中国银行业注资辨析

当前这场国际金融危机下,各国纷纷实施注资行为救助问题银行。而我国政府曾多次向国有银行等金融机构实施过各种形式的注资,中国银行业的注资问题也一直受到了学术界与实务部门的普遍关注。本文旨在从中西方对比的视角,探讨中国银行业注资的背景、方式、期限选择的特殊性所在。     

利率市场化推动中国银行业“二次转型”

正2003年10月,党的十六届三中全会通过了《中共中央关于完善社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定》,提出"选择有条件的国有商业银行实行股份制改造,加快处置不良资产,充实资本金,创造条件上市"。2003年12月,中央汇金公司对中国银行和中国建设银行分别注资225亿美元,实施股份制改造,拉开了以国有商业银行股份制改革为核心的中国银行业改革序幕。经过十年的发展,中国银行业取得了举世瞩目的成就。     

陈四清:银行业改革将进一步促进商业银行发展

2008年,世界银行业波澜壮阔跌宕起伏,国际金融危机让银行业遭受巨大损失,一些享有声誉的大银行亏损严重,美国前五大银行严重受损,上百家中小银行倒闭,欧洲银行业也经历了政府接管、注资和国有化的变革,与之形成明显对比的是中国银行业这边风景独好,以健康的资产负债表为经济复苏提供了有利支持.     

新资本协议如何实施

李明强:审计的参与度及其资源瓶颈是我国银行在实施新协议过程当中一个容易被忽略的问题。自2007年3月中国银监会发布《中国银行业实施新资本协议指导意见》始,中国银行业就开始了新资本协议的实施准备工作。到目前为止,     

银行跨国并购绩效的实证研究——基于中国银行业跨国并购实践的分析

银行跨国并购是资本跨国流动即国际资产移动的一种方式,属于国际投资范畴.银行跨国并购绩效是银行跨国并购中的核心问题,是银行实施跨国并购的支柱所在和先决条件.对该问题的研究能更好的服务于中国银行业以跨国并购的方式进军国际银行业,增强中国银行业在国际银行业中的影响力,这也是顺应经济、金融全球化发展趋势,符合中国国家政治、经济利益的.     

资本充足率监管对商业银行资本决策的影响——基于特许经营权价值的动态最优化

中国自2004年开始实施资本监管,于2010年向新巴塞尔协议过渡.资本充足率监管对于银行行为的影响主要体现在资本规模决策与资产风险决策两个方面.近年来中国银行业的许多重要事件,无论是对不良资产的剥离还是对商业银行的注资,都能够从资本监管这一线索找到逻辑支撑.本文构建了一个随机动态模型,商业银行依据其对于特许经营权价值以及资本成本的权衡,确定最优资本水平,使银行价值最大化.基于该模型探讨了资本监管制度的出现对于银行资本决策的影响.     

为客户资产保值增值

说起中国银行,大家也许马上想到炒得沸沸扬扬的国家外汇储备注资,想到中国银行的外汇业务,甚至可能误认为中国银行就是代表中国的银行.其实中国银行只是四大国有商业银行之一.1994年金融体制改革之后,所有的商业银行都可从事外汇业务,但中国银行有海外的优势并且外汇业务做得比较早、比较有经验,外汇业务一直是中国银行的强项.北京分行理财中心从2001年成立以来,也一直以外币业务居多.……     

浅谈中国银行业的问题和改革

目前,中国银行业依然在多个方面存在比较严重的问题,同时面临全面开放后严峻的外来竞争.中国银行业必须认清形势,针对自身存在的问题进行深入反思和彻底改革.     

为客户资产保值增值

说起中国银行,大家也许马上想到炒得沸沸扬扬的国家外汇储备注资,想到中国银行的外汇业务,甚至可能误认为中国银行就是代表中国的银行.其实中国银行只是四大国有商业银行之一.1994年金融体制改革之后,所有的商业银行都可从事外汇业务,但中国银行有海外的优势并且外汇业务做得比较早、比较有经验,外汇业务一直是中国银行的强项.北京分行理财中心从2001年成立以来,也一直以外币业务居多.     

中国银行业的开放与银行法人治理——第一届亚太经济与金融论坛侧记

尽管近年来中资银行借助于财政注资、资产剥离和引入境外战略投资者等方式,以股份制改造和上市等途径来改善自身的法人治理结构,但与欧美国家的大型跨国金融机构相比仍有差距。在中国银行业的开放进程中,中资银行法人治理仍存在哪些问题和缺陷?应该采取怎样的措施来构建和完善法人治理结构?未     

在全球资本市场打造中国上市银行价值品牌

商业银行投资者关系管理是上市银行与资本市场沟通的桥梁。在全球金融格局正发生着深刻变革与重构的时期,中国上市银行投资者关系管理部门在某种程度上肩负着通过向全球资本市场介绍自身运营,提升全球投资者对中国金融和银行体系市场化运营理解的使命。上市银行投资者关系管理部门应在推进与境内外投资者全方位沟通的基础上,维护和拓宽上市银行融资渠道;在充分阐述财务业绩的同时,向全球投资者提供多方位信息;提高管理层及相关业务部门对投资者关系工作的参与;加强对资本市场的监测,有效管理投资者预期,妥善处理特殊和突发事件等。     

