Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection: Implications for Discount Window Stigma

I study the implications for central bank discount window stigma of a workhorse model of adverse selection in financial markets. In the model, firms (banks) need to borrow to finance a productive project. There is limited liability and firms have private information about their ability to repay their debts, which gives rise to the possibility of adverse selection. The central bank can ameliorate the impact of adverse selection by lending to firms. Discount window borrowing is observable and it may be taken as a signal of firms' credit worthiness. Under some conditions, firms borrowing from the discount window may pay higher interest rates to borrow in the market, a phenomenon often associated with the presence of stigma. I discuss these and other outcomes in detail and what they suggest about the relevance of stigma as an empirical phenomenon.     

Implications of a TAF program stigma for lenders: the case of publicly traded banks versus privately held banks

Term auction facility (TAF) was created during the financial crisis as a substitute for the Federal Reserve’s discount window, the lender of last resort. We hypothesize if TAF borrowing is viewed as a bailout then publicly traded banks would borrow relatively fewer TAF funds to avoid a bailout stigma. We find publicly traded banks did borrow less (as a percent of total assets) in the TAF program than privately held banks. Further, too-big-to-fail banks and investment banks borrowed relatively less than other publicly traded banks indicating greater levels of public scrutiny reduces borrowing under emergency government liquidity programs. We also find that publicly traded banks pledged lower quality and less liquid collateral than private banks when borrowing under the program. Our results suggest TAF provided more benefit to traditional privately held banks with strong balance sheets that were able to borrow relatively greater amounts in anticipation of either future liquidity needs as suggested by Ivashina and Scharfstein (J Financ Econ 97:319–338, 2010) or increased lending as found by Berger et al. (The Federal Reserve’s discount window and TAF programs: “pushing on a string?” Working paper, University of South Carolina, 2014).     

A note on discount rate policy and the variability of discount window borrowing

The purpose of this note is to evaluate the appropriate discount rate policy rules consistent with minimization of the variability of borrowing at the Federal Reserve discount window. In the context of Goodfriend's (1983) model of the bank borrowing decision, it is demonstrated that either a penalty rate or a subsidy rate policy will produce minimized variability of borrowing, so long as the subsidy rate adjusts point for point to changes in the value of the Federal funds rate. These policy rules are compatible with a policy procedure designed to target borrowed or non-borrowed reserves. If the Fed does not adhere to one of these specific rules, minimization of borrowing variability requires an open market procedure in which the Fed pegs the Federal funds rate.     

Reserve regulation and recourse as a source of risk premia in the federal funds market

In this paper we demonstrate that there is a pronounced and persistent daily pattern of returns in the federal funds market, centered on Wednesday. We present evidence that explains this phenomenon as a reflection of the optimal behavior of banks operating in an environment in which there are effective reserve requirements and a penalty cost for recourse to discount borrowing. In particular, we report empirical evidence that shows there was a significant upward shift in the amplitude of this pattern of daily returns that resulted from (1) the increase in uncertainty associated with the change in Federal Reserve operating procedures during the 1979–1982 period, and (2) the imposition of a surcharge on discount borrowing instituted by the Federal Reserve. Our results demonstrate that what otherwise might be regarded as anomalous interest-rate behavior is consistent with the optimal response of banks to the regulatory environment within which they operate.     

Payment system disruptions and the federal reserve following September 11, 2001

The monetary and payment system consequences of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the Federal Reserve's response are reviewed. Interbank payment disruptions appear to be a central feature of many US banking crises, and interbank payment disruptions seem likely to recur. Federal Reserve credit extension following September 11 succeeded in massively increasing the supply of banks’ balances to satisfy the disruption-induced increase in demand and thereby ameliorate the effects of the shock. Relatively benign banking conditions helped make Fed credit policy manageable. An interbank payment disruption that coincided with less-favorable banking conditions could be more difficult to manage, given current daylight credit policies. Paying interest on reserves would facilitate improvements in daylight credit policy.     

Credit Card Debt and Default over the Life Cycle

This paper solves an empirically parameterized model of life cycle consumption, which allows for uncollaterized borrowing and the possibility of default. The simulation results show that: (i) "social stigma " and credit limit have a very large impact on default rates; (ii) education level also has a significant effect on the probability of default, namely, through differences in the shape of lifetime labor income profiles; and (iii) the response of simulated default rates to labor income shocks is determined by the nature of labor income uncertainty (temporary versus permanent). Additionally, the model generates simultaneous consumer holdings of credit card debt and liquid assets.     

