Management sub-advising in the mutual fund industry

This is a study of how contractual mechanisms can mitigate agency conflicts in sub-advised mutual funds. Sub-advising contracts allow fund families to expand their product offerings to include new investment styles and thereby gain market share. We show that costly contractual arrangements, such as co-branding, multi-advising, and performance-based compensation, can mitigate agency conflicts in outsourcing and protect investors from potential underperformance. Fund families will find it cost-effective to implement such incentive mechanisms only when investors are sophisticated in assessing manager skill. The findings help to explain why a large percentage of fund families outsource their funds to advisory firms.     

The determinants of mutual fund starts

For a sample of 1163 mutual funds started over the period 1979-1992,we find that fund initiations are positively related to thelevel of assets invested in and the capital gains embedded inother funds with the same objective, the fund family's priorperformance, the fraction of funds in the family in the lowrange of fees, and the decision by large families to open similarfunds in the prior year. In addition, consistent with the presenceof scale and scope economies in fund openings, we find thatlarge families and families that have more experience in openingfunds in the past are more likely to open new funds.     

Impact of accounting process characteristics on accounting outsourcing - Comparison of users and non-users of cloud-based accounting information systems

Prior literature informs us that a company's decision to outsource a business process depends on process characteristics such as how frequently the process is performed or how specific the assets required by the process are. In this article, we compare the effects of accounting process characteristics on outsourcing decisions across users of traditional and cloud-based accounting information systems (AIS). By focusing on outsourcing of accounting processes among small and medium sized enterprises, we investigate the effect of five business process characteristics (frequency, human asset specificity, uncertainty, information intensity, and need for customer contact) on the outsourcing decision. Our results reveal that process frequency has a weaker negative effect on the outsourcing decision among users of cloud-based AIS. This appears to contribute to users of cloud-based AIS outsourcing a larger variety of accounting processes. Compared to traditional AIS, the inherent properties of cloud-based AIS such as ubiquitous access, scalability, and integration seem to encourage users of cloud-based AIS to also outsource processes that are frequently performed.     

Determinants of cost efficiencies in the mutual fund industry

We evaluate determinants of cost efficiencies in the U.S. mutual fund industry for 1998-2003. Our empirical results show that cost increases in this industry have been less than proportional to increases in assets. We find that funds without a 12b-1 plan show larger economies of scale than funds with a 12b-1 plan; institutional funds show greater economies of scale than do retail funds; and that fund families that are more focused in their investment objectives reap benefits of lower fund management costs than do fund families that are more diversified in their investment objectives.     

Fund Advisor Compensation in Closed-End Funds

This paper examines the relation between the premium on closed-end funds and organizational features of the funds and advisors, including the compensation scheme of the investment advisor. We find that the fund premium is larger when: (a) the advisor's compensation is more sensitive to fund performance; (b) the assets managed by the advisor are concentrated in the fund in question; (c) the advisor manages other funds with low compensation sensitivity to performance and with low concentration of assets managed by the advisor; and (d) the advisor's compensation contract evaluates performance relative to a benchmark.     

Disclosure of outsourcing in the annual report: Causes and market returns effects

Firms increasingly are utilizing outsourcing to enhance or maintain their competitiveness. Prior research shows that capital markets value a firm's decision to outsource. This study uses a sample of firms announcing outsourcing arrangements in a press release to examine which factors are associated with the subsequent decision to voluntarily provide or withhold information about outsourcing in their annual report. The paper also examines whether annual report disclosure is a reliable signal of future market performance. We find that underperforming firms, larger firms, and firms experiencing negative outsourcing announcement market returns and negative long-term market returns are more likely to disclose outsourcing in their annual reports. There is also evidence that firms' disclosure of outsourcing in the annual report signals an improvement in market performance that is credible to the capital markets. We contend that the disclosure and subsequent firm performance issues we investigate apply to any type of outsourcing arrangement, and therefore our results are relevant to future information systems research on this subject. Our findings also suggest that regulatory standards could reduce private information search costs for investors by providing a common disclosure methodology for outsourcing activities.     

Closed-End Fund Discounts with Informed Ownership Differential

We develop a multiasset trading model to examine the closed-end fund discount. The model shows that the discount can arise if the quality of private information in the underlying assets is sufficiently better than in the fund. The model also indicates that a discount (premium) can arise if the excessive volatility of the fund dominates (is dominated by) the fund's diversification benefit. Moreover, the model predicts a negative relation between the discount and the institutional ownership differential, as arbitrageurs prefer funds with large discounts. Using a sample of U.S. equity closed-end funds, we test these predictions and find supporting evidence. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G10, G12, G14.     

