Policy modes,firms and the natural environment

This paper examines how different environmental policy types differentially impact firms and why firms vary in their responses to such policies. Based on the mechanisms embedded in policy instruments to create incentives for firms to comply, the characteristics of benefits/costs that policies impose on firms and the institutional context in which policy instruments were created and are sustained, the paper identifies five policy categories. These are category I (command and control), category II (market based), category III (mandatory information disclosures), category IV (business–government partnerships) and category V (private voluntary codes). Different policy types often bestow asymmetrical benefits/costs on firms. Some benefits/costs may constitute ‘private/club goods’ while others may constitute ‘public goods’. Drawing insights from public policy literature, the paper argues that firms can be expected to favor policies whose benefits have the characteristics of private/club goods but the costs of public goods. Thus, understanding the nature of benefits/costs (private/club versus public) and the magnitude of their excludability is critical in explaining the variations in firms' responses. To understand how managers perceive the nature of benefits/costs (monetary as well as non‐monetary), the paper draws on theories and perspectives in the business and public policy field. In doing so, the paper examines the ‘demand’ and the ‘supply’ sides as well as the market and non‐market environments of a given policy. Thus, the paper makes a case for a multi‐theoretic approach to understand variations in managerial assessments of benefits/costs, and consequently variations in their responses to various policy types. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

The Effects of Foreign Direct Investment Colocation: Differences Between Manufacturing and Service Firms

Colocation may result in positive performance effects because of agglomeration benefits or in negative outcomes because of fiercer competition. Using the notions of industrial organization economics, this study offers a comprehensive industry‐specific analysis on the performance effects of international colocation. We predict that bigger firms will benefit more from colocation of foreign firms in a host country. Considering industry and home country peers, the analysis suggests that positive effects dominate for manufacturing firms whereas service firms are negatively affected. However, these effects are mitigated by a firm's size in a location. A large‐scale empirical analysis on firm‐level data supports the hypotheses. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Collective action in the face of international environmental regulation

Most studies of environmental impacts operate at the level of the individual firm. However, firms can act collectively in the face of threats such as that described in this paper: the banning of CFCs. A framework based upon concepts from theories of collective action is used to explain why two different forms of collective action were initiated by producers of CFCs. Economic calculation operating within the social institutions of the industry seemed to provide a plausible explanation for the occurrence of co‐operative behaviour. In particular the concepts of collective goods and free riding proved to be helpful in explicating the driving forces that led to joint action in these circumstances. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment     

Herding versus Hotelling: Market Entry with Costly Information

Why do businesses such as fast‐food restaurants, coffee shops, and hotels cluster? In the classic analysis of Hotelling, firms cluster to attract consumers who have travel costs. We present an alternative model where firms cluster because one firm is free riding on another firm's information about market demand. One consequence of this free riding is that an informed firm might forego a market that it knows to be profitable. Furthermore, an uninformed firm might earn higher profits when research costs are high, because it can credibly commit to ignorance.     

The Role of Land Tenure,Taxation, and Monetary Systems in Achieving and Enjoying Free Trade

Civilizations rise and fall based on the effectiveness of their socio-political arrangements and institutions. The institutions that matter most are the laws and customs that govern 1) production and exchange of goods (trade), 2) land tenure and the distribution of the surplus associated with it, 3) the levying of taxes to provide public goods and services, and 4) the monetary systems adopted to facilitate such activities. If those institutions distribute the benefits of civilization equitably to all members of society, the result is likely to be peace and prosperity. However, if the rules of a society are designed to protect the interests of an elite, conflict is likely to ensue. Unrestricted trade across national borders (“free trade”) has the potential to produce socially beneficial outcomes, but it is not sufficient to overcome systemic injustices associated with flawed systems of land tenure, taxation, and monetary management. This article makes use of historical examples to examine trade in relation to the other institutions to show why just social arrangements must be considered an essential part of trade policy.     

Corporate social responsibility,durable‐goods and firm profitability

Utilizing a two‐period durable‐goods framework, we show that in uncommitted sales markets a firm may earn higher profits as it increases its level of corporate social responsibility (CSR). We find that this occurs even though CSR has no direct impact other than increasing the durable‐goods firm's manufacturing costs. We show that in sales markets, CSR may allow the firm to credibly commit itself to lower production in the future. This, in turn, can enhance their profits even though the CSR activities are costly and provide no direct demand or marketing benefit in our model. This is important because it provides another, hereto unexplored, strategic rationale for the willingness of profit‐maximizing firms to undertake costly CSR activities. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When Does a Firm Support Substitute Open Source Programming?

Software firms are observed to support programmers' communities, which develop rival open source programs. A firm selling a copyright program has an incentive to support substitute copyleft programming when support creates compatibility between the programs and programs exhibit network effects. Costly compatibility benefits the firm as its consumers gain access to the community's services but may also hurt the firm because it cannot profit from the valuation difference between incompatible networks. The incentive arises under a weak network effect even when the consumers' benefit is small. Standardization and enlarging the open source programmers' community do not always increase welfare.     

Is the Competitor of my Competitor also my Competitor?

