Mark-to-market accounting and liquidity pricing

When liquidity plays an important role as in financial crises, asset prices may reflect the amount of liquidity available rather than the asset's future earning power. Using market prices to assess financial institutions’ solvency in such circumstances is not desirable. We show that a shock in the insurance sector can cause the current market value of banks’ assets to fall below their liabilities so they are insolvent. In contrast, if values based on historic cost are used, banks can continue and meet all their future liabilities. We discuss the implications for the debate on mark-to-market versus historic cost accounting.     

Reprint of: Market liquidity in the financial crisis: The role of liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality

We examine the dynamics and the drivers of market liquidity during the financial crisis, using a unique volume-weighted spread measure. According to the literature we find that market liquidity is impaired when stock markets decline, implying a positive relation between market and liquidity risk. Moreover, this relationship is the stronger the deeper one digs into the order book. Even more interestingly, this paper sheds further light on so far puzzling features of market liquidity: liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality. We show that liquidity commonality varies over time, increases during market downturns, peaks at major crisis events and becomes weaker the deeper we look into the limit order book. Consistent with recent theoretical models that argue for a spiral effect between the financial sector’s funding liquidity and an asset’s market liquidity, we find that funding liquidity tightness induces an increase in liquidity commonality which then leads to market-wide liquidity dry-ups. Therefore our findings corroborate the view that market liquidity can be a driving force for financial contagion. Finally, we show that there is a positive relationship between credit risk and liquidity risk, i.e., there is a spread between liquidity costs of high and low credit quality stocks, and that in times of increased market uncertainty the impact of credit risk on liquidity risk intensifies. This corroborates the existence of a flight-to-quality or flight-to-liquidity phenomenon also on the stock markets.     

金融创新、投资者逃离与央行危机救助

从1970年的商业票据危机到2008年的全球金融危机,历史上发生过多次因金融创新的复杂性诱发投资者逃离进而演化为金融危机的事件,而危机的最终化解多借助于央行的危机救助。本文基于投资者逃离模型,从金融创新及其产生的投资者不确定性出发讨论金融危机中投资者逃离行为,并通过对投资者逃离行为的分析探讨央行危机救助的时点与方式。本文认为,就金融危机的事前预防而言,央行应在创新工具运用的过程中引导金融机构开展充分的投资者教育及对创新工具的总规模进行适当限制从而降低危机发生的概率和破坏性;就金融危机的事后救助而言,央行危机救助的时点应放在投资者对未来的不确定性突然增加并开始调整原有策略的时刻,救助的主要措施是承诺在一定条件下购买资产或注入流动性,从而降低投资者不确定性,促使投资者改变逃离市场的策略或者至少避免投资者逃离成为群体行为。     

Fair Value Accounting and the Financial Crisis: Messenger or Contributor?*

This commentary discusses how fair value accounting (FVA) affects the nature of financial reporting, especially for financial institutions that were deeply affected by the 2007‐9 financial crisis. Toward that end, I address four questions. First, I review FVA's role in financial reporting, emphasizing its development over time. While the commentary's focus is on the interface between financial instruments and FVA, its reach extends well beyond financial instruments. Thereafter, I discuss the measurement and valuation challenges that arise from the use of FVA in financial reporting. Then, I analyze the evidence, analytical and empirical, on the role that FVA may have played in the financial crisis of 2007‐9. Since, to some extent, the crisis is still unfolding, there is limited yet very insightful empirical evidence on this issue. The evidence does suggest that FVA, in combination with its use by regulators, may have severely undermined the financial condition of some institutions. The effect was amplified for institutions holding assets in markets that saw their liquidity dry up during the crisis. In other words, FVA may have amplified the crisis. Finally, I discuss some implications that we can draw from the crisis about the merits and risks underlying FVA. For instance, I conclude that, in a search for relevance, the use of FVA in financial reporting may accelerate its disconnection from a firm's business reality.     

Does overcapacity prompt controlling shareholders to play a propping role for listed companies?

A major risk currently facing the Chinese economy is overcapacity, which affects the efficiency of social resource allocation (Xi et al., 2017; Huang et al., 2019). When a company is in crisis, the internal capital market often plays a propping role. This study approached this issue from the perspective of the controlling shareholder and examined whether controlling shareholders provide financial support to enterprises in industries with excess capacity. According to the data for China’s A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2019, companies in industries with excess capacity received more financial support from controlling shareholders compared with those in non-overcapacity industries. Analysis of the mechanism revealed that state-owned enterprises and companies with relatively poor financial status received more financial support from controlling shareholders. This study also examined the economic consequences of such support and found that it is conducive to enhancing enterprise value. This study enriches the literature on overcapacity and internal capital markets by demonstrating that internal capital markets play a propping role for companies facing industry-level crises. This finding has both theoretical value and practical implications related to supply-side reform and capacity reduction.     

