Toward a Humanist Reconstruction of Economic Science

This paper examines whether governance matters for the economic growth of developing countries, empirically captured within the institutional economics theoretical framework using the panel data estimation procedure. In doing so, it tests the effect of several dimensions of governance on the growth of 84 low and middle-income economies using regression specifications common in the growth literature. The empirical results show that political stability and government effectiveness is significantly positively correlated with growth. Voice and accountability and corruption are statistically significantly negatively correlated with growth. The regulatory quality and rule of law dimensions of governance are negatively but statistically insignificantly correlated with growth. The findings of this study imply that the dynamics of the current modern economy makes it necessary for developing countries to act now and within their own country, improve the dimensions of governance and establish good governance practices that are domestically relevant and internationally comparable and consistent.     

The Determinants of Governance: A Cross-Country Analysis

Drawing on insights from economic, political, and cultural theories of governance, this article investigates the determinants of governance for a large sample of countries, both developed and developing. The results indicate that countries with a history of Western European influence and with British common law origins have better governance. In addition to these exogenous and historically predetermined variables, economic factors such as openness to trade, resource-intensity in exports, and levels of economic development have a significant impact on governance. (JEL D73 , H11 , K42 )     

Foreign aid and governance in Africa

This paper investigates the effect of foreign aid on governance in order to extend the debate on foreign aid and to verify common positions from Moyo’s ‘Dead Aid’, Collier’s ‘Bottom Billion’ and Eubank’s ‘Somaliland’. The empirical evidence is based on updated data from 52 African countries for the period 1996–2010. An endogeneity robust instrumental variable Two-Stage-Least Squares empirical strategy is employed. The findings reveal that development assistance deteriorates economic (regulation quality and government effectiveness) and institutional (corruption-control and rule of law) governance, but has an insignificant effect on political (political stability, voice and accountability) governance. While, these findings are broadly in accordance with Moyo and Collier on weak governance, they neither confirm the Eubank position on political governance nor the Asongu stance on the aid-corruption nexus in a debate with Okada and Samreth. The use of foreign aid as an instrument to influence the election and replacement of political leaders in Africa may have insignificant results. It is time to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid and that economists and policy makers start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is used to influence economic, institutional and political governance in recipient countries.     

Rich or alive? Political (in)stability,political leader selection and economic growth

We develop a model that studies the incentives of the ruling elite regarding the selection of the political leader. We show that it is optimal for the ruling elite to choose leaders with more military experience in a politically unstable regime while more educated leaders are preferred in politically stable regimes. Using a dataset that includes 1569 national leaders from 177 countries over the period 1946–2011, we find empirical evidence that political stability contributes to the selection of more educated leaders, while the reverse holds for leaders with high military ranks. The empirical findings are robust to different subsamples, various proxies for educational and military attainment, and different measures for political stability. Our results suggest that leader selection is another reason why political instability is harmful for economic growth.     

Governance during Social Transformations: Challenges for Africa

The governance advice that is offered to Africa usually identifies a list of ‘good governance’ goals like stable property rights, a rule of law, low corruption and government accountability as preconditions for development. These goals are difficult to implement not only because they are expensive public goods but in addition their enforcement is typically at variance with powerful interests in the political settlements of developing countries. The historical evidence and much institutional theory suggests that during their social transformations successful developing countries had a different set of ‘developmental’ or ‘growth-enhancing’ governance capabilities that enabled their states to support critical property rights transformations and assist firms in acquiring and learning to use new technology. The institutions and policies they used differed because their political and institutional starting points were different. There are therefore no blueprints for Africa or anywhere else, but certainly the good governance menu is unrealistic. Rather African countries have to experiment and develop institutional and policy solutions that work in their context and which are appropriate for transforming property rights and accelerating technology adoption.     

