Client influence and auditor independence revisited: Evidence from auditor resignations

Financial scandals such as the Enron-Andersen debacle provoke concerns that auditors lack independence when faced with influential clients. Unlike previous studies that examine whether client influence affects audit quality on ongoing engagements (providing mixed results), we investigate whether client influence (which engenders “independence risk”) at the audit-office level affects auditor resignations from high engagement-risk clients. We construct summary measures of engagement risk, using client disclosures on Form 8-K filings, potential risk factors (e.g., litigation risk), and auditor action (e.g., issuance of a going concern opinion) on the previous year’s financial statements. Focusing on risky clients, we find that auditors are more likely on average to resign from influential clients, and this positive association holds for auditors that are less likely to have mechanisms in place to mitigate independence risk. Also, importantly, influential clients are prevalent across the spectrum of client size, and the positive association between client influence and auditor resignations holds for both large and small clients.     

CAP Forum on Enron: Former Audit Firm Personnel as CFOs: Effect on Earnings Management*

Corporate hiring of former audit personnel to fill key financial positions is a practice that has attracted attention from the media, the accounting profession, and regulators. The concern is that the former external auditor who now holds a key position with the client may be able to circumvent the audit or exert pressure on the audit team and adversely influence audit quality. We compare a sample of 172 test companies that appointed to the position of chief financial officer (CFO) personnel who are former employees of the companies' auditors, with a control sample of companies that appointed new CFOs who were not affiliated with their auditors. We investigate whether the level of discretionary accruals is greater for the test sample compared with the control sample during the two years following appointment of the CFO. Both univariate and multivariate results for signed discretionary accruals suggest some support for the hypothesis that firms with affiliated CFOs are associated with greater earnings management than firms with unaffiliated CFOs. Furthermore, the results for signed discretionary accruals suggest that the association is stronger for nonpartners who moved from the audit firm to the client with little or no time gap. On average, the results for absolute discretionary accruals do not suggest differences in earnings management between affiliated and unaffiliated CFOs. However, they do indicate some earnings management relative to unaffiliated CFOs by CFOs who had little or no time gap between leaving the audit firm and joining the client firm, although at a weaker level of significance.     

Understanding the Restatement Process

Much research examines investors' reactions to restatements and the effects of restatements on chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), and auditor turnover; however, little research explores the process of restating financial reports. In this study, we investigate the process of issuing a restatement. We specifically focus on the interactions among the parties involved (e.g., CFO, board, audit committee, audit partner, and regulators) in determining and ultimately resolving a restatement, as well as the impact of the restatement on the relationships among these parties. We investigate the restatement process via semi‐structured interviews. We immersed ourselves in the restatement process by interviewing all parties typically involved, such as CFOs, auditors, and regulators. Given the findings in the auditor–client management negotiation area, which suggest that negotiation of accounting treatment and disclosure is frequent, our findings indicate that negotiations and/or difficult discussions take place among the parties involved when determining whether a restatement is necessary as well as in achieving the ultimate restatement outcome. Our findings (based on a small sample) suggest that the restatement process may influence or be influenced by such factors as the nature of the misstatement, the party that identified the misstatement, the reaction of the various parties to the misstatement, disagreement among the parties on whether to restate, communication with the regulator, the press release, client size, the personality of the CFO, audit committee strength, and the relationships among the parties subsequent to the restatement.     

The effect of benchmarked performance measures and strategic analysis on auditors’ risk assessments and mental models

As the audit environment becomes more demanding and complex, so does the set of analytical tools available to an auditor. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of two complex audit technologies commonly used by auditors, benchmarking of performance measures and strategic analysis, on the risk judgments of auditors carrying out the initial planning of an audit. We conduct an experiment that utilizes a Balanced Scorecard for organizing and evaluating analytical evidence about the performance of business units within a large client. Our first principal finding is that external benchmarking can cause an auditor to focus on performance measures that are unique to a business unit and disregard performance measures that are common to multiple business units but not benchmarked. However, our second finding is that an in-depth strategic analysis completed prior to assessing a client’s business risk or risk of material misstatement allows an auditor to incorporate more information from performance measures in risk assessments regardless of whether the performance measures are benchmarked. Strategic analysis facilitates a more balanced and accurate assessment of the risks across the business units being evaluated. We also provide evidence that the latter result occurs because in-depth strategic analysis allows auditors to develop a more complete mental model of a client, which has been a long time belief of advocates of business risk audit methodologies and consistent with current and emerging auditing standards on risk assessment.     

