“Core” and “Periphery” in a Monetary Union: A Macroeconomic Policy Game

We develop a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study strategic interactions between macroeconomic policy makers, namely the central bank and governments. In this union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies, whereas the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a core, with lower initial public debt, and a periphery, with higher initial public debt. For a symmetric demand shock, we derive numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that mildly active cooperative countercyclical policies dominate noncooperative solutions and a scenario of no policy intervention. Optimal policies call for a brief expansionary action to bolster the effects on output and a return to a small fiscal primary surplus as soon as the crisis is over until the targeted level of public debt is reached.     

“Haircuts” for the EMU periphery: virtue or vice?

We use a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study the impacts of an exogenous fall in aggregate demand, the resulting increase in public debt, and the consequences of a sovereign debt haircut for a member country or bloc of the union. Two different scenarios for such a haircut are assumed: an expected and an unexpected haircut. In the union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies whereas the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a “core” with lower initial public debt, and a “periphery” with higher initial public debt. The “periphery’’ may experience the haircut due to the high level of its sovereign debt. We calculate numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that a haircut as modeled in our study is disadvantageous for both the “core” and the “periphery” of the monetary union, both when expected and when unexpected.     

Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union

Central to ongoing debates over the desirability of monetary unions is a supposed trade-off, outlined by Mundell (1961) : a monetary union reduces transactions costs but renders stabilization policy less effective. If shocks across countries are sufficiently correlated, then, according to this argument, delegating monetary policy to a single central bank is not very costly and a monetary union is desirable.
This paper explores this argument in a setting with both monetary and fiscal policies. In an economy with monetary policy alone, we confirm the presence of the trade-off and find that indeed a monetary union will not be welfare improving if the correlation of national shocks is too low. However, fiscal interventions by national governments, combined with a central bank that has the ability to commit to monetary policy, overturn these results. In equilibrium, such a monetary union will be welfare improving for any correlation of shocks.     

Macroeconomic Stabilization in the EMU: Rules Versus Institutions

This paper investigates the macroeconomic implications of different regimes of international fiscal coordination and monetary‐fiscal cooperation in a monetary union with independent fiscal authorities, that act strategically vis‐à‐vis a common central bank. In the presence of other policy goals than cyclical stabilization, such as interest rate smoothing and fiscal stability, we show that coordination among national fiscal authorities can reduce output and inflation volatility relative to the non‐cooperative setting in specific circumstances, as in case of demand disturbances, while turning potentially counterproductive otherwise. The adverse effects of union‐wide coordinated fiscal measures can be attenuated in a regime of global coordination, namely, when a centralized fiscal stabilization is coordinated with the common monetary policy as well.     

Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.     

Budget uncertainty in a monetary union

Governments in a monetary union fear spending disturbances. We distinguish them according to their ability to hedge against these disturbances and assume that they derive their optimal fiscal decisions by using a robust control approach. Results show that governments being highly vulnerable to spending disturbances set excessive tax rates, thereby exacerbating the fiscal pressure detrimental to output and obliging the central bank to conduct an expansionary monetary policy. Countries whose governments have higher ability to hedge against spending disturbances then suffer from the inflationary consequences of this monetary policy.     

HETEROGENEITY IN A CURRENCY UNION WITH SOCIAL MARKET OBJECTIVES

In this paper, we explore whether heterogeneity among union members could threaten the stability of the European Monetary Union. The types of heterogeneity we consider are (1) asymmetries in the transmission of monetary and fiscal policies, and (2) differences in national preferences for price stability, output growth, and income redistribution. Our results show that the costs of membership can be significant for countries whose transmissions, structure, or preferences deviate from those underlying the common monetary policy. In part, these costs arise because monetary policy imposed by an independent central bank automatically constrains the use of fiscal policy by national governments.     

