Directors’ Ownership and Closed-End Fund Discounts

This paper investigates whether ownership by independent directors could provide them with effective monitoring incentives and thus help reduce discounts in the closed-end fund industry. We find that after controlling for fund observed and unobserved characteristics with the latter proxied by fund fixed effects, independent directors’ ownership is negatively related to fund discounts. We further find that funds whose independent directors have larger ownership are more likely to employ appropriate measures to reduce fund discounts, such as buying back outstanding shares, adopting managed distribution plans (MDPs) if they do not have such plans in place, or increasing the minimum payout targets under their existing MDPs. These findings may imply that independent directors become better monitors when they have larger ownership in the funds they oversee and are thus more diligent in taking actions to diminish discounts.     

Fund Manager Succession in Closed-End Mutual Funds

Managing the succession process by the hiring and firing of key executives is one of the important functions of a board of directors. In this research we study successions of fund managers in the closed‐end mutual fund industry. The agency issues inherent in closed‐end mutual funds makes them a unique laboratory for such a study. Our results suggest that while the overall abnormal returns of these manager changes are statistically insignificant, that the returns are more positive for funds with large expense ratios and for funds trading at a discount. We also find the abnormal returns are negatively related to the percentage of inside director stock ownership. Corporate bond funds and international equity funds react more negatively to these announcements than other types of funds. The abnormal returns do not appear to be related to board composition, but board composition does vary across fund type, and may therefore indirectly influence the results.     

The Impact of Corporate Governance on Closed‐end Funds

This study uses a large sample of UK‐listed closed‐end funds to examine whether governance has an impact on two indicators of fund performance: the level of fund‐management fees and the discount at which a fund trades. Fees are under the control of the directors, and we find that they are inversely related to fund returns, even after allowing for differences across investment sectors. Fees are, on average, higher if a fund has a large board, few directors from outside the fund‐family, many directors from within the fund‐family, and low ownership by the management company. Discounts for funds are wider if the management company or any blockholder has a significant long‐term stake, suggesting that investors are wary of entrenched management. The results suggest that boards are frequently compromised in their duty to shareholders by their dependence on fund‐management companies.     

On the concentration of mutual fund portfolio holdings: Evidence from Taiwan

This paper tests the alternative hypotheses of investment selection skills versus overconfidence of equity mutual funds managers in Taiwan. We find that fund holdings’ concentration levels are high and positively related to funds’ risk-adjusted returns in tranquil market periods; however, the concentration levels are low and more negatively related to risk-adjusted returns in turmoil market periods. The time varying concentration-performance relation is not driven by fund size. Our finding implies that fund managers have superior investment selection skills when the market is less volatile, but they exhibit overconfidence when the market is in turmoil, suggesting an investment strategy of shifting from concentrated funds to more broadly diversified funds when market condition becomes worse.     

Attracting Flows by Attracting Big Clients

We explore a new channel for attracting inflows using a unique data set of corporate 401(k) retirement plans and their mutual fund family trustees. Families secure substantial inflows by being named trustee. We find that family trustees significantly overweight, and are reluctant to sell, their 401(k) client firm's stock. Trustee overweighting is more pronounced when the relationship is more valuable to the trustee family, and is concentrated in those funds receiving the greatest benefit from the inflows. We quantify this flow benefit and find that inclusion in the 401(k) plan has an economically and statistically large, positive effect on inflows.     

It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans

This paper investigates whether mutual fund families acting as service providers in 401(k) plans display favoritism toward their own affiliated funds. Using a hand‐collected data set on the menu of investment options offered to plan participants, we show that fund deletions and additions are less sensitive to prior performance for affiliated than unaffiliated funds. We find no evidence that plan participants undo this affiliation bias through their investment choices. Finally, we find that the subsequent performance of poorly performing affiliated funds indicates that this favoritism is not information driven.     

The Optimal Size of Hedge Funds: Conflict between Investors and Fund Managers

This study examines whether the standard compensation contract in the hedge fund industry aligns managers’ incentives with investors’ interests. I show empirically that managers’ compensation increases when fund assets grow, even when diseconomies of scale in fund performance exist. Thus, managers’ compensation is maximized at a much larger fund size than is optimal for fund performance. However, to avoid capital outflows, managers are also motivated to restrict fund growth to maintain style‐average performance. Similarly, fund management firms have incentives to collect more capital for all funds under management, including their flagship funds, even at the expense of fund performance.     

