Does Benford’s Law hold in economic research and forecasting?

First and higher order digits in data sets of natural and socio-economic processes often follow a distribution called Benford’s law. This phenomenon has been used in business and scientific applications, especially in fraud detection for financial data. In this paper, we analyse whether Benford’s law holds in economic research and forecasting. First, we examine the distribution of regression coefficients and standard errors in research papers, published in Empirica and Applied Economics Letters. Second, we analyse forecasts of GDP growth and CPI inflation in Germany, published in Consensus Forecasts. There are two main findings: The relative frequencies of the first and second digits in economic research are broadly consistent with Benford’s law. In sharp contrast, the second digits of Consensus Forecasts exhibit a massive excess of zeros and fives, raising doubts on their information content.     

On choosing which game to play when ignorant of the rules

This paper suggests a theory of choice among strategic situations when the rules of play are not properly specified. We take the view that a “strategic situation” is adequately described by a TU game since it specifies what is feasible for each coalition but is silent on the procedures that are used to allocate the surplus. We model the choice problem facing a decision maker (DM) as having to choose from finitely many “actions”. The known “consequence” of the ith action is a coalition from game f _i over a fixed set of players \(N_i\cup\{d\}\) (where d stands for the DM). Axioms are imposed on her choice as the list of consequences (f ₁,..., f _m ) from the m actions varies. We characterize choice rules that are based on marginal contributions of the DM in general and on the Shapley Value in particular.     

Joint misrepresentation with bribes

We study the problem of assigning objects to buyers. Monetary transfers are allowed. Each buyer’s preference space contains, but is not limited to, the linear additively separable preferences. A rule maps each preference profile to an allocation. We are concerned about the possibility that a group of buyers may engage in the following kind of manipulation: They make side payments internally and then carry out a joint misrepresentation. A rule is strongly group strategy-proof if no group can gain by engaging in such operations. We also consider several other appealing requirements. We find that the posted-price rules are the only one that satisfies non-triviality, non-imposition, envy-freeness, and strong group strategy-proofness.     

Human agency and convergence: Gaus’s Kantian Parliamentarian

Public reason is justified to the extent that it uses (only) arguments, assumptions, or goals that are allowable as “public” reasons. But this exclusion requires some prior agreement on domains, and a process that disallows new unacceptable reasons by unanimous consent. Surprisingly, this problem of reconciliation is nearly the same, mutatis mutandis, as that faced by micro-economists working on general equilibrium, where a conceit—tâtonnement, directed by an auctioneer—was proposed by Leon Walras. Gaus’s justification of public reason requires the “as if” solution of a Kantian Parliamentarian, who rules on whether a proposal is “in order.” Previous work on public reason, by Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls, have all reduced decision-making and the process of “reasoning” to choice by a unitary actor, thereby begging the questions of disagreement, social choice, and reconciliation. Gaus, to his credit, solves that problem, but at the price of requiring that the process “knows” information that is in fact indiscernible to any of the participants. In fact, given the dispersed and radical situatedness of human aims and information, it is difficult for individuals, much less groups, to determine when norms are publicly justified or not. More work is required to fully take on Hayek’s insight that no person, much less all people, can have sufficient reasons to endorse the relevant norm, rule or law.     

Mixture periodic GARCH models: theory and applications

This paper discusses mixture periodic GARCH (M-PGARCH) models that constitute very flexible class of nonlinear time series models of the conditional variance. It turns out that they are more parsimonious comparatively to MPARCH models. We first provide some probabilistic properties of this class of models. We thus propose an estimation method based on the expectation-maximization algorithm. Finally, we apply this methodology to model the spot rates of the Algerian dinar against euro and US dollar. This empirical analysis shows that M-PGARCH models yield the best performance among the competing models.     

Financial liberalization and sectoral reallocation of capital in South Africa

We examine the impact of financial reforms on efficient reallocation of capital within and between sectors in South Africa using firm-level panel data for the period 1991–2008. The measure of efficient allocation of capital is based on the Tobin’s Q. We find that financial reforms are associated with improvements in within-sector, but not between-sector allocation of capital. These results imply that for South Africa to unleash the potential for take-off that is often associated with reallocation of resources from the primitive to modern sectors, reforms that focus beyond the financial sector are necessary. While more research is necessary to determine what would fully constitute such additional reforms, our analysis shows that reforms that improve the quality of economic institutions may be a step in the right the direction.     

Gordon Tullock: economic gadfly

This article discusses Gordon Tullock’s impact on the economics profession and on public choice in particular. It measures this impact through his publications, his editorship of the journal Public Choice, and his association with the Center for Public Choice.     

Tops-only domains

In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and n voters and address the following question: what are the characteristics of domains \({\mathcal D}\) that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice function \({f: {\mathcal D}^n \rightarrow A}\) satisfying unanimity, has the tops-only property? We first impose a minimal richness condition which ensures that for every alternative a, there exists an admissible ordering where a is maximal. We identify conditions on \({\mathcal D}\) that are sufficient for strategy-proofness and unanimity to imply tops onlyness in the general case of n voters and in the special case, n = 2. We provide an algorithm for constructing tops-only domains from connected graphs with elements of A as nodes. We provide several applications of our results. Finally, we relax the minimal richness assumption and partially extend our results.     

