnings depending on the directions of earnings management. More specifically, income‐increasing firms frequently employ non‐cash revenues including asset‐disposal gains. Income‐decreasing firms employ non‐cash expenses including bad‐debt expenses and asset‐disposal losses. Firms also tend to use current accruals but to a limited extent as current accruals entail cash flow implications in the following years.     

Is earnings management opportunistic or beneficial? An agency theory perspective

Earnings management has been cast into negative light due to the recent corporate scandals and, therefore, is viewed as detrimental to the firm. Enron and Worldcom represent two of the most egregious cases of opportunistic earnings management that led to the largest bankruptcies in U.S. history. However, some argue that earnings management may be beneficial because it improves the information value of earnings by conveying private information to the stockholders and the public. We offer agency theory as a tool to distinguish between the opportunistic and beneficial uses of earnings management. The empirical evidence suggests that firms where earnings management occurs to a larger (less) extent suffer less (more) agency costs. Moreover, a positive relation is documented between firm value and the extent of earnings management. Taken together, the results reveal that earnings management is, on average, not detrimental.     

The effect of corporate governance on CEO luck: Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)

CEOs are “lucky” when they receive stock option grants on days when the stock price is the lowest in the month of the grant, implying opportunistic timing. Extending the work of Bebchuk et al. (2010), we explore the effect of overall corporate governance quality on CEO luck. Provided by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), our comprehensive governance metrics are much broader than those used in prior studies, encompassing more diverse aspects of corporate governance, such as audit, state laws, boards, ownership, and director education. We show that an improvement in governance quality by one standard deviation diminishes CEO luck by 14.77–21.06%. The governance standards recommended by ISS appear to be effective in deterring the opportunistic timing of option grants.     

Estimating the market value of Steve Jobs using an event study

Using an event study approach, we seek to estimate the value investors placed on Steve Jobs by investigating the stock market reactions to his death. In the three-day window surrounding his death, the estimated cumulative abnormal returns are ?5.76%. Given the market capitalization of Apple at the time, it can be inferred that investors valued Steve Jobs at 20 billion dollars. While tragic, the news about Jobs’ death is greeted favourably by Apple’s competitors. The competitors appear to be convinced that, without Steve Jobs, they can compete with Apple better.     

How do independent directors view corporate social responsibility (CSR)? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

We investigate how independent directors view corporate social responsibility (CSR). Exploiting the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act and the associated exchange listing requirements as an exogenous regulatory shock, we document that independent directors view CSR activities unfavorably. In particular, firms forced to raise board independence reduce CSR engagement significantly relative to those not required to increase board independence. Our results are consistent with the risk-mitigation view and the agency cost hypothesis where managers over-invest in CSR to mitigate their own exposure to nonsystematic risk. The over-investments in CSR are curbed in the presence of a stronger, more independent, board of directors. Several robustness checks confirm the results, including fixed-effects and random-effects regressions, dynamic panel data analysis, instrumental-variable analysis, propensity score matching, Lewbel's heteroscedastic identification, and Oster's method for coefficient stability. We also confirm the risk-mitigation hypothesis by showing that CSR activities reduce firm risk significantly. Our research design is much less vulnerable to endogeneity and is therefore likely to show a causal effect of board independence on CSR.     

Do Independent Directors Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Great Recession

The literature offers no clear evidence on the effect of independent directors on firm value. We argue that, during stressful times, firms may need more and better expert advice to navigate a crisis. Outside independent directors can provide such advice. So, the role of independent directors may be more pronounced during a stressful time. Consistent with this notion, we find that independent directors significantly improved firm value during the Great Recession of 2008. Specifically, a rise in the percentage of independent directors by one standard deviation would have improved firm value by 4.29% during the Great Recession. Outside the crisis period, however, our results do not show that independent directors increase firm value. Further analysis confirms the results, including random‐effects regressions, propensity score matching, instrumental‐variable regressions, as well as falsification tests. Our results are crucial as they demonstrate that the role of independent directors is different during stressful times than it is during normal times.     

The Effects of Ethical Leadership and Abusive Supervision on Job Search Behaviors in the Turnover Process

Drawing upon the unfolding model of turnover and the dual-process theory of information processing, we examined the roles which ethical leadership and abusive supervision play in the turnover process. The central conclusion of this study is that ethical leadership influences job satisfaction, which then influences intentions to quit, which then impacts job search behaviors. Conversely, abusive supervision, which is the conceptual opposite of ethical leadership, has a negative influence on job satisfaction with corresponding impacts on intentions to quit and job search behavior. But, unlike ethical leadership, which does not directly lead to job search behavior, abusive supervision can also directly make people so upset that they initiate job search behaviors. Moreover, findings indicate that even low levels of abusive supervision can neutralize high levels of ethical leadership. Implications for research and practice in human resource management are discussed.     

How do bond investors perceive dividend payouts?

We explore how bond investors view corporate cash distributions through dividends and how that view influences corporate cost of debt. Explaining between 45 and 67 percent of variance in credit spreads at the time of issuance, our model reveals a non-linear association between dividend payouts and investment return expected by bondholders. In particular, while bondholders view cash disbursements in small amounts as a positive signal, large dividend payouts are viewed negatively. Our results thus provide support for both the signaling hypothesis and for the agency-cost-of-debt hypothesis. The results are robust even after controlling for firm size, growth opportunities, profitability, leverage, business risk, asset tangibility, and term structure. Exploiting the 2003 dividend tax cut as an exogenous shock, we demonstrate that our results are not vulnerable to endogeneity problems. Finally, we find no evidence of corporations timing the payouts strategically to influence the cost of debt.     

创业机会识别的整合视角

以创业机会为核心的创业研究已取得丰硕成果，但关于机会定义和识别机制的争论仍在继续，并束缚了研究的深入。分析机会定义争论的根本原因是概念定义与操作定义的混淆,厘清机会识别过程的阶段争论,梳理并区分两种机会识别观点（发现与创造观点）的主要理论基础与内容；从信息加工视角整合两种观点，即机会识别过程是创业者交互采用算法式(Algorithm)与启发式(Heuristic)加工的过程；构建机会识别过程的影响因素模型，即环境信息和以往经验对机会识别过程中信息加工方式选择的影响；最后总结并提出未来的研究方向。     

The effect of CEO power on bond ratings and yields

We argue that executives can affect firm outcomes only if they have influence over crucial decisions. This study explores the impact of CEO power or CEO dominance on bond ratings and yield spreads. We find that credit ratings are lower and yield spreads higher for firms whose CEOs have more decision-making power. To further investigate why bondholders are concerned about CEO power, we show that powerful CEOs tend to maintain an opaque information environment. Bondholders demand higher yields because it is difficult for them to monitor managers in firms with powerful CEOs. Taken together, the results suggest that bondholders perceive CEO power as a critical determinant of the cost of bond financing.