Directors' Ownership in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry

This paper empirically investigates directors' ownership in the mutual fund industry. Our results show that, contrary to anecdotal evidence, a significant portion of directors hold shares in the funds they oversee. Ownership patterns are broadly consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium. That is, ownership is positively and significantly correlated with most variables that are predicted to indicate greater value from directors' monitoring. For example, directors' ownership is more prevalent in actively managed funds and in funds with lower institutional ownership. We also show considerable heterogeneity in ownership across fund families, suggesting family‐wide policies play an important role.     

Board structure,mergers, and shareholder wealth: A study of the mutual fund industry

We study mutual fund mergers between 1999 and 2001 to understand the role and effectiveness of fund boards. Some fund mergers—typically across-family mergers—benefit target shareholders but are costly to target fund directors. Such mergers are more likely when funds underperform and their boards have a larger percentage of independent trustees, suggesting that more-independent boards tolerate less underperformance before initiating across-family mergers. This effect is most pronounced when all of the fund's directors are independent, not the 75% level of independence required by the SEC. Higher-paid target fund boards are less likely to approve across-family mergers that cause substantial reductions in their compensation.     

Outsourcing accounting information systems: Evidence from closed-end mutual fund families

This study examines the factors associated with the decision of closed-end funds to outsource their accounting information systems. Using data from 2010 and 2011, we find that the outsourcing decision is made by groups of funds with common service providers (called “fund families”), rather than by individual funds. Our results indicate that fund families containing a larger number of funds and older fund families are less likely to outsource their accounting functions. These types of fund families may have greater internal economies of scale, diminishing the potential cost savings from outsourcing. We also find that fund families with more good-faith-valued assets are less likely to outsource accounting information systems than those with more market-valued assets. Valuing these good-faith-valued assets is both an important investment-management process and a key accounting task, reducing the need to outsource accounting to focus managers on their core competency. This study is of potential importance to investors and regulators in evaluating closed-end funds' decisions on outsourcing accounting functions.     

Hedge Fund Regulation and Misreported Returns

This paper introduces a cross‐country law and finance analysis of the misreporting behaviour in the hedge fund industry in terms of smoothing returns so that a fund consistently generates positive returns. We find strong evidence that international differences in hedge fund regulation are significantly associated with the propensity of fund managers to misreport monthly returns. We find a positive association between wrappers and misreporting, particularly for funds that do not have a lockup provision. Also, we find some evidence that misreporting is less common among funds in jurisdictions with minimum capitalisation requirements and restrictions on the location of key service providers. We assess the robustness of our finds to a number of specifications, including, different specifications of misreporting bin widths, subsets of the data by fund type, as well as specifications controlling for collinearity and selection effects and other robustness checks. We show misreporting significantly affects capital allocation, and calculate the wealth transfer effects of misreporting and relate this wealth transfer to differences in hedge fund regulation.     

Mutual fund performance: Using bespoke benchmarks to disentangle mandates,constraints and skill

While no two mutual funds are alike in terms of their mandates and constraints, metrics used to evaluate fund performance relative to peers typically fail to account for these differences by relying on generic benchmark indices and rankings. We develop a methodology to construct a conditional multi-factor benchmark that explicitly incorporates the details of a given fund’s mandates and constraints. The results suggest that (i) mandates and constraints are economically important and affect funds differently, (ii) in general, the average mutual fund has a much improved track record when comparing themselves to a bespoke benchmark, and (iii) the rank ordering of fund bespoke performance relative peers is significantly different than the original rank ordering suggesting advisors and board of directors would make better decisions regarding compensation and performance assessment respectively, if they incorporate the impact of mandates and constraints.     

Mutual Fund Stock‐Picking Skill: New Evidence from Valuation‐ versus Liquidity‐Motivated Trading

We propose a novel Trade Motivation Matrix that allows differentiating funds’ valuation‐motivated (VM) and liquidity‐motivated (LM) trades on single trade level. It thus enables analyses of stock‐picking skill on three levels: trade, stock, and fund. On trade level, we find significant outperformance of VM buys and significant underperformance of VM sells, indicating manager stock‐picking skills, especially during illiquid market periods. VM trades outperform LM trades, confirming negative performance effects due to flow risk, especially when market liquidity is low. On stock level, collective VM buying explains high future stock returns while collective VM selling is related to future losses, indicating wisdom of the crowd. On fund level, higher trading discretion, measured by a higher degree of VM trading, is observed for smaller, older funds holding higher cash buffers. Finally, higher trading discretion is related to higher future fund alpha, especially during illiquid times.     

