Technology and the great divergence: Global economic development since 1820

The paper measures productivity growth in seventeen countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. GDP per worker and capital per worker in 1985 US dollars were estimated for 1820, 1850, 1880, 1913, and 1939 by using historical national accounts to back cast Penn World Table data for 1965 and 1990. Frontier and econometric production functions are used to measure neutral technical change and local technical change. The latter includes concurrent increases in capital per worker and output per worker beyond the highest values achieved. These increases were pioneered by the rich countries of the day. An increase in the capital-labor ratio was usually followed by a half century in which rich countries raised output per worker at that higher ratio. Then the rich countries moved on to a higher capital-ratio, and technical progress ceased at the lower ratio they abandoned. Most of the benefits of technical progress accrued to the rich countries that pioneered it. It is remarkable that countries in 1990 with low capital labor ratios achieved an output per worker that was no higher than countries with the same capital labor ratio in 1820. In the course of the last two hundred years, the rich countries created the production function of the world that defines the growth possibilities of poor countries today.     

American colonial incomes, 1650–1774

New data now allow conjectures on the levels of real and nominal incomes in the 13 American colonies. New England was the poorest region, and the South was the richest. Colonial per capita incomes rose only very slowly if at all, for five reasons: productivity growth was slow; population in the low‐income (but subsistence‐plus) frontier grew much faster than that in the high‐income coastal settlements; child dependency rates were high and probably even rising; the terms of trade were extremely volatile, presumably suppressing investment in export sectors; and the terms of trade rose very slowly, if at all, in the North, although faster in the South. All of this checked the growth of colony‐wide per capita income after a seventeenth‐century boom. The American colonies led Great Britain in purchasing power per capita from 1700, and possibly from 1650, until 1774, even counting slaves in the population. That is, average purchasing power in America led Britain early, when Americans were British. The common view that American per capita income did not overtake that of Britain until the start of the twentieth century appears to be off the mark by two centuries or more.     

Between Malthus and the industrial take-off: regional inequality in Sweden, 1571–1850

The causes and extent of regional inequality in the process of economic growth are at the core of historical economic research. So far, much attention has been devoted to studying the role of industrialization in driving regional divergence. However, empirical studies on relatively unequal countries such as Italy and Spain show that inequality was already high at the outset of modern industrialization. Using new estimates of Swedish regional GDP, this article looks for the first time at regional inequality in a pre-industrial European economy. Its findings show that inequality increased dramatically between 1571 and 1750 and stayed high until the mid-nineteenth century. This result refutes the classical view that the industrial take-off was the main driver of regional divergence. Decomposing the Theil index for GDP per worker, we find that the bulk of inequality from 1750 onwards was driven by structural differences across sectors rather than different regional productivity within sectors. We show that counties with higher agricultural productivity followed a classic Malthusian pattern when experiencing technological advancement, while those with higher industrial productivity did not. We suggest that institutional factors, such as the creation of the Swedish Empire, Stockholm's trading rights, and a protective industrial policy, amplified this exceptional pattern.     

Energy availability from livestock and agricultural productivity in Europe, 1815–1913: a new comparison

This article explores the proposition that a reason for high agricultural productivity in the early nineteenth century was relatively high energy availability from draught animals. The article is based on the collection of extensive new data indicating different trends in draught power availability and the efficiency of its use in different countries of Europe. This article shows that the proposition does not hold, and demonstrates that, although towards the end of the nineteenth century England had relatively high numbers of draught animals per agricultural worker, it also had low number of workers and animals per hectare, indicating the high efficiency of muscle power, rather than an abundance of such power. The higher efficiency was related to a specialization on less labour-intensive farming and a preference for horses over oxen.     

Engels’ pause: Technical change, capital accumulation, and inequality in the british industrial revolution

The paper reviews the macroeconomic data describing the British economy from 1760 to 1913 and shows that it passed through a two stage evolution of inequality. In the first half of the 19th century, the real wage stagnated while output per worker expanded. The profit rate doubled and the share of profits in national income expanded at the expense of labour and land. After the middle of the 19th century, real wages began to grow in line with productivity, and the profit rate and factor shares stabilized. An integrated model of growth and distribution is developed to explain these trends. The model includes an aggregate production function that explains the distribution of income, while a savings function in which savings depended on property income governs accumulation. Simulations with the model show that technical progress was the prime mover behind the industrial revolution. Capital accumulation was a necessary complement. The surge in inequality was intrinsic to the growth process: technical change increased the demand for capital and raised the profit rate and capital’s share. The rise in profits, in turn, sustained the industrial revolution by financing the necessary capital accumulation. After the middle of the 19th century, accumulation had caught up with the requirements of technology and wages rose in line with productivity.     