Schumpeter’s Split Between “Pure” Economics and Institutional Economics: Why Methodological Individualism Was Not Fully Considered

While Joseph A. Schumpeter is classified as a pioneer of evolutionary economics in a wide sense and of entrepreneurship and innovation management in a narrower sense, Schumpeter is less known for his contributions in the area of scientific methodology and history of science. The paper deals with methodological premises in Schumpeter’s scientific positioning. In 1908, in his Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie, Schumpeter developed and pioneered his methodological individualism which is very much acknowledged. However, comparing these early positions with methodological writings in his History of Economic Analysis (1954) shows that he has not really shifted from methodological individualism to an institutional perspective that addresses the academic interplay and sees economic action rooted in historical predispositions, paths and social constraints.     

Algebra of Integrated Time Series: Evidence from Unit Root Analysis

It is argued if x_t ~ I(1) and y_t ~ I(1), then running a regression x_t on y_t would produce spurious results because e _t would generally be I(1). However, there may exist a ‘b’ such that e _t  = x _t - by _t is I(0), then running a regression x _t on y _t would not produce spurious results. This special case of two integrated time series is known in the literature as cointegration. In this particular case, x _t and y _t are said to be cointegrated. In our review of the development of the concept of cointegration, we identified that the underlying reason for this special case to arise is the proposition that if x _t  ~ I(d _x ), y _t  ~ I(d _y ), then z _t  = bx _t  + cy _t  ~ I(max(d _x ,d _y )). In this research, we offer evidence against this proposition.     

The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities

We scrutinize the scope of auctions for firm acquisitions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities. We show that no mechanism exists that allows an investor to acquire a low-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction implies adverse selection and relies substantially on commitment to allocation and transfer rules. A pooling auction serves as a commitment device against ex-post opportunistic behavior and alleviates adverse selection. It can earn the investor a higher expected payoff than a separating auction, even when consistency is required as to qualify for a sequential equilibrium.     

The epistemic claim to the life-world: Alfred Schutz and the debates of the austrian school of economics

The aim of this article is to make a contribution to the reflection on the “interpretive turn” within Austrian economics going back to Alfred Schutz’s notion of life-world sketched out in his first book The Phenomenology of the Social World. In the context of the discussions on how hermeneutics can enrich economics, the problem of objectivism in the production of knowledge is emphasized, i.e., the danger of substitution of social reality upheld by social scientists. Although Schutz’s links with the Austrian School are well known, specialized literature, has not found in Schutz’s work comprehensive solution to the problem that objectivism sets forth regarding the production of knowledge in social sciences. In this article we aim to recover the radical character that Schutz granted his project on phenomenological foundation of social science concepts based on a thorough philosophical analysis of the features of the life-world. We will argue that Schutz sets off based on the problem objectivism in the production of knowledge and offers an answer geared towards the epistemic claim to the life-world. In this regard Schutz draws up a solution that brings together both at the life-world level and at the scientific reflection level, the subjective and objective, the aprioristic and the historical aspects of experience in a phenomenologically based continuum. Finally, and deeply connected to these considerations, new conceptual elements are brought forth to think of the problem of social order.     

On the extraordinary scholarly life and times of Gordon Tullock

Gordon Tullock, who passed away at the age of 92 on November 3, 2014, ranks justly near the top of the list of the “founding fathers” of the public choice research program. Most widely known in the academy as coauthor of The Calculus of Consent (Buchanan and Tullock 1962), Professor Tullock was not named, unfairly in our joint opinion, as co-recipient of James Buchanan’s 1986 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. A good case nevertheless can be made that Gordon earned Nobel laurels on his own account for groundbreaking contributions to the literatures on, among other topics of scholarly study, rent seeking, autocracy, bureaucracy, war and revolution, law and economics and bio-economics. This essay celebrates Gordon Tullock’s major influences on the field of public choice, including his launching of Public Choice, the journal for which both of us have served as editors, and his impacts on scholars working at the many and obviously fruitful intersections of economics and political science.     

Spatial econometric Monte Carlo studies: raising the bar

We discuss Monte Carlo methodology that can be used to explore alternative approaches to estimating spatial regression models. Our focus is on models that include spatial lags of the dependent variable, e.g., the SAR specification. A major point is that practitioners rely on scalar summary measures of direct and indirect effects estimates to interpret the impact of changes in explanatory variables on the dependent variable of interest. We argue that these should be the focus of Monte Carlo experiments. Since effects estimates reflect a nonlinear function of both \(\beta \) and \(\rho \), past studies’ focus exclusively on \(\beta \) and \(\rho \) parameter estimates may not provide useful information regarding statistical properties of effects estimates produced by alternative estimators. Since effects estimates have recently become the focus of inference regarding the significance of (scalar summary) direct and indirect impacts arising from changes in the explanatory variables, empirical measures of dispersion produced by simulating draws from the (estimated) variance–covariance matrix of the parameters \(\beta \) and \(\rho \) should be part of the Monte Carlo study. An implication is that differences in the quality of estimated variance–covariance matrices arising from alternative estimators also plays a role in determining the accuracy of inference. An applied illustration is used to demonstrate how these issues can impact conclusions regarding the performance of alternative estimators.     

