上市公司股权激励实施效果研究

本文选取沪深两市2006年至2011年实施了股权激励的101家上市公司为样本，分析了上市公司股权激励的实施效果，结果表明：随着股权激励比例的增加，委托代理成本减少；股权激励比例与企业业绩呈倒U型的曲线关系；在制度允许范围内，股权激励有效期越长，委托代理成本越小，但股权激励有效期长短对企业业绩无显著影响。针对上市公司股权激励中存在的问题，提出了相应地对策。     

管理层股权激励对企业避税影响的研究

在理论分析企业实施管理层股权激励对公司治理中代理关系具有重大影响的基础上,以2008—2014年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证研究企业管理层股权激励对企业避税的影响。研究结果表明,管理层股权激励越大,企业实际有效税率越低,但考虑优惠税率的影响后,管理层股权激励与企业避税呈U型关系。结果证实,对管理者授予股权激励的确可以提高企业避税倾向,并协调其与所有者利益保持一致。     

创业板股权激励的市场效应研究

股权激励作为解决企业委托代理关系的有效方法被我国越来越多的上市公司所采用,作为高科技代表的创业板上市公司有着更高的积极性,从而推出股权激励计划。文章以推出股权激励计划的创业板上市公司为样本,采用事件研究法分析了股权激励所产生的市场效应。     

股权激励的两种实现方式

公司制的一个主要特点是所有权与经营权的分离,企业的所有者与企业的经营者形成了委托——代理关系,由于委托人与代理人之间的目标不一致,因此会产生“代理问题”。公司治理结构研究的重点问题之一就是关于企业的激励机制。本文主要研究公司股权的激励问题。按照激励对象和激励方式的不同,股权激励又可具体分为职工持股制度和股票期权激励制度两种基本类型。     

股权激励预算松驰研究

本文从代理问题的视角探究上市公司管理层在制定股权激励方案中的绩效考核指标时,是否有预算松驰及相关公司治理措施对抑制这种机会主义行为是否有作用。根据沪深两市观测数据分析表明:大部分企业的股权激励方案中存在预算松驰;代理成本与预算松弛显著正相关,国有企业的预算松弛程度显著大于非国有企业;股权集中度与预算松弛显著负相关关系;设置薪酬委员会及董事长与总经理分离对预算松驰有抑制作用。     

浅谈代理问题下国企股权激励与私企股权激励的差异

现代企业严重的委托代理问题使得股权激励成为企业良好经营必不可少的政策之一,私营企业需要股权经营的同时,国有企业同样也需要股权经营,股权激励对私营企业以及国有企业都有激励作用,但是激励程度大小不同,而这激励程度的大小的影响因素也是国有企业与私营企业股权激励的主要不同之处,本文浅析了国有企业和私营企业股权激励不同之处的原因。     

股权激励的正确运用与陷阱规避

股权激励是两权分离条件下,对人才资本激励的需要。现代企业只要存在代理关系,无论企业的所有权性质如何,都存在对代理人的长期激励问题。经营承包制、经理人年薪制、国有企业私有化,都不能解决代理人的长期激励。长期激励当初恰恰是在国外私营股份公司中提出来的。股权激励是国外企业中长期激励的主要形式。我国企业运用股权激励的时候,只有深刻认识股权激励的本质,健全约束机制,发挥股权激励的正面效应,规避其陷阱,才能达到股权激励的目的。     

业绩型股权激励、代理冲突与企业投资效率

文章选择2011-2017年沪深A股上市企业为研究样本,对代理冲突在企业投资效率方面的作用与影响机理进行实证检验,并进一步将业绩型股权激励这一重要股权激励机制的治理效应引入两者关系研究中,结果表明:代理冲突加剧企业的非效率投资程度,对投资效率产生显著负面影响;业绩型股权激励的实施有助企业提升企业投资效率;业绩型股权激励显著削弱代理冲突与投资效率之间的相关性.     

股权激励预算松驰研究

本文从代理问题的视角探究上市公司管理层在制定股权激励方案中的绩效考核指标时，是否有预算松驰及相关公司治理措施对抑制这种机会主义行为是否有作用。根据沪深两市观测数据分析表明：大部分企业的股权激励方案中存在预算松驰；代理成本与预算松弛显著正相关，国有企业的预算松弛程度显著大于非国有企业；股权集中度与预算松弛显著负相关关系；设置薪酬委员会及董事长与总经理分离对预算松驰有抑制作用。     

