Estimation of patent licensing value using a flexible demand specification

A patent owner who is considering licensing its patent to a competitor faces a dilemma. By giving a license to the competitor, the patent owner stands to lose profits due to increased competition. In order to be willing to license, therefore, the patent owner must receive a royalty that at least compensates for these lost profits. The minimum acceptable royalty depends upon the competitive impact the potential licensee's product would have on the patent owner's product. We describe how to estimate econometrically this competitive impact and how a patent owner might use this information to determine the minimum acceptable royalty. We discuss the advantages of using a flexible functional form for the demand system specification that underlies the competitive analysis. Finally, using an empirical example, we illustrate the large differences that can arise between results based on flexible forms versus non-flexible forms.     

Licensing standard-essential patents with costly enforcement

We study the interaction between the holder of a standard-essential patent (SEP) and two downstream firms using the patented technology to design standard-compliant products. The SEP holder approaches the downstream firms simultaneously in the shadow of patent litigation and is subject to fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licensing requirements. We show that the patent holder faces a litigation credibility constraint and a license acceptability constraint when setting its licensing terms. For patents of intermediate strength, there is no royalty that allows the patent holder to reconcile these constraints. Consequently, it cannot license its technology and must go to court against infringers. We show that the availability of an injunction improves the patent holder's ability to license its technology, but it tends to inflate the royalty rate for implementers.     

Managing technology licensing for stochastic R&D: from the perspective of an enterprise information system

Enterprise information technology (IT) plays an important role in technology innovation management for high-tech enterprises. However, to date most studies on enterprise technology innovation have assumed that the research and development (R&D) outcome is certain. This assumption does not always hold in practice. Motivated by the current practice of some IT industries, we establish a three-stage duopoly game model, including the R&D stage, the licensing stage and the output stage, to investigate the influence of bargaining power and technology spillover on the optimal licensing policy for the innovating enterprise when the outcome of R&D is uncertain. Our results demonstrate that (1) if the licensor has low (high) bargaining power, fixed-fee (royalty) licensing is always superior to royalty (fixed-fee) licensing to the licensor regardless of technology spillover; (2) if the licensor has moderate bargaining power and technology spillover is low (high) as well, fixed-fee (royalty) licensing is superior to royalty (fixed-fee) licensing; (3) under two-part tariff licensing and the assumption of licensors with full bargaining power, if a negative prepaid fixed fee is not allowed, two-part tariff licensing is equivalent to royalty licensing which is the optimal licensing policy; if negative prepaid fixed fee is allowed, the optimal policy is two-part tariff licensing.     

Patents for genetic inventions: a tool to promote technological advance or a limitation for upstream inventions?

Today's conventional wisdom among economists and lawyers is heavily weighted toward the proposition that strong and broad patent rights are conducive to economic progress. Concerns have been raised as to the extent to which strong patent rights could build up barriers to follow-up research and thus hinder technological advance. This poses a number of difficulties particularly in the area of genetics with respect to the scope of protection and the definition of what is patentable. This article considers the problems of ‘anti-commons’, limitations for upstream inventions, patent thickets and royalty stacking with licenses for genetic inventions. A survey of 53 biotechnology companies in Switzerland builds the empirical basis of the investigation. The survey results confirm that the concepts of ‘anti-commons’, ‘patent thickets’ and ‘royalty stacking’ are indeed relevant. However, they are not highly relevant for the Swiss biotechnology industry from an economic point of view. A broad research exemption combined with a protection limited to concrete disclosure functions of DNA patents and compulsory licensing arrangements are considered as feasible remedies for overcoming certain difficulties with gene patents.     

The stock market response to changing drug patent legislation: The case of compulsory licensing in Canada

Between 1969 and 1987 pharmaceutical companies holding patents in Canada were subject to immediate compulsory licensing. This study evaluates the stock market response to both the imposition of immediate compulsory licensing in 1969 as well as its subsequent revocation in 1987. Since the affected companies were multinational enterprises, we analyse the movement of share prices on the New York Stock Exchange. The results indicate that patent protection is viewed positively by the stock market, but only when measured with hindsight (in 1987). Our results are consistent with other studies that suggest that patent protection does allow the appropriation of gains from knowledge by firms in the pharmaceutical industry. Thus, pharmaceutical companies would benefit from international agreements to provide more stringent levels of patent protection.     

Determinants of licensing activities of local public technology centers in Japan

Local public technology centers are publicly managed institutions that facilitate technology transfer to small local firms. As well as providing small local firms with various technological services, local public technology centers conduct their own research and patent inventions. This study examines factors facilitating licensing activities and finds that the determinants vary according to the phase of technology transfer. Employing more Ph.D. scientists tends to promote the licensing of patents, while organizational efforts that encourage scientists to better understand the technological needs of small local firms tend to increase royalty revenue. The theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.     

THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

During the last few decades, the number of patents in information and communication technologies has increased considerably. An increasing number of patents and the associated fragmentation of IP rights have generated a series of potentially problematic consequences. Patent thickets, royalty stacking, the emergence of patent assertion entities, increased patent litigation – particularly around standard essential patents – and the difficulties with defining fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory licensing terms are some of the most debated issues in the literature that we review in this paper. We devote a specific section of our survey to patent quality, currently one of the most debated issues surrounding the patent system. In our analysis, we mix theoretical and empirical arguments with a more policy‐oriented reasoning. This allows us to better position the different issues in the relevant political and economic context.     

Licensing a new product: Fee vs. royalty licensing with unionized labor market

In an economy with unionized labor market, we show that the payoff of an outside innovator may be higher under royalty licensing than under fixed-fee licensing and auction, if bargaining power of the labor union is sufficiently high. This result holds for both decentralized and centralized bargaining. It follows from our analysis that a combination of fixed-fee and output royalty can be preferable to the innovator compared to both royalty only licensing and auction (or fixed-fee licensing). We discuss the implications of positive opportunity costs of the licensees.     

Licensing and innovation with imperfect contract enforcement

Licensing promotes technology transfer and innovation, but enforcement of licensing contracts is often imperfect. We model contract enforcement as a game with perfect information but probabilistic enforcement and explore the implications of weak enforcement on the design of licensing contracts, the conduct of firms, and market performance. An upstream firm develops a technology that it can license to downstream firms using a fixed fee and a per‐unit royalty. Strictly positive per‐unit royalties maximize the licensor's profit if competition among licensees limits joint profits. With imperfect enforcement, the licensor lowers variable royalties to avoid cheating. Although imperfect contract enforcement reduces the profits of the licensor, weak enforcement lowers prices, increases downstream innovation, and in some circumstances can increase total economic welfare.     

The interplay between technology characteristics,R&D internationalisation,and new product introduction: Empirical evidence from the energy conservation sector

Developing marketable products based on proprietary technologies is the key to success in many firms, but it is still a big challenge. Factors explaining when technologies are more likely to lead to a marketable product are not fully understood yet. This gap calls for further research on this important topic. The present paper addresses this issue by focusing on specific characteristics of technologies - i.e., their nature as breakthrough technologies and their generality - which can be considered as suitable predictors of new product introduction (NPI). Specifically, we study if and how these characteristics affect the likelihood of NPI. Moreover, in our research model, we argue that the effects of technology characteristics on NPI are contingent upon the degree of a firm's R&D internationalisation. We examine this moderating firm-level factor in a cross-level study design. We develop several hypotheses and test them with objective patent and novel trademark data. In detail, the analyses are based on a unique and longitudinal sample of 11,385 patents and 1,783 trademarks registered at the USPTO in the energy conservation sector by 696 different companies. By adopting hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), we reveal that the likelihood of NPI is positively related to the breakthrough nature of technologies; this effect turns negative when the level of breakthrough nature is very high. Instead, technological generality has a negative influence on NPI. Finally, the degree to which firms internationalise their R&D activities negatively moderates those relationships.     

Dynamic Effects of Patent Policy on Sequential Innovation

When one patented innovation enables another, endogenous delay of the latter has important implications for the economics of patent life and scope, if licensing is negotiated ex post. Optimal patent life may be finite under competition, even if the royalty imposes no deadweight loss and there is no competitive dissipation of rent. Reduced scope of the first patent eliminates delay of costly enabled innovations, whether monopolized or competitive, and a combination of limited scope and infinite life can be optimal. If the second innovation is negotiated ex ante, its patentability can increase or decrease the first innovator's profit, depending on cost and market structure of the second innovation, and patent life.     

基于博弈的专利诉讼与交叉许可决策研究

随着企业研发能力和知识产权保护意识的逐渐增强,越来越多的企业通过建立专利壁垒来保证自身的持续竞争力与市场地位。"专利丛林"的现象导致企业进行技术创新以及新产品的开发举步维艰。为了节省成本,科技企业之间相互的专利侵权现象时有发生。面对相互的专利侵权现象,有的企业运用专利诉讼的手段与对方发起"专利大战"以维持自身的竞争优势,也有的企业通过专利的交叉许可协议,与对方建立长期的专利合作关系。本文通过构建博弈模型,研究了企业进行专利诉讼以及交叉许可的选择决策的机理。     

Determinants of technology licensing: the case of licensors

This paper empirically analyzes the behavior of technology licensors using a large dataset of US‐traded companies. The stock of technological knowledge of the licensor, this company's prior exposure to licensing, the rate of growth of its primary sector, the strength of IPR protection, and the nature of the technology are found to be important determinants of the propensity to sell technology through nonexclusive licenses. Smaller firms in industries with ‘simpler’ technologies tend to sell technology through exclusive licenses more than others. In contrast, larger firms in industries dealing with more ‘complex’ technologies engage relatively more in cross licensing. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Determinants of industrial innovation in China: Evidence from its recent economic census

This study examines the sources of technological innovation in Chinese industries using the 2004 economic census data. On the one hand, it analyzes the relationships between patent grants and new product sales. On the other hand, it analyzes the relationships among in-house R&D, technology transfer from foreign and Chinese domestic technology markets, spillover effects of foreign investment, as well as export. The study reveals that in-house R&D has become the most important source for industrial innovation in China. In-house technological efforts are critical for developing original innovations as well as for absorbing the technologies transferred from external agencies. However, neither technologies transferred from foreign countries nor those from the domestic technology market are playing significant roles in China’s industrial innovation. The spillover effect of foreign investment on patent grants is strong and significant, though its impact on new product sales is insignificant. Export shows negative, though insignificant, impact on patent grants, but positive, strong, and significant effects on new product development. Overall, the results of this study demonstrate the critical role of in-house R&D in China’s industrial innovation.     

