企业集团内部资本市场对其成员企业融资约束的影响——来自中国企业集团的经验证据

本文验证在中国特殊的制度环境下,企业集团内部资本市场对成员企业融资约束的影响。我们发现,企业集团通过内部资本配置,能够放松成员企业所面临的融资约束。国有集团的内部资本市场放松融资约束的功能得到了很好的发挥:内部资本市场规模小、成长速度快、控制权和现金流权分离程度小的民营集团的成员企业,其所面临的融资约束比较大。在市场化程度较高的省份(或地区),企业集团内部资本市场具有放松融资约束的功能,其成员企业所面临的融资约束小。集团内部资本市场没有放松控制权与现金流权分离程度大的集团成员企业所面临的融资约束。     

企业集团内部资本配置的经济后果——来自中国企业集团的证据

通过对企业集团的成员企业进行实证检验,我们发现:企业集团内部资本配置损害其成员企业的价值。控制权与现金流权分离程度大和规模大的成员企业,企业集团内部资本配置活动对其价值的损害比较显著。民营集团内部资本配置有利于其成员企业价值的提升,尤其是规模小的成员企业受益于集团内部的资本配置活动。中央政府为最终控制人的集团,其内部资本配置活动有利于成员企业价值的提升,集团内部资本配置尤其使规模小和存在融资约束的成员企业受益;地方政府为最终控制人的集团,内部资本配置活动往往不利于其成员企业价值的提升。     

内部资本市场效率与成本粘性——来自民营企业集团的证据

本文采用民营企业集团财务公司的经营业务数据测度内部资本市场效率,考察了内部资本市场效率对成本粘性的影响。研究发现内部资本市场效率越高,成员公司成本粘性越小。控制内生性问题之后,上述结论依然成立。这表明内部资本市场的高效率资金配置缓解了成本粘性,提高了成员公司成本管理的及时性和有效性。异质性分析表明,当成员公司融资约束越严重、管理层短视程度越低、代理成本越高时,内部资本市场效率对成本粘性的缓解作用更显著。立足民营企业集团的内部资本市场,本文丰富了成本粘性影响因素以及内部资本市场经济后果方面的文献。     

我国企业集团内部资本市场优化探讨

社会主义市场经济的不断发展和完善促生了企业集团和多元化发展,而企业集团的可持续发展又对资金管理提出了较高的要求,由此内部资本市场应运而生。内部资本市场作为企业集团资源配置的一个新方式,同时具备市场和企业机制的双重机制,备受关注,有助于提高企业集团的资源运作效率。本文在介绍内部资本市场概念、特点等的基础上,分析了我国企业集团资金集中管理尚存在的问题,分析了优化企业集团内部资本市场的必然性,最后提出了优化我国内部资本市场、提高配置效率的几点建议。     

我国企业集团内部资本市场优化探讨

社会主义市场经济的不断发展和完善促生了企业集团和多元化发展,而企业集团的可持续发展又对资金管理提出了较高的要求,由此内部资本市场应运而生。内部资本市场作为企业集团资源配置的一个新方式,同时具备市场和企业机制的双重机制,备受关注,有助于提高企业集团的资源运作效率。本文在介绍内部资本市场概念、特点等的基础上,分析了我国企业集团资金集中管理尚存在的问题,分析了优化企业集团内部资本市场的必然性,最后提出了优化我国内部资本市场、提高配置效率的几点建议。     

中国“系族企业”分部经理影响力活动、内部资本市场及其配置效率

多元化集团内部资本市场(ICM)的资源配置效率随着分部经理影响分配决策能力的变化而改变。由于我国内部资本市场替代不完美外部资本市场以及多元化企业中更易频繁发生的影响力活动,研究中国ICM配置效率尤其是分部经理影响力活动对于ICM配置效率的影响更具意义。本文以中国资本市场"系族企业"为对象进行实证检验,突出研究多元化企业中分部经理影响力对于内部资本市场配置效率的影响作用。研究结论对于我国企业集团设计资本预算程序和薪酬激励体系提供了理论依据和标杆。     

子公司多元化、业务分布与现金持有——基于母子公司内部资本配置视角的分析

本文以母子公司内部资本配置为视角,检验了业务分布对子公司多元化下现金持有水平的影响。研究发现,子公司多元化能够降低上市公司合并整体的现金持有水平;而当业务分布于子公司的比重越高或子公司业务地域分布越广时,子公司多元化降低现金持有水平的效果被削弱的程度越高;且在母子公司间业务分布与地域分布的交互影响下,子公司多元化降低现金持有水平的效果被削弱的程度会更为明显。本文揭示了子公司经营需求和自主资产配置能力对母子公司间内部资本市场效率影响的内在机理,扩展了企业集团内部资本市场的结构化特征与机理的研究。     