我国上市公司股权激励实施效果的影响因素研究——基于股权激励方案设计的视角

股权激励是建立在委托代理理论基础上的一种长期激励方式,对于提高管理者工作积极性、提升企业业绩具有重要意义。以往对于股权激励的研究多集中于股权激励与公司业绩的关系上,鲜有文章涉及股权激励实施效果的影响因素。股权激励方案设计是影响上市公司股权激励实施效果的直接影响因素,研究表明,行权/归属条件、激励力度、激励有效期都会对激励效果产生显著影响,这些结论可以为其他公司设计股权激励方案提供参考,从而促进股权激励机制的有效发展和利用。     

A classroom exercise on executive incentive compensation schemes

This paper describes a classroom exercise that has been used in several graduate courses. The exercise provides the students with a framework for understanding the rationale behind some of the mechanisms we observe in reality: incentive compensation plans for executives, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), auditing, and lawsuits against auditors. As such, the exercise provides some answers for several questions of ‘why’ before getting into the ‘how’ of reporting. The case can be used in courses dealing with financial accounting, managerial control and microeconomics in the MBA level.     

A study on the incentive compensation structure with payroll tax: A continuous-time principal-agent model

This paper studies a case when the government levies a payroll tax on the employee (agent) of an enterprise. We use a continuous-time principal-agent framework to analyze the impact of the tax on the employee’s working strategy and derive an incentive compensation scheme. The agent is supposed to be aware of his pre-tax and after-tax salary. Under the theory of behavioral economics, loss caused by taxation is taken into consideration. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation of principal’s profits is derived. By exploiting the HJB equation, we get several properties of the optimal contract. We also perform comparative statics to show our results. The model suggests that the agent’s utility loss enlarges as the tax rate increases. However, an increase in the tax rate does not always decrease principal’s profits.     

Performance compensation contracts and CEOs’ incentive to shift risk to debtholders: An empirical analysis

The paper investigates the relationships among CEO incentive contracts, manager ownership, charter value, and bank risk taking. We analyze whether the presence and magnitude of incentive contracts induce CEOs of financially distressed firms and firms with high manager ownership to take unprofitable risks that shift wealth from debtholders to equity holders. Our sample focuses on banks that had both the incentive and opportunity to shift risks, and compares them with those that did not. We compare weak and strong banks in periods when the banks’ principal creditor, the FDIC, was a lenient and then a stringent monitor. The evidence is consistent with bonus compensation inducing CEOs of financially weak firms to shift risk to debtholders only if they do not have large insider ownership. The evidence is also consistent with these contracts rewarding CEOs for their effort to manage unforeseeable risk albeit not their ability. Low charter value banks with high managerial ownership took profitable risk during the lenient regulatory period.     

Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs

The problem of incentives for correct revelation is studied as a game with incomplete information where players have individual beliefs concerning other's types. General conditions on the beliefs are given which are shown to be sufficient for the existence of a Pareto-efficient mechanism for which truth-telling is a Bayesian equilibrium.     

Bargaining over incentive contracts

The incentive contract theory assumes that the principal holds all of the bargaining power. By introducing alternating offers and strategic delay into the nonlinear pricing model, we relax this assumption and analyze an infinite-horizon contract bargaining game. We attain either the “sequential separating equilibrium” or the “simultaneous separating equilibrium”, depending on the parameter values. We prove the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium, and claim that multidimensionality and strategic delay can help resolve the multiple equilibria problem of bargaining theory. When the time between offers approaches zero, either quantity distortion or delay persists.     

Multiprincipals multiagents incentive design

This paper studies a simple setting in which the contractual arrangements which determine the incentives for agents are not designed by a single central planner, but are themselves the outcome of a game among multiple noncooperatively acting principals. The notion of an Epsilon Contracting Equilibrium is introduced to predict the outcome of the contract-design game among principals. Symmetric pure strategy Epsilon Contracting Equlibria may not exist in perfectly symmetric environments. In a symmetric Epsilon Contracting Equilibrium in mixed strategies coordination failure may lead to a suboptimal institutional network in which the agents “cheat” their principals. Received: 14 June 1995 / Accepted: 09 August 1999     

Bayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanisms

We consider a general scheme to construct Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms using a suitable ‘variable mechanism parametrization.’ The key idea is to perturb a given direct mechanism, which might not be truth revealing, introducing sufficient variability as a function of agents’ announcements to generate incentives for truthful revelation. We discuss a variable-price auction in a general setting as an example.     

Participants' values and incentive plans

Incentive plans are designed to motivate participants to pursue what is valued by an organization. This article discusses how values may influence the design of incentive plans and the success of their implementation. In situations where the incentive plan fits participants' values, the authors predict a process of mutual reinforcement. When values and incentives collide, they propose two possible yet conflicting outcomes: the “carrot effect” and the “snubbed carrot effect.” They conclude by addressing the implications of fit and misfit for research and practice. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.