生物质燃料发电供应链博奕分析

运用博弈论的方法分析了生物质秸秆燃料发电推广过程中农户、电厂、政府的行为,建立了三者之间的重复博弈模型,得出了纯策略的纳什均衡,探讨了政府在供应链中的影响,并对电厂及政府给出积极性建议。     

Newsboy 问题中的供应商质量决策

对Newsboy问题在产品质量方面做了扩展，构造了随机需求和产品质量之间的关系，通过销售商决定订货批量，制造商决定产品质量构成了供应链双方的博弈。对此博弈的Nash均衡解做了分析，讨论了一些价格变化对均衡质量水平的影响．并讨论了销售商给予制造商质量激励的情形，确定了有效激励区间和最优激励强度。     

基于交易定价的再制造供应链回收处理服务决策

研究单一制造商与单一第三方回收处理商（简称回收商）组成的再制造供应链,回收商为制造商提供回收拆卸以及增值服务。通过建立Stackelberg博弈模型首先研究回收商回收拆卸服务,分析了回收定价、回收努力程度、拆卸处理转化率等决策,在此基础上研究了增值服务对供应链带来的影响。结果表明：制造商提高回购价格,将激励回收商的回收处理行为;可拆卸处理程度较高的产品制造商更加乐于接受回收商的增值服务,制造商较高的基本支付是激励回收商回收服务行为的必要条件,否则,回收商将缺乏动力产生懈怠。     

奶站取消之博弈分析:基于质量控制视角

基于动态博弈理论,构建两种不同原奶收购模式下乳制品供应链质量控制模型,并对模型进行求解及数值模拟分析,比较两种模式下产品质量控制与检测水平,探讨奶站对乳制品产品质量控制的影响.结果显示,企业收购原奶模式不仅提高了制成品质量水平与原奶质量水平对不同品质制成品利润差、消费者索赔额度变化的灵敏度,而且降低了加工企业对原奶检测水平,减少了企业检测成本.然而,不同品质原奶价格差在对原奶质量控制水平产生激励的同时,降低了企业对原奶检测水平,导致奶农逆向选择行为的产生,最终致使原奶价格差对原奶质量水平激励无效.     

生产能力约束下的博弈均衡分析

本篇文章分析了生产能力约束如何解决伯川德悖论,在一阶博弈的情况下讨论了生产能力约束的三种情况及其在一阶段价格博弈中的均衡状态。当把博弈推向二阶我们可以得出一个跟古诺均衡一致的二阶段博弈纳什均衡。     

不对称信息下股东与经理人的股权激励博弈研究

企业经营中股东与经理人的激励博弈关系非常复杂,文章假设股东采用股权激励的方式,去激励经理人,降低管理者的道德风险,减少不确定性。基于此,文章设计了相关的股权激励博弈模型和效用函数,并进行了均衡分析。     

关于生物质发电的论述

论述了我国生物质发电的必要性和可行性,我国生物质发电的现状,我国生物质发电的前景,并对国外生物质发电产业的状况进行了说明。     

用户参与创新与企业激励的信号传递博弈模型构建

论文从不完全信息博弈的角度出发,运用博弈论的相关理论与方法构建用户参与创新与企业激励的信号传递博弈模型,探讨企业在激励用户参与创新过程中双方的博弈行为选择和博弈均衡存在的条件,基于博弈分析的结果,针对企业如何有效地激励用户参与创新提出对策与建议。     

博弈论背景下MBO财务管理研究

从MBO的本质上看,就是资方与收购方的动态博弈过程,管理层的收购是否成功直接取决于两者在博弈的过程中是否能够形成"纳什均衡"。文章基于博弈论和财务管理的角度,从融资、定价、交易、财务风险的规避、中小股东和普通员工利益的保护对经理层收购进行了深入的探究。     

供应链管理的激励资金博弈供给与分配

供应链管理中激励金的供给和分配是均衡链内各企业的利益空间,确保供应链得以稳固和完善。激励金效用函数ui=xi,G,可用博弈论中纳什均衡条件及预算约束方程求得各企业应供给的最优决策激励金额g＊i及可分配的激励金总额G＊,激励金的博弈分配额度与供应量成反比关系。以石家庄三鹿乳制品集团案为例,计算了激励金博弈供给和分配的比例关系。     

基于拍卖的垄断型产品供应链的博弈分析

论文研究了基于拍卖交易的垄断型产品供应链中卖方和买方的博弈问题,成交价格同时取决于卖方向拍卖市场的供货数量和买方向拍卖市场的竞拍数量。博弈结果显示,在垄断供应的情况下,博弈的纳什均衡将会是买卖双方都不通过拍卖渠道来进行交易,只有在非常极端的条件下可以达成供货和竞拍等量的均衡。最后,论文引入一个新卖方作为买方参与拍卖后的补货来源,得到的新均衡解能使原买卖双方的收益提高,从而说明单纯的拍卖并不总是最好的交易方式,多渠道的销售方式有时更能保障买卖双方的利益。     

Adverse selection and costly information acquisition in asset markets

We develop an asset exchange model with adverse selection and costly information acquisition incentives. A seller of an asset knows the true value of the asset, while a buyer can obtain information about the asset’s quality at a cost. An equilibrium offer is pooling, but a buyer can purchase only good assets after producing the costly information about the asset’s quality. When the probability that the seller holds good assets is above the threshold value, a trade can occur with and without information acquisition, depending on the information acquisition cost, and the trade volume and social welfare are higher in equilibrium without information production than in equilibrium with information production. When the probability of facing good assets is below the threshold value, a trade occurs only after screening the quality of assets, and, hence, the market collapses if the information acquisition cost is sufficiently high. As the information acquisition cost increases, social welfare can increase or decrease depending on the probability of facing good and bad assets.     

