THE HOUSING MARKET AND THE RECOVERY

In the run up to the key Christmas period the talk is again of renewed weakness in consumer spending. Last month saw the volume of retail sales rise by only 0.1 per cent, and the annual rate of growth has now slowed to a shade over 3 per cent, down from its peak of 4.4 per cent back in July this summer. This weakness in consumer demand is also clearly being reflected in retail prices; with retailers discounting their prices to boost sales, headline inflation fell to 1.4per cent in October, while the underlying rate dropped to its lowest level for 25 years. This forecast release looks at the wider determinants of consumer spending, especially developments in the housing market. We argue that the slowdown in high street sales is a forbear of sluggish growth to come and that lower interest rates, if they materialise, are unlikely to have much of an impact. While consumer spending has been the driving force out of recession, for the recovery to be sustained, requires that exports and investment spending now take up the running.     

Monetary policy,asset prices and consumption in China

This paper studies the wealth channel in China. Although the wealth channel has been found to be functioning in many advanced countries, its existence is yet to be explored in most emerging economies, also in China. In order to illuminate dynamics between monetary policy, asset prices and consumption, we use the structural vector autoregression method. The findings support the view that a loosening of China's monetary policy does indeed lead to higher asset prices. Furthermore, a positive shock to residential prices increases household consumption, while the role of stock prices seems to be small from the households’ point of view. Finally, we test the existence of the wealth channel more formally to find out whether those changes in asset prices that are caused by monetary policy are significant enough to increase consumption. In summary, the wealth channel remains weak but there are some signs of it via residential prices. The results are not that different from those attained for the advanced economies, where the size of the wealth channel has been found to be limited.     

Do homeowners achieve more household wealth in the long run?

Despite the public’s faith in homeownership as a vehicle for wealth creation, there are surprisingly few empirical studies of the independent impact of homeownership and its duration on household wealth accumulation. This paper provides the first empirical evidence that homeownership, after controlling for other drivers of wealth accumulation, is positively and significantly associated with wealth accumulation over time. Using the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, it examines the influence of housing tenure choices between 1989 and 2001 on household net wealth levels in 2001 after controlling for initial wealth in 1989, location, income, education, and other family and personal characteristics that might influence the rate of wealth accumulation. Importantly, the models used also control for the tendency of households to accumulate wealth between 1984 and 1989 (five years prior to the studied period). This approach is used to address the possibility that an unobserved variable—the propensity to save or accumulate wealth—may be associated with both the probability and duration of homeownership and the rate of wealth accumulation. All else equal, those who owned homes and owned for longer periods of time had significantly higher household net wealth by 2001. These results are compelling because house price appreciation over the period was near its long-run average while stock gains were above and real rent increases below their long-run averages. Hence, the findings are suggestive of a positive influence of ownership over long periods on net wealth, even during a period when alternative investments produced higher than normal returns and rents grew slowly. This is especially important because the overwhelmingly majority of households do not sell their homes shortly after buying them. In our sample, those who became owners typically owned for 7 years. Furthermore, most households that bought during a period of declining real home values in the early 1990s continued to own their homes for at least eight years and came out well ahead of those who did not own.     

The Kuznets curve of the rich

A long-standing interest in the relationship between inequality and sustainable growth continues to fascinate economists among other social scientists. It must be noted, however, that most empirical efforts have focussed on the income inequality–growth nexus, while studies on wealth inequality are much scarcer. This study attempts to fill such a gap in the literature by assessing the correspondence between the top 1 percent's wealth share and economic growth. Employing time series cointegration techniques, we study the experience of France and the United States from 1950 to 2014. Our estimates suggest that the output growth rate is an inverted-U-shaped function of the wealth share of the top 1 percent. The estimated relationship is robust to variations in control variables and estimation methods. We compute the local optimal wealth share, understood as the share of wealth compatible with the maximum growth rate, and show that France is growing close to its long-run potential, while the United States is significantly below its.     

Re-evaluating the association between housing wealth and aggregate consumption: New evidence from Sweden

This paper extends the VECM cointegration model and PT (permanent-transitory) variance decomposition framework proposed by Lettau and Ludvigson [Lettau, M., Ludvigson, S.C., 2004. Understanding trend and cycle in asset values: reevaluating the wealth effect on consumption. American Economic Review 94 (1), 276–299.] and applies them to Swedish data from 1980q1 to 2004q4. There is strong statistical evidence that the long run movements of aggregate consumption, disposable income, housing wealth, and financial wealth are tied together. However, the evidence also suggests that short run variations in the Swedish housing market are largely dissociated with consumer spending. Meanwhile, it is shown that the strength of the linkage between consumption and housing wealth is not sensitive to different model specifications and various measures of key variables.     