Assessing the effectiveness of financial reporting harmonization for emerging market banks: The case of Banco Serfin

In the last decade there has been a proliferation of financial crises in emerging markets. To some extent, the suddenness and magnitude of some of these crises have been blamed on poor financial reporting standards for bank loan losses. As a result, prior to providing countries with “financial bailout” funds, international investors and international financial organizations have increasingly required that countries harmonize their bank financial reporting standards with international financial reporting standards.Given this trend, this case requires students to assess the effectiveness of efforts to harmonize loan financial reporting (with International Financial Reporting Standards) for Mexican banks during (and after) the country’s financial crisis of the late 1990s. Students are required to assess the extent to which both pre-crisis standards as well as new, post-crisis standards complied with international financial reporting standards. They are also required to assess the impact of the new standards on the reporting practices for loans of one particularly troubled financial institution. Through the examination of this institution’s accounting practices for loans, students obtain a familiarity of the shortcomings of emerging markets’ banks’ loan financial reporting as well as the factors which influence the adoption of international financial reporting standards by emerging market banks.     

Bank funding structures and risk: Evidence from the global financial crisis

This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001–09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with pre-crisis bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border (Global) banks were more vulnerable to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. In fact, a 3.5 percentage point increase in the pre-crisis capital buffers of Global banks would have caused a 48 percentage point in their probability of failure during the crisis. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.     

Bank-to-bank lending channel and the transmission of bank liquidity shocks: Evidence from France

Good liquidity is essential for the banking system to function properly and supply credit to the real sector. However, several banks all over the world face large shocks to their liquidity supply due to numerous factors. This study contributes to the literature on the transmission of liquidity shocks by investigating the bank-to-bank lending behavior of French banks during the global financial crisis (2008 and 2009). In addition, we examine the factors strongly influencing the liquidity of the interbank deposits market. First, using a fixed-effects model on a sample of 85 French banks for the period from 2005 to 2010, we find that the deposits channel plays an important role in the transmission of liquidity shocks across the banking system. Second, we use difference-in-difference methodology to study the effects of liquidity shock on bank lending. Our results show that French banks reduced their bank-to-bank lending significantly during the financial crisis period. Moreover, our results suggest that the reduction could have been due to deposit activities.     

How prompt was regulatory corrective action during the financial crisis?

This paper empirically investigates the incidence of regulatory forbearance during the financial crisis. Using an option pricing technique in concert with valuation data gathered from failed bank sales, I find that failed banks consistently underreported the level of impairment in loan portfolios during the financial crisis period of 2008–2010, helping these market value insolvent banks to report adequate capital for regulatory purposes. Impairment-adjusted capital ratios provide evidence of regulatory forbearance for up to 18 months prior to seizure. Analyses of bank coverage ratios reveal that coverage ratios are negatively and significantly related to impairment levels and are significantly lower for banks with critically low levels of capital.     

Finance companies in Mexico: Unexpected victims of the global liquidity crunch

We study the connection between the global liquidity crisis and the severe credit crunch experienced by finance companies (SOFOLES) in Mexico using firm-level data between 2001 and 2011. Our results provide supporting evidence that, as a result of the liquidity shock, SOFOLES faced severely restricted access to their main funding sources (commercial bank loans, loans from other organizations, and public debt markets). After controlling for the potential endogeneity of their funding, we find that the liquidity shock explains 64 percent of SOFOLES’ credit contraction during the recent financial crisis (2008–2009). We use our estimates to disentangle supply from demand factors as determinants of the credit contraction. After controlling for the large decline in loan demand during the financial crisis, our findings suggest that supply factors (such as nonperforming loans and lower liquidity buffers) also played a significant role. Finally, we find that financial deregulation implemented in 2006 may have amplified the effects of the global liquidity shock.     

The liquidity impact on firm values: The evidence of Taiwan's banking industry

Liquidity plays an important role in financial markets, especially during a financial crisis. New Basel III regulatory framework highlights the importance of liquidity risk management implemented by financial institutions. Moreover, updated International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) require the improvements about fair value measurements and reinforce existing principles for disclosures about the liquidity risk associated with financial instruments. Using the liquidity discount model of Chen (2012), we are able to empirically classify Taiwan's financial institutions into three liquidity categories: safe, crisis contagious and vulnerable. Our findings can serve as an early warning signal for liquidity calamity. In addition, we investigate what factors affect firm-specific liquidity discounts for these institutions and conduct a sub-period analysis, which examines whether there is significant liquidity discounts changes before and after the 2008 financial crisis. We find that liquidity discounts change substantially during the financial crisis. Furthermore, we find that liquidity discounts can be attributed to some firm-specific performance.     

Mythical representations of trust in auditors and the preservation of social order in the financial community

The present paper investigates financial practitioners’ use and perception of audited financial statements. In-depth interviews, which we conducted with Canadian institutional investors, financial analysts and bankers, indicate: (1) a firm tendency to favour the quality of management over the content of financial statements in investment decisions and recommendation processes; and (2) a fundamental scepticism regarding the work of auditors. However, representations of auditor trustworthiness abound in formal texts surrounding the financial analysis domain—as if audited financial statements and the trust they convey towards numbers are indispensable to the work of financial analysts. Based on the work of Roland Barthes, we argue that financial practitioners’ trust in auditors constitutes a mythical representation whose main function is to maintain order and reproduce status quo within the financial system.     

