Estimating the marginal propensity to consume using the distributions of income,consumption, and wealth

Studies of economic inequality almost always separately examine income, consumption, and wealth inequality, and hence, miss the important synergy amongst the three measures explicit in the life-cycle budget constraint. These joint distributions, however, are important in evaluating macroeconomic impacts of changes in income because the response may differ across the wealth distribution. This heterogeneity in the response to income changes can have significant impact on the effectiveness of government fiscal policy. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from 1999–2013, we examine how the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) differs across the wealth distribution. We find that the MPC is lower at higher wealth quintiles, indicating that low wealth households cannot smooth consumption as much as other households. This implies that increasing wealth inequality likely reduces aggregate consumption, which, in turn, could limit economic growth.     

Reexamination of Economic Growth, Tax Policy, and Distributive Politics

The paper examines the relationship between economic growth, tax policy, and distribution of capital and labor ownership in a one‐sector political‐economy model of endogenous growth with productive government spending financed by a proportional tax on capital income. The analysis shows that inequality in wealth and income can be positively or negatively related to the optimal tax rate. In either environment, higher inequality leads to a lower after‐tax return to capital, thereby reducing the economy's growth rate.     

Public policy,dynamic status preferences,and wealth inequality

This paper studies the effect of productive government spending (taxation) on aggregate savings behavior and its consequences for the dynamics of wealth inequality, taking into consideration key behavioral changes that occur during the process of economic development. Substantial empirical evidence suggests that during this process agents' preferences toward status (positional consumption) evolves according to the average wealth of the society. The sources of wealth include private capital and productive public capital, the latter financed by a distortionary income tax. This dynamic status effect impacts peoples' responses to tax policy in ways which contrast with those of the standard neoclassical model. Specifically, we find that in response to an increase in the income tax, in economies with a strong (weak) enough dynamic status effect, savings and inequality increase (decrease). Incorporating the behavioral changes to fiscal policy expands the set of mechanisms available to explain the observed variations of savings and wealth distribution dynamics that cannot be attributed to technological or other structural factors.     

Taylor rules: Consequences for wealth and income inequality

This paper compares the consequences of “active” vs. “passive” Taylor rules for wealth and income inequality. Since the distinction is operative only along transitional paths, we compare the implications for two forms of government expenditure that generate such transitions. Our results confirm that the contrasting effects obtained previously for the aggregate economy have significant distributional consequences. For an active Taylor rule, whether the government increases its expenditure on consumption, or productively, wealth inequality will increase. Expenditure on the two public goods yields divergent paths for income inequality. Government consumption expenditure raises income inequality; productive government expenditure reduces it. If the Taylor rule is passive, an increase in either form of government expenditure reduces wealth inequality initially and over time. Income inequality initially increases, but declines over time, although remaining above its previous steady-state level.     

Education policy and inequality: A political economy approach

Regression results show that more unequal societies tend to spend comparatively more on higher levels of education. In a two-period model with heterogeneous agents, this paper investigates the political determinants of this bias. In the first period, public education is financed by the incumbent government by issuing bonds. Investments in basic and higher education have conflicting effects on future labour income distribution and net returns to these investments depend on the tax and transfers system being selected in the following period through the democratic process. Our idea is that public investment in basic education, by decreasing future labour income inequality, may induce future policy-makers to redistribute resources through financial rents taxation, thus making unfeasible the issuing of debt to finance basic education. This will be the more probable the greater wealth inequality is.     

Political regimes and foreign intervention

We present a theory of endogenous political regimes that emphasizes foreign direct investment as a motive for foreign governments to either induce regime transitions or promote regime consolidations. We characterize different forms of foreign intervention and identify the conditions under which they occur. We highlight new channels through which economic factors affect political regime choices. Foreign intervention is most likely to originate from countries where the government has a substantial pro-investor bias and to be directed at destinations where FDI is highly profitable and where income inequality is high. Foreign-sponsored coups d'état are more likely to be directed at democratic governments of poor countries. In destinations where FDI is highly profitable but the domestic elite is weak, foreign intervention tends to be aimed at stabilizing dictatorships. We relate the analysis to evidence on foreign intervention from around the world.     

