Bankruptcy probability changes and the differential informativeness of bond upgrades and downgrades

Prior studies have found that stock returns around announcements of bond upgrades are insignificant, but that stock prices respond negatively to announcements of bond downgrades. This asymmetric stock market reaction suggests either that bond downgrades are timelier than upgrades, or that voluntary disclosures by managers preempt upgrades but not downgrades. This study investigates these conjectures by examining changes in firms’ probabilities of bankruptcy (assessed using bankruptcy prediction models) and voluntary disclosure activity around rating change announcements. The results indicate that the assessed probability of bankruptcy decreases before bond upgrades, but not after. By contrast, the assessed probability of bankruptcy increases both before and after bond downgrades. We also find that controlling for potential wealth-transfer related rating actions, which can impact stock returns differently, does not alter our results. Tests of press releases and earnings forecasts issued by firms suggest that the differential informativeness of upgrades and downgrades is not caused by differences in pre-rating change voluntary disclosures by upgraded and downgraded firms. The results support the hypothesis that downgrades are timelier than upgrades.     

STOCK MARKET REACTION TO ANTICIPATED VERSUS SURPRISE RATING CHANGES

I examine whether bond rating changes can be anticipated by investors and test whether the stock price reaction to the eventual change varies as a result. All else equal, the market reaction to changes that could have been easily predicted should be significantly smaller than the reaction to changes that are largely a surprise. Although rating upgrades prove difficult to predict, approximately 20% of downgrades can be correctly predicted using a relatively small number of publicly available variables. There is no significant difference between the stock price reaction to anticipated versus unanticipated rating changes.     

“Hot Hands” in bond funds

We investigate persistence in the relative performance of 3549 bond mutual funds from 1990 to 2003. We show that bond funds that display strong (weak) performance over a past period continue to do so in future periods. The out-of-sample difference in risk-adjusted return between the top and bottom decile of funds ranked on past alpha exceeds 3.5 percent per year. We demonstrate that a strategy based on past fund returns earns an economically and statistically significant abnormal return, suggesting that bond fund investors can exploit the observed persistence. Our results are robust to a wide range of model specifications and bootstrapped test statistics.     

Does sovereign debt ratings news spill over to international stock markets?

The evidence here indicates that sovereign debt rating and credit outlook changes of one country have an asymmetric and economically significant effect on the stock market returns of other countries over 1989–2003. There is a negative reaction of 51 basis points (two-day return spread vis-á-vis the US) to a credit ratings downgrade of one notch in a common information spillover around the world. Upgrades, however, have no significant impact on return spreads of countries abroad. Closeness (e.g., geographic proximity) and emerging market status amplify the effect of a spillover. Downgrade spillover effects at the industry level are more pronounced in traded goods and small industries.     

Does the quality of acquisitions inform bond rating revisions?

A bond rating upgrade (downgrade) is more likely when preceded by acquisitions that meet with positive (negative) announcement-period abnormal returns suggesting that decisions of rating agencies are partly influenced by the quality of investments undertaken by companies. Parsing the sample along takeover motives reveals that rating upgrades are more likely in value-creating acquisitions motivated by synergy while acquisitions motivated by agency considerations are more likely to elicit a rating downgrade. Following a rating downgrade however, firms seem to significantly alter their investment policies as such firms tend to make fewer but higher quality acquisitions. In addition, value creation through synergy seems to be the dominant motive in acquisitions for downgraded firms post rating downgrade.     

Information Transfer Effects of Bond Rating Downgrades

This paper investigates information transfer effects of bond rating downgrades measured by equity abnormal returns for industry portfolios. Industry rivals can be subject to two opposing effects, the contagion effect and the competition effect. We find that the net effect is strongly dependent on the original bond rating of the downgraded firm. For investment‐grade (speculative‐grade) firms, industry abnormal equity returns are negative (positive), which implies a predominant contagion (competition) effect. The analysis reveals a rich pattern of positive and negative correlations across negative credit events, which can be used to improve our understanding of portfolio credit risk models.     

An Empirical Test of Investment Restrictions and Efficiency in the High-Yield Debt Market

The results of this study indicate that bondholders earn significant abnormal returns following upgrades from speculative to investment grade. In contrast, major downgrades and upgrades from investment grade to highquality have no effect on bondholder wealth. These results support the conclusion that investment constraints for institutional investors inhibit the price of speculativegrade bonds from rising to reflect decreases in default risk until the rating change actually occurs.     