企业集团内部资本市场的存在性与效率性

国内外的研究表明企业集团普遍存在,尤其是在新兴市场经济国家。企业集团以集团总部为核心,通过内部资本市场在分部(成员企业)之间进行资源配置。目前国内关于内部资本市场的研究集中关注内部资本市场对于缓解企业融资约束方面的功能,尚缺乏企业集团内部资本市场资源配置功能的经验证据。本文以2006-2007年沪深两市的系族企业为研究对象,探讨我国企业集团内部资本市场的存在性与效率性。本文的研究结论表明:一方面,无论是国有还是民营企业集团,普遍存在着活跃的内部资本市场;另一方面,企业集团内部资本市场的配置效率普遍不高,并且民营企业集团的内部资本市场的配置效率要显著低于国有企业集团。     

内部资本市场：组织载体、交易与租金

本文首先对内部资本市场存在于多元化企业集团的观点提出了质疑,认为多元化可以扩大内部资本市场的运作空间,但不是判断企业集团是否存在内部资本市场的必要条件；其次对内部资本市场交易按其特征进行分类,并对其与关联交易的区别进行了辨析；最后从组织租金视角研究内部资本市场的本质,界定了内部资本市场租金的内涵,提出内部资本市场的本质是租金的创造与分配。     

企业集团内部资本市场低效配置探析

国内外研究表明企业集团内普遍存在内部资本市场,但作为新兴市场经济国家,我国企业集团内部资本市场的配置效率相对较低,本文分析了我国企业集团内部资本市场低效配置的表现及成因,并就如何提高其配置效率提出了改进对策。     

Internal Funds Allocation and the Ownership Structure: Evidence from Korean Business Groups

We examine the relationship between the controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights and the funds transfer in the internal capital market within Korean business groups (chaebols) during the period from 1998 to 2001. We find that the funds allocation in the firms where controlling shareholders have high cash flow rights is better aligned with the investment opportunities and therefore, more efficient than in the firms where they have low cash flow rights. This effect is stronger when they have controlling powers large enough to expropriate minority shareholders. However, during the financial crisis period, funds simply move toward the firms where controlling shareholders have high cash flow rights. The results evidence the tunneling behavior in the internal capital market within a chaebol that the ownership structure distorts the allocation of internal funds in such a way as to benefit the controlling shareholders.JEL Classification: G31, G30     

Emerging Derivatives Markets: The Case of Chile

We compare the performance of firms affiliated with diversified business groups with the performance of unaffiliated firms in Turkey, an emerging market. We address the question of whether group-affiliated firms create internal capital markets or control large cash flows. Our findings indicate that group affiliation improves a firm's accounting performance, but not stock market performance. Deviation of cash-flow rights from voting rights has a negative but insignificant effect on accounting performance, but a significant effect on market performance. We also find that a firm's accounting, but not stock market, performance increases with the level of group diversification. Our results show that internal capital markets play an important role for the existence of business groups in an emerging market context.     

Opening the Black Box: Internal Capital Markets and Managerial Power

We analyze the internal capital markets of a multinational conglomerate, using a unique panel data set of planned and actual allocations to business units and a survey of unit CEOs. Following cash windfalls, more powerful managers obtain larger allocations and increase investment substantially more than their less connected peers. We identify cash windfalls as a source of misallocation of capital, as more powerful managers overinvest and their units exhibit lower ex post performance and productivity. These findings contribute to our understanding of frictions in resource allocation within firms and point to an important channel through which power may lead to inefficiencies.     

Internal capital market efficiency and the diversification discount: The role of financial statement comparability

This paper investigates how financial statement comparability affects the efficiency of internal capital markets and diversification discounts in multi‐segment firms through monitoring mechanisms. Previous studies suggest that financial statement comparability improves transparency and reduces the cost of information processing, mitigating information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Using measures of comparability and internal capital efficiency, we find that financial statement comparability has a strong positive influence on internal capital market efficiency. Further, we find that by improving the efficiency of internal capital markets, financial statement comparability indeed mitigates diversification discounts. Especially, the effect of financial statement comparability is more pronounced for firms with high information asymmetry or operating environment volatility. The results support our arguments that financial statement comparability enhances the efficiency of internal capital markets and increases firm value in diversified firms by mitigating agency problems via monitoring and corporate control mechanisms.     

The Impact of Business Groups on Investment Efficiency: Does Capital Allocation Matter?

