Discount window borrowing after 2003: The explicit reduction in implicit costs

In 2003, the Federal Reserve introduced primary credit as its main discount window lending program. This program replaced the adjustment credit program, which, subject to a number of restrictions, had generated a stigma associated with borrowing from the Federal Reserve. Lessening the stigma of borrowing was viewed as essential for reducing the reluctance to borrow from the Federal Reserve. We develop a structural model of daily borrowing. Using this model, we estimate the implicit cost associated with borrowing. Our results suggest that the stigma of borrowing is significantly reduced.     

Bank incentives and suboptimal lending decisions: Evidence from the valuation effect of bank loan announcements in Japan

Using a sample of bank loan announcements in Japan, we examine whether or not banks have incentives to engage in suboptimal lending that results in wealth transfer from the banks to the borrowing firms. We find that abnormal returns for borrowing firms are significantly positive, but those for lending banks are sometimes significantly negative. Furthermore, the announcement returns for borrowing firms are negatively related to those for lending banks, especially when poorly performing firms borrow from financially healthy (low-risk) banks. Our results suggest that the positive valuation effect of bank loan announcements for borrowing firms is mainly due to a wealth transfer from lending banks.     

Resaleable debt and systemic risk

Many debt claims, such as bonds, are resaleable; others, such as repos, are not. There was a fivefold increase in repo borrowing before the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Why? Did banks’ dependence on non-resaleable debt precipitate the crisis? In this paper, we develop a model of bank lending with credit frictions. The key feature of the model is that debt claims are heterogenous in their resaleability. We find that decreasing credit market frictions leads to an increase in borrowing via non-resaleable debt. Such borrowing has a dark side: It causes credit chains to form, because, if a bank makes a loan via non-resaleable debt and needs liquidity, it cannot sell the loan but must borrow via a new contract. These credit chains are a source of systemic risk, as one bank’s default harms not only its creditors but also its creditors’ creditors. Overall, our model suggests that reducing credit market frictions may have an adverse effect on the financial system and even lead to the failures of financial institutions.     

Implications of a TAF program stigma for lenders: the case of publicly traded banks versus privately held banks

Term auction facility (TAF) was created during the financial crisis as a substitute for the Federal Reserve’s discount window, the lender of last resort. We hypothesize if TAF borrowing is viewed as a bailout then publicly traded banks would borrow relatively fewer TAF funds to avoid a bailout stigma. We find publicly traded banks did borrow less (as a percent of total assets) in the TAF program than privately held banks. Further, too-big-to-fail banks and investment banks borrowed relatively less than other publicly traded banks indicating greater levels of public scrutiny reduces borrowing under emergency government liquidity programs. We also find that publicly traded banks pledged lower quality and less liquid collateral than private banks when borrowing under the program. Our results suggest TAF provided more benefit to traditional privately held banks with strong balance sheets that were able to borrow relatively greater amounts in anticipation of either future liquidity needs as suggested by Ivashina and Scharfstein (J Financ Econ 97:319–338, 2010) or increased lending as found by Berger et al. (The Federal Reserve’s discount window and TAF programs: “pushing on a string?” Working paper, University of South Carolina, 2014).     

The Choice of Debt Source by UK Firms

We examine the choice of borrowing source among public debt, syndicated bank loans, bilateral bank loans and non‐bank private debt. Using a sample of 400 non‐financial firms over the period 2000–2012, we find strong support for the reputational theory of borrowing source. Larger firms are more likely to borrow in public debt markets. Bank dependent firms are less likely to borrow in public debt markets and choose between bank and non‐bank private debt based on maturity, collateral available to lenders and other firm characteristics. These results are consistent with the role of borrower reputation being the primary determinant of borrowing source for UK listed firms.     

Discount window borrowing,monetary policy,and the post-October 6, 1979 federal reserve operating procedure

A demand schedule for discount window borrowing based on profit-maximizing bank behavior is derived. A feature of non-price rationing at the discount window making longer duration borrowing more costly is shown to make lagged borrowing and expected future spreads between the Federal funds rate and the discount rate relevant to the current borrowing decision. Consequently, both the size of the coefficients in the borrowing functions as well as the form of the function itself depend on expected Fed policy toward the spread. The demand function for discount window borrowing provides the critical link by which non-borrowed reserve control affects short-term interest rates and ultimately the money supply under post-October 6, 1979 reserve targeting. The analysis suggests some reasons why the Fed has experienced difficulty in specifying, estimating, and utilizing a discount window borrowing function in the non-borrowed reserve operating procedure.     