This paper presents several results on multimarket competition. First, whenever a firm faces multimarket competitors that sell goods in markets to which the firm itself has no access, the firm gains a strong incentive to expand production in its own market(s). In the capacity choice model, such a firm builds larger than Cournot capacity and pushes its competitors towards other markets. Consumers always benefit from multimarket competition. In asymmetric market structures, some firms may also benefit from multimarket arrangements, but in symmetric ones, all firms are necessarily harmed by it. Second, the intensification of indirect competition is not necessarily bad for the firm. It may be the case that, the more competitors its competitors have, the higher the firm’s profit. Finally, this model also has a multiproduct interpretation which suggests that a merger of single‐product firms may be beneficial or harmful from a social welfare perspective, depending on whether the new entity will compete with several single‐product firms or another multiproduct one.     

Price Discrimination under Customer Recognition and Mergers

This paper studies the interaction between horizontal mergers and price discrimination by endogenizing the merger formation process in the context of a repeated purchase model with two periods and three firms wherein firms may engage in behavior‐based price discrimination (BBPD). From a merger policy perspective, this paper's main contribution is twofold. First, it shows that when firms are allowed to price discriminate, the (unique) equilibrium merger gives rise to significant increases in profits for the merging firms (the ones with information to price discriminate), but has no ex‐post effect on the outsider firm's profitability, thereby eliminating the so‐called (static) “free‐riding problem.” Second, this equilibrium merger is shown to increase industry profits at the expense of consumers' surplus, leaving total welfare unaffected. This then suggests that competition authorities should scrutinize with greater zeal mergers in industries where firms are expected to engage in BBPD.     

BEHAVIOR IN GROUP CONTESTS: A REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH

Group contests are ubiquitous. Some examples include warfare between countries, competition between political parties, team‐incentives within firms, and rent‐seeking. In order to succeed, members of the same group have incentives to cooperate with each other by expending effort. However, since effort is costly, each member also has an incentive to abstain from expending any effort and instead free ride on the efforts of other members. Contest theory predicts that the intensity of competition between groups and the amount of free riding within groups depend on the group size, sharing rule, group impact function, contest success function, and heterogeneity of players. We review experimental studies testing these theoretical predictions. Most studies find significant over‐expenditure of effort relative to the theory and significant heterogeneity of behavior within and between groups. Also, most studies find support for the comparative statics predictions of the theory (with the exception of the “group size paradox”). Finally, studies show that there are effective mechanisms that can promote within‐group cooperation and conflict resolution mechanisms that can de‐escalate and potentially eliminate between‐group conflict.     

Firms' Stakeholders and the Costs of Transparency

We develop a model of a firm whose production process requires it to initiate and nurture a relationship with its stakeholders. Because there are spillover benefits of being associated with a "winner," the perceptions of stakeholders and potential stakeholders can affect firm value. Our analysis indicates that while transparency (i.e., generating information about a firm's quality) may improve the allocation of resources, a firm may have a higher ex ante value if information about its quality is not prematurely generated. Transparency costs arise because of asymmetric information regarding the extent to which stakeholders benefit from having a relationship with a high-quality firm. These costs are higher when firms can undertake noncontractible innovative investments that enhance the value of their stakeholder relationships. Stakeholder effects of transparency are especially important for younger firms with less established track records.     

Vertical Integration and Proprietary Information Transfers

Suppose that rival downstream producers of a final good contract with the same upstream supplier of an input and, in the process, reveal private information. A vertical merger between the upstream supplier and one of the downstream firms may dissipate the information advantage of the remaining downstream firms. The welfare consequences of such a merger and related information sharing depend on the value of information, the benefits of integration apart from information sharing, and the nature of upstream competition. In this paper, conditions are found under which owners of a vertically integrated firm are better off breaking up into independent firms. This result may explain AT&T's recent spinoff of Lucent Technologies. Further results suggest that a prohibition on information transfers, such as that often proposed by the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice as a precursor to approving vertical mergers, may actually reduce expected consumer surplus and expected social welfare.     

Bayesian inference for the gravity model

This paper seeks to empirically extend the gravity model, which has been widely used to analyze volumes of trade between pairs of countries. We generalize the basic threshold tobit model by allowing for the inclusion of country‐specific effects into the analysis and also show how one can explore the relationship between trade volumes and a given covariate via a non‐parametric approach. We use our derived methodology to investigate the impact of a particular aspect of institutions—the enforcement of contracts—on bilateral trade. We find that contract enforcement matters in predicting trade volumes for all types of goods, that it matters most for the trade of differentiated goods, and that the relationship between contract enforcement and trade in our threshold tobit exhibits some nonlinearities. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Endogenous mergers under multi-market competition

This paper examines a simple model of strategic interactions among firms that face at least some of the same rivals in two related markets (for goods 1 and 2). It shows that when firms compete in quantity, market prices increase as the degree of multi-market contact increases. However, the welfare consequences of multi-market contact are more complex and depend on how two fundamental forces play out. The first is the selection effect, which acts to increase welfare, as shutting down the relatively more inefficient firm is beneficial. The second opposing effect is the internalisation of the Cournot externality effect; reducing the production of good 2 allows firms to sustain a higher price for good 1. This works to increase prices and, therefore, decrease consumer surplus (but increase producer surplus). These two effects are influenced by the degree of asymmetry between markets 1 and 2 and the degree of substitutability between goods 1 and 2.     

