A Crisis of Banks as Liquidity Providers

Can banks maintain their advantage as liquidity providers when exposed to a financial crisis? While banks honored credit lines drawn by firms during the 2007 to 2009 crisis, this liquidity provision was only possible because of explicit, large support from the government and government‐sponsored agencies. At the onset of the crisis, aggregate deposit inflows into banks weakened and their loan‐to‐deposit shortfalls widened. These patterns were pronounced at banks with greater undrawn commitments. Such banks sought to attract deposits by offering higher rates, but the resulting private funding was insufficient to cover shortfalls and they reduced new credit.     

Liquidity crisis,relationship lending and corporate finance

This paper investigates the consequences of the liquidity shocks in wholesale funding markets during the 2007–2009 financial crisis on bank lending and corporate financing. We show that banks that relied more heavily on wholesale funding contracted lending more severely than banks that relied more on insured deposits. We then examine the effects of loan contraction on the financial positions of publicly traded firms. We find that both during and after the crisis, the change in leverage of bank-dependent firms is less than that of firms with access to public debt markets. In addition, bank-dependent firms rely more on cash than net equity issuance to finance operations. We also find that firms with established bank lending relationships weather the crisis better. Such firms are able to attain higher levels of leverage during the crisis, add to their cash holdings, secure new bank credit, and achieve higher profitability as a result.     

Do public banks have a competitive advantage?

Public banks are often blamed to possess an unfair competitive advantage in the form of lower funding costs due to a state guarantee on their deposits. However, public and private banks tend to differ not only in their funding costs, but also in the way they deal with borrowers in financial distress. The model presented in this paper shows that if banks differ in these two characteristics, a separation of borrowers may result, with public banks lending to risky firms and private banks lending to safe firms. This separation can explain differences in the lending behavior and performance of public and private banks as observed in the market. Interestingly, the separation may persist even when funding costs are equal, implying that an abolition of state guarantees will not necessarily lead to identical performance of the two types of banks.     

Crisis, Adjustment, and Reform in Thailand's Industrial Firms

New data on Thailand's industrial firms shed light on the originsof the East Asian financial crisis and on the response of themanufacturing sector to the structural adjust-ment program supportedby the international financial institutions. Before the crisis,Thai firms had declining profitability, but they neverthelessmaintained high levels of investment, often in domesticallyoriented areas (notably the auto sector). Thai firms financedthese investments with short-term borrowing from financial institutions,which in turn borrowed short term on foreign markets. That only40 percent of firms provided audited financial statements totheir banks meant that the financial sector had poor informationfor assessing the true riskiness of these investments. The financialstructure was thus vulnerable even to small shocks. How well did the adjustment program deal with the crisis? Thaifirms had difficulty increasing their exports quickly becauseof investment in the wrong sectors, a decline in regional demand,and bottlenecks that included red tape and poor customs administration.Because of the poor export response, the brunt of adjustmenthad to come through compression of demand and of imports. Inretrospect, the macroeconomic program— which assumed quickexport recovery— was too tight.      

Bank funding structures and risk: Evidence from the global financial crisis

This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001–09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with pre-crisis bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border (Global) banks were more vulnerable to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. In fact, a 3.5 percentage point increase in the pre-crisis capital buffers of Global banks would have caused a 48 percentage point in their probability of failure during the crisis. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.     

Banking deregulation and innovation

We document empirical support for a key micro-level channel—innovation by young, private firms—through which financial sector deregulation affects economic growth. We find that intrastate banking deregulation, which increased the local market power of banks, decreased the level and risk of innovation by young, private firms. In contrast, interstate banking deregulation, which decreased the local market power of banks, increased the level and risk of innovation by young, private firms. These contrasting effects on innovation also translated into contrasting effects on economic growth. Our study suggests that the nature of financial sector deregulation crucially affects its potential benefits to the real economy.     

Same information,different value: New evidence on the value of voluntary assurance

This paper examines whether there is a difference in the value of voluntarily assured financial statements of private firms, depending on the availability of other information for the users of the statements. By using a within-firm estimator that completely controls for firm fixed effects, we find that the loan interest rate for private firms with voluntarily assured financial statements is lower when the firms have longer relationships with their banks. This finding suggests that the value of assured financial statements differs among the same type of users (banks), and is larger for those that accumulate soft information through long-term lending relationships. We also find that this larger value is not present when the tenure of the auditor with the client is very long.     