Is the quality of female auditors really better? Evidence based on the Chinese A-share market

Unlike previous studies in which a single index was used to measure audit quality, this study establishes a new comprehensive index to measure audit quality via Discretionary Accrual, as estimated by Jones’ basic model (1991) and Audit Opinions. The former is used to measure the quality of financial statements, and the latter is used to measure the auditors’ independence in the mainstream international literature. We examine whether and how an auditor’s gender affects the quality of his or her audits under the framework of empathy theory and gender role socialization theory. Using a large sample of 9861 auditor-firm-year observations from Chinese A-share–listed companies from 2011 to 2015, we find that the audit quality of signed auditors shows significant gender differences: these significant gender differences differ from the findings of previous studies that female auditors could provide a higher-quality audit than male auditors; that is, in our study the audit quality of the male auditors exceeds that of the female auditors. After distinguishing the positive and negative directions of the Discretionary Accrual, we find no significant gender differences in audit quality between male and female auditors when the earnings had been adjusted upward by the client; that is, female and male auditors had the same audit risk perception. However, when the client adjusted earnings downward, which indicates a lower audit risk for the auditor, the audit quality of female auditors was significantly lower than that of the male auditors. After controlling for the age and position of the auditors, we also find that the gender differences in the auditors’ audit quality decreased significantly or even disappeared when the auditor’s age exceeded 45?years and/or their position was manager or above. These results are consistent with the empathy theory and gender role socialization theory.     

On the effort-saving effect of audit committee–auditor interlocking

Using unique data on audit hours from China, this paper investigates the effort-saving effect of the audit committee–auditor interlocking (AClk). We find that AClk is negatively associated with audit effort without any deterioration in audit quality. The results suggest that AClk has an effort-saving effect through information sharing between interlocked audit committee members and auditors. However, auditors retain the effort-saving benefits of AClk without sharing them with their client firms. Further analysis shows that the effort-saving effect of AClk is more pronounced for client firms whose auditors have industry expertise, for client firms that share the same individual auditor, or for client firms that share audit committee members with financial expertise.     

The influence of litigation risk and internal audit source on reliance decisions

External auditor reliance on the work of internal auditors in an integrated audit of the financial statements and internal control is an important audit planning procedure that can impact audit efficiency and effectiveness. The purpose of this study is to examine how perceived auditor litigation risk and internal audit source affect external auditors' reliance decisions in an integrated audit environment under varying levels of risk of material misstatement. In an experimental study using 89 practicing Big 4 auditors, this study finds that auditors who perceive low litigation risk from placing reliance on the work of internal auditors will rely more on outsourced internal auditors than in-house internal auditors. The results also show that auditors' reliance decisions are sensitive to the level of account risk consistent with the risk-based approach to the integrated audit encouraged by the PCAOB.     

Responses by Australian auditors to the global financial crisis

We examine the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on auditor behaviour in Australia. Using a sample of listed companies, we examine whether the GFC impacted the propensity of auditors to issue going concern modifications and increased audit effort as reflected in audit fees and audit reporting lag. Controlling for client characteristics, we find an increase in the propensity to issue going concern opinions during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007 and that Big N auditors responded to the GFC earlier than non‐Big N auditors. In relation to audit effort, we find evidence of increased audit fees during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007. There is, however, no evidence of increased audit reporting lags during the GFC.     

Does Ethical Culture in Audit Firms Support Auditor Objectivity?

The suggested cause of constrained auditor objectivity has been centred on auditors' financial incentives and long audit tenure. Recent research has challenged those assumptions and questioned the effectiveness of auditor rotation to counteract short-tenure threats to auditor objectivity. Audit firms and regulators need to adopt methods for enhancing auditor objectivity that are effective in various auditor–client relationships. This study examines whether audit firm ethical culture is positively related to auditor objectivity. Based on the responses of 281 practising auditors, the findings indicate that auditors are more likely to make objective judgments in ethical cultures characterized by the rewarding of ethical behaviour and punishment of unethical behaviour, prevalence of ethical norms, visible ethical leadership, and low emphasis on obedience to authority. In conclusion, evidence indicates that auditors in audit firms with a strong ethical culture are more likely to maintain auditor objectivity than are auditors in less supportive cultures. This suggests that audit firms should promote a strong ethical culture to reduce the risk of constrained auditor judgment.     

