Optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a search theoretic model of monetary exchange

Search models of monetary exchange commonly assume that terms of trade in anonymous markets are determined via Nash bargaining, which generally causes monetary equilibrium to be inefficient. Bargaining frictions add to the classical intertemporal distortion present in most monetary models, whereby agents work today to obtain cash that can be used only in future transactions. In this paper, we study the properties of optimal fiscal and monetary policy within the framework of Lagos and Wright (2005). We show that fiscal policy can be implemented to alleviate underproduction while money is still essential. If lump sum monetary transfers are available, a production subsidy can restore the efficiency of monetary equilibria. The Friedman rule belongs to the optimal policy set, but higher inflation rates are also possible. When lump-sum monetary transfers are not available, equilibrium allocations are generally not first-best. Nevertheless, fiscal policy still results in substantial welfare gains. Money can be extracted from circulation via a sales tax on decentralized market activities, and the Friedman rule is only optimal if the buyer has relatively low bargaining power.     

Audits or Distortions: The Optimal Scheme to Enforce Self‐Employment Income Taxes

I investigate the optimal auditing scheme for a revenue‐maximizing tax collection agency that observes not only reported profits, but also a single factor of production at each firm. Each firm is owned by a single entrepreneur whose managerial ability is random. The optimal auditing scheme is discontinuous and nonmonotone in ability. In intermediate audit costs, less productive entrepreneurs face auditing probabilities that increase in ability, whereas the ablest ones are not audited. Finally, the effective tax rate is higher in the middle of the managerial ability distribution; thus, the overall regressive (or progressive) bias that arises from evasion is unknown.     

(In)determinacy, increasing returns, and the optimality of the Friedman rule in an endogenously growing open economy

This paper sets up a monetary endogenous growth model with Benhabib–Farmer production externalities for an open economy, and then uses it to investigate the possibility of indeterminacy. Moreover, the paper examines how the monetary authorities will set its optimal anchor of the money growth rate from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. Several main findings emerge from the analysis. First, when investment does not involve adjustment costs, the monetary equilibrium is locally determinate regardless of the strength of the labor externality and the extent of world capital market imperfections. Second, in the presence of investment adjustment costs, the monetary equilibrium may exhibit indeterminacy when the aggregate increasing returns-to-scale in production is sufficiently strong. Third, in the presence of world capital market imperfections, the Friedman rule of a zero nominal interest rate fails to be optimal. Fourth, in the face of perfect world capital markets, the optimal nominal money growth rate is maintained at the rate that is conformable to the Friedman rule, regardless of whether investment involves adjustment costs or not.     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policy with sticky wages and sticky prices

We determine the optimal degree of price inflation volatility when nominal wages are sticky and the government uses state-contingent inflation to finance government spending. We address this question in a well-understood Ramsey model of fiscal and monetary policy, in which the benevolent planner has access to labor income taxes, nominally risk-free debt, and money creation. Our main result is that sticky wages alone make price stability optimal in the face of shocks to the government budget, to a degree quantitatively similar as sticky prices alone. Key for our results is an equilibrium restriction between nominal price inflation and nominal wage inflation that holds trivially in a Ramsey model featuring only sticky prices. Our results thus show that when nominal wages are sticky, setting real wages as close as possible to their efficient path is a more important goal of optimal monetary policy than is financing innovations in the government budget via state-contingent inflation. A second important result is that the nominal interest rate can be used to indirectly tax the rents of monopolistic labor suppliers. Taken together, our results uncover features of Ramsey fiscal and monetary policy in the presence of a type of labor market imperfection that is widely-believed to be important.     

Floor systems for implementing monetary policy: Some unpleasant fiscal arithmetic

An increasing number of central banks implement monetary policy via a channel system or a floor system. We construct a general equilibrium model to study the properties of these systems. We find that a floor system is weakly optimal if and only if the target rate satisfies the Friedman rule. Unfortunately, the optimal floor system requires either transfers from the fiscal authority to the central bank or a reduction in seigniorage payments from the central bank to the government. This is the unpleasant fiscal arithmetic of a floor system. When the central bank faces financing constraints on its interest expense, we show that it is strictly optimal to operate a channel system.     