THE VANISHING BEQUEST TAX: THE COMPARATIVE EVOLUTION OF BEQUEST TAXATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Bequest tax revenues have been declining in OECD countries for at least 70 years. We propose an explanation that is based on a dynamic politico‐economic model where the evolution of bequest taxation is determined by wealth inequality. Since economic development induces a growing role of labor income and thus a reduction of wealth inequality, bequest taxation is reduced over time. The model also embeds a process of structural reallocation from agriculture to manufacturing and a consequent shift of the tax base from easy‐to‐tax land to hard‐to‐tax capital. This process implies a lower tax level and slower equalization‐induced tax reduction, the higher is the tax avoidance rate and the less developed is the economy. The introduction of franchise restrictions which are gradually lifted over time allows the hump‐shaped long‐term evolution of bequest taxation to be reproduced starting from the nineteenth century for those countries that are now modern industrial democracies. The evolution of political institutions also helps to explain the discrepancies currently observed between tax systems in developed and underdeveloped countries.     

Income inequality and economic growth in an open economy

Income inequality has a strong impact on fiscal policy when majority voting enables those individuals with less-than-average income to decide on tax rates. This study analyzes the impact on economic growth of income inequality in an open economy where tax revenues are partially used for international transfers. In any case, income inequality is harmful for growth. In an economic union, positive effects of international integration raise the growth rate as long as net transfers do not grow proportionally. In a political union, unionwide voting makes distributive politics depending on the union's median voter. In this case, additional output growth on aggregate level is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a majority of voters to accept union membership.     

Political capitalism: The interaction between income inequality,economic freedom and democracy

We study the relationship between income inequality and economic freedom for a panel of 100 countries for the 1971–2010 period. Using a panel Granger non-causality approach, we reject the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality running from income inequality to economic freedom, but not vice versa. From a series of dynamic panel estimations we show that the effect of income inequality on economic freedom is negative and robust to the inclusion of additional controls. In particular, inequality is negatively associated with those components of economic freedom related to international trade, domestic market regulation as well as the rule of law and property rights protection. We argue that the negative effect of inequality on economic freedom is due to the economic elite converting its economic power into de facto political power to defend its economic interests; these interests run counter to economic freedom, discouraging innovation and competition as well as protecting the elite's rents. Finally, we show that economic freedom decreases with income inequality even in democratic countries, suggesting that democratic institutions do not prevent economic freedom from eroding. We argue that the latter finding corresponds to a system of political capitalism or captured democracy, where a powerful economic elite can nevertheless exercise de facto political power by cooperating with politicians and other decision-makers for their mutual benefit.     

Credit constraints,growth and inequality dynamics

This paper examines how credit constraints affect the dynamics of wealth and thereby the dynamics of capital and output growth. We develop standard Ak growth models that display transitional dynamics, contrary to general belief, once the complete credit markets assumption is relaxed. The mechanism is that credit constraints make individual productivity differences persist, which in turn leads to the persistence of income inequality. The dynamics of inequality is jointly determined with the dynamics of aggregate capital. The economy thus passes through a transitional period of inequality, individual and aggregate capital dynamics before it converges to a long-run balanced growth path. The application of the model to the analysis of intergenerational mobility and inequality dynamics suggests substantial economic and policy significance. In particular, introducing credit constraints to the Barro Ak model, public investment could have an indirect impact on growth via its effect on inequality and mobility.     

Income Distribution and Demand-Induced Innovations

We introduce non-homothetic preferences into an innovation-based growth model and study how income and wealth inequality affect economic growth. We identify a (positive) price effect—where increasing inequality allows innovators to charge higher prices and (negative) market-size effects—with higher inequality implying smaller markets for new goods and/or a slower transition of new goods into mass markets. It turns out that price effects dominate market-size effects. We also show that a redistribution from the poor to the rich may be Pareto improving for low levels of inequality.     

Relative deprivation,wealth inequality and economic growth

This paper presents an endogenous growth model where utility depends on relative deprivation as well as consumption. It is shown that a negative relationship exists between wealth inequality and equilibrium growth rate. In addition, if the concern for relative deprivation is strong enough, instantaneous utility decreases while aggregate income increases.      

Consumption externalities: a representative consumer model when agents are heterogeneous

We examine a growth model with consumption externalities where agents differ in their initial capital endowment and their reference group. We show under which conditions the aggregate equilibrium with heterogeneous agents replicates that obtained with a representative consumer, despite the fact that different individuals have different consumption levels. Next we consider the implications of the presence of consumption externalities for the long-run distributions of income and wealth. We find that, in a growing economy, “keeping up with the Joneses” results in less inequality than would prevail in an economy with no consumption externalities.     