Using data on internal capital markets in China, this paper examines the influence of internal capital markets on investment efficiency in business groups. The empirical results show that using internal capital markets can alleviate over invests within business groups. In addition, it can alleviate deficiencies in R&D investment in business groups effectively. The impact of internal capital markets on investment efficiency varies between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises. At private enterprises, internal capital market operations significantly alleviate overinvestment and promote R&D investment. However, at state-owned enterprises, internal capital market operations increase overinvestment and reduce investment in R&D.     

Size and diversity in VC syndicates and their impact on IPO performance

This paper investigates the impact of venture capital (VC) syndicate size and composition on the IPO and post-IPO performances of investee companies in an attempt to shed some light on the extent to which larger and more diverse syndicates are more likely to suffer from internal agency problems which might hinder the decision-making process and lead to less value added for their portfolio companies. The question is of great relevance because, while the vast majority of the empirical literature compares VC backed IPOs with non-VC backed ones, most VC funding is provided by syndicates of two or more financiers. We construct alternative measures of size as well as diversity based on several VC characteristics such as age, geographic location, type and affiliation of VC firms and find that larger and more diverse syndicates are associated with higher underpricing and lower valuation at the IPO date. Furthermore, we provide evidence that that diversity and size are negatively correlated to the long-term performance of the IPO firms and this finding is robust to several alternative measures of long-term performance.     

The deep-pocket effect of internal capital markets

We provide evidence that incumbent and entrant firms' access to business group deep pockets affects the entry patterns in product markets. Relying on a unique French data set on business groups, our paper shows that entry into manufacturing industries is negatively related to the cash hoarded by incumbent affiliated groups and positively related to entrant groups' cash. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that the impact of group cash holdingson entry is more important in environments where financial constraints are pronounced. The cash holdings of incumbent and entrant groups also affect the survival rate of entrants in the three- to five-year post-entry window. Overall, our findings suggest that internal capital markets operate within corporate groups and affect the product market behavior of affiliated firms by mitigating financial constraints.     

Corporate Groups and Minority Shareholder Wealth: A Role for Private Benefits?

This paper aims at developing a theoretical framework to address the issue of internal resource allocation within corporate groups, representing an extension of the internal capital market approach developed for Anglo-Saxon type multidivisional enterprises. In particular, the paper investigates how private benefits from control affect investment decision processes in a capital constrained business group. We consider a group of n listed companies controlled by one main shareholder (i.e., a hierarchical group), and suppose that the group as a whole is endowed with an exogenous and limited amount of capital for investment. We analyze the effects of private benefits on the investment allocative efficiency and on the wealth of the group';s various claimants. Under reasonable assumptions, we show that the controlling shareholder always finds preferable to secure private benefits. Moreover, and surprisingly enough, we find that the appropriation of control benefits may give rise to an increase in the market value of the group as well as in the portfolio wealth of the set of minority shareholders. In particular, the positive effect of control benefits on minority interests increases with the capital rationing of the group. Therefore, the effects of private benefits can be different in different markets, depending on the degree of development and the credit capacity of the single market. The findings of this paper challenge the largely accepted view that private benefits from control are always harmful to minority shareholders.     

A flight to Q? Firm investment and financing in Korea before and after the 1997 financial crisis

We examine investment behavior among exchange-listed Korean manufacturing firms before and after the 1997 financial crisis using firm-level panel data. Starting with the standard Q-theory of investment, we augment it by allowing for a sales accelerator and the possibility of cash constraints, categorizing firms based on their age, size and affiliation to an industrial conglomerate (i.e., chaebol). We find that Tobin’s Q is a robust determinant of investment in a pooled sample for 1992–2001, but that it became more important for small firms and less important for chaebol-affiliated firms after the crisis. Investment by chaebol firms also became more sensitive to the availability of internal cash balances after the crisis. We interpret this as reflecting a shift in the Korean economy to a stronger market orientation after the crisis and to a business climate in which the quality of potential projects became more important relative to capital market imperfections in determining the destination of investment funds.     

Business groups in China

We investigate whether business groups in China act as internal capital markets, in an environment that is characterized by a high level of government intervention, a weak legal system, and an underdeveloped financial market. We study how institutional factors, such as the ultimate owner and level of market development, shape the role of these business groups. We find that business groups help member firms overcome constraints in raising external capital, and that the internal capital market within a business group is more likely to be an alternative financing channel among state-owned firms than among private firms. We also find that the internal capital market is more likely to help those affiliated firms which are private, local government owned relative to those owned by central government, or located in regions with a well-developed institutional environment. We present evidence of the role of business groups in risk sharing among affiliated firms, but find that business group affiliation has no impact on firm accounting performance. This study sheds new light on the theory of the firm and its boundaries, and provides a better understanding of China's rapidly growing economy.