Dissertation abstract: The experimental analysis of the political economics of fisheries governance

This dissertation focuses on the political economy of fisheries governance. The study develops a formal model of fisheries governance by combining the features of the common pool fishery and the political institution of lobbying; designs a laboratory fishery governance institution and conducts economic experiments to test the hypotheses derived from the formal model. Specifically, the study analyzes how fishing firms invest in efforts to influence fishery regulation and management through voluntary contribution lobbying. The study also analyses and compares contribution and effort behavior in the lobbying and the CPR using data from economic experiments. The results indicate that lobbying to change suboptimal fishery regulations was significantly below the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction and contributions to raise the cap were significantly different than contributions to lower the cap toward the social optimum. Study results show that subjects successfully lobbied to raise inefficiently low fishing quotas, but were unable to lobby to reduce inefficiently high fishing quotas. Detailed analysis of subjects’ contribution and effort behavior suggest that despite the interesting benefit-cost duality between pure public goods and CPRs, the pattern of cooperative behavior in these two social dilemma situations was different and the level of cooperation in the voluntary contribution lobbying experiment was lower than those reported in other public goods experiments. To provide external validity to these experimental findings, the study further analyzes and compares lobbying expenditures in the fishery sector with those in other natural resource industries using field data from the United States. A comparison of actual lobbying expenditures as percentage of valued added shows that lobbying effort in the U.S fishery sector is not significantly different than those in other natural resource industries such as mining and electric utility industries, but the pattern of lobbying is different. Whereas fishing firms lobby through associations or pressure groups, firms in other natural resource industries lobby unilaterally. This observation suggests that differences in industrial structure and incentives influence the pattern of lobbying and the lobbying behavior of firms across industries. The theoretical predictions derived from the formal model of fisheries governance are consistent with our experimental findings and with the field data on lobbying in the US fisheries sector. These findings suggest that heterogeneity drives rent-seeking activities in the US fisheries sector and that fishing firms attempt to circumvent political collective action problems by forming and lobbying through associations of stakeholders with relatively homogenous policy preferences. JEL Classification D22, D72, D78, H41 Advisor: Prof. Jon G. Sutinen     

Institutional quality and the effectiveness of aid for trade

Trade policy barriers and high transaction costs hinder developing countries from taking the full advantages of the global trading system. In order to help developing countries overcome the problem, the World Trade Organization (WTO) launched the Aid for Trade (AFT) initiatives in its Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong in 2005. We examine the effects of AFT inflows on bilateral trade costs facing 133 developing countries while accounting for differences in their location on the contours of various measures of institutional quality. Our results from the estimation of a mixed effects (random-intercept and random-coefficient) model indicate that institutional quality significantly affects the extent to which AFT reduces bilateral trade costs. An important policy implication of our findings is that an economically robust and sustainable reduction in bilateral trade costs facing developing countries requires the presence of both promulgated and effectively functioning institutions such as regulatory power and the rule of law.     

Aid and public sector fiscal behaviour in failing states

This paper looks at interactions between foreign aid and the public sector in developing countries, especially those considered to be fragile or failing states. A model is proposed which employs actual budgetary appropriations and revenue estimates (rather than estimated target variables) and allows for asymmetric preferences. Variants of the model are estimated using time-series data for Papua New Guinea (PNG). PNG is classified as a fragile state by the international community owing to perceived policy and institutional inadequacies. Results obtained suggest that foreign aid increases consumption and investment expenditures and decreases tax revenues and the level of borrowing.     

WHAT DETERMINES THE “LEGAL” QUALITY Of BANK REGULATION AND SUPERVISION?

This article has two contributions. First, using the methodology of Neyapti and Dincer, it provides measures of legal quality of bank regulation and supervision (RS) for a new set of developed and less‐developed countries. Second, it investigates the determinants of RS in view of the hypothesis that the existing institutional environment matters for the quality of formal institutions such as banking laws. The empirical evidence in this article demonstrates that past financial crises and prevailing levels of both financial market development and foreign direct investment inflows affect RS beyond and above the effects of other potential factors, such as macroeconomic performance and good governance. Evidence from transition economies also supports these findings. (JEL E44, G2, K29, O1)     

