Bilateral Agreements in a MultiFirm Industry: Technology Transfer and Horizontal Merger

The paper studies the profitability of technology transfer and horizontal merger between two asymmetric firms in a multifirm Cournot oligopoly. If there is only one technologically advanced firm and one or many technologically backward firm(s), a profitable technology deal between two asymmetric firms exists if and only if the collaborating firms are "close" in terms of their initial technology levels. With more than one advanced firm such a technology deal is "always" profitable. Contrary to that, a profitable bilateral horizontal merger occurs if and only if the gap of technologies between the two partners is larger than a critical level. The paper also studies the relative profitability of these two bilateral arrangements.     

Negotiation over Intellectual Property Rights Protection in a Mixed Market

This article models a North–South negotiation under a mixed oligopolistic setting where a public firm in the South and a private firm from the North compete in the southern market. The southern firm is a public one whose objective is a weighted sum of the South's social welfare and its own profit, whereas the northern firm is a pure profit maximizer. The North provides a quid pro quo in exchange for the strengthening of the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the South. We show that when the northern and southern firms engage in quantity competition in the southern market, the southern government's optimal choice is either complete protection or complete violation. We show this to depend on the southern government's valuation of the quid pro quo. Moreover, strengthening IPR protection will deepen the privatization process in the South, though it brings about a social welfare loss to the South.     

DECISION TO INVEST ABROAD: THE CASE OF SOUTH KOREAN MULTINATIONALS

Recent firm‐based empirical studies examine whether firms serving foreign markets either through exports or foreign direct investment (FDI) are more efficient than their domestically‐oriented counterparts. The purpose of the present paper is to study the link between performance of multinational firms and the choice to participate in foreign investment. In so doing, this paper explicitly differentiates exports and FDI decisions. Using firm‐level data for large South Korean manufacturing firms, I provide evidence that the premium for FDI is huge compared to exports, and that good firms undertake FDI. Studying performance across firms, I find that firms that engage in FDI outperform other firms in the future in all possible dimensions; they are larger, pay higher wages, and are also more productive. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that good firms self‐select to engage in FDI. I also find clear evidence that past FDI experience has a strong positive effect on the probability of current investment abroad. This implies that the sunk cost involved in FDI plays a role in current decisions to undertake FDI.     

Barriers to innovation in young and mature firms

This paper examines how firm age can affect a firm’s perception of the obstacles (deterring vs. revealed) that hamper and delay innovation. Using a comprehensive panel of Spanish firms for the period 2004–2011, the empirical analysis conducted shows that distinct types of obstacle are perceived differently by firms of different ages. First, a clear-cut negative relationship is identified between firm age and a firm’s assessment of both the internal and external shortages of financial resources. Second, young firms seem to be less sensitive to the lack of qualified personnel when initiating an innovative project than when they are already engaged in such activities. By contrast, the attempts of mature firms to engage in innovation activity are significantly affected by the lack of qualified personnel. Finally, mature incumbents appear to attach greater importance to obstacles related to market structure and demand than is the case of firms with less experience.     

Export Destination,Product Quality and Wages in a Middle‐Income Country. The Case of South Africa

A robust finding in the firm‐level literature is that exporting firms pay higher wages. Using South African data this paper investigates the relationship between export destination and wages at a worker level. South Africa, a middle‐income country, has two distinct main export markets—a regional market where per capita incomes are lower than at home, and an international market with higher per capita incomes. Our estimates show that workers in firms that export to the region earn less than those that produce for the domestic market. Those in firms that export outside the region earn more than either domestic producers or region‐only exporters. Much of this difference in wages can be explained by the premium the different types of exporters pay for skills. These results support previous studies which suggest that export destination is related to product quality which in turn is related to worker quality and therefore wages.     

Asymmetric Labor Markets, Southern Wages and the Location of Firms

This paper studies the behavior of firms towards weak protection of labor standards in developing countries (South). A less than perfectly elastic labor supply in the South gives firms an oligopsony position in the labor market tempting them to strategically reduce output to cut wages. In an open economy, competitors operating where labor standards are recognized meanwhile enjoy less aggressive competitors and raise output. Delocation also increases Southern wages and triggers a competition effect, lowering ex post output and hence potential profits of a relocating firm. These effects reduce relative profitability of moving production to the South casting doubts on traditional beliefs that multinationals are attracted to regions with lower wages. Moreover, adopting a minimum wage policy in the South eliminates the oligopsony distortion and improves competitiveness of Southern firms in the world product market. It also enhances consumer and wage surplus in the South and hence unambiguously raises Southern welfare.     