以外储战略性注资推动中国商业银行国际化研究

跨国银行集团是发达国家核心竞争力之一,在历次危机中(尤其是在此次全球金融风暴的冲击下),西方发达国家都大幅注资本国大型金融机构,力图稳定其在国际金融领域的优势地位。中国商业银行经过多年来发展和海外经营,实力明显上升,并多次运用资本市场补充资本金,具备了提升国际化经营水平的基础,目前也迎来了国际化的良机,但仍然面临着资本约束的瓶颈。2003年以来,国家以外汇储备对中国大型商业银行进行的战略性注资,获得的回报远大于投入,并健全了我国的金融体系。从提高我国外汇储备战略性投资作用的角度,建议国家以强国方略再度以外储对大型商业银行进行战略性注资,再辅之以监管部门进一步改革监管和资本账户管制,以及商业银行在国际经营中充分发挥自身的主体作用,多管齐下来共同推动中国商业银行的国际化。     

State owned banking: gaining policy support and investor interest

State owned banking has staged a major comeback. Finding a place among the top 25 banks in the world in terms of market cap and assets apart, state owned banks have emerged as hot stocks for domestic and international investors. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, privatization of the financial sector, which has been the major policy thrust evident in numerous countries, took a backseat with governments taking over banking institutions and providing various forms of support ranging from capital injections to outright nationalization of the global banks adversely affected by the crisis. The current crisis also may encourage governments to keep their stakeholding in the public banks in view of the need to support the vital sectors of the economy and also pursue financial inclusion that emerged as a major policy priority. This article presents a brief perspective on the comeback of the state owned banking, and also its own transformation that led to its growing acceptance and endorsements from policymakers investors and customers.     

Non-performing loans,moral hazard and regulation of the Chinese commercial banking system

Non-performing loans (NPLs) represent a major obstacle to the development of banking sector. One of the key objectives of the banking sector reforms in China has therefore been to reduce the high level of NPLs. To do so, Chinese regulatory authorities have injected significant capital into the banking system and scrutinized NPLs since 2003. This paper examines the impact of NPLs on bank behavior in China. Using a threshold panel regression model and a dataset covering 60 city commercial banks, 16 state-owned banks and joint-stock banks, and 11 rural commercial banks during 2006–2012, we test whether lending decisions of Chinese banks exhibit moral hazard. The results support the moral hazard hypothesis, suggesting that an increase in the NPLs ratio raises riskier lending, potentially causing further deterioration of the loan quality and financial system instability. Policy implications of findings are evaluated.     

Dwarf banks

This study examines the business model and the viability of very small commercial banks in emerging market context. Using a unique sample of 141 Russian banks with less than a $10 million in assets, I trace performance, survival, recapitalization and growth patterns of these dwarf banks in response to the sharp increase in the minimum capital requirements. I find that dwarf banks are, on average, low-risk financial intermediaries that perform simple operations and have significantly higher survival rates in local markets with poor economic and banking services outreach characteristics. I also find that the average dwarf banks withstand the regulatory capital shock surprisingly well by securing fresh capital injection followed by a twofold asset size increase. The results of this study contribute to the literature on the relationship between the small bank business model, local banking markets characteristics and long-term viability. They also provide new evidence on the expected and unexpected outcomes of the “too small to survive” regulatory intervention into the banking market size structures.     

Banking Market Size Structure and Financial Stability: Evidence from Eight Asian Countries

Using commercial bank data from eight major Asian countries, we examine the relationship between the banking market size structure and the stability of financial institutions. We also analyze the effect of bank upsizing on the financial stability. Our results show that a rise in large banks’ market power, accompanying an increase in their market shares, lowers the capital adequacy of small banks. Small banks’ nonperforming loans and the possibility of their bankruptcy also increase as large banks’ market shares rise. We further show that larger banks tend to have lower capital adequacy ratios, liquidity ratios, and distance-to-default ratios. Our study suggests that large banks’ greater market shares are associated with small banks’ financial instability. Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion of the recent banking literature that has important antitrust policy implications.     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

影子银行：体系、内生性风险及国际监管取向

摘要：全球金融危机后,国际社会从一个新的视角——影子银行体系来分析现代金融体系,并重构现代国际金融监管制度。影子银行体系的有效监管必须具有翔实的微观基础,比如体系边界、风险特征及表现形式等。国际上对影子银行体系并无公认的定义。影子银行具有证券化程度高、信息不透明、杠杆率较高等特征,这直接引致其存在诸多内生性金融风险,国际社会倾向于采用“类银行化”的监管路径对影子银行进行金融监管。国际社会采取的一系列法律、政策措施对我国影子银行监管具有一定的启示。     

Bank credit risk and macro-prudential policies: Role of counter-cyclical capital buffer

This paper investigates the impact of macro-prudential policy (proxied by the counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCyB)) on bank credit risk during uncertain times, as banking sector stability is crucial in promoting financial intermediation. Using a unique daily data set consisting of 4939 credit default swaps (CDS) of 70 banks from 25 countries over the period 2010–2019, we find that CCyB tightening decreases bank-level CDS spreads, while CCyB loosening increases CDS spreads. This heterogeneous effect of CCyB arises due to its asymmetric effect on the capital ratio (i.e., the equity-to-total assets ratio) of banks. Tightening CCyB significantly increases capital, whereas loosening CCyB does not impact capital. Thus, the risks that emanate from the banking sector during periods of heightened uncertainty and financial distress can be significantly dampened when CCyB regulation is enabled. Consequently, macro-prudential policies for banks to hold higher levels of capital during good times are justified to contain financial market risks during downturns.