中国股市财富效应静态和动态实证分析

本文利用2002—2008年的月度数据,利用协整分析、误差修正模型等现代计量经济方法和状态空间模型研究了中国股市财富效应问题。研究结果认为:从长期均衡关系看,我国股市财富效应是显著存在;从短期动态关系看,我国股市财富波动对全社会消费支出波动具有负影响但不显著;从股市财富的边际消费倾向的动态过程看,我国股市财富效应始终存在,但挤出效应同样显著。     

Dynamic relationship between stock prices and exchange rates for G-7 countries

There are two major findings from our time-series estimations. First, we find that there is no long-run significant relationship between stock prices and exchange rates in the G-7 countries. This result interfaces with Bahmani-Oskooee and Sohrabian’s (1992) finding, but contrasts with the studies that suggest there be a significant relationship between these two financial variables. Our second finding is that the short-run significant relationship has only been found for one day in certain G-7 countries. For instance, currency depreciation often drags down stock returns in the German financial market, but it stimulates the Canadian and UK markets on the following day. However, an increase in stock price often causes currency depreciation the next day in Italy and Japan. In addition, we also find that the record of stock price and the value of the dollar cannot be depended on when predicting the future in the US, either in the short-run or long-run.     

The impact of rising EU Allowance prices on core inflation in the Eurozone

This article examines the impact of EU Allowance (EUA) prices on core inflation in the Eurozone between 2005 and 2022. The empirical results suggest that a positive shock to the EUA price led to higher long-run inflation expectations and core inflation. This implies that the rise in EUA prices can be passed on to consumers and enterprises, leading to an increase in production costs and consumer prices. And, while a positive shock to EUA prices may promote investment in renewable energy in the short term, the impact is not statistically significant and does not last long. The results suggest considerable potential for European policymakers to re-examine policy mechanisms to accelerate renewable energy investment and maintain price stability in the medium term.     

WEALTH EFFECTS AND MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS

The effect of wealth on consumption is an issue of long‐standing interest to economists. Conventional wisdom suggests that fluctuations in household wealth have driven major swings in economic activity both in the United States and abroad. This paper considers the so‐called consumption wealth effects. There is an extensive existing literature on wealth effects that has yielded some insights. For example, research has documented the relationship between aggregate household wealth and aggregate consumption over time, and a large number of household‐level studies suggest that wealth effects are larger for households facing credit constraints. However, there are also many unresolved issues regarding the influence of household wealth on consumption. We review the most important of these issues and argue that there is a need for much more research in these areas as well as better data sources for conducting such analysis.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing: Forecast Release: THE TIMING OF RECOVERY

In his Budget speech the Chancellor argued that "there are good reasons to expect that the recovery will begin around the middle of this year, although initially it may be slow. As we found ten years ago, confidence revives as inflation comes down… Just as falling consumer spending contributed to the onset of recession, so returning consumer confidence is likely to lead the recovery." Since then Mr. Lamont has detected 'faint stirrings' of a recovery in activity, while the Prime Minister is confident of a return to growth, arguing this month that "there are far too many indications for anyone to doubt that in the second half of this year there will be a great improvement and we will be coining out of recession." For all the official confidence that their relatively modest prognosis, which we shared in our June forecast, is proving correct, there are many who remain doubtful. The survey data, while improving, do not yet convincingly point to an upturn and there is a fear that while lower inflation and easier monetary policy would on their own produce higher spending, this effect could be outweighed by consumer caution in the face of rising unemployment. This Forecast Release examines these issues. It focuses particularly on the link between lower interest rates, falling inflation, rising unemployment and the savings ratio and finds that, on the basis of the experience in the recessions of 1975 and 1980 and the boom of 1988, it would be surprising if the savings ratio were not to head lower in the second half of the year. The latest figures on retail sales, which rose more than 1 per cent in June, suggest that this may already be happening, though this will only be confirmed by data showing a greater willingness on the part of consumers to step up their borrowing once again.     

Housing and the Korean economy

This paper explores the nexus between housing and the Korean economy. It starts with an overview of the size, growth, and volatility of residential investment in conjunction with long-term resource allocation and short-term macroeconomic fluctuations. Then, the evolution of housing finance and its implications for recent house price run-up are discussed. The relationships among housing price, consumer spending, and inflation are also investigated. Particular attention is paid to the debate over house price bubbles, housing wealth effects on consumption, and the causality between house price and inflation. The paper concludes with a brief assessment of government intervention to stabilize house prices.     