Social security, public education and the growth-inequality relationship

We study how the relationship between economic growth and inequality depends upon the levels of funding of two of the largest government programs, public education and social security. We do this in the context of an overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous agents where the government collects a tax on labor income to finance these programs. We show that in our model an increase in government spending on social security reduces income inequality and can have a non-monotonic effect on growth. When the initial level of social security funding is low, as is the case in most poor economies, then its increase will enhance growth. When its funding level is high as is typical for developed countries, we show that its further increase can slow down growth while reducing income inequality. These results obtain regardless of whether the increase in social security funding is financed by a tax increase or by cutting the public education budget. We also find that the effects of increasing the level of public education expenditures or the overall size of the government budget (holding the budget composition fixed) are characterized by similar non-monotonic growth-inequality relationships.     

Income inequality and economic growth

Despite the extensive existing literature on income inequality and economic growth, there remains considerable disagreement on the effect of inequality on economic growth. Existing literatures find either a positive or a negative relationship. In this paper, we attempt to theoretically examine that relationship with a stochastic optimal growth model. We make the disagreement clear within a single model. We conclude (i) that both are possible – that is, higher inequality can retard growth in the early stage of economic development, and can encourage growth in a near steady state, (ii) that income redistribution by high income tax does not always reduce income inequality. Income inequality can be reduced by higher income tax in a near steady state, but it cannot be reduced in the early stage of economic development, and (iii) that two government polices – rapid economic growth and low income inequality – can be achieved by low income tax in the early stage of economic development, but both cannot be achieved simultaneously in a near steady state.     

IDIOSYNCRATIC AND AGGREGATE RISKS,INEQUALITY AND GROWTH

The paper disaggregates productivity shocks at a firm level into idiosyncratic and aggregate risks, and studies their impacts on inequality, growth and welfare. It develops a growth model with human capital and incomplete insurance and credit markets that provides a closed‐form solution for income inequality dynamics. We find that uninsured idiosyncratic risks are the most important determinants of inequality, growth and welfare. They are the source of nondegenerate wealth distribution. A lower weight of these shocks leads to lower steady‐state inequality, higher growth and welfare. A redistribution of income that serves as social insurance against such risks increases welfare and decreases inequality. But, it also decreases growth by distorting individual consumption and saving decisions.     

Bequests,taxation and the distribution of wealth in a general equilibrium model

This paper examines the role of bequests and of taxation on bequests for the distribution of wealth. We investigate a model with overlapping generations and heterogenous households where parents derive utility directly from their bequests. We obtain all results analytically. Using the coefficient of variation as the measure of inequality, bequests per se diminish the inequality of wealth since they raise private savings and hence average wealth holdings more than the variance of wealth. From a policy perspective, taxing bequests and redistributing government revenue lump-sum among the young generation further decreases wealth inequality.     

Wealth inequality,democracy and economic freedom

Using a novel panel data set from the Credit Suisse on the top wealth shares for 46 sample countries spanning 2000–2014, this paper empirically investigates to what extent wealth inequality influences economic freedom and whether this relationship is affected by the level of democracy. Economic freedom is measured by the Fraser Institute's economic freedom summary index as well as its five major sub-indices, such as government size, property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade, and regulations. Wealth inequality is measured by the top wealth shares. Trade union density is used as an instrument for wealth inequality. Empirical results suggest that the rising wealth inequality significantly hampers overall economic freedom, property rights protection, freedom to trade, soundness of money and regulatory environment. Furthermore, this negative effect of wealth inequality is reinforced at a lower level of democracy. These findings are robust to alternative measures of wealth inequality, economic freedom, treatment for endogeneity, and model specification.     

Fiscal shocks and their consequences

This paper investigates the response of hours worked and real wages to fiscal policy shocks in the post-World-War II US. We identify these shocks with exogenous changes in military purchases and argue that they lead to a persistent increase in government purchases and tax rates on capital and labor income, and a persistent rise in aggregate hours worked as well as declines in real wages. The shocks are also associated with short lived rises in aggregate investment and small movements in private consumption. We describe and implement a methodology for assessing whether standard neoclassical models can account for the consequences of a fiscal policy shock. Simple versions of the neoclassical model can account for the qualitative effects of a fiscal shock. Once we allow for habit formation and investment adjustment costs, the model can also account reasonably well for the quantitative effects of a fiscal shock.     

Wealth inequality,governance and economic growth

Links between economic growth and inequality are of growing interest for researchers and policy makers. Previous studies of this relationship have focused mainly on inequalities in income rather than in wealth. Yet from many perspectives wealth inequality is arguably more important. Using a new panel data set from Credit Suisse for 45 sample countries over the period 2000–2012, this study investigates the effects of wealth inequality on economic growth. Empirical results from system GMM estimation suggest that the wealth inequality is negatively associated with cross-country economic growth. This result is robust to alternative estimators and measures of wealth inequality, as well as the econometric specification. Further empirical investigation reveals that impact of wealth inequality on growth is mitigated by better governance.