STRATEGIC GROUPS AND RIVALROUS FIRM BEHAVIOR: TOWARDS A RECONCILIATION

This research examines the question of whether rivalry is greater between or within strategic groups by utilizing more direct, dynamic and fine-grained measures of rivalry. Examining the competitive actions of firms in different strategic groups to determine if competitive responses were more likely to occur from firms in the same strategic group, or from firms in different strategic groups, the research found that competitive responses cannot be predicted by strategic group membership. Importantly, however, strategic group membership is a predictor of the manner by which firms compete with one another, or the frequency with which they undertake competitive actions, cut prices, instigate warfare and imitate rivals. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ownership Dynamics with Multiple Insiders: The Case of REITs

We study ownership dynamics of multiple strategic risk-averse insiders facing a moral hazard problem. We show that, when insiders cannot commit,  ex ante , to an ownership policy, the aggregate insider stake gradually declines toward the competitive market allocation. Both the speed of adjustment and the long-term equilibrium aggregate insider ownership level are greater for companies with a larger number of insiders,  ceteris paribus . Using data from U.S. real estate investment trusts, we then test the model and find that the predictions of the model are verified empirically.     

Asymmetric rivalry within and between strategic groups

Our study examines asymmetric rivalry within and between strategic groups defined according to the size of their members. We hypothesize that, owing to several forms of group‐level effects, including switching costs and efficiency, strategic groups comprising large firms expect to experience a large amount of retaliation from firms within their group and accommodation from the group comprising smaller firms. Small firms, on the other hand, expect to experience a small amount of retaliation from the group comprising large firms and no reaction from the other firms in their group. We estimate the effect of group‐level strategic interactions on firm performance. Our analysis reveals that the rivalry behavior within and between groups is asymmetric, which supports the dominant‐fringe relation between firms, as described in our hypothesis. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rivalry within strategic groups and consequences for performance: the firm‐size effects

Our study examines how, in a given industry, rivalry functions within strategic groups defined according to the size of their member firms and how this rivalry affects performance. We hypothesize that, owing to several forms of group‐level effects including market power, efficiency, differentiation, and multimarket contact, strategic groups that comprise smaller firms will exhibit both increased rivalry and decreased performance compared with strategic groups that comprise larger firms. We test our hypotheses by estimating the effect of group‐level strategic interactions (i.e., conjectural variations) on firm performance. Ultimately, our analysis of empirical data on loans in the Spanish banking industry demonstrates that increased rivalry and decreased performance indeed characterizes firms belonging to a strategic group that comprises smaller firms. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A longitudinal study of customers' desired value change in business-to-business markets

Customer value is a dynamic interactive phenomenon. Based on a longitudinal, phenomenological study of buyers and sellers in the New Zealand wine industry, we shed light on the phenomena of customers' desired value change (CDVC), driving contextual conditions, and firms' strategic response. A four-stage model of market-CDVC evolution is proposed. Findings identified external and internal drivers of CDVC, such as increasing niche density, changing customer demands, changing competitor actions, and increased competitive rivalry. We were able to track changes in each driver, and identify the related changes in CDVC, including changes in CDVC form and intensity, and the scope of CDVC related actions.     

Internet companies' growth strategies: determinants of investment intensity and long‐term performance

To exploit first‐mover advantages, pioneers may be motivated to amass customers before rivals enter the market. Likewise, when they enjoy increasing returns due to network effects, static scale economies, or learning effects, companies have incentives to invest aggressively in growth. This paper presents econometric analysis of factors that determined the intensity of Internet companies' investments in growth, and analyzes the long‐term performance consequences of such investments. Results indicate that first movers spent significantly more on upfront marketing than non‐pioneers. Contrary to expectations, however, firms in markets that exhibited increasing returns did not spend more on their early customer acquisition efforts than other sample companies. Although the typical sample company did not earn positive long‐term returns, heavy early investments in growth were nevertheless economically rational. In most cases, reducing marketing outlays would have worsened a bad outcome, consistent with an inverted ‘U’ relationship between long‐term returns and upfront marketing spending. Thus, the typical sample company invested in marketing, ex ante, at levels close to those that would have maximized returns, observed ex post. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The cornerstones of competitive advantage: A resource-based view