Coups,regime transitions,and institutional consequences

Coups and regime transitions are events that typically are intended to change the basic institutional framework of a country. Which specific institutions change and the consequences of these changes nevertheless remains largely unknown. Change after a coup or transition implies that some form of political or judiciary barrier has been erected or removed. We therefore focus on what happens to the quality of judicial institutions and political corruption around coup attempts and other types of regime transitions. We hypothesize that when coups are conducted by members of the incumbent political elite, they are likely to remove barriers to change while coup makers outside of the ruling elite are more likely to do the opposite and thus protect themselves from what remains of the elite in the political system. Using the new Bjørnskov-Rode coup dataset, our results suggest that successful coups are associated with degradation of institutions, with successful military coups in particular having a significant negative effect. Results are more varied for civilian coups where we find indications of differences depending on whether the coup makers are part of a political elite or not. We also explore whether the incumbent regime influences the effect of coup attempts on institutional change.     

Economic Consequences of Armaments Production: Institutional Perspectives of J.K. Galbraith and T.B. Veblen

J.K. Galbraith’s short book, How to Control the Military, boldly championed political and institutional reforms to curb “the military power.” Galbraith stood out among economists for his advocacy of arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union. He rejected the hypothesis that the Soviet Union nurtured an aggressive expansionary military policy. At the same time, he maintained that the tenor of national policy and the shaping of national priorities emanated from the Pentagon. Galbraith’s assertion that the military was the dominant force within the “military-industrial complex” was never empirically demonstrated. Nor did he adequately address the crucial role that military outlays played in advancing major technological innovations which underwrote the accumulation process. Veblen offered a more comprehensive analysis of the role of military expenditures, correctly showing that forms of “waste” are highly functional to the institutional and ideological structure of the U.S. economy. Military Keynesianism constituted the evolution of his conceptualization.     

Effects of government spending on private investment

This paper investigates the effects of military and non-military public expenditures on gross private investment using cointegration and error-correction analysis. The latter type of public spending is disagreggated into expenditures of infrastructure, consumption and other general government expenditures. The empirical evidence from four emerging European countries namely, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain suggests that in some cases public capital spending stimulates investment, while in others it depresses it. Also, the results tentatively indicate that defence spending exerts no influence on private investment, thus adding to the ongoing controversy of the economic effects of military spending.     

Trade openness and child health: a heterogeneous panel cointegration analysis

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we examine the impact of trade openness on child health, based on a cross-country panel data set covering 66 countries for the period 1960–2013. To account for the time-series properties of the data and potential cross-country heterogeneity in the impact of trade openness, the study employs heterogeneous panel cointegration techniques that are robust to omitted variables and endogeneity problems. The results reveal that trade openness and child health are cointegrated, and that trade works to reduce the child mortality rate significantly in the long-run. The results are robust to the methodology and trade openness and child health indicators employed, as well as to the presence of cross-sectional dependence and changes in the sample composition. The findings also suggest that the impact of trade on child health tends to be stronger in countries with better institutional quality, lower corruption, good governance, political stability, and sound policies that promote private sector development.     

治理环境、企业寻租与交易成本-基于中国上市公司非生产性支出的经验证据

基于交易成本理论,本文分析了治理环境如何影响企业寻租动机并进而影响企业交易成本——非生产性支出。本文借鉴并改进了Andersonetal.(2006)模型,探讨了非生产性支出的度量,并实证检验了影响非生产性支出的制度因素。研究表明,企业所处地区治理环境对交易成本有显著影响,减少政府干预、改善政府服务、加强法律保护均有利于减少企业非生产性支出。本文研究发现不仅具有理论上的意义,也为我国市场化改革提供了进一步的实证支持。     

Does geopolitical risk matter for corporate investment decisions? Evidence from cross-border acquisitions

Heightened geopolitical risk has become the new normal. We study the effects of geopolitical risks on cross-border acquisition activity. Using military alliance to proxy for the degree of geopolitical risks, we find that the formation of military alliance between two countries is associated with greater cross-border acquisition flows. Using the recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization enlargements as identification strategy, we find stronger effects of military alliance, especially with defense pacts. One important channel is that military alliance can substitute for target countries’ institutional quality and minimize extreme geopolitical threats faced by acquirers. We find that countries with poor governance and weaker legal enforcement benefit more from military alliance, especially by receiving inbound acquisitions from major military powers. These findings highlight the role of military alliance in the global market for corporate control by reducing geopolitical risks.     

