非活跃市场环境下公允价值计量相关问题研究

公允价值并非只运用于活跃市场,非活跃市场是公允价值运用不可或缺的主要环境,活跃市场在很大程度上只是公允价值运用的特殊环境。美国FAS157《公允价值计量》没有系统考虑非活跃市场环境下诸多公允价值计量问题。深入研究非活跃市场环境下公允价值计量相关问题,并与基于活跃市场环境的公允价值计量框架进行对比和对接,有利于完善公允价值计量理论与方法体系,提高会计信息的决策有用性,加速实现我国与国际会计准则的持续全面趋同。     

Shedding “light” on marriage: The influence of skin shade on marriage for black females

The inter-racial marriage gap that opened in the past 50 years is generally attributed to a decline in the availability of young black marriageable men. We contend that the associated shortage of desirable men in the marriage market provides those black men who are sought after with the opportunity to attain a high status spouse, which has placed a premium on black women with lighter skin. We provide evidence, based on data drawn from the Multi City Study of Urban Inequality, consistent with this hypothesis. Our theoretical analysis of the marriage market reveals that marriage promotion policies to increase the desire to marry on the part of young black women will serve to exacerbate the importance attached to skin shade.     

Notes on marriage markets with weak externalities

We consider marriage markets with externalities. We focus on weak externalities, that is, markets in which each agent is primarily concerned about her partner. We formalize and prove the claim that weak externalities are not so significant in the marriage market: in this case, the ω-core and the α-core coincide and are both nonempty. In addition, we show that, if we allow agents to block matchings without changing their mate, the results do not longer hold.     

The “similarity” and “heterogeneity” theses in studying innovation: evidence from the end-of-life vehicle case

The paper seeks to understand how eight companies in the European car industry responded to changing business conditions under the threat of regulation on the waste problem of end-of-life vehicles. It was observed that the companies pursued diverging innovation tracks in dealing with the regulatory pressure, although competing in the same markets and subject to similar regulatory pressure. The case is interesting to consider in the light of recent discussions of differences in styles of innovation. The question then is whether any sort of style of innovation may be distinguished in the diverging innovation tracks. The objective of the paper is to add to these discussions by considering the results of this case study in the light of “similarity” and heterogeneity hypotheses that may be advanced around “styles” of innovation.     

董事会独立性能影响公允价值计量的价值相关性吗

基于中国证券市场2007年至2010年1203例披露过公允价值会计信息的非金融类上市公司样本,考察公允价值计量是否具有价值相关性以及董事会独立性对公允价值计量的价值相关性的影响。结果显示:(1)公允价值计量较历史成本计量更具有价值相关性,并且这一点在利润表项目上体现得更为明显;(2)董事会独立性对公允价值计量的价值相关性具有显著的正向影响。这支持了中国证券市场环境下董事会独立性作为公允价值信息控制机制的有效性。     

Agglomeration and fair wages

Abstract.  This paper implements a fair wage constraint into an analytically tractable core-periphery agglomeration model. This enables us to study the role of imperfect labour markets for the pattern of agglomeration. In the short run, a marginal increase in fair wage preferences leads to an unambiguous compression of the national factor price differential between skilled and unskilled labour, involving an increase in the unemployment rate of unskilled workers. In the long run, this mechanism renders full dispersion of an unstable equilibrium already at higher trade costs than in perfect labour markets. There is a tendency for fair wage preferences to enforce agglomeration.     

Malthus in Sweden

This paper presents some new and unique cross‐county data from 19th‐century Sweden over birth, death, and marriage rates, grain prices, and harvests. Local grain prices correlate negatively with local harvests, suggesting imperfectly integrated food markets. The so‐called positive and preventive checks are also present: good local harvests are associated with high birth and marriage rates, and low death rates. We also find that the fertility and marriage effects from changes in prices – but not harvests – are greater in counties that rely more on manufacturing, consistent with an open‐economy model of fertility choice, where agents earn income from both agriculture and manufacturing.     

Sequential, nonzero-sum “Blotto”: Allocating defensive resources prior to attack

The strategic allocation of resources across multiple fronts has long been studied in the context of Blotto games in which two players simultaneously select their allocations. However many allocation problems are sequential. For example, a state trying to defend against a terrorist attack generally allocates some or all of its resources before the attacker decides where to strike. This paper studies the allocation problem confronting a defender who must decide how to distribute limited resources across multiple sites before an attacker chooses where to strike. Unlike many Blotto games which only have very complicated mixed-strategy equilibria, the sequential, nonzero-sum “Blotto” game always has a very simple pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium. Further, the defender always plays the same pure strategy in any equilibrium, and the attacker's equilibrium response is generically unique and entails no mixing. The defender minmaxes the attacker in equilibrium even though the game is nonzero-sum, and the attacker strikes the site among its best replies that minimizes the defender's expected losses.     

Why Do Women Wait? Matching, Wage Inequality, and the Incentives for Fertility Delay

This paper explores the interaction between wage inequality and the marriage and fertility decisions of young women. We develop an equilibrium search model of marriage, divorce, and investment in children that allows for differential timing of fertility. We show how patterns of fertility timing in U.S. data can be explained by the incentives for fertility delay implied by marriage and labor markets. We find that these incentives help explain both the cross-sectional relationship between women's wages and fertility timing and the changes over the past 40 years in married women's fertility timing and labor supply. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: J12, J13.     