This paper elucidates the underlying economics of the resource-based view of competitive advantage and integrates existing perspectives into a parsimonious model of resources and firm performance. The essence of this model is that four conditions underlie sustained competitive advantage, all of which must be met. These include superior resources (heterogeneity within an industry), ex post limits to competition, imperfect resource mobility, and ex ante limits to competition. In the concluding section, applications of the model for both single business strategy and corporate strategy are discussed.     

Strategic repertoire variety and new venture growth: The moderating effects of origin and industry dynamism

New ventures (companies eight years or younger) face an important choice in attempting to achieve growth: Should they follow “strategic simplicity” by relying on a few similar competitive actions, or emphasize “strategic variety” by implementing multiple different competitive actions? Data from 140 new ventures in Spain suggest that new ventures benefit from pursuing strategic variety, especially when their industries are highly dynamic. Further, although new ventures in general gain from strategic variety in highly dynamic industries, independently owned ventures achieve higher growth rates than their corporate counterparts. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Time delays,competitive interdependence,and firm performance

Research summary: Competitors' experiences of prior interactions shape patterns of rivalry over time. However, mechanisms that influence learning from competitive experience remain largely unexamined. We develop a computational model of dyadic rivalry to examine how time delays in competitors' feedback influence their learning. Time delays are inevitable because the process of executing competitive moves takes time, and the market's responses unfold gradually. We analyze how these lags impact learning and, subsequently, firms' competitive behavior, industry profits, and performance heterogeneity. In line with the extant learning literature, our findings reveal that time delays hinder learning from experience. However, this counterintuitively increases rivals' profits by reducing their investments in costly head‐to‐head competition. Time delays also engender performance heterogeneity by causing rivals' paths of competitive behavior to diverge. Managerial summary: While competitive actions such as new product launches, geographical expansion, and marketing campaigns require up‐front resource commitments, the potential lift in profits takes time to materialize. This time delay, combined with uncertainty surrounding the outcomes of competitive actions, makes it difficult for managers to learn reliably from previous investment decisions. This results in systematic underinvestment in competitive actions. The severity of the underinvestment grows as the time delay between an investment and its positive results increases. Counterintuitively, however, competitors' collective underinvestment increases profit‐making opportunities. In industries with large time delays, companies that do invest in competitive actions are likely to enjoy high returns on investment. It is also likely that rivals' paths of competitive behavior bifurcate. Together, these mechanisms generate large differences in competitors' profits. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Trading between agents for a better match

This paper studies externalities that arise when agents can trade outcomes ex post. I show that when agents can trade outcomes ex post, principals are incentivized to contract with agents ex ante to reduce ex post transfers to outside agents with whom the principals do not directly contract. This causes principals to offer agents piece-rates that are inefficiently low and lower than the piece-rates they would offer if trading was not allowed. Although trading reduces an agent's effort and could increase the agent's outside option of rejecting a principal's ex ante contract, principals ultimately gain from allowing ex post trading because such trading results in outcomes that better match their tastes.     

Ex ante or ex post competition policy? A progress report

When intervening in markets, say to block a merger, competition authorities are constrained by the limited information they have about the social desirability of the available alternatives. Compared to ex ante control, ex post control is based on the more accurate information that becomes available in the intervening period, but entails temporary losses to social welfare and reversal costs incurred to unscramble the eggs. Through a toy model, we identify situations in which the competition authority finds it optimal to commit to forego the option of ex post review in order to avoid chilling ex ante socially beneficial mergers. On the other hand, the case for ex post review is strengthened if post-merger market conducts can signal the merged firm's private information about the consequences of the merger.     