Political instability,political freedom and inflation

Using a dynamic panel data approach, we estimate the impact of the political and institutional factors on inflation. Estimation results show that a lower degree of political instability generates lower inflation only for developed and low-inflation countries. However, when political freedom is taken into account, political instability appears to be influential on inflation also for developing countries and turns out to be significant only for high-inflation countries. Such findings emphasize the inflation-reducing effects of political stability depending on democratic political structure.     

Remittances and investment nexus in Bangladesh: an ARDL bounds testing approach

Bangladesh is the 8th largest remittance recipient country in the world and one of the heavily dependent (11 % of GDP) countries of remittances. Despite its importance in policy making in developing countries like Bangladesh, there is absence of any study regarding the effect of remittances on the level of investment. In an attempt to fill the gap, we examine the cointegrating property and stability of the relationship among these variables using the ARDL bounds testing approach combined with CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests. Our findings show that both remittances and trade openness positively and significantly influence the level of investment in Bangladesh, meaning that contrary to most conclusions found in the literature, migrant remittances in developing countries are not entirely spent in basic consumption needs. We also find that foreign aid has very little and insignificant impact on investment. Finally, we find long-run unidirectional causal relationship running from remittances to investment indicating that favorable policies to increase the flow of remittance will promote investment in Bangladesh.     

Income, income inequality, and health: Evidence from China

This paper tests using survey data from China whether individual health is associated with income and community-level income inequality. Although poor health and high inequality are key features of many developing countries, most of the earlier literature has drawn on data from developed countries in studying the association between the two. We find that self-reported health status increases with per capita income, but at a decreasing rate. Controlling for per capita income, we find an inverted-U association between self-reported health status and income inequality, which suggests that high inequality in a community poses threats to health. We also find that high inequality increases the probability of health-compromising behavior such as smoking and alcohol consumption. Most of our findings are robust to different measures of health status and income inequality. Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (4) (2006) 668–693.     

Narrating Crisis,Constructing Policy: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in Syria

During crises, ideas play a decisive role in shaping radical paradigm shifts in economic governance. However, not all crises immediately produce such ‘great transformations’. Why do some ideas result in incremental rather than abrupt change after crisis? To identify mechanisms potentially explaining this variation, I conduct an exploratory process tracing of an understudied case of incremental institutional change: post-independence Syria. Competing political actors in Syria converged on identical policy responses to crisis despite their very different interpretations of its causes. Although power oscillated between these increasingly bitter rivals in the early 1950s, their ideational consensus on economic issues nevertheless led to a decade of steady institutional change that transformed previously fragile government institutions into powerful vehicles of statism. I derive from this analysis the potential causal significance of two new variables – crisis narrative and crisis response – and hypothesise that their configuration can explain variation in post-crisis patterns of institutional change. Ideas can explain not only the new direction of economic governance after crisis, but also the speed and scale of its movement.     

EXPLORING POTENTIAL ARMS RACES

Defense spending accounts for a larger share of national output in most countries than many of the other allocative decisions, both public and private, which the majority of economic research aims at explaining. Yet with notable exceptions, most economists have ignored this topic and relegated to political science the task of explaining how resources are allocated to this sector. This paper aims at contributing to this literature by economists. A theoretical model is developed to explain the dynamics of the arms acquisition process. Within this framework, defense expenditures are governed by the expenditures of potential adversaries if these exist. Then the model is empirically tested using a sample of countries or dyads which have been proposed to be adversaries. The direction of the prima facie causal relationship between the military expenditures of these dyads is investigated using parametric causality tests. The results indicate that some of these country's expenditures seem to reflect an arms race while other proposed dyads seem not to be adversaries, i.e., their expenditures are independent and therefore, seem to be governed by other than an external threat.