论营销渠道的合作博弈

对比分析合作博弈和非合作博奕的理论,合作博弈相比非合作博弈能产生合作剩余,增进合作双方、行业和社会的整体刺益,并通过建立营销渠道模型对比各种博弈条件下实现的渠道总利润,论证营销渠道合作博弈的合理性。实现合作博弈须经过合作双方共同努力,在条件不具备时,非合作博弈仍有其存在的必然性。     

基于“囚徒困境”模型的黑龙江省科技型中小企业营销渠道博弈分析

营销渠道的正确管理对于黑龙江省科技型中小企业的发展至关重要。文章通过对黑龙江省科技型中小企业的发展现状以及营销渠道特点进行分析,总结了黑龙江省科技型中小企业渠道冲突类型,并采用"三人囚徒困境"模型对产生冲突的原因进行博弈分析,研究表明合作解是提高渠道成员利益的最优解,进而对黑龙江省科技型中小企业渠道合作提出了合理化建议。     

营销渠道管理的策略研究

权力、合作与冲突是营销渠道管理与控制的重要内容之一,对营销渠道权力的善加运用是管理合作与冲突的前提,也是进行营销渠道成员管理与激励的有效手段.本文主要探讨营销渠道纵向冲突、横向冲突及营销渠道人员管理等几个方面的策略.     

中小企业成员非合作博弈及其影响

企业成员的非合作博弈是我国中小企业“英年早逝”的首要因素之一。企业成员的非协调行为，即使是非常简单，也能导致及其复杂的组织问题，使企业陷入科层困境，最终解体。企业成员的非合作博弈集中体现在企业内部伦理问题上。企业内部伦理问题是企业成员的个体行为规则及其非合作博弈关系的总和。企业内部伦理状态与中小企业演进能力正相关。解答企业内部非合作问题的常规策略是建构合作的企业文化。     

营销渠道冲突的起因与控制

渠道冲突指的是一些渠道成员从事的活动阻碍或者不利于其他渠道成员实现其目标,渠道成员之间进而发生的种种矛盾和纠纷。营销渠道冲突类型有多渠道冲突、垂直渠道冲突、水平渠道冲突。营销渠道冲突主要由于渠道成员的利益至上、渠道成员间的功能差异、渠道体系设计缺陷等因素所引起。营销渠道冲突的控制主要采用设置渠道成员的共同目标,建立真心沟通的机制,进行协商谈判,诉诸法律武器,适时退出机制等手段来解决。     

营销渠道冲突文化解决途径探析

营销渠道冲突是渠道运作的常态。从文化层面上分析,渠道冲突源于价值观、沟通等要素。企业可以考虑以统一的企业文化为纽带,以营销渠道为整体,将各自独立的企业系统与其他渠道成员系统整合为一个系统,形成渠道成员共同体,构建文化型营销渠道,化解营销渠道冲突。     

博弈论又一次在经济学中辉煌——2005年诺贝尔经济学奖得主奥曼与谢林对经济学的贡献评介

谢林和奥曼深入发展了非合作博弈。谢林最主要的理论有讨价还价和冲突管理、相互依存的选择和行为、自我控制理论，他认为许多相似的交互行为可以视为包括共同利益与冲突利益的非合作博弈；奥曼最主要的理论贡献是重复博弈理论和对博弈论基础概念的提炼与创新，他证明了在长期中交互行为可以用正规非合作博弈理论来分析。两位的研究加深了我们对冲突与合作的理解。     

营销渠道的冲突与管理

营销渠道冲突是指渠道成员之间的目标、理念或行为相互不能满足对方要求的状态.营销渠道冲突有两种类型,即水平冲突与垂直冲突.渠道成员之间的目标差别、决策权与资源竞争、职能缺位、认识差距、沟通不畅等是渠道冲突产生的直接原因.渠道冲突的产生与发展一般要经过四个阶段,即冲突的酝酿、冲突契机的出现、冲突行为的发生、冲突的结果.渠道冲突是客观存在的,可以通过说服、宣传、融合、等待、谈判、仲裁、诉讼、联合、退让等手段对渠道冲突进行管理.     