What induces firms to license foreign technologies? International survey evidence

The paper provides insights into drivers of foreign technology licensing from the licensee's perspective, using data across 114 nations. Technology licensing enables licensees to access proven technologies without development delays, although licensors might deny licenses for strategic reasons. Results show that firms with own R&D are more likely to license foreign technologies, as are larger firms and firms in the nations' main business cities. However, the macroeconomic and institutional environment matters as well: domestic interest rates, informal sector competition, and the literacy of a country's labor force all impact foreign technology licensing. Some implications for technology policy are discussed.     

标准化组织专利政策采用事先披露原则的利弊分析及改进模式探讨

技术标准涉及专利的对外许可一直都是在标准制定完成之后由专利权人或标准化组织与使用方谈判确定。VITA推出的新专利政策中在世界范围内第一次采用了事先披露原则,要求专利权人在标准制定之前,不仅要披露专利信息,还需披露许可条件。虽然这一专利政策草案通过了美国司法部的反垄断审查,但依然引起广泛争议。本文对事先披露原则的利弊进行了分析,在此基础上探讨了对事先披露许可费模式的改进思路——由标准化组织事先披露总许可费率的模式。     

Choosing the partners in the licensing alliance

I consider a situation in which the incumbent strategically adopts the licensing alliance, facing potential entrants. The queue of entrants consists of two firms, the ‘strong’ entrant and the ‘weak’ entrant, who differ in their productivities. The incumbent sets a licensing fee and offers it to the entrants. Each entrant decides whether or not to buy the licensing alliance. After the set of the licensing alliance is determined, they engage in the Cournot competition. I examine the optimal licensing fee, and show that the optimal licensing fee is to charge a discriminatory royalty to each licensee. I also examine the licensing policy on the partner(s): To whom should the licensor license its technology? By comparing the equilibrium expected payoffs for the licensor, I show that licensing to both entrants would be preferred to licensing to a single entrant. But, if the licensor faces the problem on choosing the partner, he prefers the licensing of the weak entrant to the strong entrant. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Organisational modes for Open Innovation in the bio-pharmaceutical industry: An exploratory analysis

This paper investigates the adoption of Open Innovation in the bio-pharmaceutical industry, studying through which organisational modes it is put into practice and how these modes are interwoven with the different phases of drug discovery and development process. Two rounds of interviews with industry experts were carried out to develop a model describing the adoption of Open Innovation by bio-pharmaceutical companies. This framework was then applied to an extensive and longitudinal empirical basis, which includes data about the adoption of Open Innovation by the top 20 worldwide industry players, in the time period 2000-2007. The paper provides a thorough discussion of how bio-pharmaceutical firms have used different organisational modes (i.e. licensing agreements, non-equity alliance, purchase and supply of technical and scientific services) to enter into relationship with different types of partners (i.e. large pharmaceutical companies, product biotech firms, platform biotech firms and universities) with the aim to acquire (Inbound Open Innovation) or commercially exploit (Outbound Open Innovation) technologies and knowledge. The implications of the study for Open Innovation research and possible avenues for future investigation are discussed at length in the paper.     

Market share and firms’ patent exploitation

As the current patent policy encourages the early stage of innovation but imposes hardly any regulations on how patent holders use their patents, an understanding of how firms use their patents is largely lacking. In this study, we seek to determine whether differences exist in firms’ strategies for utilizing patents depending on their market share. Using a discrete choice model, the repeated multinomial logit model, we analyzed Korean firms’ choices of patent use. Market share is found to positively influence three patent exploitation modes: own use, simultaneous exploitation of own use and licensing, and blocking. And the blocking use of patents is the most significant mode that is positively associated with market share. Our results provide a basis for understanding the effects of patent policy from the industrial perspective, such as industrial organization or competition policy. We discussed the implications for various actors related to patent systems, including researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners.     

Positive Assortive Merging

This paper addresses the following two questions: (i) Is there any evidence that firms, like human beings, prefer to partner with alike? (ii) Is there any relationship between the ex ante technological and product relatedness of merging parties and the postmerger performances? Using data of patent holdings and product portfolios of big pharmaceutical companies, I find that (i) merger deals are more likely to be signed between firms with related technologies and drug portfolios, and (ii) product relatedness and technology relatedness are positively and negatively correlated with postmerger performances, respectively. The analysis suggests that the negative effect of technology relatedness might be driven by a large human capital depreciation following consolidations. The results have important implications for competition policy, which are discussed in the concluding section.