中国土地征收制度变迁的财政逻辑 ——基于财政社会学角度的考察

土地征收制度会受到财政政策影响.1959-1982年,财政权力下放、重工业优先支出,致使农村通货膨胀、地方征地权力增大,所以征地审批机关级别提高、权力回收,补偿标准上调.1982-1998年,分税制促使政府通过城市扩张提高GDP,加之通货膨胀使得征地程序更严格,补偿标准提高.新世纪公共财政下,法律细化了"公共利益"范围、提高了征地透明度,农民参与土地分红.财政从家财型向税收型转变,应当要严格征地程序,加强社会保障,处理好"央-地"关系.     

The potential for expropriation through joint ventures

We examine the potential expropriation of a firm's intellectual capital that results from joint venture agreements when a firm's joint venture partner becomes the target of an acquisition attempt. We find that: (1) non-targeted joint venture partners often suffer losses in value upon the announcement of the acquisition; (2) the magnitude of the loss increases with the R&D intensity of the non-targeted joint venture partner; and (3) average bidder returns are less negative for acquirers if the affected joint venture partners report R&D spending and are in the same line of business as the acquirer. Our estimate of the average loss is $843 million per firm, roughly 3% of the non-targeted firm's pre-announcement equity value. Our evidence suggests a previously unrecognized merger motive in that joint ventures expose a firm's intellectual capital to the risk of expropriation.     

Cultural Origin and Minority Shareholder Expropriation: Historical Evidence

Can culture explain regional differences in minority shareholder expropriation? Examining regional variation in China, we document that the influence of historical Confucian values persists, despite decades of political movements clamping down on these values, and that these values reduce minority shareholder expropriation in local public firms. The effect on minority shareholder expropriation, in part, operates through the establishment of oversight mechanisms (i.e., greater financial reporting quality and dividend payouts) that constrain expropriation. The findings have important implications for understanding the origins of enduring regional differences in minority shareholder expropriation and capital market development.     

我国集体土地收益分配制度的缺陷及重构思路

我国现行集体土地收益分配制度存在以下缺陷：农民集体和农民未能分享土地征收过程中产生的发展性利益;失地农民土地权利受到侵害;土地征收过程中政府所获收益比重过大。造成土地征收收益分配制度出现缺陷的原因是土地的动态发展性收益、农民的土地权利保障缺失及地方政府对土地财政的依赖性。针对我国现行土地征收收益分配制度存在的缺陷,本文提出以下对策建议：针对土地发展权建立合理制度;切实开展确权登记,赋予农民分享土地增值收益的法律凭证;增加中央参与土地收益的分配比例。     

Risk sharing,finance, and institutions in international portfolios

We develop a standard model to show how transaction costs in international investment affect conventional tests of consumption risk sharing, both in a multilateral and a bilateral setting. We implement the tests in a novel international data set on bilateral holdings of equity, bonds, foreign direct investment (FDI) and bank loans. In our data, high foreign capital holdings are associated with international consumption risk sharing as implied by our theory. This is especially true of investment in equity or bonds, but not of foreign direct investment or bank loans. In our model, the implication is that transaction costs are higher for FDI and international loans. The discrepancy could reflect technological differences, but also the prospect of expropriation, perhaps most stringent for FDI or loans. We argue that expropriation risk is endogenous to both the borrower's institutions and its openness to international markets. The detrimental impact of poor institutions is muted in open economies, where the possibility of subsequent exclusion from world markets deters expropriation of foreign capital. We show the implied effects of institutions prevail in both the cross-section of consumption risk sharing and in observed international investment patterns.     

信息攫取与出口信用保险发展:以中国出口信用保险公司为例

出口信用保险是规避收汇风险的有效途径,信息攫取则是发展出口信用保险的手段之一,对出口信用保险发展起到促进作用。当信息攫取、资本、国际贸易对出口信用保险发展的边际贡献率相同时,出口信用保险增长率达到稳态,并以一个稳定的速率增长。将出口信用保险纳入Ramsey模型,从信息攫取角度分析中国出口信用保险业发展,结论表明,无论长期还是短期,信息攫取对出口信用保险发展都存在显著影响。但出口信用保险行业的信息攫取力度仍有待加强。     

The effect of government quality on corporate cash holdings

We use China as a laboratory to test the effect of government quality on cash holdings. We build on, and extend, the existing literature on government expropriation and its interaction with firm-level agency problems by proposing a financial constraint mitigation argument. We find that firms hold less cash when local government quality is high, which is not consistent with the state expropriation argument, but supports the financial constraint mitigation argument. A good government lowers the investment sensitivity to cash flows and cash sensitivity to cash flows, decreases cash holdings more significantly in private firms, and improves access to bank and trade credit financing. We also test and find support for Stulz's (2005) model on the interaction between government and firm agency problems.     