Input versus output incentive schemes

Previous analyses have modeled income tax evasion as a ‘portfolio problem’, deriving the optimal consumption of the ‘risky asset’ (unreported income) assuming a fixed probability of detection. We compare an alternative audit policy to the standard random audit policy. We focus on an ‘audit cutoff’ policy, in which an agent triggers an audit if reported income is ‘too low’, and is not audited if reported income is ‘sufficiently high’. We find that random audit rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules. Given lump-sum taxes and fines, audit cutoff rules are the least-cost policies which induce truthful reporting of income.     

Fiscal policy and the structure of production in a two-sector developing economy

This paper develops a two-sector model of a developing economy and examines the role of the informal sector in limiting the government's ability to increase tax revenues. A key feature is the introduction of auditing of the informal sector and degree of tax enforcement in that sector. We emphasize the interdependence between tax policy and enforcement in achieving a developing economy's fiscal objectives and show that by judicious policy choices the presence of the informal sector need not hinder its ability to raise tax revenues. We supplement the formal analysis with numerical simulations highlighting the contrasting intertemporal tradeoffs implied by higher tax rates and tax-enforcement levels.     

Modernization of Tax Administrations and Optimal Fiscal Policies

Since Sandmo (1981) , many articles have analyzed optimal fiscal policies in economies with tax evasion. All share a feature: they assume that the cost of enforcing the tax law is exogenous. However, governments often invest resources to reduce these enforcement costs. In a very simple model, we incorporate such investments in the analysis of an optimal fiscal policy. We characterize their optimal level and we show numerically how they interact with the other dimensions of the optimal fiscal policy. Finally, we highlight the differences between our results and those obtained in a model without investment in the tax administration.     

Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy

We study the optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy when (i) the regulator does not know the firms’ abatement costs, (ii) penalties for tax evasion are limited, and (iii) monitoring of pollution is costly. We show that the threat of being audited alter the usual firms’ incentives to over-estimate their abatement costs. In particular, depending on the firms’ abatement costs, the optimal policy may involve over or under-deterrence compared to the full information outcome. We then investigate the properties of a pollution standard. We show that this policy comes close to an environmental tax once the economic incentives of the accompanying enforcement policy are considered.     

Some Fiscal Implications of Monetary Policy

We study the implications of alternative monetary targeting procedures for real interest rates and economic activity. We find that countercyclical monetary policy rules lead to higher real interest rates, higher average tax rates, lower output but lower variability of tax rates and consumption relative to procyclical rules. For a country with a high level of public debt (e.g. Italy), the adoption of a countercyclical procedure such as interest rate pegging may conceivably raise public debt servicing costs by more than half a percentage point of GNP. Our analysis suggests that the current debate on the targeting procedures of the European Central Bank ought to be broadened to include a discussion of the fiscal implications of monetary policy.     

Optimal Monetary Policy, Taxes, and Public Debt in an Intertemporal Equilibrium

This article is devoted to a study of the optimal monetary and fiscal policies within the framework of an overlapping generations model with cash-in-advance constraints. We first characterize the intertemporal equilibrium. Then we show how to decentralize the optimal growth path using available policy instruments (i.e., labor income and capital taxes, public debt, money supply). Between the four instruments: wages and capital taxes, debt and monetary policy, one is redundant among the three last which implies that the Friedman Rule is only a special case.     

Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments under velocity and fiscal shocks

This paper, in the spirit of Poole [Poole, William, 1970. The Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Macro Model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 192–216.], studies how differently monetary and fiscal shocks influence the appropriate choice of the monetary policy regime. Velocity shocks are introduced by embedding a stochastic cash-in-advance constraint within the New Keynesian framework. In addition to optimal policy under discretion, three classic rules, interest rate targeting, monetary targeting, and the Taylor rule are ranked under both fiscal and velocity shocks. The non-stationarity of prices under the Taylor rule makes it inferior to the other rules under which prices are stationary. Monetary targeting, by stabilizing aggregate demand under fiscal shocks, outperforms interest rate targeting, while the latter provides a better insulation against velocity shocks. Monetary targeting (under fiscal shocks) and interest rate targeting (under velocity shocks) even outperform the optimal policy under discretion for sufficiently high intertemporal elasticities of consumption substitution.     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky prices

This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky product prices. The theoretical framework is a stochastic production economy. The government finances an exogenous stream of purchases by levying distortionary income taxes, printing money, and issuing nominal non-state-contingent bonds. The main findings of the paper are: First, for a miniscule degree of price stickiness (i.e., many times below available empirical estimates) the optimal volatility of inflation is near zero. Second, small deviations from full price flexibility induce near random walk behavior in government debt and tax rates. Finally, price stickiness induces deviation from the Friedman rule.     

Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary Union with Exit Option

It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary policy. A central bank aiming at securing the existence of a monetary union in the presence of asymmetric shocks has to compensate single countries for the tax distortions arising from fiscal transfers. Monetary policy may become more expansionary or restrictive depending on asymmetries between member countries' inflation aversion and exit costs.     

The evasion of fiscal and labor regulations: Firm behavior and optimal tax policy

Firms face many fiscal and labor regulations, but they may evade these legal requirements in several different ways. We develop a model that captures these two types of evasion decisions and unlike existing literature assume firms can evade labor regulations independently from income tax responsibilities. We characterize firms’ entry and evasion behavior and find that the design of the tax system can generate both positive and negative correlations between evasion decisions consistent with what is observed empirically. We then characterize optimal government policies given the firms’ decisions. We obtain intuitive optimal tax rules that highlight the trade‐offs the government faces when firms have multiple margins on which to evade.     

Optimal Monetary Policy in OLG Models with Long‐Lived Agents: A Note

This note reexamines Crettez, Michel, and Wigniolle ( 2002 ), who studied a two‐period overlapping generations model with cash‐in‐advance constraints and showed that a combination of saving tax and monetary policy involving positive nominal interest rates could achieve the first‐best allocation. The note shows that their result does not hold if agents live for three periods. The implementation of the first best requires the Friedman rule. If agents are long‐lived, saving tax cannot offset a distortion caused by the positive nominal interest rate.     

Budgetary policies in a DSGE model with finite horizons

This paper presents a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities, capital accumulation and finite horizons. Our New Keynesian framework exhibits intergenerational wealth effects and is intended to investigate the macroeconomic implications of fiscal policy, which is specified by either a debt-based tax rule or a balanced-budget rule allowing for temporary deficits. The model predicts that fiscal expansions generate a trade-off in output dynamics between short-term gains and medium-term losses. It is shown that the effects of fiscal shocks crucially depend upon the conduct of monetary policy. Simulation analysis suggests that balanced-budget requirements enhance the determinacy properties of feedback interest rate rules by guaranteeing inflation stabilization.     

What is the right balance between US monetary and fiscal policy? Explorations using simulated wavelet-based optimal tracking control

This paper uses wavelet-based optimal control to simulate fiscal and monetary strategies under different levels of policy restrictions. The model applies the maximal overlap discrete wavelet transform to US quarterly GDP data and then uses the decomposed variables to build a large 80-dimensional state-space linear-quadratic tracking model. Using a political targeting design for the frequency range weights, we simulate jointly optimal fiscal and monetary policy where: (1) both fiscal and monetary policy are dually emphasized, (2) fiscal policy is unrestricted while monetary policy is restricted to achieving a steady increase in the market interest rate, (3) only monetary policy is relatively active, while fiscal spending is restricted to achieving a target growth rate, and (4) monetary policy emphasizes short-run stabilization, while fiscal policy utilizes political cycle targeting. The results show that fiscal policy must be more aggressive when the monetary authorities are not accommodating the fiscal expansion and that the dual-emphasis policy leads to a series of interest rate increases that are balanced between a steadily increasing target and a low, fixed rate. This research is the first to construct integrated fiscal and monetary policies in an applied wavelet-based optimal control setting using US data.