Productivity,Efficiency and Strike Activity

The economic impact of unions has received increasing attention in the literature. However, the channels through which unions impinge on performance are seldom identified. This paper examines the impact of industrial conflict on output and factor productivity in a panel of British manufacturing industries for the 1970s. Production frontiers augmented by various dimensions of strike activity are estimated and strikes are found to have a negligible net impact on output. Furthermore, while there is some weak evidence to suggest that union presence adversely affects (relative) efficiency, this effect is not derived from higher levels of strike activity.     

Wage discrimination and antidiscrimination policy in unionized industries

We consider industries where the equally skilled workers/members of firm-specific monopoly unions can be grouped according to different reservation wages. We show that, in absence of active antidiscrimination policy, discriminatory wage contracts across groups of employees may emerge, in equilibrium, under either oligopoly or a perfectly competitive product market. We subsequently propose that to combat wage discrimination a benevolent policy maker should under either market structure subsidize the employment of the low reservation wage group. The reason is that taxing wage discrimination, as an alternative antidiscrimination policy, always entails a welfare loss relative to the no policy/wage discrimination status quo.     

The endogenous national minimum wage institution

This paper offers reasoning for the endogenous sustainability of the National Minimum Wage Institution (NMWI). In an economy with asymmetries in productivity among unionized firms, high-tech firms may often opt for minimum wage agreements covering all unionized workers, in order to raise the relative costs of their rival low-tech firms. Their workers’ unions as well as the unions of workers in low-tech firms share this interest, provided that the degree of product substitutability is not too low and the wage agreement is not too high. Hence, since economy-wide minimum wage agreements prove to be compatible with the interest of all unions and high-tech firms, the NMWI can be sustained in equilibrium under politically convenient circumstances.     

Monetary Institutions,Monopolistic Competition,Unionized Labor Markets and Economic Performance*

Recent literature on the interactions between labor unions and monetary institutions features either a supply or a demand channel of monetary policy, but not both. This leads to two opposing views about the effects of central bank conservativeness. We evaluate the relative merits of those conflicting views by developing a unified framework. We find that: (i) the effect of conservativeness on employment depends on unions’ relative aversion to unemployment versus inflation, and (ii) for plausible values of this relative aversion (and more than one union), social welfare is maximized under a highly conservative central bank. We also evaluate the effects of centralization of wage bargaining and product market competition on unemployment and inflation.     

THE WAGE IMPACT OF TEACHERS UNIONS: A META‐ANALYSIS

The literature examining the impact of teachers unions on education is very large and diverse. We meta‐analyze the literature on the wage impacts of teachers unions to try to draw out general findings, the importance of empirical model specification, and samples. A key finding of this study is that the average wage impact estimated by the included papers is modest, around 2%–4.5%. Our findings also suggest that the quality of an empirical strategy significantly affects the size of the estimated impact. We find that teachers union wage impacts have varied over time. The largest impacts appear to be following the rapid expansion of teacher unionism in the 1970s. Finally, we gain new insight into the goals of teachers unions by using the increased statistical power of meta‐analytic techniques to show that unions increase the wages of new teachers and not just senior teachers. (JEL J51, I21, I30)     

Wage-setting coordination in a small open economy*

This paper studies wage-setting coordination in a two-sector, open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Two large sectoral unions anticipate the effects of their wage demands on aggregate variables. In an open economy, there are externalities that the unions can take into account to increase aggregate welfare, but the strategic interaction between the sectoral unions tends to erode this gain. When wage coordination takes place through a wage norm set by either of the sectors, this minimizes the strategic interaction. However, wage norms create welfare losses as sector-specific wage adjustment is required to make an efficient adjustment to shocks.     

Taxes,Strikes and Wages

A union and a firm bargain about wage increases. The firm possesses private information about its revenues. A two-period screening model is used to derive equilibrium wage demands by the union and to calculate measures of strike activity. Changes in wage demands and dispute probabilities due to alterations in various taxes are analysed. A more progressive income tax, a lower level of income taxes and higher payroll taxes reduce wages and strike activity. Hence, tax policy can be used not only to affect wages and employment, but lso to influence strike incidence.     

Fairness Considerations in Labor Union Wage Setting – A Theoretical Analysis

We consider a theoretical model in which unions not only take the outside option into account, but also care about the performance of the firm and base their wage‐setting decisions on a firm internal reference, called the fairness reference. Two references, which measure the earnings situation of the firm, are considered – productivity and profits per worker. Wage and employment outcomes as well as the degree of wage rigidity depend on the size of the fairness reference relative to the outside option. A high fairness reference leads to wage pressure and real wage rigidity, whereas a low fairness reference leads to wage moderation and real wage flexibility. An increase in the weight on the fairness reference amplifies these deviations from the standard model.     