UK Household Debt: A Threat to Growth or Stability?

The liberalisation of credit constraints in the 1970s for UK consumers has had important implications for the housing market and consumer spending. This paper by John Muellbauer¹ examines the factors that have driven soaring consumer debt and house price levels; in particular those observed since the mid-1990s. By relying on recent econometric evidence and trends in credit availability, real income per head, nominal and real after tax mortgage rates, measures of perceived risk and broad demographic trends, it also analyses the prospects for house prices, mortgage debt and unsecured debt over the coming years. The outlook is for a 'soft landing' in the housing market and associated declines in the rate of growth of consumer debt, which, although probably not smooth, does suggest the underlying situation is more benign and less crisis-prone than it was in 1988–89.     

The stability of money demand in China: Evidence from the ARDL model

This study examines the demand for broad money (M2) in China using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) cointegration framework. The results based on the bounds testing procedure confirm that a stable, long-run relationship exists between M2 and its determinants: real income, inflation, foreign interest rates and stock prices. Importantly, our results reveal that stock prices have a significant wealth effect on long- and short-run broad money demand; its omission can lead to serious misspecifications in the money demand function (MDF). This finding is consistent with the notion that asset inflation (deflation) has systematic influence on the pattern of monetary aggregates.     

Wealth spurt unlikely to offer much aid to the consumer

• ? UK households are wealthier than ever, thanks to continued growth in house prices and a buoyant stock market. However, the nature and distribution of that wealth means that support for consumer spending from a ‘wealth effect’ is likely to be both small and less than in the past.
• ? In Q4 2016, households' holdings of owner‐occupied property and net holdings of financial assets amounted to £9.2tr, almost 8% up on the level a year earlier. This was equivalent to 719% of annual household gross disposable income, a near‐record high.
• ? A long‐established feature of economics is the concept of a ‘wealth effect’ – the premise that faced with rising wealth levels, households feel more comfortable and economically secure and hence spend more. But the economic literature differs on how large this effect is.
• ? Our own Global Model suggests that the wealth effect is modest, with a 10% rise in wealth boosting consumer spending by only around 0.2%. One reason is that about half of financial wealth consists of highly illiquid assets in pension funds. But this component has recently been the biggest source of growth in wealth.
• ? Given differences in the propensity to consume out of income and wealth, the concentration of financial and housing assets among better‐off households will also act to neuter the size of any wealth effect. The wealthiest one percent of households hold around 20% of household wealth. But the bottom quartile owns only 1.5%.
• ? Meanwhile, the housing market has created an ever‐greater concentration of wealth. The share of households owning their own property fell from 71% to 63% in the decade to 2015. But the share of private renters more than doubled in the same period, from 9% to just over 19%. And the pre‐crisis appetite to finance consumption by borrowing against the value of property shows no sign of returning.

     

Hedging inflation with individual US stocks: A long-run portfolio analysis

This paper examines whether individual stocks can act as inflation hedgers. We focus on longer investment horizons and construct in- and out-of-sample portfolios based on the long-run relationship (cointegration) of stock prices with respect to consumer prices. Empirical evidence suggests that investors are better off by holding a portfolio of stocks with higher long-run betas as part of asset selection and allocation strategy. Stocks that outperform inflation tend to be drawn from the Energy and Industrial sectors. Finally, we observe that the companies average inflation hedging ability declined steadily over the past ten years, while the number of firms that hedge inflation has decreased considerably after the recent downturn of the US economy.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Output has stagnated in the main industrialised countries this year but we expect the benefits of lower oil prices to show up in rapid growth from now on. The present weakness in the world economy stems from tighter US fiscal policy and the oil price shock itself. These have combined to reduce domestic demand in the United States, and hence to cut the market for Japanese exports in particular, and also to reduce expenditure by energydependent countries and companies. A further factor is that, with prices of oil-based products falling, there is an incentive to delay expenditure. We expect this impact effect of OPEC III to be short-lived and to give way to its positive effects in the second half of this year. Specifically, we expect consumer spending to lead the recovery as real incomes will be boosted by the terms of trade gain from lower oil prices - equivalent to 3 per cent of GNP in the OECD area as a whole. On the basis of oil prices holding at $15. we forecast OECD output growth of 3 per cent this year, rising to 41/2 per cent in 1987. Additionally, we expect lower oil prices to produce a significant reduction in world inflation. Zero growth of producer prices is forecast on average this year arid consumer price inflation is expected to fall to wards 2 per cent in the course of the year.     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: World growth cut as financial woes persist