Top executive gender diversity and financial reporting quality

We examine whether gender diversity of chief executive and chief financial officers (CEOs and CFOs) is associated with financial reporting quality. The CEOs and CFOs of publicly traded companies are both required to certify the appropriateness of their financial statements and annual disclosures. We argue that gender diverse dyads (groups) of executives can bring different perspectives and professional skepticism to financial reporting. Using a sample of different CEO/CFO gender dyads during 2006–2019, we postulate and find evidence of higher accruals quality among firms led by gender-diverse dyads compared to accruals quality reported by firms led by all-male CEO/CFO pairs. Additional analyses reveal that the auditors of firms with gender-diverse executive dyads issue audit reports later, charge higher audit fees, and are more likely to be one of the Big 4 firms. These findings support the view that top executive gender diversity enhances financial reporting quality, which has important implications for corporate governance mechanisms.     

To switch or not to switch? The effect of audit firms’ economies of scale on audit firm switches after audit price deregulation in China

We exploit the unique setting of China’s 2014 audit price deregulation policy to examine whether audit firms use their economies of scale (EOS) to compete for clients. We find a significant increase in client firms switching from a non-EOS auditor to an EOS auditor after the audit price deregulation policy was implemented. The additional analyses show that EOS audit firms are more likely to offer audit fee discounts than non-EOS audit firms while retaining audit quality. We also find that the auditors’ EOS effect is more pronounced for highly homogeneous industries and firms paying high abnormal audit fees, firms in financial distress, and firms receiving less capital market attention than for less homogeneous industries and firms paying low abnormal audit fees, financially stable firms, and firms receiving more capital market attention. Finally, we find that the presence of state-owned enterprises and political connections both separately and jointly moderate the effect of audit firm–client realignments from a non-EOS auditor to an EOS auditor after the audit price deregulation. Overall, our study provides important insights for policymakers and regulators reviewing and developing new policies on audit services.     

Client Characteristics and the Negotiation Tactics of Auditors: Implications for Financial Reporting

Although the financial statements of an organization are considered a product of management, prior research suggests that a company's financial statements may be affected by the negotiation strategy employed by the auditor when resolving audit differences with management. However, little subsequent research discusses the potential strategies that auditors may employ during the negotiation process. Our study extends the literature by investigating, in a post–Sarbanes‐Oxley environment, whether auditors will employ a reciprocity‐based strategy for the resolution of audit differences and what client characteristics (client management's negotiating style and client retention risk) increase the extent to which it is utilized. Further, we explore the potential effect of a reciprocity‐based strategy on the quality of the financial statements. Such a strategy involves bringing inconsequential items to management and subsequently waiving these items in an effort to encourage management to be more cooperative in the posting of significant income‐decreasing adjustments. The results of experiment 1 indicate that client management's negotiating style and retention risk have an interactive effect on auditors' use of a reciprocity‐based strategy. Specifically, auditors are more likely to utilize a reciprocity‐based strategy when management's negotiating style is competitive and client retention risk is high. Experiment 2 findings suggest that the auditor's use of reciprocity during negotiation can actually result in more conservative financial statements by helping the auditor manage perceived client pressures to waive or reduce proposed adjustments.     

Auditor litigation: Evidence that revenue restatements are determinative

This study extends the Palmrose and Scholz (2004) general litigation and general restatements study by focusing on auditor litigation and revenue restatements. We investigate all potential accounting issues, individually, instead of by their group method, with regard to auditor litigation. The impact of the individual accounting issues implicated in restatements is of concern to auditors and audit standard setters in gauging auditor litigation risk and audit risk. It also is important for financial analysis and securities valuation because investors' losses are greater, and recovery of losses on a percentage basis is lower, when the auditor is a defendant, and especially when the auditor has a more severe, negative litigation experience (Commolli et al., 2012). We examine financial reporting lawsuits filed from 2001 to 2008 and find that revenue restatements—far more than any other kind of restatements—are associated with auditors being named defendants and also auditors experiencing a more severe, negative outcome in the litigation.     