Australian squatters,convicts, and capitalists: dividing up a fast‐growing frontier pie, 1821–71

Compared with its competitors, Australian GDP per worker grew exceptionally quickly from the 1820s to the 1870s, at a rate about twice that of the US and three times that of Britain. Did this rapid growth produce rising inequality, following a Kuznets curve? Using a novel dataset, this article offers new evidence that provides unambiguous support for the view that, in sharp contrast with the US experience and with globalization‐inequality views concerning late nineteenth‐century frontiers, Australia underwent a revolutionary levelling in incomes up to the 1870s. This assessment is based on trends in many proxies for inequality, as well as annual estimates of functional income shares in the form of land rents, convict payments, free unskilled labour incomes, free skilled labour and white collar incomes, British imperial transfers, and a capitalist residual.     

Italy in the Renaissance: a leading economy in the European context, 1350–1550

A well‐known debate on the Renaissance economy was held in this journal in 1962–4 between Roberto S. Lopez and Harry Miskimin on one hand and Carlo M. Cipolla on the other. More than half a century later, this topic can be reconsidered in the light of much wider information on the late medieval/early modern Italian economy. Using data on population, urbanization, prices, wages, and GDP, this article outlines the macroeconomic trends in central and northern Italy in the age of the Renaissance (1350–1550). The frequent plagues during the early Renaissance—that is, between 1348 and 1450—decimated the population, probably causing more deaths than in other European countries. Hence resources per worker increased and labour productivity, incomes, and standards of living improved remarkably. A favourable economic environment thus seems to have been a pre‐condition for the Renaissance in culture, art, and politics and the spread of new kinds of consumer demand. From the middle of the fifteenth century, living standards gradually worsened and eventually reached the low levels that had prevailed prior to the Renaissance.     

Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1885–2008: Evidence from eight countries

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been absent from recent debates about comparative long-run growth owing to the lack of data on aggregate economic performance before 1950. This paper provides estimates of GDP per capita on an annual basis for eight Anglophone African economies for the period since 1885, raising new questions about previous characterizations of the region's economic performance. The new data show that many of these economies had levels of per capita income which were above subsistence by the early twentieth century, on a par with the largest economies in Asia until the 1980s. However, overall improvements in GDP per capita were limited by episodes of negative growth or “shrinking”, the scale and scope of which can be measured through annual data.     

‘Th'ancient Distaff’ and ‘Whirling Spindle’: measuring the contribution of spinning to household earnings and the national economy in England, 1550–17701

The purpose of this article is to estimate the workforce involved in spinning from the late sixteenth century until the eve of mechanization. In addition, the potential contribution to family earnings from spinning will be examined. Just about all of the millions of yards of woollen yarn that went into making English cloth had to be spun by women and children, but this activity has not been investigated to the extent that it deserves. Spinning was a skilled occupation where there was a great demand for the best quality product. Sources exist which make it possible to make general estimates of the amount of spinning needed in the economy, and its cost. This evidence shows that employment in spinning increased dramatically from the late seventeenth century, and continued to increase until there were probably over one million women and children employed in spinning by the mid‐eighteenth century. In addition earnings increased to the extent whereby earnings from spinning could contribute over 30 per cent of household income for poorer families. This has implications for looking at trends in real wages over time, as well as for the concept of the industrious revolution.     

Tall and shrinking Muslims, short and growing Europeans: The long-run welfare development of the Middle East, 1850-1980

In this study we examine anthropometric data for eight countries in the Middle East for the period 1850-1910, and we follow those countries until the 1980s. The Middle East had a relatively good position during the mid-19th century, if human stature or real wages are considered, but much less so in terms of GDP per capita. Initially low population densities allowed better anthropometric outcomes. The height advantage was due, among other factors, to easier access to animal products. All indicators suggest that the Middle East lost ground after the 1870s relative to the industrializing Countries.     

The Influence of Government Policies on Informal Labor: Implications for Long-Run Growth

Using cross-sectional data from industrialized and developing economies, we examine long-run growth regressions linking government policies, informal employment and real GDP per worker. We find that changes in government policies of taxation and enforcement significantly affect growth in the informal sector. Further, we show that increases (decreases) in informal employment significantly and negatively (positively) affect a country's growth rate of real GDP per worker. The empirical link between government policies, informal employment and real GDP per worker holds irrespective of a country's development. On average, changes in government policies, through their effect on the size of the informal sector, account for 6 percent of the growth rate of real GDP per worker between 1960 and 1990.     

Shipping and economic development in nineteenth‐century Ireland1

The tonnage of shipping entering and leaving Ireland grew rapidly from the late eighteenth century until the mid‐1870s, after which there was a distinct slowdown. The mid‐nineteenth century was notable for a five‐fold increase in shipping per capita, an indicator of the Irish economy’s increasing commercialization. The slowdown after 1870 would have been even greater without the industrial dynamism of Belfast, Ireland’s leading port from the 1880s. The early and rapid introduction of steamships from the 1820s made possible large‐scale exports of live animals and fresh eggs, products that would account for 60 per cent of agricultural exports and a quarter of total exports by 1910.     