• This month sees our world GDP forecast for 2016 cut to 2.3%, from 2.6% previously. Our new forecast implies this year will be the weakest for the world economy since 2009.
• Our 2016 growth forecast was over 3% in mid‐2015. But the economic backdrop has worsened markedly since, with steep drops in stock markets, slumping commodities and widening credit spreads.
• We flagged the risks from the financial market sell‐off last month and conditions have improved little since. Worse, there are some signs that weakness in the real economy may be broadening.
• This month's global downgrade partly reflects familiar factors such as worsening emerging markets: we now expect even deeper recessions in Brazil and Russia.
• The US forecast has also been downgraded again, to 2% from 2.4% last month. This in part reflects a soft Q4 GDP reading, one worrying detail of which was a weaker performance by consumer spending.
• Signs of a slowdown in services were also visible in the PMI surveys for January in the US and Eurozone. Partly as a result, our Eurozone growth forecast has been cut this month to 1.6% from 1.8%.
• With world industry already stagnant, signs of weakness spreading to services are unwelcome. We are particularly concerned that the financial market slump will create a negative global credit and confidence shock.
• Another concern is that the collapse in world stock prices is starting to have ‘negative wealth effects’. For most consumers, wealth effects are more likely to be generated by house price moves. In this respect, there is some room for optimism – house prices are still growing in most of the main economies.
• But housing is weakening in some emerging countries and world house and stock prices have tended to move together since 2007.
• Pressures on policymakers to act remain strong and are increasingly focused on using negative interest rates – as in Japan and Sweden in the last month.

     

CENTRAL BANK POLICIES AND INCOME AND WEALTH INEQUALITY: A SURVEY

This paper reviews recent research on the relationship between central bank policies and inequality. A new paradigm which integrates sticky‐prices, incomplete markets, and heterogeneity among households is emerging, which allows for the joint study of how inequality shapes macroeconomic aggregates and how macroeconomic shocks and policies affect inequality. The new paradigm features multiple distributional channels of monetary policy. Most empirical studies, however, analyze each potential channel of redistribution in isolation. Our review suggests that empirical research on the effects of conventional monetary policy on income and wealth inequality yields mixed findings, although there seems to be a consensus that higher inflation, at least above some threshold, increases inequality. In contrast to common wisdom, conclusions concerning the impact of unconventional monetary policies on inequality are also not clear cut. To better understand policy effects on inequality, future research should focus on the estimation of General Equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents.     

New insights into the role of global factors in BRICS stock markets: A quantile cointegration approach

Because of the acceleration in marketization and globalization, stock markets in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries are affected by various global factors, for example, oil prices, gold prices, global stock market volatility, global economic policy uncertainty, financial stress, and investor sentiment. This paper offers new insights into the short- and long-run linkages between global factors and BRICS stock markets by applying the quantile autoregressive distributed lags (QARDL) approach. This novel methodology enables us to test short- and long-run linkages accounting for distributional asymmetry. That is, the nonlinear dynamic relationship between the global factors and BRICS stock prices depends on market conditions. Our empirical results show that the effects of gold prices and global stock market volatility on BRICS stock prices are more significant in the long run than in the short run. A decrease in global stock market volatility is associated with higher stock prices, while gold prices demonstrate upward co-movement in dynamic correlations with stock markets. Irrational factors, such as economic policy uncertainty, financial stress, and investor sentiment, play a critical role in the short term, and negative interdependence is dominant. Finally, the rolling-window estimation technique is used to examine time-varying patterns between major global factors and BRICS stock markets.     

Forecasting using a periodic transfer function: with an application to the UK price of ferrous scrap

The familiar concept of cointegration enables us to determine whether or not there is a long-run relationship between two integrated time series. However, this may not capture short-run effects such as seasonality. Two series which display different seasonal effects can still be cointegrated. Seasonality may arise independently of the long-run relationship between two time series or, indeed, the long-run relationship may itself be seasonal. The market for recycled ferrous scrap displays these features: the US and UK scrap prices are cointegrated, yet the local markets exhibit different forms of seasonality. The paper addresses the problem of using both cointegrating and seasonal relationships in forecasting time series through the use of periodic transfer function models. We consider the problems of testing for cointegration between series with differing seasonal patterns and develop a periodic transfer function model for the US and UK scrap markets. Forecast comparisons with other time series models suggest that forecasting efficiency may be improved by allowing for periodicity but that such improvement is by no means guaranteed. The correct specification of the periodic component of the model is critical for forecast accuracy.