Do workers perceive high wage settlements of craft unions as fair?

In recent years, Germany has experienced an increasing impact of craft unions that negotiate high wage increases for the occupations they represent. This article analyses under which conditions workers perceive such over-proportional wage increases for occupational groups represented by craft unions as (rather) fair. We use a vignette approach, asking respondents for their fairness perceptions of several hypothetical scenarios. The results show that perceptions depend on the burdens of the occupational group, the size of the wage increase, information policies and potential consequences for other groups. These findings are in line with social and organizational justice theories about equity and informational justice.     

Unions and wage inequality: The roles of gender,skill and public sector employment

We examine the changing relationship between unionization and wage inequality in Canada and the United States. Our study is motivated by profound recent changes in the composition of the unionized workforce. Historically, union jobs were concentrated among low-skilled men in private sector industries. With the steady decline in private sector unionization and rising influence in the public sector, half of unionized workers are now in the public sector. Accompanying these changes was a remarkable rise in the share of women among unionized workers. Currently, approximately half of unionized employees in North America are women. While early studies of unions and inequality focused on males, recent studies find that unions reduce wage inequality among men but not among women. In both countries, we find striking differences between the private and public sectors in the effects of unionization on wage inequality. At present, unions reduce economy-wide wage inequality by less than 10%. However, union impacts on wage inequality are much larger in the public sector. Once we disaggregate by sector, the effects of unions on male and female wage inequality no longer differ. The key differences in union impacts are between the public and private sectors—not between males and females.     

DO CHINESE UNIONS HAVE “REAL” EFFECTS ON EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION?

In this article, we use enterprise population‐level data to investigate the effectiveness of Chinese unions in improving employee wage and nonwage compensation. We show that the effectiveness of Chinese unions stems from a “collective voice” face rather than from a “monopoly” face. The empirical findings on the effectiveness of unions are remarkable: unions in the workplace significantly improve employee wage and nonwage compensation, along with employee training. Moreover, the presence of unions within the same region and industry generates positive spillovers for employee compensation. The unions in China do have “real” effects. (JEL J30, J50, J51, K31)     

Continuity and Change in Australian Wages Policy

Australia shares with several small European economies the characteristic of having a relatively coordinated union movement with the ability to influence real wage levels. This article explores the course of wages policy over the last decade by applying to Australia a model of wage determination originating in Europe, a model which assumes that the union movement can determine the real wage level. The wage level the union movement chooses is influenced by choices it faces between real wage increases and employment growth. The unions are also influenced by the public sector employment generating activity of government. Stagflation in the late 1970s is analysed by hypothesising a misperception by the union movement of the policy options available to government, and a mistrust by government of the unions' willingness to moderate wage increases if employment levels rise rapidly. The model suggests that an accord between unions and government (such as that which has been in place in Australia since 1983) is a way to escape some of these policy dilemmas.     

Profit sharing and strike activity in Cournot oligopoly

Within an incomplete-information framework, we develop a model of wage determination in a unionized Cournot oligopoly. The assumption of incomplete information allows the possibility of strikes or lockouts, which waste industry potential resources, at equilibrium. Facing such deadweight loss, the government or the social planner may decide to adopt a policy, such as a profit-sharing scheme. Under two different bargaining structures (firm level vs. industry level), we investigate the effects of adopting profit sharing on the wage outcome and the strike activity. If the base-wage bargaining takes place at the industry level, then the introduction of a profit-sharing scheme increases the strike activity. But if the base-wage bargaining takes place at the firm level and the number of firms in the industry is greater than two, then the introduction of a profit-sharing scheme reduces the strike activity.     

Testing for uniform wage trends in West-Germany: A cohort analysis using quantile regressions for censored data

The rise of unemployment in West Germany is often attributed to an inflexibility of the wage structure in the face of a skill bias in labor demand trends. In addition, there is concern in Germany that during the 70s and 80s unions were pursuing a too egalitarian wage policy. In a cohort analysis, we estimate quantile regressions of wages taking account of the censoring in the data. We present a new framework to describe trends in the entire wage distribution across education and age groups in a parsimonious way. We explore whether wage trends are uniform across cohorts, thus defining a macroeconomic wage trend. Our findings are that wages of workers with intermediate education levels, among them especially those of young workers, deteriorated slightly relative to both high and low education levels. Wage inequality within age-education groups stayed fairly constant. Nevertheless, the German wage structure was fairly stable, especially in international comparison. The results appear consistent with a skill bias in labor demand trends, recognizing that union wages are only likely to be binding floors for low-wage earners.     

