Building blocks in the economics of mandates

The paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investigate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers’ insurance, and may also redistribute in favour of more ‘deserving’ workers. The risk is that it may also reduce output. The more diverse are free market contracts—separating the various worker types—the more likely it is that such output effects will on balance serve to reduce welfare. It is shown that adverse effects can be reduced by restricting mandates to larger firms. An alternative to a mandate is direct government provision. We demonstrate that direct government provision has the advantage over mandates of preserving separations.

Social Market Economy: origins,meanings and interpretations

This paper investigates various possible meanings of ‘Social Market Economy’—60 years after its political initiation in Germany. We focus on the variety of intellectual sources that influenced the formation and interpretation of the concept in Germany during the first half of the last century. Our particular attention is on Müller-Armack’s definition of a rather dualistic concept of ‘social’ versus ‘market economy’ and the subtle differences it has with an original (Freiburg School) view of ordo-liberalism that lends itself more easily to a constitutional economics perspective.

The concept of choice: why and how innovative behaviour is not just stochastic

The goal of this paper is to highlight the importance of the concept of choice. To do so, a synopsis of the most important contributions to this topic—featuring an eclectic set of scholars across disciplines—is provided. As central to the argument, John von Neumann’s contributions, game theory and simulation techniques on von Neumann machines, are identified. Innovation (economic and theoretic) as the driving force behind human evolution seems to head for a new scientific paradigm based on von Neumann’s ideas.

On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device

In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of ‘swapping’ individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology—of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks—which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors, a scenario is postulated under which ‘programmed’ migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation.

Mises’ democracy–dictatorship equivalence theorem: A critique

Ludwig von Mises argues that public opinion, not the form of government, is the ultimate determinant of policy. The implication is that, holding public opinion constant, democracies and dictatorships will have the same policies—a result I call Mises’ Democracy–Dictatorship Equivalence Theorem. According to Mises, dictators have to comply with public opinion or else they will be overthrown. I argue that he seriously overestimates the power of revolution to discipline dictators. Mises was perceptive to note that, in practice, “dictatorially imposed” policies are often democratically sustainable, but he neglected several mechanisms—all more plausible than the threat of revolution—capable of explaining this fact.

On the distribution of product price and quality

We investigate the structure of demand by focusing on the distribution of prices within narrowly-defined classes of goods. We observe considerable heterogeneity—products that are functionally similar but presumably of different ‘quality’ may sell at very different prices. We analyze distribution of prices for bottles of wine, used cars, houses in London and week-long holidays in Majorca, and observe in each case that the the resulting distribution is more skewed than the lognormal but less skewed than a Pareto distribution. We then present a theoretical model whereby products can distinguish themselves along multiple hedonic dimensions of ‘performance’, with these product attributes being random variables subject to multiplicative interactions. Variations of this model can reproduce a lognormal price distribution and a Pareto distribution as lower and upper bound benchmarks (respectively).

Buchanan’s constitutional political economy: exchange vs. choice in economics and in politics

This article discusses the methodological foundations of Buchanan’s constitutional political economy. We argue that Buchanan is a constitutional economist because he is an economist or a political economist. In other words, Buchanan is a constitutional economist—he insists on the necessity of focusing on constitutions and to analyze the “rules of the social game”—because he defines economics as a science of exchange. Buchanan’s definition of economics is not only specific, it is also opposed to the definition of economics that other economists retain and, above all, opposed to the definition of economics that many public choice theorists use. The latter have, in effect, adopted the Robbins 1932 definition of economics as a science of choice that Buchanan criticizes and rejects. Buchanan’s constitutional economics can be a branch of public choice only under certain conditions.

Buchanan on monetary constitutions

Buchanan’s reflections on monetary issues have been mostly neglected, despite their great interest both per se and for a deeper understanding of his general constitutional endeavour. We will thus propose a comprehensive assessment of Buchanan’s writings on this topic, focusing in particular on the different political models that have been developed to argue in favour of constitutional constraints on the governmental power to create money and on the implications that one can draw from our author’s monetary papers for the structure and the objectives of his constitutional discourse more generally.