Multinational banks in the crisis: Foreign affiliate lending as a mirror of funding pressure and competition on the internal capital market

We investigate how the lending activities abroad of a multinational bank’s local and hub affiliates have been affected by funding difficulties during the financial crisis. We find that affiliates’ local deposits and performance have been stabilizing loan supply. By contrast, relying on short-term wholesale funding has increasingly proven to be a disadvantage in the crisis, which has seen inter-bank and capital markets freeze. By introducing a liable approximate measure for intra-bank flows, we detect competition for intra-bank funding between the affiliates abroad as well as an increasing focus on the parent bank’s home market activities. In addition, the more an affiliate abroad relies on intra-bank funding in the crisis, the greater its dependence on its parent bank having a stable deposit and long-term wholesale funding position. We consider changes in long-term lending to the private sectors of 40 countries by the affiliates of the 68 largest German banks. To obtain a more precise picture, we clean our lending data from valuation effects.     

The effect of banking crisis on bank-dependent borrowers

We provide causal evidence that adverse capital shocks to banks affect their borrowers’ performance negatively. We use an exogenous shock to the U.S. banking system during the Russian crisis of Fall 1998 to separate the effect of borrowers’ demand of credit from the supply of credit by the banks. Firms that primarily relied on banks for capital suffered larger valuation losses during this period and subsequently experienced a higher decline in their capital expenditure and profitability as compared to firms that had access to the public-debt market. Consistent with an adverse shock to the supply of credit, crisis-affected banks decreased the quantity of their lending and increased loan interest rates in the post-crisis period significantly more than the unaffected banks. Our results suggest that the global integration of the financial sector can contribute to the propagation of financial shocks from one economy to another through the banking channel.     

Bank systemic risk and corporate investment: Evidence from the US

In this paper, we develop a simple two-period model in which a bank’s investment (e.g., loans) is influenced by short-term financing and a probability of a financial crisis. When banks ex ante expect to be bailed out during financial crises, they do not necessarily internalize the cost of financial crises and invest more. We argue that the level of systemic risk in the banking sector is largely driven by (1) the way in which banks finance their investment (e.g., loans) using more short-term debt and/or (2) the increase in asset commonality amongst banks. We use three measures that arguably capture two dimensions of “bank systemic risk”, namely, (1) bank funding maturity and (2) bank asset commonality, to empirically test whether bank systemic risk has a positive effect on corporate investment. We document that in a sample of publicly listed firms in the United States over the period 1991–2013, bank systemic risk is positively associated with the firm-level investment ratio after controlling for a large set of country- and firm-level variables. In addition, we show that a firm's leverage strengthens the positive effect of bank systemic risk on corporate investment, suggesting that more financially constrained firms experience a larger effect of bank systemic risk on corporate investment than less financially constrained firms.     

Interbank funding,bank risk exposure and performance in the UK: A three-stage network DEA approach

Operating on unsecured interbank markets exposes banks to various risks which trigger changes in bank strategic outcomes such as risk management and performance. This paper proposes a novel three-stage network data envelopment approach with feedback and alliance to examine the importance of bank risk exposures through interbank funding on bank efficiency levels. Our results show that overall bank performance management is achieved via a complement of good alliance between risk and funding, and financial performance. In addition, high financial or overall performance may not imply better risk management or allied process performance. Rather, banks are inherently performance-driven institutions whose performance objectives are independently optimal but aggregately suboptimal. Further analyses show that, for international banks, high financial or overall performance may not necessarily limit high allied process and risk management. Moreover, risk governance in large banks has not improved despite the increased regulatory pressure induced after the 2007–2008 credit crisis. Our results remain robust regardless of whether the alliance or financial performance stage is given priority in the overall efficiency decomposition, and when the novel resource imbalance index is used to assess and enhance the discriminatory power of performance.     

A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?

The present study investigates theoretically the lending responses of government-owned and private banks in the event of unexpected financial shocks. Our model predicts that public banks provide more loans to the real sector during times of crisis, compared to private banks which cut down on lending and increase liquidity holdings. We put forth three reasons for this heterogeneous behavior. First, the objective of public banks, in contrast to their private peers, is not only to maximize profits given risks, but also to stabilize and promote the recovery of the economy. Second, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals or avoid a bank run in a severe crisis, because the state has better access to additional funds making a recapitalization more likely. And finally, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals due to their higher credibility in promising a future recapitalization in the case of a severe crisis.     

Derivatives usage,securitization, and the crash sensitivity of bank stocks

We show that the information on derivatives usage and securitization activities of U.S. banks as disclosed in their pre-crisis 10-K filings explains extreme equity returns of banks during the financial crisis. Stocks of banks that had previously disclosed a more extensive use of financial derivatives and loan securitization were more likely to experience extreme losses. Our findings are consistent with investors viewing banks that used derivatives for non-hedging purposes as highly vulnerable to the crisis. Moreover, banks which had significant securitization activities and were thus potentially exposed to under-capitalized risks from conduits possess a higher vulnerability of their equity to market downturns.     