Emerging Market Exposures and the Predictability of Hedge Fund Returns

We examine emerging market and global macro hedge funds and find a significant positive relation between hedge funds’ future returns and their exposure to both emerging market equities and emerging market currencies. We present evidence that the strong predictive power of emerging market betas is related to the superior market‐timing ability of these fund managers. Results are robust after controlling for commonly used hedge fund factors, the emerging market equity index, lagged fund returns, liquidity risk, and fund characteristics. Our results suggest that hedge funds can earn positive excess returns by timing their exposure to emerging market securities.     

New Zealand mutual funds: measuring performance and persistence in performance

The present study investigates the performance of New Zealand mutual funds using a survivorship‐bias controlled sample of 143 funds for the period of 1990–2003. Our overall results suggest that New Zealand mutual funds have not been able to provide out‐performance. Alphas for equity funds, both domestic and international, are insignificantly different from zero, whereas balanced funds underperform significantly. There is no evidence of timing abilities by the fund managers. In the short term, significant evidence of return persistence for all funds is observed. This persistence, however, is driven by ‘icy hands’ rather than ‘hot hands’. Finally, we find the risk‐adjusted performance for equity funds to be positively related to fund size and expense ratio and negatively related to load charges.     

Transparency and fund governance efficacy: The effect of the SEC'S disclosure rule on advisory contracts

In June 2004, the SEC required mutual fund boards to disclose additional information about the inputs and processes involved in advisory contract approvals to help investors make more informed decisions and to encourage independent directors to act more independently when negotiating advisory fees. We find that CEF advisory fees are more likely to decrease after the 2004 SEC amendments, especially for those CEFs with high advisory fees and low investment performances. After the 2004 SEC amendments, CEF advisory rates decrease on average and the magnitudes of their decreases increase. We find that more board meetings and the likelihood of a decrease in advisory fees after the amendments increases with the number of board meetings. Our results are not only supported by textual analysis and type of filing downloads but are also robust to time-series placebo tests, changes in the ratios of independent directors, and funds belonging to “scandal” families. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that the 2004 SEC amendments successfully encouraged independent fund directors to exert more effort and to act more independently in negotiating advisory fees with fund advisors.     

Independent Directors and Favoritism: When Multiple Board Affiliations Prevail in Mutual Fund Families

I examine whether independent directors with multiple board affiliations (IDMAs) trade off the interests of one fund relative to another (fund favoritism) or whether they benefit fund shareholders by increasing the level of the board's expertise. Using a sample of mutual funds affiliated with the top 55 fund sponsors from 2002 to 2008, I find that the presence of IDMAs is negatively related to performance/resource shifting across funds within fund families. IDMAs appear to decrease fund fees, increase the return gap associated with the unobserved actions of fund managers, and facilitate the transfer of information across funds in a fund family.     

MUTUAL FUND TRADES: ASYMMETRIC LIQUIDITY PREFERENCES AND FUND PERFORMANCE

We investigate the role of the liquidity of stocks traded by mutual funds on the performance of funds experiencing substantial and sustained redemptions (outflows) or inflows. Accordingly, we identify 770 redeeming fund‐periods and 1,757 inflow fund‐periods and find a statistically significant relation between the liquidity of the stocks they trade and the quantity of the stock traded. Notably, when funds experience redemptions, those with low portfolio liquidity have an elevated preference for selling more‐liquid stocks. In the following period, such funds statistically and economically underperform funds that sell less‐liquid stocks. This is consistent with redemptions detrimentally affecting shareholders that remain in a fund.     

Sticking points: common‐agency problems and contracting in the US healthcare system

We propose a “common‐agency” model for explaining inefficient contracting in the US healthcare system. Common‐agency problems arise when multiple payers seek to motivate a provider to invest in improved care coordination. We highlight the possibility of “sticking points,” that is, Pareto‐dominated equilibria in which payers coordinate around contracts which give weak incentives to the provider. Sticking points rationalize three hard‐to‐explain features of the US healthcare system: widespread fee‐for‐service arrangements; problematic care coordination; and the historical reliance on single‐specialty practices to deliver care. The model also analyzes the effects of policies promoting more efficient contracting between payers and providers.     

ETF Competition and Market Quality

This paper examines competition between exchange traded funds (ETFs) that hold nearly identical portfolios of securities. We provide evidence that incumbent‐fund liquidity is negatively affected when a new ETF is added to an asset class. The degradation in liquidity is even more severe whenever both funds follow the same benchmark. We also document a decline in primary‐market activity for the incumbent ETFs after the arrival of new competitors. Furthermore, increasing the number of funds in an asset class does not put downward pressure on fund management fees. Thus, the deterioration in market quality may not be offset by decreasing costs of fund ownership.