The Taylor Rule and “Opportunistic” Monetary Policy

We investigate the possibility that the Taylor rule should be formulated as a threshold process such that the Federal Reserve acts more aggressively in some circumstances than in others. It seems reasonable that the Federal Reserve would act more aggressively when inflation is high than when it is low. Similarly, it might be expected that the Federal Reserve responds more to a negative than a positive output gap. Although these specifications receive some empirical support, we find that a modified threshold model that is consistent with “opportunistic” monetary policy makes significant progress toward explaining Federal Reserve behavior.     

Credit Indicators as Predictors of Economic Activity: A Real‐Time VAR Analysis

Using readily available indicators of the profitability, price, and availability of credit—the term spread, junk‐bond spread, and banks’ “willingness to lend” as reported by the Federal Reserve—we show that it is possible to significantly improve on the real‐time output and employment predictions of forecasting professionals at the medium‐run horizons that are most relevant to policymakers and private decision makers. Key to this improvement is a flexible state–space model of data revisions. The willingness‐to‐lend variable is the best real‐time predictor of GDP growth. For forecasting job growth, all three credit indicators prove helpful.     

Analysis of Stigma and Bank Credit Provision

Bank rescue programs are designed to provide assistance to struggling financial intermediaries during financial crises. A complicating factor is that participating banks are often stigmatized by accepting assistance from the government. This paper investigates stigma in two ways: (i) it examines how stigma changes a bank's decision to seek assistance from the rescue program, and (ii) it analyzes how stigma affects a bank's ability to operate as a financial intermediary using a joint model for bank‐level application, approval, and lending decisions. The empirical results indicate that stigma hinders the objectives of the rescue program and slows the production of credit.     

The Impact of the Federal Reserve's Large‐Scale Asset Purchase Programs on Corporate Credit Risk

Estimating the effect of Federal Reserve's announcements of Large‐Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) programs on corporate credit risk is complicated by the simultaneity of policy decisions and movements in prices of risky financial assets, as well as by the fact that both interest rates of assets targeted by the programs and indicators of credit risk reacted to other common shocks during the recent financial crisis. This paper employs a heteroskedasticity‐based approach to estimate the structural coefficient measuring the sensitivity of market‐based indicators of corporate credit risk to declines in the benchmark market interest rates prompted by the LSAP announcements. The results indicate that the LSAP announcements led to a significant reduction in the cost of insuring against default risk—as measured by the CDX indexes—for both investment‐ and speculative‐grade corporate credits. While the unconventional policy measures employed by the Federal Reserve to stimulate the economy have substantially lowered the overall level of credit risk in the economy, the LSAP announcements appear to have had no measurable effect on credit risk in the financial intermediary sector.     

Credit Availability and the Collapse of the Banking Sector in the 1930s

This paper examines the mechanism through which banking sector distress affects the availability of credit using the experience of the United States during the Great Depression. We utilize previously neglected data from a 1934 survey conducted by the Federal Reserve System of both banks and Chambers of Commerce regarding the availability of credit, and examine which aspects of the banking system collapse affected credit availability as indicated by the survey. We find that bank failures had the most dominant impact, but there is also some evidence for the importance of funding constraints from deposit outflows and of protracted bank liquidation.     

The Federal Reserve's Tools for Policy Normalization in a Preferred Habitat Model of Financial Markets

We develop a model to analyze monetary policy implementation with multiple Federal Reserve liabilities and superabundant reserves. The analysis demonstrates the Federal Reserve's tools including interest on excess reserves (IOER), overnight reverse repurchase agreements (ON RRP), and term deposits should allow the Federal Reserve to raise the short‐term interest rates to any desired level. We find the contribution of each the increase in the IOER and ON RRP offering rates in firming money market rates suggested by the data during the December 2015 policy tightening event is remarkably similar to the effect of each tool implied by the calibrated model.     

Credit risk dynamics in response to changes in the federal funds target: The implication for firm short-term debt

The recent credit crisis has raised a number of interesting questions regarding the role of the Federal Reserve Bank and the effectiveness of its expected and unexpected interventions in financial markets, especially during the crisis, given its mandate. This paper reviews and evaluates the impact of expected and unexpected changes in the federal funds rate target on credit risk premia. The paper's main innovation is the use of an ACH-VAR (autoregressive conditional hazard VAR) model to generate the Fed's expected and unexpected monetary policy shocks which are then used to determine the effects of a Federal Reserve policy change on counterparty credit risk and more importantly short-term firm debt financing. The findings answer a longstanding question sought by researchers on the effect of policy makers' announcements on firm debt financing. The results clearly show that the Federal Reserve influences short-term debt financing through the credit channel for both expansionary and contractionary monetary policies. In particular, we find that the growth in counterparty risk appears less responsive to anticipated responses in the Fed funds rate that fail to materialize than to an unanticipated increase in the federal funds rate. Finally, we also document that the results appear to validate the Feds interventions in financial markets to stem counterparty risk and to make liquidity more readily available to firms.     

