Will Global Central Bankers Provoke a Jolting Bear Market

Markets are running scared, as investors become more and more concerned that global central bankers become so obsessed with inflation that .they raise interests too high, and provoke a sharp slowdown of the world economy.     

加强基层央行离退休干部管理服务工作的几点思考

离退休干部是人民银行干部队伍的重要组成部分,为人民银行事业的发展做出了重要贡献。做好离退休干部管理服务工作,不断丰富充实广大离退休干部的日常生活是高效履行央行职能、实践和谐央行理念的必然要求。本文以人民银行宁夏辖区离退休干部管理工作为例,系统分析了当前基层人民银行离退休干部队伍的特点和离退休干部管理服务工作面临的主要困难与问题,并结合地区实际提出改进基层人民银行离退休干部管理工作的政策建议。     

International Spillover Effects and Monetary Policy Activism

This paper examines how the preferences of a large economy’s central bank affect the trade‐off between output and inflation volatility faced by the central bank of a small open economy by analyzing the impact of a global cost‐push shock. We demonstrate that under the assumption of producer currency pricing, the trade‐off faced by the small open economy is likely to worsen as the foreign central bank becomes more focused on output stabilization relative to inflation stabilization; but the opposite is true in the case of local currency pricing.     

Monetary policy games,financial instability and incomplete information

In the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, monetary authorities, while pursuing traditional objectives, such as the control of inflation, are also eager to promote financial stability. In this paper, we model the strategic interaction of the central bank and the financial sector and explore a simple monetary policy game with perceived substantial risks to financial stability, where the central bank can be of two types, one pursuing strict inflation-targeting and the other concerned with affecting the expectations formed by the financial sector participants; however, the financial sector is unsure which, due to incomplete information. The conclusion is that for small shocks to inflation there is a pooling equilibrium, whereas for larger shocks there is separation. In the latter case, the central bank that has an explicit financial stability concern is willing to exercise more muted control to inflation in order to reinforce the safety of the financial sector.     

Correlated bank runs,interbank markets and reserve requirements

This article extends the application of global games of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) in the banking model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) to account for correlation in the quality of banks’ long term investment, when banks are linked through cross deposits and there is a central bank. The goal is to study how these elements affect the deposit contract that banks offer to depositors and the ex ante probability of a bank run. We show that the coexistence of a central bank, which determines banks’ reserve requirements, and an interbank market, which redistributes reserves, leads to a smaller probability of a bank run and to fewer inefficient bank runs, relative to the case with no central bank and no interbank market. By adequately choosing the level of reserves to store, the central bank can improve the equilibrium outcome and allow banks to offer a higher interim payment to depositors, relative to the situation with no cross deposits.     

Network centrality and funding rates in the e-MID interbank market

This paper empirically investigates the role of banks’ network centrality in the interbank market on their funding rates. Specifically we analyze transaction data from the e-MID market, the only electronic interbank market in the Euro Area and US, over the period 2006–2009 that encompasses the global financial crisis. We show that interbank spreads are significantly affected by both local and global measures of connectedness. The effects of network centrality increased as the financial crisis evolved. Local measures show that having more links increases borrowing costs for borrowers and reduces premia for lenders. For global network centrality, borrowers receive a significant discount if they increase their intermediation activity and become more central, while lenders pay in general a premium (i.e. receive lower rates) for centrality. This provides evidence of the ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ hypothesis.     

不同发展阶段的中小企业财务战略选择

目前,我国中小企业的财务战略管理意识薄弱。中小企业要想在全球化的经济竞争中立于不败之地,其财务管理不仅要有科学的日常管理,更要有高瞻远瞩的战略管理。中小企业生命周期可划分为初创期、成长期、成熟期和衰退期。中小企业应根据各阶段的特点采取不同的财务战略。     

A Survival Plan for Global Capitalism

The intellectual impact of this economic crisis has already been colossal. The "Greenspanist" doctrine in monetary policy is in retreat. It no longer seems clear that it is easier for central banks to clean up after asset price bubbles     

In search of consensus: The role of accounting in the definition and reproduction of dominant interests

This article examines the role of accounting in the manufacture of consensus. Consensus building is often considered a central value for rational decision-making and management. However, more than a democratic confrontation of vantage points, the quest for consensus is a way to discourage conflict and resistance. Our main argument is that accounting and consensus play central roles in processes of definition and the social reproduction of dominant interests. Accounting acts to promote some stakes and strategies (and silence others), as if they were collective and disinterested, which makes them more powerful in debates that deny struggles and asymmetries in positions of power, as well as increases legitimacy by creating an illusion of participation. We illustrate these processes through a case study in which we document the intersection between two fields of knowledge, marketing and accounting, that compete for a monopoly on the definition of value and the ability to speak for the organisation. This analysis draws on Bourdieu's conceptualisation of symbolic domination to highlight how powerful actors secure influence while avoiding contestation. Accounting produces symbolic violence that consolidates asymmetries in positions of power by shaping what is consensual and what is not so that dominant interests are reproduced with the consent of those who have most to lose in the process.     