A firm's capability to calibrate supply chain knowledge—Antecedents and consequences

This paper proposes a conceptual model for a firm's capability to calibrate supply chain knowledge (CCK). Knowledge calibration is achieved when there is a match between managers’ ex ante confidence in the accuracy of held knowledge and the ex post accuracy of that knowledge. Knowledge calibration is closely related to knowledge utility or willingness to use the available ex ante knowledge: a manager uses the ex ante knowledge if he/she is confident in the accuracy of that knowledge, and does not use it or uses it with reservation, when the confidence is low. Thus, knowledge calibration attained through the firm's CCK enables managers to deal with incomplete and uncertain information and enhances quality of decisions. In the supply chain context, although demand- and supply-related knowledge is available, supply chain inefficiencies, such as the bullwhip effect, remain. These issues may be caused not by a lack of knowledge but by a firm's lack of capability to sense potential disagreement between knowledge accuracy and confidence. Therefore, this paper contributes to the understanding of supply chain knowledge utilization by defining CCK and identifying a set of antecedents and consequences of CCK in the supply chain context.     

Playing dirty or building capability? Corruption and HR training as competitive actions to threats from informal and foreign firm rivals

Research summary : We examine why a firm takes specific competitive action in nonmarket and resource‐market spaces, particularly when it perceives threats from informal and foreign competitor groups, respectively. We address this question by combining insights from competitive rivalry, strategic groups, and nonmarket strategy literatures in an emerging economy context. Specifically, we theorize how threats from informal and foreign rival firms in an emerging market influence a firm's engagement in corruption activities and its investments in HR training, respectively. We also argue that the likelihoods of such focal firm actions against competitor group threats differ, contingent on the focal firm's market and resource profiles. Results from the empirical analyses, with survey data from the Indian IT industry, provide broad support to our hypotheses. Managerial summary : Based on a World Bank dataset on the Indian IT industry, this study finds that corruption and HR training are pursued by firms in emerging economies as mindful strategies against specific types of rivals—informal and foreign firm rivals, respectively, and are not pursued simply as culturally‐based practices. Multinational companies may need to understand that domestic firms in emerging countries will engage in corruption strategically to reduce their costs and time to market of their products/services. Therefore, multinational firms may need to devise suitable strategies other than corruption to reduce their costs and time to market if they wish to compete with firms in emerging economies for customers who don't care about ethical issues and will buy a cheaper product/service that is delivered quickly. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rivalry,strategic groups and firm profitability

An analysis of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry during the period 1963–82 finds that a substantial decline in industry profitability is not explained by changes in the number and size distribution of firms, in segment interdependence and in strategic distance. In contrast, declining industry profitability is strongly associated with increasing rivalry. This increasing rivalry is associated with changes in strategic group structure and a concomitant shift from within group rivalry to between group rivalry.     

Are individuals entering self‐employment overly optimistic? an empirical test of plans and projections on nascent entrepreneur expectations

This research examines the rationality of the expectations of nascent entrepreneurs. Consistent with conjectures regarding entry into self‐employment, I find substantial overoptimism in nascent entrepreneurs' expectations, in that they overestimate the probability that their nascent activity will result in an operating venture. Further, for those ventures that achieve operation, individuals overestimate the expected future sales and employment. To explain variations in overoptimism, I posit that those individuals who adopt an inside view to forecasting through the use of plans and financial projections, will exhibit greater ex ante bias in their expectations. Consistent with the inside view causing overoptimism in expectations, I find that the preparation of projected financial statements results in more overly optimistic venture sale forecasts. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An evolutionary perspective on strategic group emergence: a genetic algorithm‐based model

We develop a simulation model to examine conditions under which strategic groups emerge and their performance difference persists. In our model, mobility barriers, strategic interactions among high performers, dynamic capabilities (the mechanisms that allow winners to continue to survive), and boundary of rivalry are put together to derive their joint implications for the evolution of strategic groups. Not surprisingly, our model behavior shows that mobility barriers and strategic interactions play an important role in sustaining intergroup performance difference. However, the extremely high level of mobility barriers is shown to impede the emergence of strategic groups. We also find that dynamic capabilities and boundary of rivalry are as essential as mobility barriers in understanding the emergence and stability of strategic groups. When dynamic capabilities are absent or when rivalry is extended over firms with dissimilar strategies, strategic groups are less likely to exist. These findings can serve as a guideline for empirical research to probe why strategic groups exist sometimes and why they do not at other times. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Examining the effect of complexity in strategic group knowledge structures on firm performance