财政政策与货币政策的动态调控效应——基于时变参数向量自回归模型的检验

本文廓清了财政政策与货币政策搭配动态调控宏观经济的机理,揭示了两者协调影响经济的“黑箱”机制及其在经济不同阶段的搭配方式;运用中国2004—2019年的经济季度数据,构建TVP SV VAR模型探究两类政策对宏观经济的调控效应。研究发现：财政政策与货币政策共同把控流动性“闸门”实现互动协调;财政政策搭配货币政策具有时变性,在整体上“同向发力”推动经济发展;两类政策对产出的影响并非始终如理论一致,在结构层面仍有优化靶向性操作的余地。     

Financial frictions and optimal stabilization policy in a monetary union

Financial frictions differ across countries and thus cause international differences in the transmission of shocks. This paper shows how the optimal mix of monetary and fiscal policy depends on these country-specific financial frictions. To this end, we build a two-country DSGE-model of a monetary union. Financial frictions are captured by the cost channel approach. We show that the traditional solution to the assignment problem – the common central bank stabilizes the inflation rate at the union level and the national fiscal authorities stabilize the national economies – does not hold in a world with financial frictions. The cost channel decreases the efficiency of monetary policy and increases the need for fiscal stabilization even at the union level. Moreover, the more heterogeneous the union, the more important is fiscal policy in stabilizing shocks. Finally, we evaluate the scenarios in terms of welfare of the representative household.     

MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION POLICIES IN THE EMU: SPILLOVERS, ASYMMETRIES AND INSTITUTIONS

This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. The specific policy recommendations in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) context depend on the particular characteristics of the shocks and the economic structure. In the case of a common shock, fiscal coordination or full policy coordination is desirable. When anti‐symmetric shocks are considered, fiscal coordination improves the performance but full policy coordination does not produce further gains in policymakers' welfare.     

The unbearable tightness of being in a monetary union: Fiscal restrictions and regional stability

We study how constrained fiscal policy can affect macroeconomic stability and welfare in a two-region model of a monetary union with sticky prices and distortionary taxation. Both government spending and taxes can be used to stabilize regional variables; however, the best welfare outcome is obtained under some tax variability and constant regional inflations. We use a variety of rules to characterize constrained fiscal policy and find that strict fiscal rules coupled with a monetary policy that targets union-wide inflation result in regional inflation stability and the welfare costs of such rules are not as unbearable as one would expect. Fiscal authorities can enhance welfare by targeting the regional output gap, while targeting regional inflation is less successful since inflation stability is guaranteed by the central bank.     

On the Institutional Design of the European Monetary Union: Conservatism, Stability Pact and Economic Shocks

The aim of this paper is to design the optimal institutional arrangement for a monetary union. Using a two-country rational expectations model, the study analyses how the conservatism of the area-wide central bank and the penalty system for fiscal deviation (Stability and Growth Pact) should be designed with respect to different economic shocks. The optimal institutional arrangement is also dependent on who is the 'leader' of the policy game. When national governments move first, the independent area-wide central bank can exercise greater discipline over national fiscal policies, making the Stability Pact unnecessary.
(J.E.L.: E58, E63, F42).     

Fiscal space on the eurozone periphery and the use of the (partially) balanced-budget multiplier: The case of Spain

This article adopts the “functional finance” approach to consider the utilization of expansive fiscal policies in the members of the European Monetary Union most affected by high unemployment. As they do not have their own monetary policy, fiscal deficits require the issuing of public debt without the support of the central bank. The authors consequently incorporate the notion of a (partially) balanced-budget expansion to achieve the desired stimulus in gross domestic product (GDP) with the least possible effect on public debt. Their proposal is only a sort of “imperfect” balanced-budget expansion: It is based on the idea that simultaneous increases in public revenue and expenditure can boost GDP, but without any pretension of keeping public deficit unchanged. Specifically, the authors use the case of Spain to show that a more expansive fiscal policy is desirable on economic grounds, and that only institutional constraints prevent it. They do it presenting two alternative scenarios for the coming years and analyzing their different impact on unemployment and fiscal sustainability. The first represents a firm commitment to budget consolidation, whereas the second is based on this “imperfect” application of the balanced budget multiplier. The main conclusion is that a more expansive fiscal policy is perfectly compatible with finance sustainability.     

European Monetary and Fiscal Policies after the EU Enlargement

This paper examines the design of macroeconomic policies after Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have joined the EU. We consider scenarios with and without CEECs being members of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and analyze consequences of different intermediate targets for the European Central Bank. For the fiscal policy variables, we assume that the governments of incumbent and new members either refrain from pursuing active stabilization policies or follow either non-cooperative or cooperative activist fiscal policies. Different scenarios are simulated with the macroeconomic McKibbin–Sachs Model (MSG2 Model), and the resulting welfare orderings are determined. They show that the advantages and disadvantages of different policy arrangements depend strongly on the nature of the shock the economies are faced with. Additional macroeconomic noise resulting from the CEECs' membership of the EMU does not seem to be too much of a problem.     