Financial sector structure and financial crisis burden

We consider an overlapping generations model in the presence of financial intermediation. The paper focuses on the analysis of the consequences of a sudden negative repayments shock on financial intermediation capacity and consequently on the economy as a whole. The model exhibits a property of the ‘chain reaction’ when a single macroeconomic shock can lead to the exhaustion of credit resources and subsequently to the collapse of the banking system. To maintain the capability of the system to recover, a regulatory intervention is needed even in presence of the state guarantees on agents’ deposits in the banks. We compare the results for an intermediated economy with those derived for the market economy and draw some broad conclusions regarding the crisis consequences depending on the financial sector structure. We also compare the model predictions with the stylised facts about the Russian financial crisis of 1998.     

Financial crisis,shareholder protection and cash holdings

In this paper, I investigate the relationship between shareholder protection and corporate cash holdings under the impact of the global financial crisis. With a sample of 192,807 observations across 40 countries during the period 2002–2015, I find that the global financial crisis mitigates the controlling effect of shareholder protection on corporate cash holdings. In addition, this mitigating role is stronger in financially constrained firms. Overall, the results suggest that managers are more likely to expropriate shareholders through corporate liquidity policy during a financial crisis.     

Bank loans for private and public firms in a liquidity crunch

Bank reliance on short-term funding has increased over time. While an effective source of financing in good times, the 2007 financial crisis has exposed the vulnerability of banks and ultimately firms to such a liability structure. We show that banks dependent on wholesale funding contracted their lending the greatest during the crisis. Our results suggest, however, that in the financial crisis vulnerable banks passed the liquidity shock only to public firms and not to private firms. Loans to private firms were affected through a different channel, largely through higher retained shares by lead arrangers. Consistent with standard models of financial intermediation with information asymmetry, vulnerable banks increased their monitoring of informationally opaque firms for which the potential for informational rents is the highest.     

Investor wealth,the IMF,and the Asian crisis

This study further investigates the impact of IMF actions on stock markets during the Asian crisis. Extending two earlier studies by Kho and Stulz (2000) and Evrensel and Kutan (2007), we investigate the long-term shareholder wealth impact of IMF actions and programs on both financial and real sector returns in the stock markets of Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea. We perform a series of tests employed in Cornett and Tehranian (1989, 1990) that incorporate heteroscedasticity across sectors and contemporaneous dependence of the disturbances. The findings indicate that IMF actions regarding liquidity disbursement or liquidity concerns in markets are the most important events affecting abnormal returns and hence investor wealth in both real and financial sectors. However, the response of the financial sector to IMF actions is much stronger than that of the real sector. In addition, the results suggest moral hazard effects during the Asian crisis in all the three countries.     

Aggregate liquidity shortages, idiosyncratic liquidity smoothing and banking regulation

This paper develops a model of banking fragility driven by aggregate liquidity shortages. Inefficiencies arise from a failure of the interbank market to smooth the available liquidity in such a shortage. We find that a standard lender of last resort policy is ineffective in restoring efficiency as it leads to offsetting changes in the banks’ supply of liquidity. In contrast, subsidizing the purchase of assets from troubled banks increases welfare by improving the banks’ liquidity holdings. The first best, however, is achieved by redistributing existing liquidity from healthy to troubled banks in a crisis.     

Illiquidity or credit deterioration: A study of liquidity in the US corporate bond market during financial crises

We investigate whether liquidity is an important price factor in the US corporate bond market. In particular, we focus on whether liquidity effects are more pronounced in periods of financial crises, especially for bonds with high credit risk, using a unique data set covering more than 20,000 bonds, between October 2004 and December 2008. We employ a wide range of liquidity measures and find that liquidity effects account for approximately 14% of the explained market-wide corporate yield spread changes. We conclude that the economic impact of the liquidity measures is significantly larger in periods of crisis, and for speculative grade bonds.     

A framework for assessing financial stability?

I worked as a consultant in the Financial Stability Department (FSD) of the Bank of England for several years (2002–2004). In this paper I reflect on issues relating to the work of such an FSD, starting with the difficulty of defining or measuring ‘financial stability’. Stress tests are commonly used, but, for an FSD, should relate to the system as a whole, not just to individual institutions. FSDs need to assess the probability, virulence and speed of occurrence of potential shocks. There is a need to develop appropriate analytical models. The focus on capital adequacy has diverted attention from concern about having sufficient liquidity.     

Phoenix rising: Legal reforms and changes in valuations in Finland during the economic crisis

Finland experienced an extremely severe economic depression in the early 1990s. As a part of the government's crisis management policies, significant new legislation was passed that increased supervisory powers of financial market regulators and reformed bankruptcy procedures significantly decreasing the protection of creditors. We show that the introduction of these new laws resulted in positive abnormal stock returns. The new laws also lead to increases in firms’ Tobin's q, especially for more levered firms. In contrast to previous studies, our results also suggest that public supervision of financial markets fosters rather than hampers financial market development.