Employment Protection Versus Flexicurity: On Technology Adoption in Unionised Firms*

We analyse how different labour‐market institutions – employment protection versus ‘flexicurity’– affect technology adoption in unionised firms. We consider trade unions’ incentives to oppose or endorse labour‐saving technology and firms’ incentives to invest in such technology. Increased flexicurity – interpreted as less employment protection and a higher reservation wage for workers – unambiguously increases firms’ incentives for technology adoption. If unions have some direct influence on technology, a higher reservation wage also makes unions more willing to accept technological change. Less employment protection has the opposite effect, as this increases the downside (job losses) of labour‐saving technology.     

Labour market outliers: Lessons from Portugal and Spain

Spain has the highest unemployment rate (22.2%) of any European Union country, Portugal one of the lowest (7.3%). Superficially, these countries share many labour market features: the toughest job security rules in the OECD, an apparently similar architecture of wage bargaining, and comparable generosity of their unemployment insurance systems, at least since 1989. We address the puzzle by examining Portuguese and Spanish labour market institutions, in particular job security, unemployment benefits and the system of wage bargaining. We then conduct empirical analysis of Spanish and Portuguese unemployment outflows and wage distributions, using micro data. We find differences in unemployment benefits (non-existent in Portugal until 1985, and less generous nowadays), differences in wage flexibility (wage floors by category established by collective agreements are set at a lower relative level in Portugal), and, in practice, higher firing costs in Spain. A key explanation of the difference in Portuguese and Spanish unemployment rates is the wage adjustment process. Generous benefit levels may have been necessary for the path Spanish unions took, but this was not the sole explanation of different wage setting in Spain and Portugal.     

Competing wage claims,cost inflation,and capacity utilization

This paper develops a theory of competing wage claims and cost inflation, and attempts to integrate this theory into the core of modern macroeconomic analysis. Specifically, the paper proposes an explanation for wage inertia and wage interdependence based on an application of duopoly theory to labor unions, and incorporates this microeconomic theory of labor union behavior into a macroeconomic general equilibrium model with goods, money, and bonds as well as two kinds of labor. Special emphasis is placed on the interplay between demand and cost factors in the inflation process and on the implications of wage competition among labor unions for the relationship between inflation and unemployment in the short and long run.     

UNION–FIRM BARGAINING AGENDA REVISITED: WHEN UNIONS HAVE DISTINCT PREFERENCES

In this paper we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between firms and unions by considering a more general union's utility function with distinct preferences and sequential negotiations. First, we compare exogenously given labour market institutions; i.e., right‐to‐manage (RTM) and sequential efficient bargaining (SEB). We show that the conventional wisdom, which states that firms always prefer RTM, no longer holds. In fact, when unions are adequately wage aggressive and have strong enough bargaining power, firms may prefer SEB negotiations; however, firms switch their preference to RTM when unions are very strong. Moreover, we show that a conflict of interest between the parties may emerge when unions are sufficiently employment oriented as well as sufficiently wage aggressive and not too strong or too weak in bargaining. Second, we analyse the endogenous choice of the bargaining agenda. We show that a rich plethora of equilibria may occur and new situations of conflict/agreement of interests between the bargaining parties arise in particular when unions are sufficiently wage‐aggressive.     

The incidence of,and returns to overeducation in the UK

Drawing on German data we look for evidence of a supply-side political business cycle. The hypothesis suggests that centralized trade unions with political interests and some degree of monopoly power may fine-tune their collective wage bargaining strategies so as to help preferred or to harm rejected parties in power. The regression results confirm that between 1960 and 1988 German trade unions exercised additional wage pressure before general elections under a Christian Democratic incumbent drew closer, trade unions pursued a restrictive wage policy to promote the government' chances for re-election.     

Economic growth, skill-biased technical change and wage inequality: A model and estimations for the US and Europe

In recent literature skill-biased technical change has been viewed as a major cause for wage inequality. Some modelling and presentation of stylized facts have been undertaken for US time series data. A preliminary study of wage inequality in a model with knowledge as input in an aggregate production function has been presented by Riddell and Romer [General Purpose Technologies and Economic Growth, 1998, MIT Press]. Although some important forces determining wage inequality are widely accepted we know little about the quantitative impact of each source and differences across countries. We present a growth model of the Romer type with innovation-based technical change and two skill groups where the growth of knowledge, the relative supply of the two skill groups, externalities and substitution effects among the two groups are the driving forces for wage inequality. We undertake estimates for US time series data and contrast those estimates with results from some European countries. In particular, we compare parameter estimations for US and German time series data. The paper concludes that there is less wage inequality across skills in Europe in contrast to the US on the macroeconomic level. But, considering disaggregated data we observe some increases in inequality for Germany, too. Although our model reveals important variables for the explanation of wage inequality there may, however, also be other factors, such as trade unions, which have impacted the wage spread.