考虑产品不同残值的供应链收益共享契约协调效用研究

研究了一个制造商批发一种产品给单一零售商的供应链协调模型.研究表明,当零售商剩余产品处理残值大于或等于制造商产品处理残值时,通过收益共享契约可以有效协调供应链,实现供应链最大化利润;但当零售商剩余产品处理残值小于制造商产品处理残值时,通过收益共享契约无法实现供应链利润最大化.     

考虑产品不同残值的供应链收益共享契约协调效用研究

研究了一个制造商批发一种产品给单一零售商的供应链协调模型。研究表明,当零售商剩余产品处理残值大于或等于制造商产品处理残值时,通过收益共享契约可以有效协调供应链,实现供应链最大化利润;但当零售商剩余产品处理残值小于制造商产品处理残值时,通过收益共享契约无法实现供应链利润最大化。     

碳中和奖惩下考虑环境目标的闭环供应链决策与协调

在同时考虑环境与利润目标的情形下，构建了由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的两阶段闭环供应链Stackelberg博弈模型，采用成本共担契约协调并对比分析，研究发现：制造商环境意识的增强会导致制造商的效用上升、碳排放下降；成本共担契约虽然会造成零售商效用下降，但是总体来看，能有效协调供应链整体效用、降低供应链中碳排放；环境目标的权重增加还会导致供应链中再制造产品的占比上升。     

零售商公平关切下闭环供应链产品升级生产与协调机制研究

研究了由一个制造商和零售商组成的产品升级闭环供应链的生产协调问题。引入公平关切系数后,分别讨论了产品升级闭环供应链集中与分散模型下的最优生产决策,分析零售商公平关切行为、产品升级前后性能差距对产品升级闭环供应链利润的影响,并提出“定价契约”对产品升级闭环供应链利润进行协调。研究表明,制造商需要合理控制升级前后产品性能差距才能使得升级前后产品拥有更好的市场;随着零售商公平关切行为程度的提升,制造商的利润会向零售商发生转移;控制升级性能差距不变,产品不断地推陈出新会提高供应链的整体收益;采用“定价契约”可以协调制造商和零售商之间的收益,实现帕累托优化。     

基于收入共享契约的三层供应链协调研究

构造收入共享契约模型,研究制造商-分销商-零售商组成的三层供应链利润协调问题。以利润最大化为目标,得出供应链各成员的最优订购量。研究表明,选择恰当的契约参数,可以使供应链各成员的利润大于在简单市场环境下的利润,实现收入共享、利润协调的目的。最后,通过模拟算例对结论进行验证。     

弹性需求下考虑风险规避的反向保理融资决策研究

由于供应链成员在融资过程中具有风险规避行为,本文研究弹性需求下考虑风险规避的反向保理融资定价决策,并设计收益共享契约以协调供应链成员之间的收益水平.结果表明,弹性需求下零售商需要设计协调契约弥补自己因规避风险带来的损失,以在保证自身收益的同时推动反向保理业务长期稳定的良好发展.     

需求受库存水平影响三级供应链协调策略研究

在一个由制造商、分销商、零售商组成的三层供应链系统．研究需求受库存水平影响的供应链协调问题。首先在非合作的情况下确定各个参与者的利润和零售商的最优订购量;然后用收益共享契约来对供应链系统进行协调。得出一个协调策略．研究结果证明该模型不仅能提高零售商的利润．还能提高分销商和制造商的利润。通过研究分析给出各个协调参数的有效值域;最后。给出一个数值算例。     

考虑政府补贴的绿色供应链契约分析及优化研究

以政府、供应商和制造商组成的绿色供应链为研究对象,探讨政府补贴和供应链契约对绿色供应链绩效的影响。构建了批发价格契约、收益共享契约和数量折扣契约模型,比较分析了不同契约下各主体效益及契约选择偏好,设计了收益共享且绿色投入成本共担契约来提高供应链绩效。研究发现:消费者绿色偏好越强烈,产品绿色度和供应链各主体效益越高;当产品绿色度相等时,制造商更倾向于选择批发价格契约,而供应商和政府更倾向于选择收益共享契约或数量折扣契约;相较于其他契约,设计的收益共享且绿色投入成本共担契约可以提高产品绿色度和企业效益。本文为考虑政府补贴的绿色供应链企业决策及选择合理的合作契约提供了理论支持。     