Determinants of auditor changes for non-accelerated filers

Significant accounting scandals and the imminent collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2001 precipitated a period of heightened regulatory response, most notably the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. In the years that followed, the Securities and Exchange Commission created a separate class of non-accelerated filers (companies with public float of up to $75 million) and provided these companies with significant regulatory relief from certain financial reporting disclosure and auditing requirements, including the extension of scaled disclosure to these companies in 2007. Over the period of 2001 through 2007, as non-accelerated clients anticipated and responded to their different and evolving regulatory regime, audit firms were adjusting to the increased concentration in their market, a new monitoring structure, and significant changes to the scope of their work. We examine whether auditor–client misalignment is a significant determinant of auditor change during this period, particularly for non-accelerated filers, as large auditors sought to rebalance their client portfolios. We find evidence that auditor–client misalignment increases the likelihood of auditor change (resignation and dismissal) for non-accelerated, but not accelerated, filers. We also find that auditor–client misalignment increases the likelihood of downward changes to third-tier auditors for non-accelerated, but not accelerated, filers.     

An Empirical Investigation of the Interface Between Internal and External Auditors

Professional standards place specific responsibilities on auditors for the discovery of material mis-statements in reports of corporate financial performance. Certain factors have been shown to increase the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. One warning sign is the potentially pervasive effect of a weak internal control environment consistent with a weak internal audit group. This study investigates the impact of internal audit department quality differences on auditors ‘willingness to place reliance on the work performed by internal auditors. The study also gives consideration to auditors’ recent experiences with material errors and irregularities and examines the influence of two previously untested individual auditor differences on audit judgment decisions: (1) conflict management style and (2) perception of internal/external auditor communication barriers. The results indicate that auditors attend to internal audit department quality differences and that individual auditor differences exhibit significant influence over auditor judgments. Implications for audit practice are considered and directions for future research are suggested.     

CFO Narcissism and Financial Reporting Quality

We investigate the effect of CFO narcissism, as measured by signature size, on financial reporting quality. Experimentally, we validate that narcissism predicts misreporting behavior, and that signature size predicts misreporting through its association with narcissism. Empirically, we examine notarized CFO signatures and find CFO narcissism is associated with more earnings management, less timely loss recognition, weaker internal control quality, and a higher probability of restatements. The results are consistent for within‐firm comparisons focusing on CFO changes and are robust to controlling for CFO overconfidence and CEO narcissism. The results highlight the importance of CFO characteristics in the domain of financial reporting decisions.     

CFO narcissism and audit fees: Evidence from listed companies in China

This paper examines the effects of CFO narcissism on audit fees in China. Using the size of CFO signatures in annual audit reports to measure individual narcissism, we find that CFO narcissism is associated with higher audit fees. We find empirical evidence that CFO narcissism significantly increases the audit fees of listed companies, and this effect is stronger in state-owned enterprises. This paper also explores the mediating effects of financial information and the engagement of prestigious Big-4 and Big-10 firms. The results show that companies with narcissistic CFOs have lower quality financial information and prefer more prestigious firms, which leads to higher audit fees. This research highlights the importance of CFO narcissism in corporate performance and provides new evidence that will be useful for listed companies that plan to hire senior executives.     

Auditors’ scepticism in response to audit committee oversight behaviour

We use two experiments and a survey to examine how audit committee (hereafter, AC) oversight behaviour, particularly AC sceptical attitude and proactive behaviour, affects auditor scepticism, and whether the influence is driven by the risk aspect of auditors’ assessment of AC oversight behaviour. We find that when ACs exercise insufficient scepticism, auditors (junior auditors, managers, and partners) perceive AC oversight as weak, and increase their scepticism. However, AC proactive behaviour does not significantly influence auditor scepticism. Our findings suggest auditors view weak AC oversight as a risk indicator and respond by exercising greater scepticism.     

The effect of client management bargaining power, moral reasoning development, and belief in a just world on auditor independence

In two studies, practising auditors' responses to hypothetical audit conflict scenarios were used to test hypotheses that moral reasoning development and belief in a just world influence resistance to client management power. Based on a mixed factorial ANOVA design, results confirmed that auditor independence is interactively determined. Three styles of auditor decision-making emerged: “autonomous”, “accommodating” and “pragmatic”. Autonomous auditors were responsive to personal beliefs, such that those with strong just world beliefs were more likely to resist client management power. Pragmatic auditors were responsive to client management power, irrespective of beliefs. Accommodating auditors responded both to personal beliefs and client management power; they comprised the least resistant group, especially when they believed in an unjust world.