具缺货期不同决策支配权的两级供应链合作机制研究

从考虑市场需求固定且卖方和买方对缺货期的不同决策支配权情况,研究了两级供应链的合作机制,建立了其不完全信息的动态博弈模型,并得出其精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡,从理论上证明了卖方和买方分别占支配地位和从属地位时买方卖方应相互合作。     

Agency Problems and Commitment in Delegated Bargaining

In the context of (one-sided) delegated bargaining, we analyze how a principal (a seller) should design the delegation contract in order to provide proper incentives for her delegate (an intermediary) and gain strategic advantage against a third party (a buyer). We consider situations in which there are both moral hazard and adverse selection problems in the delegation relationship and where the seller tries to gain strategic advantage by imposing a minimum price above which she pays the delegate a commission. It is shown that incentives and commitment are substitutes. A low-type agent is given less discretion in dealing with the buyer and weaker incentives, while a high-type agent is given more discretion and stronger incentives .     

The effects of volume consolidation on buyer–supplier relationships: A study of Chinese firms

Volume consolidation is a major consequence of supply base reduction. This study explores the relationships between volume consolidation and supply chain outcomes such as buyer coordination costs, supplier performance, buyer environment learning ability, and buyer learning from the supplier. This study also examines the effects of these supply chain outcomes on buyer satisfaction. Based on results derived from an empirical study of 398 Chinese manufacturing companies, it is found that volume consolidation enhances supplier performance, buyer learning from the supplier, and its environment learning ability. It is also determined that coordination costs negatively affect supplier performance and buyer satisfaction. Environment learning ability does not affect buyer satisfaction, while supplier performance and buyer learning from the supplier positively affect buyer satisfaction. As such, the effects of volume consolidation are not limited to enhanced supply chain performance, but also to organizational learning in the supply chain.     

Group Buying Commitment and Sellers’ Competitive Advantages

This paper examines a model of duopoly firms selling to an exogenously formed buyer group consisting of members with heterogeneous preferences. Two research questions are addressed: (1) when is it optimal for a buyer group to commit to exclusive purchase from a single seller, and (2) how does the presence of group buying and the exclusive purchase commitment associated with it affect firms’ incentives to invest in quality improvement? We find that, even though exclusive purchase commitment benefits buyers when the competing products provide similar quality, it may lower buyer surplus if one product is significantly advantaged and/or the competing products are not highly differentiated horizontally. This result is robust even if the buyer group is formed endogenously. In addition, contingent on the similarity between the competing sellers’ investment costs, the sellers’ incentives to improve quality may be positively or negatively affected by the presence of group buying.     

Core issues in sustainable supply chain management – a Delphi study

Sustainable supply chain management has emerged as a growing topic, receiving increasing interest in the sustainability and supply chain management area. So far, the field is dominated by either case or survey based research. Few attempts have been made to take a broader look at the overarching issues, which form core topics of sustainable supply chain management. This paper presents the findings from a Delphi study where experts were asked to contribute their opinion. The Delphi study allows an aggregation of these opinions and extracts underlying topics in a structured manner. Four major topics were identified, which are (1) pressures and incentives for sustainable supply chain management, (2) identifying and measuring impacts on sustainable supply chain management, (3) supplier management (particularly addressing issues at the supplier–buyer interface) and (4) supply chain management (dealing with issues across all companies involved in the supply chain). The research presented contributes to substantiating and consolidating the field of sustainable supply chain management. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Equilibrium price and advertisement distributions

We consider an economy where many sellers sell identical goods to many buyers. Each seller has a unit supply and each buyer has a unit demand. The only possible information flow about prices is through costly advertising. We show that in equilibrium the sellers use mixed strategies in pricing which leads to price and advertisement distributions. With convex advertising costs each seller sends only one advertisement in the market. We also delineate a class of advertising costs which ensures that sellers may send multiple advertisements in equilibrium. Higher prices are advertised more than lower prices.     

Information Revelation in Procurement Auctions with Two‐Sided Asymmetric Information

A buyer needs to procure a good from one of two suppliers offering differentiated products and with privately observed costs. The buyer privately observes the own valuations for the products and (ex ante) decides how much of this information should be revealed to suppliers before they play a first score auction. Our main result is that the more significant is each supplier's private information on the own cost, the less information the buyer should reveal. We also examine the buyer's incentives to make untruthful announces.