Consumer Attitudes and Their Forecasting Power for Consumer Spending

The University of Michigan's Surveys of Consumers is summarized with principal components of consumer attitudes with respect to income and wealth, prices, and interest rates and credit availability. These summary measures contain information beyond that captured by the Index of Consumer Sentiment. The summary measures have forecasting power for aggregate consumption behavior, even when controlling for economic fundamentals. These measures also help to improve significantly upon Survey of Professional Forecasters, Blue Chip Consensus, and Federal Reserve Board's forecasts of consumption and other real activity measures, consistent with their predictive ability conditioned upon a broader set of fundamentals and forecasters’ judgment.     

Communication by Central Bank Committee Members: Different Strategies, Same Effectiveness?

The paper assesses the communication strategies of the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the European Central Bank and their effectiveness. We find that the effectiveness of communication is not independent from the decision-making process. The paper shows that the Federal Reserve has been pursuing a highly individualistic communication strategy amid a collegial approach to decision making, while the Bank of England is using a collegial communication strategy and highly individualistic decision making. The European Central Bank (ECB) has chosen a collegial approach both in its communication and in its decision making. Assessing these strategies, we find that predictability of policy decisions and the responsiveness of financial markets to communication are equally good for the Federal Reserve and the ECB. This suggests that there may not be a single best approach to designing a central bank communication strategy.     

Federal reserve policy viewed through a money supply lens

Federal Reserve nonborrowed reserve supply systematically responded to changes in inflation and in the output gap over the period 1969-2000. While the feedback from output gap is always negative, the response of money supply to changes in inflation varies considerably across time. Nonborrowed reserves decreased with inflation in the post-1979 period and increased in the pre-1979 period. Applying a standard macro-model, the estimated reaction functions are shown to ensure equilibrium determinacy. Viewed through the money supply lens, Federal Reserve policy substantially changed over time, but has never allowed for endogenous fluctuations, which contrasts conclusions drawn from federal funds rate analyses.     

Liquidity in Frictional Asset Markets

On November 14–15, 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland hosted a conference on “Liquidity in frictional asset markets.” In this paper, we review the literature on asset markets with trading frictions in both finance and monetary theory using a simple search‐theoretic model, and we discuss the papers presented at the conference in the context of this literature. We will show the diversity of topics covered in this literature, for example, the dynamics of housing and credit markets, the functioning of payment systems, optimal monetary policy and the cost of inflation, the role of banks, the effect of informational frictions on asset trading.     

Identifying the effects of a lender of last resort on financial markets: Lessons from the founding of the fed

We use the founding of the Federal Reserve to identify the effects of a lender of last resort. We examine stock return and interest rate volatility during September and October, when markets were vulnerable because of financial stringency from the harvest. Stock volatility fell by 40% and interest rate volatility by more than 70% following the monetary regime change. The drop is insignificant if major panic years are omitted from the analysis, however. Because business cycle downturns occurred in the same year as financial crises, our results suggest that the existence of the Federal Reserve reduced liquidity risk.     

Operational outages and aggregate uncertainty in the federal funds market

This paper uses operational problems at depository institutions in sending Fedwire payments as a proxy for aggregate uncertainty in end-of-day Fed account positions and then examines funds market behavior on those days. The results suggest that increased uncertainty is associated with a deviation of the federal funds rate from the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) target rate; the magnitude depends on the severity of the difficulty, the payment volume of the affected participant, and the time of day. The intraday standard deviation of the federal funds rate is also affected by operational outages. Moreover, extensions to Fedwire are more likely on days with possible outages, and discount window borrowing picks up on these days as well.     

Credit Traps and Macroprudential Leverage

We construct a macroeconomic model with overlapping generations to study credit traps—prolonged periods of stagnant real activity accompanied by low productivity, financial sector undercapitalization, and credit misallocation. Shocks to bank capital tighten banks' borrowing constraints causing them to allocate credit to easily collateralizable but low productivity projects. Low productivity weakens bank capital generation, reinforcing tight borrowing constraints, sustaining the credit trap steady state. Macroprudential policy to limit bank leverage can be welfare enhancing. In the presence of a credit trap, optimal leverage policy is countercyclical.