次贷危机冲击下的中美货币政策需要协调吗?——中美货币政策博弈研究

基于中美货币政策博弈模型对两国货币政策非合作博彝和合作博弈的收益进行的比较,以及就美国次贷危机时两国货币政策博弈均衡进行的分析,我们发现:中美货币政策进行协调的合作博弈均衡优于非合作博弈均衡.协调收益长期存在;中美货币政策非合作博弈在特定条件下存在向合作均衡改进的趋势,但这种状态是偶然的和不稳定的;次贷危机冲击使得中美货币非合作博弈的前景堪忧,中美货币政策协调不仅必要,而且现实紧迫.     

合作博弈下的虚拟企业财权配置研究

虚拟企业是适应市场需求多元化的动态策略联盟，是信息充分条件下的合作博弈。因此虚拟企业合作机制的设计和实施尤显重要，财权配置即是其中的主要环节。依据合作博弈的思想，构建了由核心企业主导制定战略并协调成员财务关系的高度分权的虚拟企业财权配置结构。     

SOCIAL NORMS,LOCAL INTERACTION,AND NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING*

This article examines optimal social linkage when each individual's repeated interaction with each of his neighbors creates spillovers. Each individual's discount factor is randomly determined. A planner chooses a local interaction network or neighborhood design before the discount factors are realized. Each individual then plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with his neighbors. A local trigger strategy equilibrium (LTSE) describes an equilibrium in which each individual conditions his cooperation on the cooperation of at least one “acceptable” group of neighbors. Our main results demonstrate a basic trade‐off in the design problem between suboptimal punishment and social conflict. Potentially suboptimal punishment arises in designs with local interactions since in this case monitoring is imperfect. Owing to the heterogeneity of discount factors, however, greater social conflict may arise in more connected networks. When individuals' discount factors are known to the planner, the optimal design exhibits a cooperative “core” and an uncooperative “fringe.”“Uncooperative” (impatient) types are connected to cooperative ones who tolerate their free riding so that social conflict is kept to a minimum. By contrast, when the planner knows only the ex ante distribution over individual discount factors, then in some cases the optimal design partitions individuals into maximally connected cliques (e.g., cul‐de‐sacs), whereas in other cases incomplete graphs with small overlap (e.g., grids) are possible.     

渠道权力的来源、使用与渠道绩效——关于我国汽车营销渠道的实证研究

产生渠道冲突的非常重要的原因是渠道成员所拥有的不同的渠道权力来源和使用方式。渠道权力是成员间依赖性的反映，它既来源干强制性权力，也来源于非强制性权力，使用不同的权力引起的后果不同。本文发现，生产商的权力无论来源于强制性权力还是非强制性权力，都对经销商拥有更大的权力，从而牢牢控制着渠道；无论强制性权力还是非强制性权力，都可以引发渠道冲突；生产商对经销商较大的权力和渠道冲突并无必然联系，但对渠道绩效却有显著的正面效应。     

Conflict technology in cooperation: The group size paradox revisited

This paper studies the implications of punishment‐induced conflict in a public goods game. It shows, under plausible assumptions, how larger group size sometimes enhances punishing behavior in social dilemmas and hence supports higher levels of cooperation. Unlike existing approaches that focus on uncoordinated punishment, I consider punishment as a coordinated activity that may be resisted by those being punished and study the implications of punishment‐induced conflict situations. Developing a conflict model of punishment and combining it with a standard public good game, I show that coordinated punishment can yield the concentration effect of punishment, leading to a larger group advantage; that is, the larger the group, the easier it becomes to organize cooperation. The key idea is that when punishers coordinate their punishment, punishers as a coalition successfully divide defectors and punish each defector one by one. Surprisingly, even when coordination among punishers decays as group size increases, as long as the rate of decaying remains relatively slow the larger group advantage still obtains.     

The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game

This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking activities in a context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking game between two groups of different size. We first investigate Nash reversion strategies to support cooperative behavior in both groups, before analyzing double-edge trigger strategies which support cooperation in one group only. These last strategies have the property that cheating on the agreement in the cooperative group is followed by non-cooperation in this group and cooperation in the rival group. The main conclusion is that the set of parameters for which cooperation can be sustained within the larger group as a subgame perfect outcome is as large as that for which cooperation can be sustained in the smaller group. Hence, in contrast to Olson?s (1965) celebrated thesis, but in accordance with many informal and formal observations, larger groups can be as effective as smaller groups in furthering their interests.     