The role of on- and off-balance-sheet leverage of banks in the late 2000s crisis

Extensive regulatory changes and technological advances have transformed banking systems to a great extent. Banks have reacted to the challenges posed by the new operating environment by creating new products and expanding their activities to some uncharted business areas. In this paper, we study how modern banking which gave birth to the off-balance-sheet leverage activities affected the risk profile of U.S. banks as well as the level of systemic risk before and after the onset of the late 2000s financial crisis. Towards this, we separate on- from off-balance-sheet leverage and capture the latter with different, yet complementary, measures which do not exist in the current literature. Special attention is paid on the deleveraging process that occurred in the banking market after the crisis erupted, which is an additional innovative feature of this study. Our findings reveal that leverage, both explicit and hidden off-the-balance-sheet, increases the individual risk of banking firms making them vulnerable to financial shocks. Reverse leverage, on the other hand, is beneficial for individual banks’ health, but is found to be harmful for financial stability. We also demonstrate that the banks which concentrate on traditional lines of business typically carry less risk compared to those involved with modern financial instruments.     

Flight to liquidity and the Great Recession

This paper argues that counter-cyclical liquidity hoarding by financial intermediaries may strongly amplify business cycles. It develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which banks operate subject to agency problems and funding liquidity risk in their intermediation activity. Importantly, the amount of liquidity reserves held in the financial sector is determined endogenously: Balance sheet constraints force banks to trade off insurance against funding outflows with loan scale. A financial crisis, simulated as an abrupt decline in the collateral value of bank assets, triggers a flight to liquidity, which strongly amplifies the initial shock and induces credit crunch dynamics sharing key features with the Great Recession. The paper thus develops a new balance sheet channel of shock transmission that works through the composition of banks’ asset portfolios.     

Relationship Lending, Accounting Disclosure, and Credit Availability during the Asian Financial Crisis

We examine whether lending relationships benefit firms by making credit more available during periods of financial stress. Our main finding is that during the Asian financial crisis of July 1997 through the end of 1998, relationship lending increased the likelihood that Korean and Thai firms would obtain credit but it had no effect on Indonesian and Philippine firms. We ask if accounting disclosure might explain the observed differences among the three countries for which audit information is available. We find that for Indonesian firms with weak lending relationships, banks replace relationship lending technology with a financial-statement lending technology. Such a result does not hold for Korean and Philippine firms.     

The Home Bias and the Credit Crunch: A Regional Perspective

Using detailed data on loan applications and decisions for a large sample of manufacturing firms in Italy during the recent financial crisis, we find that the credit crunch has been harsher in provinces with a large share of branches owned by distantly managed banks. Inconsistent with a flight to quality we do not find evidence that economically weaker firms suffered more during the crisis. In contrast, we find that financially healthier firms were affected more in functionally distant credit markets than in markets populated by less distant banks, consistent with a home bias on the part of nationwide banks.     

银行价格竞争、融资约束与企业研发投资——基于“中介效应”模型的实证研究

近年来我国利率市场化改革积极推进,实体经济发展积极向创新驱动转型,一个亟须研究厘清的关键问题是,银行业竞争如何驱动企业创新活动？本文关注银行价格竞争对企业创新的影响,以2013—2018年沪深两市的上市企业为样本,采用“中介效应”因果分析模型,实证检验了银行价格竞争对企业研发投资的影响,并识别出以融资约束为中介渠道的作用机制。研究发现,银行价格竞争不仅会提高银行的风险容忍度,直接增加R&D投资的信贷供给意愿,而且还会通过降低贷款价格和增加贷款可得性来缓解企业整体的融资约束,间接促进企业创新活动。这一机制在解除贷款利率管制之后以及在民营企业层面体现得更加明显。本文的研究结果对于深化金融市场化改革、改善金融服务实体经济效果以及实施经济创新驱动发展战略,具有明确的政策启示。     

Local Crowding-Out in China

In China, between 2006 and 2013, local public debt crowded out the investment of private firms by tightening their funding constraints while leaving state-owned firms' investment unaffected. We establish this result using a purpose-built data set for Chinese local public debt. Private firms invest less in cities with more public debt, with the reduction in investment larger for firms located farther from banks in other cities or more dependent on external funding. Moreover, in cities where public debt is high, private firms' investment is more sensitive to internal cash flow.     

Bank regulation and supervision in the context of the global crisis

We provide novel evidence on regulatory and supervisory practices around the world in the context of the global financial crisis, using data from a new World Bank survey covering 143 countries. Analyzing differences between crisis and non-crisis countries, we find that crisis countries had less stringent and more complex definitions of capital but exhibited lower actual capital ratios, faced fewer restrictions on non-bank activities, were less strict in the regulatory treatment of bad loans, were less able to demand banks to adjust their equity, provisions or compensation schemes, and had greater disclosure requirements but weaker incentives for private agents to monitor banks. Comparing regulatory and supervisory practices before and after the global crisis, there is evidence of few changes. While capital ratios increased, bank governance and resolution regimes were strengthened, private sector incentives to monitor banks deteriorated.