Access to credit and informality among micro and small enterprises in Ethiopia

This paper examines the determinants of Micro and Small and Enterprises (MSEs) access to credit in Ethiopia using detailed firm‐level data collected in 2003. Its basic purpose is to identify the various attributes of a firm that determine its access to credit with an emphasis on the role of firm formality. We find that informal firms are more credit constrained compared to formal firms. A firm’s location, membership of a business association and maintaining an accounting record are found to be important determinants of access to credit. Further, we find firms whose owners have vocational training are more credit constrained than those who are not, as are firms that are exclusively male owned. There is no systematic relation between access to credit and a firm’s age, size and the sector in which it operates. The paper concludes with possible policy interventions designed to improve access to credit for MSEs in Ethiopia.     

Collusion and Price Rigidity

We consider an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period. We focus on symmetric perfect public equilibria, wherein any "punishments" are borne equally by all firms. We identify a tradeoff that is associated with collusive pricing schemes in which the price to be charged by each firm is strictly increasing in its cost level: such "fully sorting" schemes offer efficiency benefits, as they ensure that the lowest-cost firm makes the current sale, but they also imply an informational cost (distorted pricing and/or equilibrium-path price wars), since a higher-cost firm must be deterred from mimicking a lower-cost firm by charging a lower price. A rigid-pricing scheme, where a firm's collusive price is independent of its current cost position, sacrifices efficiency benefits but also diminishes the informational cost. For a wide range of settings, the optimal symmetric collusive scheme requires (i) the absence of equilibrium-path price wars and (ii) a rigid price. If firms are sufficiently impatient, however, the rigid-pricing scheme cannot be enforced, and the collusive price of lower-cost firms may be distorted downward in order to diminish the incentive to cheat. When the model is modified to include i.i.d. public demand shocks, the downward pricing distortion that accompanies a firm's lower-cost realization may occur only when current demand is high.     

International Organization of Production with Heterogeneous Firms

This paper presents a North–South model with differentiated goods being produced in the North. Each differentiated final good requires both management and manufacturing services as inputs, and firms are heterogeneous with regard to their productivity levels in providing these inputs. Two scenarios of relocating manufacturing to the South, which are interpreted to correspond to vertical foreign direct investment (FDI) and offshoring, are investigated. In both cases there is a minimum level of management productivity required for firms to benefit from relocation of manufacturing to the South. In the case of offshoring, productivity and profit gains are relatively larger for firms with low initial manufacturing productivity. Firms with high initial productivity in both aspects choose not to offshore owing to the presence of fixed costs. The model is subsequently used to examine the implications of global economic integration on the type of firm that exits an industry, changes production location or keeps manufacturing domestically.     

Price competition and quality differentiation with multiproduct firms

This paper examines a two-stage competition where firms simultaneously choose the number of products and qualities in the first stage, and then compete in prices. It is shown that a monopolist must sell a single product. In addition, in any equilibrium of multiproduct duopoly, there are segmented patterns of quality differentiation. Entangled configurations never emerge because each firm has an incentive to reduce the number of products facing direct competition with its rival. This result contrasts sharply with the equilibrium of non-segmented quality differentiation when firms compete in quantities. Furthermore, we find that the high-quality firm never offers more products than the low-quality firm, and quality differentiation between firms is greater than that within a firm.     

Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives

In this paper we are analyzing a mixed quantity-setting duopoly consisting of a socially concerned firm and a profit-maximizing firm. The socially concerned firm considers one group of stakeholders in its objective function and maximizes its profit plus a share of consumer surplus. Both firms have the option to hire a manager who determines the production quantity on behalf of the firm's owner. We find that in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game both firms hire a manager and delegate the production choice. If the unit production costs of the firms are similar, then the socially concerned firm has a higher market share and even higher profit. Interestingly, we observe that the relationship between the share of consumer surplus taken into account by the socially concerned firm and its profit is non-monotonic. As the share increases, the socially concerned firm's profit first increases and then decreases. The conclusion is that it pays off to take stakeholder interests into account, but not too much.     

Intellectual property rights,technology transfer and exports in developing countries

We develop a model to analyze one mechanism under which stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection may improve the ability of firms in developing countries to break into export markets. A Northern firm with a superior process technology chooses either exports or technology transfer through licensing as its mode of supplying the Southern market, based on local IPR policy. Given this decision, the North and South firms engage in Cournot competition in both markets. We find that stronger IPR would enhance technology transfer through licensing and reduce the South firm's marginal production cost, thereby increasing its exports. Welfare in the South would rise (fall) if that country has high (low) absorptive capacity. Excessively strong IPR diminish competition and welfare, however. Adding foreign direct investment as an additional channel of technology transfer sustains these basic messages.     

Intellectual property rights, technology transfer and exports in developing countries

We develop a model to analyze one mechanism under which stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection may improve the ability of firms in developing countries to break into export markets. A Northern firm with a superior process technology chooses either exports or technology transfer through licensing as its mode of supplying the Southern market, based on local IPR policy. Given this decision, the North and South firms engage in Cournot competition in both markets. We find that stronger IPR would enhance technology transfer through licensing and reduce the South firm's marginal production cost, thereby increasing its exports. Welfare in the South would rise (fall) if that country has high (low) absorptive capacity. Excessively strong IPR diminish competition and welfare, however. Adding foreign direct investment as an additional channel of technology transfer sustains these basic messages.     