A developing stream of research in the strategy field explores the competitive structure of industries from the perspective of industry participants. This work has demonstrated that managers develop strategic group knowledge structures in order to make sense of their competitive environment. This study extends this line of research by examining the complexity evident in the strategic group knowledge structures developed by firms' top management teams and assessing the relationship between complexity in these knowledge structures and subsequent firm performance. Specifically, we examine the complexity of top managers' knowledge structures regarding their competition using a sample of 76 top management teams from banks in three U.S. cities. Using hierarchical regression, we find a significant relationship between the complexity of cognitive strategic groups and subsequent firm performance. These results suggest that the structure of the cognitive templates that top managers use to understand their environment and the actions of their competitor influence the degree of strategic success of their firm. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic focus of incumbents in the European telecommunications industry: The cases of BT,Deutsche Telekom and KPN

This study investigates the internal and external strategic choices that telecommunications firms, operating in a dynamic network environment, make to adapt to changes and to respond quickly in order to create or to sustain their competitive advantage. In particular, in the European telecommunications industry incumbent firms have faced important challenges from new technologies, liberalization and the convergence of markets. The leading European telecommunications companies initially focused on new markets and new businesses, emphasizing their plans to become major players in relevant markets. However, after the telecommunications euphoria companies were more restrained due to their huge burden of debt and their market value. Through refocusing or restructuring, these companies have tried to streamline their businesses in order to restore their value and to improve their competitiveness. Insight into the specific strategic actions of traditional telecommunications companies in Europe to the recent developments in the industry is provided from the analysis of three leading traditional telecommunications companies: BT, Deutsche Telekom and KPN.     

The impact of new product launch strategies on competitive reaction in industrial markets

The importance of successful innovation for the long‐term performance of companies can hardly be exaggerated. However, we need to consider this in a dynamic setting, in which competitors do not remain passive. We find that two thirds of new product launches meet reaction by competitors after their launch. We also empirically demonstrate that the strategic launch decisions that managers take have an effect on future reaction by competitors. Following an extensive review of the literature, a propositional model is developed. In order to test this theoretical model, an ex post facto field study was designed, in which the authors obtained comprehensive information on 509 new industrial products launched in the US, the UK and the Netherlands. Competitive reaction is diagnosed in terms of changes in the marketing instruments of the competitor. A logistic regression model is estimated on the occurrence of competitive reaction with any marketing instrument. We also look at the occurrence of individual marketing instrument reactions. The data show that competitors react primarily by means of price changes. Product assortment and promotional changes are less frequent, whereas distribution policy modifications occur very rarely. The characteristics of the new product launch strategy were found to have a significant impact on both the occurrence and nature of competitive reactions. We claim that the competitive effect of radically new products and incrementally new products greatly differs. The results show that competitors fail to respond to radical innovations and to new products that employ a niche strategy. They do react if a new product can be assessed within an existing product category and thus represent an unambiguous attack. Both innovative and imitative new products meet reaction in this case. The results also demonstrate that competitors are more inclined to react to the introduction of new products that are supported by extensive communication by the innovating firm. The likelihood of reaction is also higher in high growth markets than in low growth markets. The article discusses theoretical and managerial implications of these results, as well as thoughts for future research that may add more insight.     

RESOURCE AND MARKET BASED DETERMINANTS OF PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S. BANKING INDUSTRY

This paper explores the implications of studying industry competitive patterns at the level of resource accumulation and the relationship between resource endowments and firm performance outcomes in the U.S. banking industry. It uses the strategic group framework to evaluate two models of rivalry and performance and concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for competitive analysis, strategic group theory and the banking industry.