分布式创新的合作博弈分析

分布式创新作为一种新型的技术创新模式,已被许多跨国公司和大型企业所积极运用和实践.分布式创新的合作受多种因素影响,是一个博弈过程.基于博弈理论,通过参与分布式创新的企业间的一次性合作博弈、重复合作博弈和合作协议约束下的合作博弈模型的分析,阐释了分布式创新合作机制形成的机理.博弈模型分析表明:企业之间的一次性合作博弈不能建立分布式创新的合作机制,重复合作博弈为通过市场机制自发形成分布式创新的内在合作机制提供了可能,而合作协议的事先引入则更有利于分布式创新合作机制的形成和合作的稳定.根据以上分析,从重视和加强合作协议和合同的管理、构建分布式创新信任机制、建立惩罚和退出机制三个方面提出了构建分布式创新合作机制的对策.     

Play locally,learn globally: group selection and structural basis of cooperation

In group-structured populations, altruistic cooperation among unrelated group members may be sustainable even when the evolution of behavioral traits is governed by a payoff-based replicator dynamic. This paper explores the importance in this dynamic of two aspects of group structure: global or local interaction in a public goods game and global or local cultural transmission (learning) of behavioral traits. To clarify the underlying dynamic, I derive an extension of the Price equation for the decomposition of changes in the population frequency of a binary trait. I use this to analyze the effect of different structures of interaction and learning on within- and between-group variances of the frequency of cooperative behaviors and thereby on the evolution of cooperation. Of the four population structures given by global/local learning and global/local interaction, local interaction with global learning provides the most favorable environment for the evolution of cooperation. This combination of learning and interaction structures supports a high level of between-group variance in the frequency of cooperative types, so that most cooperators benefit from being in groups composed mostly of cooperators. However, while global learning is essential to the evolution of cooperation, cooperation is more robust when learning is not entirely global because local learning process, ironically, limits the extent to which defectors can free ride on cooperative group members.      

Reciprocity Game

This paper shows that reciprocity comes from the desire to cooperate in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game. Before playing the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game, players choose the reciprocity level and commit to it, and the reciprocity level is public information. There are T equilibria if the prisoner's dilemma game is repeated for T periods, and each equilibrium is associated with different levels of cooperation. Further, if players choose their reciprocity levels sequentially, then the most cooperative equilibrium will be the unique equilibrium. However, reciprocity does not matter for the one‐period game and the infinitely repeated game.     

Cooperation and cultural transmission in a coordination game

The aim of this paper is to analyze if cooperation can be the product of cultural evolution in a two-stage coordination game, consisting of a production stage followed by a negotiation phase. We present an overlapping generations model with cultural transmission of preferences where the distribution of preferences in the population and the strategies are determined endogenously and simultaneously. There are several groups in the society; some of them play cooperatively and others do not. Socialization takes place inside the group, but there is a positive rate of migration among groups which parents anticipate. Our main result shows that all groups converge to the cooperative equilibrium.     

区域服务贸易自由化合作机制的博弈分析——以中国——东盟自由贸易区为例

笔者以中国——东盟自由贸易区服务贸易自由化发展为例,探讨了区域服务贸易自由化的合作机制。首先分析了中国——东盟发展服务贸易的现实基础,并从合作博弈的角度提出合作是区域服务贸易自由化发展的唯一手段,利用议价模型进一步分析如何通过有效协商达成区域服务贸易合作的目的,在此基础上,提出了发展区域服务贸易自由化的对策建议。     

Cooperative R&D and strategic trade policy

Abstract.  In this paper three different cooperative R&D arrangements in a strategic trade policy model are examined. A policy game between two governments is analysed, where each government chooses a particular cooperative R&D policy in order to maximize national welfare. Allowing cooperation in R&D is also compared with the use of R&D subsidies. It is jointly optimal for both governments to allow their firms to participate in the same type of cooperative R&D, and allowing cooperation in R&D can be superior to the use of R&D subsidies. JEL Classification: F13, L24