Politics, selection and the public interest: Besley’s benevolent despot

This paper is an assessment of Besley’s attempt to orchestrate a rapprochement between public choice theory and conventional public economics—with its characteristic normative orientation towards public policy. In this paper, I first try to set the Besley enterprise in the context of earlier work—focussing on my own work with Buchanan (The Power to Tax and The Reason of Rules). I then direct attention to three aspects of the Besley enterprise: whether selecting for competence depends on having solved the motivation problem (either by incentive or selection means), how selection mechanisms might be supported institutionally and the possibility that selection processes might create incentives at the ‘dispositional’ level.

F. A. Hayek’s influence on Nobel Prize winners

F.A. Hayek’s broad research program has led some to conclude that his impact on economics has been minimal. This citation study examines the frequency of Nobel laureates cited by other laureates in the official Prize Lectures to understand how elite economists influence other elite economists. It finds that Hayek is the second most frequently mentioned laureate in the Prize Lectures, and he has the second most publication citations of the laureates. Hayek’s influence on the top tier of economists is substantial.

Transaction tax and stock market behavior: evidence from an emerging market

This study examines the impact of a stamp tax rate increase on market behavior, using data from two stock exchanges in China. We find that when the tax rate increases from 0.3 to 0.5% (which implies that the transaction cost increases by about 1/3) trading volume decreases by 1/3. This implies an elasticity of turnover with respect to a stamp tax of −50% and an elasticity of turnover with respect to transaction cost of −100%. The markets’ volatility significantly increases after the increase in the tax rate. Furthermore, the change in the volatility structure indicates that the markets become less efficient in the sense that shocks are less quickly assimilated in the markets.

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The value of rents and the likelihood of conflicts

This paper extends the prey–predator model of Grossman and Kim (J Political Econ 103:1275–1288, 1995) to analyze the relation between the value of a contested rent and the emergence of conflict. We show that an increase in the value of the rent makes a conflict equilibrium more likely. We also analyze the case where the valuation of the rent is different for the two players. We find, for example, that a conflict equilibrium may occur even though the predator has an important disadvantage in warfare. That is when his valuation of the rent is sufficiently high compared to that of the prey.

Understanding the microenterprise sector to design a tailor-made microfinance policy for Cape Verde

Two of the central challenges faced by Cape Verde at the present are the high level of unemployment and the increasing proportion of the population living in (relative) poverty. Microenterprise development can be an effective means of addressing both problems in a developing country like Cape Verde, where microenterprises account for about 50% of employment. In this paper we provide a detailed profile of Cape Verdean microenterprises and microentrepreneurs and investigate the relationship between their characteristics and the resort to outside seed capital. We find a cluster of factors—the microentrepreneur’s age, gender, level of education and reason for being self-employed—which influence significantly the probability of being in need for external start-up capital. The policy implications of these findings for the design of a specific microfinance program for Cape Verde are discussed.

Price-setting behavior of Austrian firms

This paper explores nominal rigidities by investigating price-setting behavior of Austrian firms based on survey evidence. Distinguishing between two stages of price setting—first the price reviewing phase and second the price changing phase—our results suggest that the main obstacles to price flexibility lie on the second stage. Our main result is that firms postpone price adjustments, because they are afraid to antagonize customers with frequent price changes. Thus, customer relationships - especially those with consumers—are a major source of price stickiness in the Austrian economy.

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in the EMU when cyclical conditions are uncertain

This paper examines economic policy interactions in the Economic and Monetary Union when the assessment of cyclical conditions in real time is surrounded by uncertainty. On the basis of a simple stylised model it shows that with a Nash-type of interaction different views about the output gap on the side of the policy players—the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Central Bank—can give rise to excessive activism with policy players pushing economic variables into opposite directions. It argues that the costs of such policy conflicts can be reduced by agreeing on a common assessment of the cycle, by constraining policy variables, and/or by increasing the weight of fiscally conservative institutions. An alternative option to sidestep policy conflicts ensuing from diverging views of the cycle is to take policy decisions sequentially, as is the case in a Stackelberg-type of interaction. The paper shows that for a given misperception of the cycle, the impact on the policy instruments and on output and inflation are generally smaller in the Stackelberg equilibrium as compared to a Nash outcome. Alternative allocations of roles—that is leader versus follower—are discussed and assessed.