Urbanization, population transition, and growth

This paper analyzes a dual economy consisting of urban marketareas and less developed rural areas with or without local markets.Urban areas have better opportunities for earnings and educationthan rural areas. Rural families choose whether to move to urbanareas at costs that differ from location to location. As percapita output grows relative to the moving cost, urbanizationproceeds, leading to lower fertility, more investments in humanand physical capital per child relative to output per worker,and faster economic growth. These impacts are stronger if ruralareas have no access to markets.     

Economic Convergence in the African Continent: Closing the Gap

The paper attempts to analyse the conditional β‐convergence and its sources for 32 African countries over the period 1960‐2008. The augmented Solow model with both gross domestic product (GDP) per worker and per capita income is estimated using the dynamic system generalized methods of moments (GMM) technique with the panel data. This is the first study on the sources of conditional β‐convergence for African countries. According to the results of the augmented Solow model, income convergence rates are lower than those of GDP per worker. Moreover, total factor productivity convergence, human capital convergence and capital labour convergence are contributing towards the convergence of GDP per worker in Africa. This means that growth in the poorest African countries is being augmented by “catch‐up factor,” which is good news for them. However, convergence in terms of GDP per worker is not being fully translated into income per capita convergence. The demographic structure in the African continent with its record of persistent population growth has played an important role in lowering the income convergence of its countries.     

Growth or stagnation? Farming in England, 1200–1800

Estimates of English income in Broadberry et al.’s British economic growth, 1270–1870 are founded upon a fourfold growth of farm output, and output per farm worker, over this interval. This article shows, using four separate tests, that farm output growth must have been much more limited. The tests are, first, whether in 1300 there was enough work at harvest to employ all the labour force; second, whether the value of output per worker in agriculture was greater than the annual earnings of workers; third, whether the implied relative outputs per acre of arable versus pasture were reasonable; and fourth, whether a much shorter medieval work year was possible. An alternative index of farm output consistent with the labour supply, wages, and farm rents is derived. This shows much less growth during the period 1270–1800. Overall economic growth in England during these years must consequently have been far less than Broadberry et al. estimate.     

浙江中小企业的现状、问题及发展对策

沐浴着新世纪的阳光 ,新一代的思想政治工作者接受着瞬息万变的政治、经济、科技、道德、文化辐射 ,该怎样面对新实际、新情况 ,探索工作新思路、新途径成为现实课题。本文试图提出学习型思想政治工作者概念 ,以研究新时期思想政治工作者如何跨越“老政工”干部形象光环 ,塑造     

Lancashire,India, and shifting competitive advantage in cotton textiles, 1700–1850: the neglected role of factor prices1

In the early eighteenth century, wages in Britain were more than four times as high as in India, the world's major exporter of cotton textiles. This induced the adoption of more capital‐intensive production methods in Britain and a faster rate of technological progress, so that competitive advantage had begun to shift in Britain's favour by the late eighteenth century. However, the completion of the process was delayed until after the Napoleonic Wars by increasing raw cotton costs, before supply adjusted to the major increase in demand for inputs.     

The State and the finance sector: the evolution of regulatory apparatus

This paper seeks to explain the motivation for the growth of regulation of the Australian financial sector and banking in particular. It will be argued that the pace and direction of the growth of the regulatory apparatus from the 1930s until the 1980s was set by concerns of governments about macro–economic issues rather than issues affecting the financial sector per se. The drivers of regulatory change over the last two decades of the century reflect new concerns about the efficiency and underlying stability of financial markets, and equity issues.     

Nineteenth Century Black and Mixed-Race Physical Activity,Calories, and Life Expectancy: Nutrition,Sanitation, or Medical Intervention?

Using data from late 19th and early twentieth century US prisons, this study considers how black and mixed-race basal metabolic rates and calories varied with economic development. During the nineteenth century, African-American physical activity and net nutrition decreased across their BMR and calorie distributions, and increasing black life expectancy indicates that decreasing mortality was not likely due to improved nutrition. Physically active farmers had greater BMRs and required more calories per day than workers in other occupations. Black diets, nutrition, and calories varied by residence, and rural blacks in the Deep South required the most calories per day, while their Northeastern urban counterparts required the least. Policy implications are that public sanitation facilities may be of greater import than nutrition during economic development.     

Capital deepening and the rise of the factory: the American experience during the nineteenth century1

Between 1850 and 1880, capital per worker in United States manufacturing increased on average by at least 75 per cent, even after taking account of declining capital goods prices. During this same period, production shifted from small, labour‐intensive artisan shops to large capital‐intensive factories. Similar changes have occurred in many other countries at the same stage of industrialization. Establishment‐level data from the federal censuses of manufacturing, however, reveal that the shift in production in the United States accounts for a modest amount of the increased capital per worker. There, at least, capital deepening seems to have occurred in almost all firms everywhere.