Corporate governance, expropriation of minority shareholders�� rights, and performance of Latin American enterprises

This study empirically exams whether the internal corporate governance mechanisms of the firms represented in Latin American equity markets lead to the expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights; and whether such expropriation leads to economic underperformance. The data is a sample of 97 companies from Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, for a 3-year period (2000–2002). The results suggest a relationship between the characteristics of a firm’s board of directors and the expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights. Finally, the study provides evidence that expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights may lead to under performance in emerging economies.     

“土地财政”问题研究：成因与治理——基于地方政府行为的视角

通过分析导致土地财政产生的制度变迁和政府行为选择,并运用计量经济模型验证理论分析结论的结果表明,地方政府间的＂标尺竞争＂格局、预算内财政压力和软预算约束的制度环境的综合作用是促使地方政府迈向土地财政的背后推力,土地财政的最大风险是危及中国的城市化进程。因此,须重构地方政府竞争体系,转换政绩考核标尺,发展地方主体税种,运用硬化预算约束等措施来＂校正＂地方政府行为选择,并进一步改革土地征收和出让制度,这样方能杜绝土地财政现象。     

Political corruption and mergers and acquisitions

This research examines the relation between political corruption and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that local corruption increases firm acquisitiveness but decreases firm targetiveness. The levels of corruption in acquirer areas relate positively to the bid premiums and negatively to the likelihood of deal completion. Corruption motivates acquiring firms to use excess cash for payment, which mitigates the negative effect of corruption on acquirer shareholder value. The evidence indicates that acquisitions help acquiring firms convert cash into hard-to-extract assets and relocate assets from the high to low corruption areas, thereby shielding their liquid assets from expropriation by local officials.     

International, Local and Regional Government Alliances

Kent County Council now promotes itself as the 'European County', a message that it seeks to deliver to the heart of institutional Europe through its Brussels office. Commentators generally agree that Kent has demonstrated how British local authorities can play an influential role at the European level, but will this acknowledged success be sufficient to maintain Kent's position over the coming years in a rapidly changing Europe where large regions look set to wield the power? This article reviews how Kent formed alliances with authorities in the same region of north-west Europe. How real are these supra-national groupings and what benefits can they bring to the partner areas?     

Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence

We develop and test a model that investigates how controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives affect firm values during crisis and subsequent recovery periods. Consistent with the prediction of our model, we find that, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Asian firms with weaker corporate governance experience a larger drop in their share values but, during the post-crisis recovery period, such firms experience a larger rebound in their share values. We also find consistent evidence for Latin American firms during the 2001 Argentine economic crisis. Our results support the view that controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value.     

When bank loans are bad news: Evidence from market reactions to loan announcements under the risk of expropriation

In this paper we investigate whether inefficient bank loans can reduce the value of borrowing firms when expropriation of the stock of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders is a major concern. Using data from Chinese banks, we find that bank loan announcements generate significantly negative abnormal returns for the borrowing firms. In line with this expropriation view, negative stock price reactions following bank loan announcements are concentrated in firms that are perceived to be more vulnerable to expropriation by controlling shareholders. Finally, we find evidence that a negative relationship between market reactions and firm vulnerability to expropriation exists only when firms borrow from the least efficient banks.     

Tunneling,propping, and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong

We examine a sample of connected transactions between Hong Kong listed companies and their controlling shareholders. We address three questions: What types of connected transactions lead to expropriation of minority shareholders? Which firms are more likely to expropriate? Does the market anticipate the expropriation by firms? On average, firms announcing connected transactions earn significant negative excess returns, significantly lower than firms announcing similar arm's length transactions. We find limited evidence that firms undertaking connected transactions trade at discounted valuations prior to the expropriation, suggesting that investors cannot predict expropriation and revalue firms only when expropriation does occur.     