An independent central bank faced with elected governments

The literature argues that the benefits of an independent central bank accrue at no cost to the real side. In this paper, we argue that the lack of correlation between monetary autonomy and output variability is due to the proactive role of fiscal policy when faced with rigid monetary objectives. Few of the attempts to measure these correlations actually allow for a changing fiscal role. Yet, when an independent authority handles monetary policy, fiscal and wage/social protection policies remain instruments in the hands of elected governments. We find that, so long as the two authorities pursue their goals independently of each other, a conflict arises that becomes stronger as preferences diverge. We also find that the establishment of a conservative central bank encourages more divergent preferences among the public (as reflected in the government that is elected). The election of more interventionist governments then makes it harder for either authority to reach its own preferred objectives, unless cooperation is possible.     

Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary Union with Exit Option

It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary policy. A central bank aiming at securing the existence of a monetary union in the presence of asymmetric shocks has to compensate single countries for the tax distortions arising from fiscal transfers. Monetary policy may become more expansionary or restrictive depending on asymmetries between member countries' inflation aversion and exit costs.     

A simulation study of an ASEAN monetary union

This paper analyzes some pros and cons of a monetary union for the ASEAN¹ countries, excluding Myanmar. We estimate a stylized open-economy dynamic general equilibrium model for the ASEAN countries. Using the framework of linear quadratic differential games, we contrast the potential gains or losses for these countries due to economic shocks, in case they maintain their status-quo, they coordinate their monetary and/or fiscal policies, or form a monetary union. Assuming for all players open-loop information, we conclude that there are substantial gains from cooperation of monetary authorities. We also find that whether a monetary union improves upon monetary cooperation depends on the type of shocks and the extent of fiscal policy cooperation. Results are based both on a theoretical study of the structure of the estimated model and a simulation study.     

MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS IN OECD DEMOCRACIES*

The purpose of this paper is to test for evidence of opportunistic “political business cycles” in a large sample of 18 OECD economies. Our results can be summarized as follows: 1) We find very little evidence of pre-electoral effects on economic outcomes, in particular, on GDP growth and unemployment; 2) We see some evidence of “political monetary cycles,” that is, expansionary monetary policy in election years; 3) We also observe indications of “political budget cycles,” or “loose” fiscal policy prior to elections; 4) Inflation exhibits a post-electoral jump, which could be explained by either the pre-electoral “loose” monetary and fiscal policies and/or by an opportunistic timing of increases in publicly controlled prices, or indirect taxes.     

Compatibility between monetary and fiscal policy under EMU

The debate over the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as a part of European Monetary Union, has highlighted the need to assess the extent to which fiscal policies of union members should be constrained as a pre-requisite for price stability within the union. In this paper, we develop a two country open economy model, where each country has overlapping generations of finitely lived consumers who supply labour to imperfectly competitive firms which can only change their prices infrequently. We examine the case where the two countries have formed a monetary union, but where the fiscal authorities remain independent. We show that the fiscal response required to ensure stability of the real debt stock is greater when consumers are not infinitely lived. In principle, this allows for some compensating behaviour between governments, but we show that the scope for compensation is limited. The monetary authority can abandon its active targeting of inflation to stabilise the debt of at most one fiscal authority, and any other combination of policies will either result in price level indeterminacy and/or indefinite transfers of wealth between the two economies. Finally, in a series of simulations we show that fiscal shocks have limited impact on output and inflation provided the fiscal authorities meet the (weak) requirements of fiscal solvency. However, when monetary policy is forced to abandon its active targeting of inflation, then fiscal shocks have a much greater impact on both output and inflation.     

我国财政货币政策作用关系实证研究--基于VAR模型的检验分析

文章通过构建一个真实GDP增长率、财政赤字占GDP比重、货币供给M2增长率、零售物价指数变化率等4个变量的VAR模型,对我国财政政策与货币政策相互作用的关系及其动态性进行了实证分析,通过模型设定、格兰杰因果关系检验、脉冲响应函数分析和预测方差分解,发现在我国不存在简单的财政货币政策的互补或替代关系,而是存在一种非对称性的关系,即扩张的货币政策伴随着收缩或稳健的财政政策,而扩张的财政政策导致被动扩张的货币政策,表现形式取决于具体宏观经济环境和经济冲击形式。同时,文章也得到其他一些结论,并认为,要增强政策的效率,必须强化央行的独立性,在现阶段需要严格控制赤字财政政策,以减少其对经济增长和经济波动的影响。