Outsourcing Mutual Fund Management: Firm Boundaries,Incentives, and Performance

We investigate the effects of managerial outsourcing on the performance and incentives of mutual funds. Fund families outsource the management of a large fraction of their funds to advisory firms. These funds underperform those run internally by about 52 basis points per year. After instrumenting for a fund's outsourcing status, the estimated underperformance is three times larger. We hypothesize that contractual externalities due to firm boundaries make it difficult to extract performance from an outsourced relationship. Consistent with this view, outsourced funds face higher powered incentives; they are more likely to be closed after poor performance and excessive risk‐taking.     

An empirical analysis of Mexican and US closed-end mutual fund IPOs

We examine 135 Mexican closed-end fund IPOs and 370 Mexican non-fund IPOs that issued between 1994 and 2003 along with 217 contemporaneous US fund IPOs and document three primary results. First, we find that Mexican IPOs in the aggregate experience no significant underpricing, unlike their US IPO counterparts. Both Mexican and US IPOs experience significantly negative long-run performance. Second, Mexican closed-end fund IPOs experience positive long-run performance, significantly better than Mexican non-fund IPOs which experience negative long-run performance. Unlike Mexican fund IPOs, US fund IPOs experience negative long-run performance. Third, we find that both Mexican and US debt-backed closed-end fund IPOs significantly outperform equity-backed closed-end IPOs. In Mexico, debt-backed funds experience positive abnormal returns, compared to negative abnormal returns for Mexican equity-backed funds, US debt-backed funds, and US equity-backed funds.     

The efficiency of international information flow: Evidence from the ETF and CEF prices

While similar in their trading and organization, closed-end funds (CEFs) and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) differ in their liquidity and ease of arbitrage. We compare their price transmission dynamics using a sample of funds that invest in foreign securities and are most likely to show the deficiencies in the manner in which they process information. Our analysis shows that ETF returns are more closely related to their portfolio returns than are CEF returns. However, both fund types underreact to portfolio returns but overreact to domestic stock market returns. A simple trading strategy using these results is profitable with roundtrip trading costs less than 1.38% for CEFs and 0.71% for ETFs.     

Directors’ Ownership and Closed-End Fund Discounts

This paper investigates whether ownership by independent directors could provide them with effective monitoring incentives and thus help reduce discounts in the closed-end fund industry. We find that after controlling for fund observed and unobserved characteristics with the latter proxied by fund fixed effects, independent directors’ ownership is negatively related to fund discounts. We further find that funds whose independent directors have larger ownership are more likely to employ appropriate measures to reduce fund discounts, such as buying back outstanding shares, adopting managed distribution plans (MDPs) if they do not have such plans in place, or increasing the minimum payout targets under their existing MDPs. These findings may imply that independent directors become better monitors when they have larger ownership in the funds they oversee and are thus more diligent in taking actions to diminish discounts.     

Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts: An Empirical Investigation

We investigate marginal compensation rates in mutual fund advisory contracts and find the following. Equity and foreign fund advisors receive higher marginal compensation than debt and domestic fund advisors. Advisors of funds with greater turnover receive higher marginal compensation. Also, closed-end fund advisors receive higher marginal compensation than open-end fund advisors. Finally, we find that marginal compensation is lower for advisors of large funds and members of large fund families. We argue that these differences in marginal compensation reflect differences in advisor marginal product, differences in the difficulty of monitoring performance, differences in control environments, and scale economies.     

Are IPO investors rational? Evidence from closed-end funds

Why buy a closed-end fund at IPO, when it is likely to trade at a discount in a few months’ time? One theory suggests that buying a new fund is justified by an initial period of investment outperformance. A second theory is that new funds are launched to provide access to assets that are temporarily illiquid and to exploit the subsequent liquidity gain while a third theory asserts that buyers of new issues are not fully rational but are influenced by time-varying sentiment. This paper tests the three theories using data from UK-traded closed-end equity-fund IPOs over 1984–2006. The empirical results provide strong support for the influence of sentiment but provide little or no support for the two other theories.     