The impact of credit rating announcements on credit default swap spreads

We document the ability of the credit default swap (CDS) market to anticipate favorable as well as unfavorable credit rating change (RC) announcements based on more extensive samples of credit rating events and CDS spreads than previous studies. We obtain four new results. In contrast to prior published studies, we find that corporate RC upgrades do have a significant impact on CDS spreads even though they are still not as well anticipated as downgrades. Second, CreditWatch (CW) and Outlook (OL) announcements, after controlling for prior credit rating events, lead to significant CARs at the time positive CW and OL credit rating events are announced. Third, we extend prior results by showing that changes in CDS spreads for non-investment-grade credits contain information useful for estimating the probability of negative credit rating events. Fourth, we find that the CDS spread impact of upgrades but not downgrades is magnified during recessions and that upgrades and downgrades also differ as to the impact of simultaneous CW/OL announcements, investment-grade/speculative-grade crossovers, current credit rating, market volatility, and industry effects.     

Do Sovereign Re‐Ratings Destabilize Equity Markets during Financial Crises? New Evidence from Higher Return Moments

This study investigates the effects of S&P's sovereign re‐ratings on the higher moments of equity market returns over recent financial crises. Using a set of intraday stock market index prices and sovereign credit ratings for a sample of 36 countries that experienced sovereign rating changes over the period from 1996 to 2013, we find that the higher moments of stock market returns are significantly more responsive to sovereign re‐ratings during financial crises, but the effects on stock markets are not the same across different financial crises. The effects during crises are, however, magnified for large downgrades and those that are associated with a loss of investment grade status. We find that there are asymmetric effects during financial crises in that downgrades are consistently more significant than upgrades in increasing realized volatility and realized kurtosis. Both upgrades and downgrades affect realized skewness in times of crises in the expected direction.     

Liquidity risk of corporate bond returns: conditional approach

We study the exposure of the US corporate bond returns to liquidity shocks of stocks and Treasury bonds over the period 1973–2007 in a regime-switching model. In one regime, liquidity shocks have mostly insignificant effects on bond prices, whereas in another regime, a rise in illiquidity produces significant but conflicting effects: Prices of investment-grade bonds rise while prices of speculative-grade (junk) bonds fall substantially (relative to the market). Relating the probability of these regimes to macroeconomic conditions we find that the second regime can be predicted by economic conditions that are characterized as “stress.” These effects, which are robust to controlling for other systematic risks (term and default), suggest the existence of time-varying liquidity risk of corporate bond returns conditional on episodes of flight to liquidity. Our model can predict the out-of-sample bond returns for the stress years 2008–2009. We find a similar pattern for stocks classified by high or low book-to-market ratio, where again, liquidity shocks play a special role in periods characterized by adverse economic conditions.     

Equity market information,bank holding company risk,and market discipline

For market discipline to be effective, market factors such as changes in firm equity and debt values and returns, must influence firm decision making. In banking, this can occur directly via bank management or indirectly though supervisory examinations and oversight influencing bank management. In this study, we investigate whether equity market variables can provide timely information and add value to accounting models that predict changes in bank holding company (BOPEC) risk ratings over the 1988–2000 period. Using a variety of equity market indicators, the findings suggest that one-quarter lagged market data adds forecast value to lagged financial statement data and prior supervisory information in the logistic regressions. Furthermore, using extensive out-of-sample testing for the years 2001–2003, we find: (1) that multiple models estimated over different phases of the business and banking cycles are superior to a single model for forecasting BOPEC rating changes; (2) that equity data adds economically significant power in forecasting BOPEC rating upgrades and performs well for identifying no changes; (3) that for downgrades, the accounting model forecasts the best; (4) that modeling the three possible risk ratings categories simultaneously (downgrade, no change and upgrade) minimizes both Type I and Type II classification errors; and (5) that using multiple models to forecast risk ratings enhances the overall percentage of correct classifications.     

The Information Content of Ratings: An Analysis of Australian Credit Default Swap Spreads

We examine the information content of Australian credit rating announcements by measuring the abnormal changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads. CDS spreads provide a direct view of credit quality and thus should impound information quickly when investors receive new credit risk related information via a rating event. Using an event study methodology, we show that watch downs and rating upgrades contain valuable information even after controlling for sources of contamination. We find that watch downs elicit statistically significant market reactions, while subsequent downgrades are anticipated. Upgrades are associated with a significant but small abnormal reduction in CDS spreads, whereas watch ups appear to contain no new information.     

Common risk factors in the cross-section of corporate bond returns

We investigate the cross-sectional determinants of corporate bond returns and find that downside risk is the strongest predictor of future bond returns. We also introduce common risk factors based on the prevalent risk characteristics of corporate bonds—downside risk, credit risk, and liquidity risk—and find that these novel bond factors have economically and statistically significant risk premiums that cannot be explained by long-established stock and bond market factors. We show that the newly proposed risk factors outperform all other models considered in the literature in explaining the returns of the industry- and size/maturity-sorted portfolios of corporate bonds.     