Building the Family Nest: Premarital Investments, Marriage Markets, and Spousal Allocations

We develop a transferable utility model of the household in which the marriage market is characterized by (negative or positive) assortative matching, and spousal allocations are determined by premarital investments. We demonstrate that all sharing rules along the assortative order support efficient outcomes both in terms of premarital investments and intra-household allocations. The efficiency of premarital choices and household allocations then enables us to show that, for each couple, the marriage market generates a unique and maritally sustainable sharing rule that is a function of the distribution of premarital endowments and the sex ratios in the market. According to our results, transfers among spouses occur on two margins: premarital investments and intra-marital spousal allocations. Asymmetries in the sex ratios in the marriage markets produce gender differences in premarital investments and consumption that are larger for individuals with small premarital endowments than those with larger endowments. A corollary of these findings is that, when men are in short supply in the marriage markets, women can invest more than men even when the returns to investment are lower or the costs are higher for women.     

Newspapers’ market shares and the theory of the circulation spiral

We consider a model of daily newspapers’ competition to test the validity of the so-called “theory of the circulation spiral”. According to it, the interaction between the newspapers and the advertising markets drives the newspaper with the smaller readership into a vicious circle, finally leading it to death. In a model with two newspapers, we show that, contrary to this conjecture, the dynamics envisaged by the proposers of the theory, does not always lead to the elimination of one of them.     

MARRIAGE,MARKETS, AND MONEY: A COASIAN THEORY OF HOUSEHOLD FORMATION

This article integrates search‐based models of marriage and money. We think about households as organizations, the way Coase thinks about firms, as alternatives to markets that become more attractive when transactions costs increase. In the model, individuals consume market‐ and home‐produced goods, and home production is facilitated by marriage. Market frictions, including taxes, search, and bargaining problems, increase the marriage propensity. The inflation tax encourages marriage because being single is cash intensive. Microdata confirm singles use cash more than married people. We use macrodata over many countries to investigate how marriage responds to inflation, taxation, and other variables.     

Marriage: Past, Present, Future?

If they existed, markets for sex and markets for children wouldshare a common feature: women sell and men demand. No societyallows the trade in children, instead we have marriage. Thisarticle discusses biological and legal aspects of reproduction,and their implications for gender roles and family forms. (JEL:J12, J13)     

Sex and the City

Throughout the industrialized world, young women outnumber young men in urban areas. This paper proposes that such a pattern may be linked to higher male incomes in urban areas. The argument is that urban areas offer skilled workers better labor markets. Assuming that there are more skilled males than females, this alone would predict a surplus of males. However, the presence of males with high incomes may attract not only skilled females but also unskilled females. Thus, a surplus of women in urban areas may result from a combination of better labor and marriage markets. Swedish municipality data support the results.     

BEAUTY PREMIUM AND MARRIAGE PREMIUM IN SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL TEST

We propose a theoretical explanation for the so‐called beauty premium. Our approach relies entirely on search frictions and the fact that physical appearance plays an important role in attracting a marriage partner. We analyze the interaction between frictional labor and marriage markets, making use of what we label constrained job search. The optimal strategy entails different reservation wages for different men, and we establish the existence of a search equilibrium characterized by a beauty premium and/or marriage premium. Predicted profiles of premia allow for potential falsification tests and point to relevant empirical evidence in support of our theory.     

The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem

Two-sided matching markets of the kind known as the “college admissions problem” have been widely thought to be virtually equivalent to the simpler “marriage problem” for which some striking results concerning agents' preferences and incentives have been recently obtained. It is shown here that some of these results do not generalize to the college admissions problem, contrary to a number of assertions in the recent literature. No stable matching procedure exists that makes it a dominant strategy for colleges to reveal their true preferences, and some outcomes may be preferred by all colleges to the college-optimal stable outcome.     

Competition,strategic delegation and delay in technology adoption

This paper examines how strategic managerial delegation affects firms' timing of adoption of a new technology under different modes of product market competition. It demonstrates that strategic delegation has differential impacts on adoption dates under Cournot and Bertrand competitions. Strategic delegation with ‘own-performance’-based incentive schemes always leads to early adoption in markets with Bertrand competition compared to that under no-delegation, but not necessarily so in markets with Cournot competition. It also shows that under strategic delegation with ‘own-performance’-based incentive schemes, adoption occurs earlier (later) in markets with Cournot competition than in markets with Bertrand competition, if the degree of product differentiation is high (low). In contrast, under strategic delegation with ‘relative-performance’-based incentive schemes, adoption dates do not differ across markets with different modes of competition. It also analyses implications of firms' choice over types of managerial incentive schemes on the speed of diffusion of new technology.     

Corrigendum to “On randomized matching mechanisms” [Economic Theory 8(1996)377–381]

Ma (in Econ. Theory 8, 377–381, 1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (Econometrica 58, 1475–1480, 1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented – and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 – is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as “symmetric.” We thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. B. Klaus’s and F. Klijn’s research was supported by Ramón y Cajal contracts of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. The work of the authors was also partially supported through the Spanish Plan Nacional I+D+I (BEC2002-02130 and SEJ2005-01690) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR2005-00626 and the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA).     

国内外青年婚恋研究综述

婚恋、家庭研究在社会学领域中一直占有重要地位,是社会科学的其它领域如微观经济学、心理学、人口学中关注的重点。对于青年婚恋专题的研究,涉及的专著与论文较多。加强对国内外学者相关文献的整理,可厘清青年婚恋研究的基本趋势及其一般路径。     

The “Impossible Trinity” Hypothesis in an Era of Global Imbalances: Measurement and Testing

We outline new metrics for measuring the trilemma aspects: exchange rate flexibility, monetary independence, and capital account openness, taking into account substantial international reserve accumulation that has taken place since the 2000s. Since 1990, the trilemma variables in emerging markets have converged towards intermediate levels, characterizing by managed flexibility, using sizable international reserves as a buffer while retaining some degree of monetary autonomy. We test the linearity of the trilemma, and find that the weighted sum of the three trilemma variables adds up to a constant. Thus, a rise in one trilemma variable should be traded‐off with a drop of the weighted sum of the other two.