Old (Chicago) school,new century: the link between Knight and Simons’ Chicago plan to Buchanan’s constitutional money

James Buchanan had long been a champion of the early Chicago school’s emphasis on the essential role that institutions play in framing the market process. In his post-2009 analysis of the financial crisis, Buchanan echoed his old Chicago mentors like Frank Knight and Henry Simons in arguing that the Great Recession, like all previous financial crises, was primarily a failure of the rules governing our monetary-financial system. This “old Chicago” emphasis on the institutional “rules of the game” formed the basis of his essential post-2009 argument that the financial crisis fundamentally represented not a market failure, per say, but a constitutional failure. In this paper, I connect the dots in Buchanan’s post-2009 analysis of the Great Recession and his reaffirmation of the need for “constitutional money” to his old Chicago mentor’s strikingly similar calls for a radical restructuring of the monetary-financial system in the Chicago Plan of the 1930s. Though Buchanan’s twenty-first century resurrection of these ideas has yet to conjure up the academic support of his predecessors, certain elements of his “old school” monetary-financial reforms have experienced a strong revival since the financial crisis, as has Buchanan’s more general call to “constitutionalize money.”     

Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate

When designing schemes such as conditional cash transfers or payments for ecosystem services, the choice of whom to select and whom to exclude is critical. We incentivize and measure actual contributions to an environmental public good to ascertain whether being excluded from a rebate can affect contributions and, if so, whether the rationale for exclusion influences such effects. Treatments, i.e., three rules that determine who is selected and excluded, are randomly assigned. Two of the rules base exclusion on subjects’ initial contributions. The third is based upon location and the rationales are always explained. The rule that targets the rebate to low initial contributors, who have more potential to raise contributions, is the only rule that raised contributions by those selected. Yet by design, that same rule excludes the subjects who contributed the most initially. They respond by reducing their contributions even though their income and prices are unchanged.     

The role of the German Historical School in the development of Mises’s thought

Hülsmann (2007) and Hayek ([1922] 1981) have argued that Mises’s first book The Development of the Relationship between Lords of Manor and Peasants in Galicia, 1772–1848 (1902) is written in the tradition of the German Historical School. Historicist contemporaries of Mises also considered his first academic work a continuation of the Knapp-Grünberg tradition (Kaser Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich, 28(1), 374–79, 1904; Wimbersky, 1906). We argue that von Mises (1902) does not represent the younger German Historical School. First, Mises provides a rationalization of the history rather than ethical and cultural explanation of historical events. Second, he does not support the Knapp-Grünberg argument about the historical development of serfdom under a Slavic rule. Finally, von Mises (1902) does not adhere to the ideology of the Historical School regarding the virtues of the Prussian bureaucracy.     

A simple note on herd behaviour

In his ‘Simple model of herd behaviour’, (Banerjee A (1992) A simple model of herd behaviour. Q J Econ CVII:797–817) shows that—in a sequential game—if the first two players have chosen the same action, player 3 and all subsequent players will ignore his/her own information and start a herd, an irreversible one. In this paper, we analyse the role played by the tie-breaking assumptions in reaching the equilibrium. We show that: players’ strategies are parameter dependent—an incorrect herd may be reversed; a correct herd is irreversible.

“Why historians have failed to recognize Mises’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Theory and History</Emphasis>”

Theory and History is often said to be Ludwig von Mises’ least read and least appreciated book. This article argues that historians in the Anglo-American world generally did not understand the German and Austrian traditions that Mises drew on, and that their early reviews of the book therefore fundamentally misunderstood its purpose. Most saw it as a political tract. Some commented on Mises’ contribution to the debate about the autonomy of the discipline of history. Few, however, understood Mises’ apriorism or logical approach. To understand why Theory and History has not been recognized for its a contribution to historical methodology, we must first understand Mises’ place as an outsider in the debates on historiography in the 1950s.     

Overcoming coordination failure using a mechanism based on gradualism and endogeneity

We examine three tools that can enhance coordination success in a repeated multiple-choice coordination game. Gradualism means that the game starts as an easy coordination problem and moves gradually to a more difficult one. The Endogenous Ascending mechanism implies that a gradual increase in the upper bound of coordination occurs only if coordination with the Pareto superior equilibrium in a stage game is attained. The Endogenous Descending mechanism requires that when the game’s participants fail to coordinate, the level of the next coordination game be adjusted such that the game becomes simpler. We show that gradualism may not always work, but in such instances, its effect can be reinforced by endogeneity. Our laboratory experiment provides evidence that a mechanism that combines three tools, herein termed the “Gradualism with Endogenous Ascending and Descending (GEAD)” mechanism, works well. We discuss how the GEAD mechanism can be applied to real-life situations that suffer from coordination failure.