The Structure of Multiple Credit Relationships: Evidence from U.S. Firms

When firms borrow from multiple concentrated creditors such as banks they appear to differentiate their allocation of borrowing. In this paper, we put forward hypotheses for this borrowing pattern based on incomplete contract theories and test them using a sample of small U.S. firms. We find that firms with more valuable and more homogeneous assets differentiate borrowing more sharply across concentrated creditors. Moreover, borrowing differentiation is inversely related to restructuring costs and positively related to firms' informational transparency. The results suggest that the structure of credit relationships is used to discipline creditors and entrepreneurs, especially during corporate reorganizations.     

Rediscounting under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard

Freeman (1999) proposes a model in which discount window lending and open‐market operations have different effects. This is important because in most of the literature these policies are indistinguishable. However, Freeman's argument that the central bank should absorb losses associated with default to provide risk sharing stands in stark contrast to the concern that central banks should limit their exposure to credit risk. We extend Freeman's model by introducing moral hazard. With moral hazard, the central bank should avoid absorbing losses and Freeman's argument breaks down. However, we show that policies resembling discount window lending and open‐market operations can still be distinguished in this new framework. The optimal policy is for the central bank to make a restricted number of creditors compete for funds. By restricting the number of agents, the central bank can limit the moral hazard problem. By making them compete with each other, the central bank can exploit market information that reveals the state of the economy.     

Information Contagion and Bank Herding

We show that the likelihood of information contagion induces profit-maximizing bank owners to herd with other banks. When bank loan returns have a common systematic factor, the cost of borrowing for a bank increases when there is adverse news on other banks since such news conveys adverse information about the common factor. The increase in a bank's cost of borrowing relative to the situation of good news about other banks is greater when bank loan returns have less commonality (in addition to the systematic risk factor). Hence, banks herd and undertake correlated investments so as to minimize the impact of such information contagion on the expected cost of borrowing. Competitive effects such as superior margins from lending in different industries mitigate herding incentives.     

Near integration,bank reluctance,and discount window borrowing

This study puts forth stationarity considerations in explaining the observed breakdown between aggregate Discount Window borrowing and the spread between the Federal Funds rate and the discount rate during the post-1987 period. Tests with biweekly data indicate stationarity for adjustment borrowing, but cannot reject the unit root for the spread. The Goodfriend–Dutkowsky dynamic implicit cost formulation can accommodate the contrasting stationarity properties. Structural restrictions are compatible with stationary borrowing and a stationary or near integrated spread. While empirical findings from the static model indicate greater bank reluctance to borrow over time, the dynamic model gives considerably less support.     

When bank loans are bad news: Evidence from market reactions to loan announcements under the risk of expropriation

In this paper we investigate whether inefficient bank loans can reduce the value of borrowing firms when expropriation of the stock of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders is a major concern. Using data from Chinese banks, we find that bank loan announcements generate significantly negative abnormal returns for the borrowing firms. In line with this expropriation view, negative stock price reactions following bank loan announcements are concentrated in firms that are perceived to be more vulnerable to expropriation by controlling shareholders. Finally, we find evidence that a negative relationship between market reactions and firm vulnerability to expropriation exists only when firms borrow from the least efficient banks.     

Corporate ownership structure and the choice between bank debt and public debt

This article examines the relation between a borrowing firm's ownership structure and its choice of debt source using a novel data set on corporate ownership, control, and debt structures for 9,831 firms in 20 countries from 2001 to 2010. We find that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant negative impact on the firm's reliance on bank debt financing. In addition, we show that the control-ownership divergence affects other aspects of debt structure including debt maturity and security. Our results indicate that firms controlled by large shareholders with excess control rights may choose public debt financing over bank debt as a way of avoiding scrutiny and insulating themselves from bank monitoring.     

A note on discount rate policy and the variability of discount window borrowing

The purpose of this note is to evaluate the appropriate discount rate policy rules consistent with minimization of the variability of borrowing at the Federal Reserve discount window. In the context of Goodfriend's (1983) model of the bank borrowing decision, it is demonstrated that either a penalty rate or a subsidy rate policy will produce minimized variability of borrowing, so long as the subsidy rate adjusts point for point to changes in the value of the Federal funds rate. These policy rules are compatible with a policy procedure designed to target borrowed or non-borrowed reserves. If the Fed does not adhere to one of these specific rules, minimization of borrowing variability requires an open market procedure in which the Fed pegs the Federal funds rate.     