Things are different today: the challenge of global systemic risks

While most OECD countries have been rather successful in reducing risks to human lives, health, and the quality of the environment, the record for new global risks such as climate change, pandemics, financial breakdowns, and social inequality is much less convincing. This is the challenge of systemic risks. Since the global financial crisis, it has received rapidly growing attention. However, considerable conceptual confusion mars research on and practical responses to this challenge. We undertake an effort of conceptual clarification, starting with the paradigmatic example of the financial crisis. This leads to a view of global systems as involving an interplay between micro- and macrodynamics internal to the system, with the system simultaneously interacting with its environment. Such dynamics typically show periods of stability, punctuated by situations opening up several possible futures. Alternative global futures, like other prospects, constitute risks for an agent if she considers some of these futures as less desirable than others. Agents may have lexicographic preferences over futures they would like to avoid, so as to consider some futures as just undesirable, but others as catastrophic. If an agent expects some of the relevant futures at a bifurcation point of a global system to be catastrophic in this sense, they are faced with a systemic risk.     

How global brands compete

It's time to rethink global branding. More than two decades ago, Harvard Business School professor Theodore Levitt argued that corporations should grow by selling standardized products all over the world. But consumers in most countries had trouble relating to generic products, so executives instead strove for global scale on backstage activities such as production while customizing product features and selling techniques to local tastes. Such "glocal" strategies now rule marketing. Global branding has lost more luster recently because transnational companies have been under siege, with brands like Coca-Cola and Nike becoming lightning rods for antiglobalization protests. The instinctive reaction of most transnational companies has been to try to fly below the radar. But global brands can't escape notice. In fact, most transnational corporations don't realize that because of their power and pervasiveness, people view them differently than they do other firms. In a research project involving 3,300 consumers in 41 countries, the authors found that most people choose one global brand over another because of differences in the brands'global qualities. Ratherthan ignore the global characteristics of their brands, firms must learn to manage those characteristics. That's critical, because future growth for most companies will likely come from foreign markets. Consumers base preferences on three dimensions of global brands--quality (signaled by a company's global stature); the cultural myths that brands author; and firms' efforts to address social problems. The authors also found that it didn't matter to consumers whether the brands they bought were American--a remarkable finding considering that the study was conducted when anti-American sentiment in many nations was on the rise.     

美欧场外衍生品交易监管的制度改革

危机后美欧均将加强场外衍生品交易监管作为金融监管改革的一个重要领域，2014年以来纷纷加快了改革进度。在此背景下，本文对美欧场外衍生品交易监管改革的政策内容进行专题研究，分析了其在加强集中清算、严格风险防控措施、强制信息列报等方面的主要监管要求，并探讨了其对于国内金融机构衍生品业务发展的启示。     

Social imaginaries and Big History: Towards a new planetary consciousness?

A sustainable global future depends on a fundamental shift from the currently dominant national imaginary to a global imaginary. Most of human reasoning is based on prototypes, framings and metaphors that are seldom explicit; although they can be forged, usually they are merely presupposed in everyday reasoning and debates. The background social imaginary offers explanations of how ‘we’ fit together, how things go on between us, the expectations we have of each other and outsiders, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie those expectations. We argue that although the 17th and 18th century scientific and social revolutions generated prototypes, metaphors, framings and related conceptions of time and space that pointed towards a global imaginary, there were deep-seated structural reasons for the ‘nation’ to become, at least temporarily, the central category of human existence and belonging. By the early 21st century, there are already widespread metaphors that envisage the human world as a whole—from the ‘global shopping mall’ or ‘global village’ to the ‘spaceship Earth’. Yet, compared to the rich poetics of national imaginaries, the proposed prototypes, metaphors and framings are often thin. Evoking innovative myths about shared human existence and destiny, Big History helps to articulate the rising global imaginary in terms that motivate transformative and progressive politics in the 21st century.     