Maintenance contracts for leased goods: their role in creating brand loyalty

Using a two‐period switching cost model, this paper compares rental profit with sales profit in a framework in which duopolists produce horizontally differentiated durable goods. Rental firms use maintenance contracts that stipulate that repeat customers pay a lower fine per unit of damage than do those customers who switch to a rival firm. In the sales regime, firms give loyal customers a discount on their second period prices. If switching costs are zero, sales profit equals rental profit. For positive and identical switching costs, either regime can dominate. As the exogenous rate of depreciation falls, rental profit exceeds sales profit. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The measurement of marketing efficiency in the presence of spillovers: theory and evidence

We develop a model of marketing efficiency based on a directional distance function that allows for marketing spillovers. A parametric model is used to test for spillovers from rival marketing and from a firm's marketing activity of its other related products. We then show how this information can be incorporated into a non‐parametric model and used to estimate marketing inefficiency. We apply brand level data from the US brewing industry to the non‐parametric model to determine the effectiveness of television, radio, and print advertising. We find that advertising spillovers are important in brewing and show that efficiency estimates are inaccurate when spillover effects are ignored. Our results also suggest that marketing efficiency may be an important component to firm success in brewing, a result that may apply to other consumer goods industries. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly

A model of duopoly competition in nonlinear pricing when firms are imperfectly informed about consumer locations is analyzed. A continuum of consumers purchase a variable amount of a product from one of two firms located at the endpoints of the market. At the Nash equilibrium in quantity-outlay schedules, consumers buy the same quantities as they would from the same firm if it were a monopolist facing the same informational asymmetries, but they receive greater surplus. Hence, no efficiency gains result from competition. If consumers have the option to reveal their locations and have the firms deliver the goods, all consumers choose to reveal their locations in equilibrium. Thus, the inefficiencies from information asymmetries may not arise because firms can deliver the good to consumers. In contrast, with a monopoly seller, consumers have no incentives to reveal their locations.     

Pursuing sustainable development through green entrepreneurship: An institutional perspective

Pursuing sustainable development through green entrepreneurship has been advocated, conceptualized, and empirically examined in the recent environmental management and entrepreneurship literature. However, green entrepreneurs are embedded in institutional environments that may discourage them from embracing sustainable development because of the “paradox of embedded agency.” How can a firm overcome the liability of such an agency issue and escape what has become known as a “green prison”? This study proposes that, because international venturing exposes firms to foreign institutions, it provides them with opportunities for institutional learning. Thus, we examine how international venturing influences green entrepreneurship which, in turn, impacts firm performance. Specifically, based on institutional theory, this study develops a firm-level green entrepreneurship framework with three dimensions: green initiatives (a firm's active adoption of green practices), received government green support (benefits that a firm gains from the government by adapting to governmental incentives, programs, and policies related to green practices), and green political influence (a firm's attempts to influence legislation that enacts laws, rules, and regulations related to green practices). The results obtained by analyzing 152 firms that engage in international venturing activities and 151 firms that do not show that international venturing is positively associated with green initiatives and government green support while these two factors further directly enhance firm performance and mediate the effects of international venturing on performance.     

Exporting firms and retail internationalization: Evidence from France

This paper questions the impact of the globalization of the retail sector on the export activity of origin country agri‐food firms. We use an original firm‐level database of French agri‐food exports that identifies the domestic suppliers of French retailers through certification with the private International Featured Standard (IFS). The results show that IFS certified French firms are more likely to export and export larger volumes than noncertified firms to markets where French retailers have established outlets. We also show that when French retailers stop their activities in a market, certified firms reduce their exports to this market in the following years. The results are robust to the use of different sets of firm‐year‐ and country‐year‐specific controls and fixed effects, and are not affected by possible selection and endogeneity biases. The difference in the behavior of certified and noncertified exporting firms on markets where French retailers operate confirms the network effect that benefits retailers’ suppliers, which is lost when French retailers exit from the destination country.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Managerial Knowledge Spillovers through the Diffusion of Management Practices

Although managerial knowledge spillovers have long been claimed to be a major benefit of foreign direct investment (FDI), such spillovers have not yet been systematically analysed. This paper adds to the literature by analysing the nature and extent of managerial knowledge spillovers from FDI through the diffusion of management practices. Taking into account the tacit and explicit elements of management practices and distinguishing between industry and non‐industry specific practices, the paper identifies different types of spillovers and discusses their transmission mechanisms. Evidence from establishment‐level panel data from the UK attests to the existence and significance of intra‐industry, linkage, and non‐linkage based inter‐industry spillovers of managerial knowledge from foreign to local firms, although the strength varies for different types of practices. The spillovers are geographically localized, especially in channels without supply chain linkages. Local firms are selective in the adoption of individual practices and the spillover effects are more significant at the cluster and management system level. Reverse spillovers from local firms to MNEs from industrialized countries appear to be limited despite significant spillovers of practices amongst local firms.