Announcement effects of convertible bond loans and warrant-bond loans: An empirical analysis for the Dutch market

This study investigates the announcement effects of offerings of convertible bond loans and warrant-bond loans using data for the Dutch market. The event study analysis shows that announcement effects of convertible bonds are associated with positive but insignificant abnormal returns and that announcements of warrant-bonds are associated with significant positive abnormal returns. These findings are similar to the results for Japanese hybrid debt, as reported by Kang et al. (1995) (Kang, J.K., Kim, Y.C., Park, K.J., Stulz, R.M., 1995. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, pp. 257–270) and Kang and Stulz (1996) (Kang, J.K., Stulz, R.M., 1996. Review of Financial Studies, pp. 109–139), but they contrast with studies for the United States that generally find significant negative abnormal returns for convertible bond loans and insignificant negative abnormal returns for warrant-bond loans. Our results cannot be attributed to differences in the corporate governance structures of the Netherlands and the United States. We find that the positive abnormal returns for the warrant-bond loans are caused by the packaging of the announcements with other (good) firm-specific news.     

Currency devaluation and stock market response: An empirical analysis

We study local stock market reaction to currency devaluation by a country's central bank. Devaluations appear to be anticipated by the local stock markets, and there are significant negative abnormal returns even one year prior to the announcement of the devaluation. A negative trend in stock returns persists for up to one quarter following the first announcement, and then becomes positive thereafter, suggesting a reversal. We explore whether changes in macroeconomic variables prior to currency devaluations are related to abnormal stock returns. We find that stock returns are significantly lower if the devaluation is larger and if the country is a developing nation. Furthermore, stock markets decline more around devaluations if reserves are lower, if the real exchange rate has depreciated over the prior years, if the capital account has declined, if the current account deficit has gone up, or if the country credit rating has deteriorated.     

Is a Bond Rating Downgrade Bad News,Good News,or No News for Stockholders?

We examine the reaction of common stock returns to bond rating changes. While recent studies find a significant negative stock response to downgrades, we argue that this reaction should not be expected for all downgrades because: (1) some rating changes are anticipated by market participants and (2) downgrades because of an anticipated move to transfer wealth from bondholders to stockholders should be good news for stockholders. We find that downgrades associated with deteriorating financial prospects convey new negative information to the capital market, but that downgrades due to changes in firms' leverage do not.     

The performance of US bond mutual funds

We evaluate the performance of the US bond mutual fund industry using a comprehensive sample of bond funds over a long time period from January 1998 to February 2017. In this one study, we examine bond fund selectivity, market timing and performance persistence. We evaluate bond funds relative to their self-declared benchmarks and in terms of both gross-of-fee returns and net-of-fee returns. We document considerable abnormal performance among funds both to the fund (gross returns) and to the investor (net returns). Bond fund performance is found to be superior in the post financial crisis period. However, past strong performance cannot be relied upon to predict future performance. Finally, while some funds exhibit market timing ability; we find a predominance of negative market timing among US bond mutual funds.     

Compensation incentives of credit rating agencies and predictability of changes in bond ratings and financial strength ratings

Over the past decade there has been mixed evidence on the lead–lag relation between issuer-paid and investor-paid credit rating agencies. We investigate the lead–lag relationship for changes in bond ratings (BRs) and financial strength ratings (FSRs), for the US insurance industry, where FSRs impose market discipline. First, we find that changes in issuer-paid BRs are led by changes in investor-paid BRs, even over a period that issuer-paid agencies have improved their timeliness. Second, information flows in both directions between changes in issuer-paid BRs and FSRs. Third, issuer-paid FSRs are predictable by investor-paid BRs. Fourth, the lead effect of investor-paid downgrades is economically significant as it is associated with an unconditional, post-event, 30-day cumulative abnormal return of −4%. This return is a result of investor-paid downgrades in BRs, which predict more downgrades in the following 90 days (same period return of −11%).     

Do bond rating changes affect the information asymmetry of stock trading?

Using a sample of 279 upgrades and 310 downgrades from 1996 to 2004, we find that bond rating changes affect the information asymmetry of stock trading and other measures of information risk. Specifically, when a firm's bond rating is upgraded, its stock information asymmetry and its analysts' earnings forecast dispersion are significantly reduced, while the institutional equity holdings of its shares are significantly increased. The reverse is true for a downgrade. In addition, the degree of change in stock information asymmetry is positively associated with the magnitude of the bond rating changes.     

THE IMPACT OF CREDITWATCH PLACEMENT ON EQUITY RETURNS AND BOND PRICES

This paper examines the equity returns and bond prices of firms around the dates of their placement on CreditWatch by Standard and Poor's. Bond prices and equity returns for companies listed on CreditWatch are compared with a set of firms whose debt was rerated during the same time period but were never placed on CreditWatch. The evidence indicates no market reaction when firms are listed on CreditWatch with subsequent rating affirmations, but a significant reaction exists in those cases where the listing was followed by downgradings. Furthermore, the bond market does not appear so efficient as the stock market since relative bond prices continue to decline as long as seven months after a rating change.