当前全球中央银行研究的若干重点问题

国际金融危机以来,世界经济形势发生了复杂而深远的变化,一些影响长期化的新现象、新问题、新概念不断涌现。作为全球重要的宏观经济研究力量,各国中央银行纷纷着手对后危机时代的新理念、新规律展开深入研究,并努力进行政策性的探索。本文重点讨论当前全球中央银行比较关注的三大问题:一是负利率政策的逻辑与效果;二是全球稳定币的宏观政策挑战;三是气候变化导致的宏观金融风险。现有宏观理论研究存在的不足及政策实践面临的新问题,对研究工作者而言,既是重大挑战,也是难得的历史性机遇。应立足中国国情,放眼全球百年变局,密切跟踪极具未来性的热点问题和理论前沿并将其科学应用于我国高质量发展时代的政策实践。     

Large Infrastructure Investments: Financing Mechanisms and Incentives in Decentralised Countries*

Infrastructure services crucially affect competitiveness and efficiency. They are essential but they usually require important amounts of public funds. In decentralised countries, regional governments cannot usually afford large infrastructure projects, so co-financing with the central government is required. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the influence of the central government financing mechanisms on the contract offered by the regional government for the construction, maintenance and operation of the infrastructure. We prove that if the central government uses certain financing mechanisms (total cost coverage), the regional government may have no incentives to offer an efficient contract to the firm.     

Political Risk as a Determinant of Southern European FDI in Neighboring Developing Countries

This study analyzes foreign direct investment flows from southern European countries to one of two nearby developing regions: north African countries and new European Union member states in central and eastern Europe. As expected, good economic perspectives, human capital, and development of infrastructures attract greater investment flows. However, greater levels of political risk, measured through scales of political discretion, corruption, and economic freedom, do also attract higher inflows. Despite the fact that one might expect global flows to fall as a consequence of political risk, those from the countries in the sample increase, because they come from firms that are searching for a market niche where they can take advantage of their political capabilities.     

Bank recapitalization and economic recovery after financial crises

Does support to distressed banks early on during financial crises mitigate the macroeconomic consequences of financial distress, and if so does it matter what form the intervention takes? We analyze the effects of government and central bank interventions in 69 systemic banking crises since 1980, of which 29 are part of the recent global financial crisis. Our estimation approach controls for the correlation between intervention measures and the time-invariant component of unobservable crisis severity. We find that timely bank recapitalizations substantially reduce the duration of recessions, underscoring the distortions caused by zombie banks and the costs of regulatory forbearance.     

Balancing corporate power: a new Federalist paper

In an effort to govern their increasingly complex organizations, chief executives in some of today's largest corporations are turning to one of the world's oldest political philosophies-federalism. Given that organizations are seen more and more as minisocieties, the prospect of applying political principles to management makes a great deal of sense. Federalism is particularly appropriate because it offers a well-recognized system for dealing with paradoxes of power and control: the need to make things big by keeping them small; to encourage autonomy but within bounds; and to combine variety and shared purpose, individuality and partnership, local and global. As London Business School professor Charles Handy explains it, federalism responds to these paradoxes by balancing power among those in the center of the organization, those in the centers of expertise, and those in the center of the action--the operating businesses. The centers of federal organizations meet regularly, but they do not need to live together. Doing so would concentrate too much power in one place, whereas federalism gets its strength and energy from spreading responsibility across many decision points. Guided by five principles, federalism avoids the risks of autocracy and the overcontrol of a central bureaucracy. It ensures a measure of democracy and creates a "dispersed center" that is more a network than a place. That's why Asea Brown Boveri CEO Percy Barnevik calls his sprawling "multi-domestic" enterprise of 1,100 separate companies and 210,000 employees a federation. It succeeds because the independent bits, be they individuals, clusters, or business units, know they are part of the greater whole.     

欧洲央行负利率政策评析——以对德意志银行的影响为例

自2014年6月欧洲央行实施负利率以来,已有近六个年头,最初的政策设计是以负利率降低企业和个人融资成本,刺激投资与消费,从而实现经济增长和避免通货紧缩,但事与愿违,2019年欧元区经济增速仅为1.2%,创下六年来的新低,同期CPI为1.3%,也远低于2%。在宏观经济目标未实现的情况下,理论上负利率可以降低银行利息支出,提升银行的经营业绩,事实如何呢?本文以德意志银行为例进行案例分析,揭示负利率对银行业的影响。     

How do global investors differentiate between sovereign risks? The new normal versus the old

When global investors go into emerging markets or get out of them, how do they differentiate between economies? Has this behavior changed since the crisis of 2008 to reflect a “new normal”? We consider these questions by focusing on sovereign risk as reflected in monthly returns on credit default swaps (CDS) for 18 emerging markets and 10 developed countries. Tests for breaks in the time series of such returns suggest a new normal that ensued around October 2008 or soon afterwards. Dividing the sample into two periods and extracting risk factors from CDS returns, we find an old normal in which a single global risk factor drives half of the variation in returns and a new normal in which that risk factor becomes even more dominant. Surprisingly, in both the old and new normal, the way countries load on this factor depends not so much on economic fundamentals as on whether they are designated an emerging market.