A model of insurance markets with incomplete information

The paper investigates how a competitive market would allocate insurance policies if firms were not able to determine the riskiness of individual consumers. It is demonstrated that if all firms have static expectations with regard to the policy offers of other firms, no stationary equilibrium may exist. A second equilibrium concept is then introduced which incorporates a different expectation rule. Each firm assumes that any policy will be immediately withdrawn which becomes unprofitable after that firm makes its own policy offer. This equilibrium is shown to exist and some of its welfare properties are investigated.     

Mode of International Investment and Endogenous Risk of Expropriation

This paper analyzes the relationship between the mode of international investment and institutional quality. Foreign investors from a capital‐rich North can either purchase productive assets in a capital‐poor South and transfer their capital within integrated multinational firms or they can form joint ventures with local asset owners. The South is ruled by an autocratic elite that may use its political power to expropriate productive assets. The expropriation risk lowers the incentive to provide specific capital in an integrated firm and distorts the decision between joint ventures and integrated production. We determine the equilibrium risk of expropriation in this framework and the resulting pattern of international production. We also analyze as to how globalization, which is reflected in a decline in investment costs, influences institutional quality.     

INNOVATION ACTIVITIES EXPLAINED BY FIRM ATTRIBUTES AND LOCATION

In this paper, innovation activities of a firm are observed as its R&D spending and participation in three categories of innovation systems. The various factors that can influence a firm's innovation efforts are divided into, (i) firm location reflecting the regional milieu and (ii) firm attributes such as corporate structure, nature of the knowledge production, type of industry and a set of specific firm characteristics. The study is based on information about 2094 individual firms, which may be non-affiliated or belong to a group (multi-firm enterprise). The empirical analysis applies a novel data set to examine the influence of location versus a vector of firm attributes. Among innovative firms, the location of a firm does not influence neither the R&D intensity nor the frequency of interaction in horizontal and vertical innovation systems, when controlling the skill composition, physical capital intensity, industry, firm size and market extension. The paper contributes to the literature by observing that innovative firms have similar characteristics irrespective of where they are located, although the share of innovative firms differs between regions.     

Industry concentration in South African manufacturing industry: Trends and consequences, 1972–96

This paper reports industry concentration measures for the South African manufacturing sector over the 1972–1996 period for the three digit industry classification. Noted are high level of industry concentration in South African manufacturing, and a rising trend in concentration across a wide range of industries as measured by the Gini coefficient, though some countervailing evidence emerges on the Rosenbluth index. Analytically the paper examines the impact of concentration on employment and investment rates. Results show that increased concentration unambiguously lowers employment. For investment rates, increased inequality of market share serves to raise investment rates, while falling firm numbers for any given inequality of market share lowers investment rates. The difference is consistent with a disciplining effect of a competitive fringe of firms on the behaviour of large firms in a market.     

PRECAUTIONARY DEMAND FOR LABOUR AND FIRM SIZE

This paper studies firms' job creation decisions in a labour market with search frictions. A simple labour market search model is developed in which a firm can search for a second employee while producing with a first worker, and this creates the equilibrium size distribution of firms. A firm expands employment even if the instantaneous payoff to a large firm is less than that of staying small – a firm has a precautionary motive to expand its size. In addition, this motive is enhanced by a greater market tightness. Because of this effect, firms’ decisions become interdependent – a firm creates a vacancy if it expects other firms to do the same, creating strategic complementarity among firms and thereby self‐fulfilling multiple equilibria. An increase in productivity can cause a qualitative change in labour market tightness and the rate of unemployment.     

Regional infrastructure and firm investment: theory and empirical evidence for Italy

The authors model the channels through which public expenditure on infrastructure influences firm value and shapes its investment decisions via both adjustment costs and marginal profitability of capital. The authors test these hypotheses using a large panel of Italian firms. Empirical results show that infrastructure interacts with revenues and costs in shaping firm??s capital profitability and influences its adjustment costs. Finally, the authors find that infrastructure expenditure contributes to the reduction of the economic gap between the North and the South of Italy. These effects vary across regions and sectors.     

Price competition and market transparency: evidence from a random response technique

Surveys can increase market transparency when information asymmetries are present—but this will only happen when respondents answer questions truthfully. Sometimes, however, it might not be in the respondents’ best interest to provide truthful information on their firm or market. This will be especially true when other firms can exploit any information they provide. Understanding when, and under what conditions, respondents answer questions truthfully is important to researchers studying these markets and to policymakers using firm surveys to identify ways of improving the business environment. Using data from two countries in South Asia, this paper uses a random response technique to identify respondents that do not answer truthfully. We label these respondents as ‘reticent’. We show that respondents become more reticent when their firms face intense price competition. We argue that this is because intense competition gives respondents a greater incentive to misreport information to reduce market transparency.