股权制衡、法律保护与控股股东侵占——来自中国A股民营上市公司关联交易的实证分析

控股股东利用关联交易对中小投资者利益进行侵占已经成为公司治理研究中最重要的问题。本文采用中国A股民营上市公司的相关数据,从关联交易规模的角度实证检验了股权制衡因素和外部投资者法律保护对于控股股东侵占的影响。研究结果发现,股权制衡程度越高,控股股东的侵占水平会越低;但是法律保护和股权制衡之间存在替代关系,两者对于控股股东侵占的作用具有一定的重合性,如果同步提高的话,可能会削弱股权制衡对于控股股东侵占的限制作用。     

LOCAL AUTHORITY E-GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS IN ENGLAND: A CASE STUDY

This paper uses a case study of an e-government partnership of ten local authorities to consider how governance structures, financial arrangements and performance management systems may promote or inhibit successful collaborative working. The case is considered within the contexts of continuing new public management reforms including the balance between formal performance measurement indicators imposed by higher authorities and the scope for dialogue in the development of performance management systems. The case supports a view that collaborative working can benefit from a governance structure supporting a consistency of objectives of the partners operating within similar political and regulatory environments. Externally imposed performance indicators are significant to the partner authorities but their influence does not exclude the possibility of more dialogue-driven performance management systems being developed within the partnership. Sustainability of the partnership is never assured and tensions develop as a result of developing priorities of individual authorities, the possibility of local government reorganisation and changing national policy initiatives.     

终极控制、自由现金流约束与公司绩效——基于我国民营上市公司的经验证据

本文从终极控制人的视角,以我国2002-2006年民营上市公司为研究对象,研究了终极控制股东现金流权及控制权与现金流权的偏离对公司绩效的影响,并在此基础上考察了自由现金流对终极控制股东攫取行为的约束作用。研究表明:现金流权与公司绩效显著正相关,对终极控制股东存在"激励效应";控制权与现金流权的偏离与公司绩效显著负相关,终极控制股东对公司具有"堑壕效应",且当现金流权较高时,终极控制股东的"堑壕效应"显著降低。进一步研究发现,终极控制股东攫取行为的发生不仅需要其有"能力"和"动机",还需要有充足的自由现金流这个"机会",较少的自由现金流能够有效地约束终极控制股东的攫取行为。     

Complex ownership and capital structure

This paper explores pyramidal firms and their motivations for the use of debt financing. We find that pyramids have significantly higher leverage than non-pyramids and that the use of debt in pyramids is associated with the risk of expropriation. We do not find evidence for the control-enhancing, disciplining, tax-reduction, and risk-sharing explanations for the use of debt financing. Our results indicate that the capital structure of pyramids is affected by the expropriation activities of ultimate owners that have excess control rights.     

Enhancing the role of accountability in promoting the rights of beneficiaries of development NGOs

This paper identifies and assesses the extent to which downward accountability mechanisms in nongovernmental development organisations (NGDOs) have had the potential in practice to contribute to the effectiveness of rights‐based approaches to development. The paper draws on evidence gathered from a detailed documentary analysis and a series of in‐depth interviews undertaken with senior individuals working in the Irish NGDO sector. The analysis indicates variations in practice with regard to the substantive implementation of key downward accountability mechanisms. The accountability‐in‐practice revealed suggests that challenges to substantive implementation have arisen due to: insufficient Irish NGDO attention to oversight of downward accountability within locally based partner NGDOs; a reluctance and/or inability to transfer influence to locally based partner NGDOs by allowing them some influence on Irish NGDO governance and strategy; the perceived control of locally based partner NGDOs by local elites who may be distant from, and unrepresentative of, local communities; and a perception that locally based partner NGDOs may not require downward accountability. Drawing on these findings, the paper makes some suggestions aimed at helping to transform the rhetorical NGDO commitment to downward accountability into real practices that can contribute substantively to the realisation of the key elements of the rights‐based approach to development.     

Reputation as a governance mechanism? Evidence from payout policy of insider‐controlled firms in Taiwan

This paper examines the effect of entrenched insiders’ reputational concerns on corporate payout policy in Taiwan, a market in which typical public firms are controlled by a single dominant shareholder who is subject to weak takeover threats and has incentives and abilities to extract private benefits by oppressing minority equity holders. The reputation‐building hypothesis predicts that firms with higher expropriation risk by a controlling shareholder make more payouts to credibly commit not to expropriate minority shareholders, thereby establishing reputation in the capital market for risk diversification and low‐cost external financing. I show that corporate payout intensity is significantly and positively correlated with measures related to the moral hazard of dominant owners. The reputation effect manifests in firms that most value it; the interaction analyses indicate that younger, smaller, or growth firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk pay more cash dividends. Moreover, firms are less likely to omit dividends and more likely to resume dividends when their controlling shareholders are more entrenched. Finally, I show that the value of cash dividends is higher for firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk and that expected dividend increases in these firms are value enhancing.