Legislative output and the Constitutional Court in Italy

This paper considers the impact of the Constitutional Court on legislative output in Italy. Following Tsebelis’ ((2002) Veto Players: Foundations of Institutional Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press) veto players model and the stylised facts as regards the Italian Constitutional Court’s activity, this paper presents a multi-stage game in the spirit of Gely and Spiller ((1990). A rational choice theory of supreme court statutory decisions with applications to the state farm and grove city cases. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6, 263–300). In the first stage, the legislative veto players, namely the parties in government, choose whether to change or not the policy status quo by enacting new legislation. In the second stage, the Court makes a constitutional interpretation: it decides whether to alter or not the outcome of the first stage through a sentence of constitutional illegitimacy. The Court has both the power of annulling laws and a limited power of creating new legally binding norms. Moreover, in the third stage, a constitutional law voted by a parliamentary qualified majority can overturn the Court’s decisions. The model predicts that the presence of the Court lowers legislative policy change and tests this prediction with 1956–2001 annual time series data for Italy.

Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions: a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms

This paper proposes a discrete bidding model for both quantities and pricing. It has a two-unit demand environment where subjects bid for contracts with an unknown redemption value, common to all bidders. Prior to bidding, the bidders receive private signals of information on the (common) value. The relevant task is to compare the equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue of the three most common auction formats with two players. The result is that the Vickrey auction always gives the most revenue to the seller, the discriminatory auction follows closely and the uniform auction clearly is the worst due to demand reduction.

Ludwig von Mises on the epistemological foundation for social sciences reconstructed

This paper focuses on Ludwig von Mises’s attempt to establish an epistemological/methodological foundation for the social sciences (praxeology). I reconstruct Mises’s writings by disentangling the distinct realms of ontology and epistemology in his arguments. Although Mises’s line of reasoning is squarely based on the distinction between ontology and epistemology, he nonetheless tends to mix ontological and epistemological viewpoints in his argumentation, thereby clouding the issue involved. I believe this is one reason why the writings of Mises appear to be so difficult and engendered different as well as competing readings amongst Austrian economists. Furthermore, this analysis also allows us to assess whether or not Mises offers a sound theory of knowledge. I conclude that praxeology displays internal tensions and explain the reasons for these tensions.

Thought experiments, counterfactuals and comparative analysis

This article discusses the problem of “thought experiments” in Austrian economics and takes as a starting point Lawrence Moss’ argument on the divide between the older Austrian economists—for whom thought experiments were crucial—and the new generation that, in Moss’ view, has “abandoned” such methods. The article is an attempt not only to bridge this alleged divide but also to contribute to the development of the Austrian methodology. It is argued that what may be perceived as “abandonment” bolsters rather than precludes the role of thought experiments in the Austrian paradigm. The article identifies an entire family of comparative and counterfactual analysis research strategies available to the Austrians, all enjoying a solid epistemological and methodological grounding. The “comparative-counterfactual analytics” pattern threads together the conjectural histories, spontaneous orders and empirical case studies of the contemporary Austrians, with the classic tradition of older works. Consequently, the recent evolution of Austrian scholarship should not be seen as an aberration or abandonment but as a deliberate, natural and commendable development.

A note on parental and child risk valuation

The paper develops a model that allows the estimation of parent’s valuation of own and child health, in an endogenous risk framework, where parents can employ multiple activities to protect themselves and their children from a health risk. These risk-reducing activities may differ in their effectiveness and their intensity of use. We suggest how to estimate the parent’s ex ante marginal willingness-to-pay for a reduction in the ambient level of health risk, unencumbered by expected utility terms.