The decision to outsource risk management services

We apply transaction cost economics to identify factors influencing companies’ decision to internally generate or outsource risk management services. A unique sample is used which combines publicly available data with private information supplied by 281 Australian listed companies. We find that expenditure on research and development, greater technological uncertainty, more competitive environments, more overseas sales and transaction frequency are associated with less outsourcing of risk management services. Uncertainty due to environmental diversity is associated with more outsourcing of risk management services. Companies that outsource risk management services also have lower staff turnover and provide more specialised training and longer contracts for risk management suppliers.     

“和而不群”还是“卓尔不群”?——基于基金网络信息使用的视角

如何识别出优秀的基金管理者,理解其信息决策机制,对于优化资源配置、提升市场效率具有重要意义。本文探究了基金经理对自身所处基金网络中的共享信息的使用程度与其管理能力之间的关系。具体而言,本文通过基金的重仓持股构建了基金网络,采用基金自身交易与其所处网络中其他基金平均交易的偏离程度作为该基金对基金网络中信息使用的衡量。研究发现:(1)对基金网络中信息使用程度较低的基金的业绩要显著好于对基金网络中信息使用程度较高的基金。(2)更高的超额收益主要来源于基金经理优异的选股能力,虽由此承担了更多的异质性风险,却并未增大总体风险水平。(3)基金经理更换数据表明基金对网络内信息的使用程度更多地与基金经理特征相关而非与基金特征相关。(4)网络内信息使用程度直接反映了基金私有信息含量,因此更可能与基金经理能力相关。     

“和而不群”还是“卓尔不群”?——基于基金网络信息使用的视角

如何识别出优秀的基金管理者,理解其信息决策机制,对于优化资源配置、提升市场效率具有重要意义。本文探究了基金经理对自身所处基金网络中的共享信息的使用程度与其管理能力之间的关系。具体而言,本文通过基金的重仓持股构建了基金网络,采用基金自身交易与其所处网络中其他基金平均交易的偏离程度作为该基金对基金网络中信息使用的衡量。研究发现:(1)对基金网络中信息使用程度较低的基金的业绩要显著好于对基金网络中信息使用程度较高的基金。(2)更高的超额收益主要来源于基金经理优异的选股能力,虽由此承担了更多的异质性风险,却并未增大总体风险水平。(3)基金经理更换数据表明基金对网络内信息的使用程度更多地与基金经理特征相关而非与基金特征相关。(4)网络内信息使用程度直接反映了基金私有信息含量,因此更可能与基金经理能力相关。     

Prudent man or agency problem? On the performance of insurance mutual funds

Active equity mutual funds managed by insurance companies underperform peer funds by over 1% per year. There is no evidence that insurance funds make less risky investments; instead they have lower risk-adjusted returns and their fund flows are less sensitive to performance when they perform poorly. Across insurance funds, those with heavy advertising, directly established by insurers or using parent firms' brandnames, and those whose managers simultaneously manage substantial non-mutual-fund assets, are more likely to underperform. We conclude that insurers' efforts to cross-sell mutual funds aggravate agency problems that erode fund performance.     

我国基金公司内部封闭式基金对开放式基金的补贴研究

由于封闭式基金与开放式基金的差异,基金公司倾向于补贴开放式基金而侵害封闭式基金的利益。经验证据表明,我国基金公司确实存在封闭式基金对开放式基金的补贴行为。论文进而构建了一个封闭式基金对开放式基金补贴模型,指出投资者偏好、市场预期的开放式基金销售量、激励机制、基金公司自身的管理能力是影响补贴行为的重要因素,并讨论了如何进行防范。     

An Analysis of Closed-end Fund Seasoned Equity Offerings

We examine the stock price reaction to seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) of closed‐end funds and the determinants of the issuance decision. We find that sample funds have negative and significant average announcement‐day returns that are less than the returns associated with industrial firm SEOs, most likely because funds have fewer information asymmetries. Issuing funds have higher pre‐issue returns, higher premiums, lower betas, and lower three‐year, post‐issue returns than nonissuing funds. The results of the study are consistent with the argument that fund managers time issues to take advantage of mean reversion in fund returns.     

It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans

This paper investigates whether mutual fund families acting as service providers in 401(k) plans display favoritism toward their own affiliated funds. Using a hand‐collected data set on the menu of investment options offered to plan participants, we show that fund deletions and additions are less sensitive to prior performance for affiliated than unaffiliated funds. We find no evidence that plan participants undo this affiliation bias through their investment choices. Finally, we find that the subsequent performance of poorly performing affiliated funds indicates that this favoritism is not information driven.