基于公平偏好的双渠道供应链改进回购契约协调

在市场需求是非线性随机且受零售商努力因素影响的一般情形下,引入通常被忽略了的渠道成员的公平偏好心理特征,研究设计能够协调双渠道供应链的包含努力成本分担参数的改进回购契约。结果表明:即使考虑渠道成员的公平偏好心理特征之后,只要参数取值恰当,改进回购契约就能够协调双渠道供应链。通过数值算例进一步分析了在协调双渠道供应链的改进回购契约下公平偏好对渠道成员利润或效用的影响,发现公平偏好会使零售商遭受负效用且公平偏好强度越大负效用也越大,从而使零售商在供应链整体利润分配中占据更大的份额,即零售商利润随公平偏好强度的增大而增加,制造商利润随公平偏好强度的增大而减少。     

基于决策者风险偏好的收入共享契约模型

收入共享契约是供应链成员（包括制造商、供应商和零售商等）在产品销售周期末,对产品销售收入进行合理分配,实现共担市场风险的一种协议。作为一种新的供应链协调方式,收入共享契约主要研究的是供应链的核心内容——成员企业的收益。本文拟在Cachon and Lariviere提出的收入共享契约模型上进行拓展,将决策者风险偏好因素引入到供应链契约模型中,利用均值方差效用函数建立具有决策者风险偏好影响的收入共享契约模型。     

Time-sensitive supply chain disruption recovery and resource sharing incentive strategy

Market demand is becoming increasingly time-sensitive in competitive environments. Hence, supply disruptions will have a more serious impact on the profits of supply chains. This study applies a Stackelberg competition between a single supplier and a single manufacturer in a time-sensitive supply chain in a cloud manufacturing environment. We aim to address the supplier’s production capacity recovery issues and the manufacturer’s incentive decision issues after supply disruption. We find that the supplier is in a weak position when the information is symmetrical. The manufacturer can encourage the supplier to shorten the recovery time by raising the unit wholesale price. When the supplier’s unit production cost remains unchanged but the unit wholesale price increases, the profit of the supplier first increases and then decreases. In addition, under the centralized decision-making setting, the optimal recovery time of the supplier is shorter and the optimal unit market price of the product is lower than that under decentralized decision-making. We further find that resource sharing can shorten the optimal recovery time, but it does not necessarily play an incentivizing role.     

Dynamic decision and coordination in a low-carbon supply chain considering the retailer's social preference

We establish dynamic game models in a low-carbon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer with social preference. This study investigates the complex dynamic characteristics of pricing decision and carbon abatement strategy in the supply chain and focuses on the impact of the retailer's social preference on pricing decision, carbon emission abatement strategy, profits, supply chain coordination, and complexity of dynamic models. We find that adjustment parameters of pricing and carbon emission abatement should be maintained in a certain range; otherwise, the system will be unstable and even chaotic through period double bifurcation or wave shape chaos. A higher social preference of the retailer is always beneficial to carbon abatement and the manufacturer and helps maintain the stability of the supply chain system. However, the impact on the long-term profitability of the supply chain is related to the state of the system. Compared with the setting of a centralized decision, the optimal carbon abatement strategy and supply chain profit in a decentralized decision are always less than those in a centralized setting, regardless of whether the retailer has social preference. Therefore, a side-payment self-executing contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto improvement. The coordination mechanism proposed in this study not only leads to Pareto improvement but also increases the stability of the supply chain system. Finally, this study enlightens management in operating a low-carbon supply chain.     

基于渠道竞争的双渠道供应链低碳协调策略

针对由一个制造商和一个零售商构成的双渠道供应链,将渠道竞争和产品的低碳性能引入消费者的非线性需求中,通过构建制造商为主导者的Stackelberg博弈模型,对比分析了分散决策和集中决策下的最优定价、碳排放水平和成员利润,并采用价格折扣-成本分摊契约实现了供应链的协调。研究结果表明:在分散决策和集中决策两种情况下,渠道竞争程度的增加均会造成碳排放水平、供应链利润和消费者效用的降低;集中决策下的直销价格大于分散决策下的直销价格,集中决策下的零售价格小于分散决策下的零售价格。最后通过算例验证了以上结论和协调机制的有效性。     