Managerial compensation and the debt placement decision

Extant research argues that borrowing from financial intermediaries subjects managers to external monitoring. However, given managers' flexibility in choosing the type of debt financing, why would managers submit themselves to external monitoring? Recent theory points to the role of managerial incentive compensation. Specifically, it is argued that managers will borrow from financial intermediaries if their compensation is tied to firm performance. Additionally, it is noted that a more optimal compensation scheme will induce managers to undertake intermediated loans only when the firm is sufficiently profitable. Such a compensation scheme is likely to exist in opaque firm settings where borrowing from financial intermediaries can serve to signal firm profitability. Our study provides corroborative evidence. We find that the choice of syndicated bank loans is positively associated with CEO equity incentives. Second, this syndicated debt-incentive compensation link is influenced by firm profitability, particularly among information problematic firms. Overall, our study points to the role of incentive compensation in the debt placement decision.     

Does banking deregulation affect accounting conservatism?

This study examines the effect of banking competition on borrowing firms’ conditional accounting conservatism (i.e., asymmetric timely loss recognition). The context of the study is the staggered passage of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA), the deregulation that permits banks to establish branches across state lines and increases bank competition. I find that firms report less conservatively after the passage of the IBBEA in their headquarter states. The effect on conditional conservatism is stronger for firms in states with a greater increase in competition among banks, firms that are more likely to borrow from in-state banks, firms with greater financial constraint, and firms subject to less external monitoring. Additional tests confirm that the decline in conditional conservatism is observed only after the adoption of IBBEA and lasts for two years. The findings indicate that banks tend to “lowball” borrowers when competition arises by relaxing their demand for conservative reporting. Overall, this study highlights the unintended impacts of banking competition on borrowing firms’ financial reporting.     

The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses

We test hypotheses about the effects of bank size, foreign ownership, and distress on lending to informationally opaque small firms using a rich new data set on Argentinean banks, firms, and loans. We also test hypotheses about borrowing from a single bank versus multiple banks. Our results suggest that large and foreign-owned institutions may have difficulty extending relationship loans to opaque small firms. Bank distress appears to have no greater effect on small borrowers than on large borrowers, although even small firms may react to bank distress by borrowing from multiple banks, raising borrowing costs and destroying some relationship benefits.     

Switching from Single to Multiple Bank Lending Relationships: Determinants and Implications

Our data show that nearly all firms borrow for the first time in their life from a single bank, but soon afterward some of them start borrowing from additional banks. Duration analysis shows that the likelihood of a firm substituting a single relationship with multiple relationships increases with the duration of that relationship. It also shows that this substitution is more likely to occur for firms with more growth opportunities and for firms with poor performance. The analysis of the ex post effects of the initiation of multiple relationships, in turn, shows that firms with higher levels of investment prior to the initiation of multiple relationships increase their investment even further when they start to borrow from multiple banks and that firms with poor prior performance continue to perform poorly afterward. These results suggest that concerns with hold-up costs, together with an unwillingness by the incumbent bank to increase its exposure to a firm because of its past poor performance, are the key reasons for these firms to initiate an additional relationship this early in their life. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, G32.     

Board quality and the cost of debt capital: The case of bank loans

We analyze the relation between comprehensive measures of board quality and the cost as well as the non-price terms of bank loans. We show that firms that have higher quality boards with a greater advisory presence borrow at lower interest rates. This relation exists even after controlling for ownership structure, CEO compensation policy, and shareholder protection, as well as the size and financial characteristics of the borrower and of the loan. We also show evidence that board quality and other governance characteristics influence the likelihood that loans have covenant requirements, but the relations differ by covenant type. When we combine the direct and indirect costs of bank loans we find that firms with large, independent, experienced, and diverse boards and lower institutional ownership borrow more cheaply. Overall, the evidence indicates that board quality impacts the cost of bank debt.     

Disequilibrium in the UK corporate loan market

In the last decade, a debate has resurfaced about whether financial constraints stemming from asymmetric information and incentive problems play an important role in propagating monetary policy shocks. This paper investigates the monetary transmission mechanism in the UK and its impact on the availability of bank credit to small and medium size firms.The empirical specification is based on a disequilibrium model that allows for the possibility of transitory credit rationing. Sample firms are classified endogenously into ‘borrowing constrained’ and ‘borrowing unconstrained’. The analysis of credit rationing takes into account not only firm specific variables, but also important macroeconomic factors such as the prevailing monetary conditions and the stage of the business cycle.We find that (i) firms’ assets play an important role as collateral in mitigating borrowing constraints; (ii) during periods of tight monetary conditions corporate demand for bank credit increases, whereas the supply of bank loans is reduced; (iii) to avoid bank credit rationing smaller companies increase their reliance on interfirm credit; (iv) the proportion of borrowing constrained firms is significantly higher during the recession years of the early 1990s than at other times.