Decision analysis and coordination of dual supply chain with retailer's offline return service and online reviews

Based on the centralized and decentralized decision-making cases, this study constructs a dual-channel supply chain game model that considers offline return service and online reviews, and explores the pricing decisions and benefits of supply chains under the dual influence of return service level and online reviews. The impact of return rate, return service level and perceived quality of online reviews on optimal supply chain decisions and profits are further analyzed. Finally, considering the phenomenon of double marginalization in the supply chain, this study coordinates the supply chain based on the benefit-sharing contract coordination model to achieve Pareto improvement. The research shows that: The manufacturer's optimal wholesale price, the optimal online selling price and the retailer's optimal offline price are positively correlated with the perceived quality of online reviews and the level of return service. Compared with the return service level, the perceived quality of online reviews has a greater impact on the overall profit of the supply chain. Under the dual influence of the perceived quality of online reviews and the level of return service, the supply chain profit in the centralized model is better than that in the decentralized model. The coordination model can effectively coordinate the supply chain. Moreover, when the sharing ratio of manufacturers is obviously lower than that of retailers, the coordination effect is better at this time.     

信息分享对原始设备制造商与其合同制造商竞争的影响

研究了原始设备制造商的预测信息分享对一个原始设备制造商和一个与其同时有合作和竞争的合同制造商组成的供应链系统的影响,建立制造商间信息分享的模型,该模型包括一个原始设备制造商和一个合同制造商。研究发现,原始设备制造商关于市场潜在需求预测信息的分享对其预期利润是不利的,同时需求信息预测的精度对原始设备制造商信息分享的决策也有影响,原始设备制造商没有动机与其供应链成员进行信息分享,但信息分享使得供应链整体利润增加。最后,建立一个信息分享补偿机制分享供应链利润的增加量,以期通过信息分享补偿机制促使原始设备制造商有动机进行信息分享,从而实现其与合同制造商的“双赢”。     

竞争制造商持股关系的供应链分析

考虑两竞争制造商通过共同零售商销售替代产品的两层供应链系统,分别研究制造商未持股和制造商单向持股情形下供应链成员的决策及其对供应链绩效的影响。对制造商单向持股存在持股方与售股方都可以接受的持股成本区间,但这会损害零售商收益和供应链整体绩效,随着持股比例的增加,对供应链绩效的损害会进一步加剧。     

存在规模效应的再制造回收渠道决策模型

在第三方回收存在规模效应的情况下,文中建立了再制造闭环供应链的回收渠道决策模型。比较了三种回收渠道中回收率、零售价、批发价以及制造商和零售商的利润关系,以及通过算例分析了规模效应对第三方回收率以及供应链上各成员利润的影响。结果表明：规模效应较大时,第三方回收渠道优于制造商和零售商回收渠道;在第三方回收模型中,回收率随着规模效应的减小而减小;规模效应较大时,第三方分得最多的再制造利润,其次是制造商,但随着规模效应的减小,利润逐渐转移到零售商那里。     

Supply chain decisions and coordination in the presence of an imperfect spot market

This study considers a supply chain consisting of a commodity supplier and a final product manufacturer with uncertain demand. In addition to purchasing from the supplier through a forward contract, the manufacturer can adjust their inventory by trading the commodity in an online spot market after observing the actual demand. However, the spot market is imperfect in that transactions cannot be certainly realized and come with additional transaction costs. Furthermore, the spot price is volatile such that overly relying on the spot market is unwise. To investigate how the spot market affects the decisions and coordination in a supply chain, we develop a game-theoretical model incorporating spot trading. We derive the optimal ordering decision in a centralized supply chain, as well as the supplier's and manufacturer's equilibrium pricing and ordering decisions in a decentralized supply chain. The impact of the imperfect spot market on the optimal decisions and profits is analyzed. This study also demonstrates how the supply chain can be coordinated in the presence of an imperfect spot market. Finally, a numerical analysis is performed to examine the analytical results. Our results indicate that the spot market can generally improve the performance of the centralized supply chain and benefit the manufacturer in the decentralized one. However, it can be detrimental to the supplier. The supply chain can be coordinated by a revenue-sharing contract, and both parties' profits can be improved. Our findings suggest that the manufacturer could take advantage of the spot market, and the supplier should attempt to integrate or coordinate the supply chain to share the benefits of spot trading.