Optimal pricing of intraday liquidity

This paper presents a general equilibrium model where intraday liquidity is needed because the timing of payments is uncertain. A necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium to be efficient is that the nominal intraday interest rate be zero, even when the overnight rate is strictly positive. Because a market for liquidity may not achieve efficiency, this creates a role for the central bank. I allow for the possibility of moral hazard and study policies commonly used by central banks to reduce their exposure to risk. I show collateralized lending achieves the efficient allocation, while, for certain parameters, caps cannot prevent moral hazard.     

Banks’ intraday liquidity management during operational outages: Theory and evidence from the UK payment system

We investigate how settlement banks in the United Kingdom’s large-value payment system deal with intraday liquidity and operational risk. In particular, we are interested in payments behaviour towards a bank that is, for operational reasons, unable to make but able to receive payments. If other banks did not sufficiently monitor their outgoing payments, these operational shocks could impact the entire payment system because the affected bank could absorb liquidity from the system. Our game-theoretic model predicts that only early in the day, when they are uncertain about the payment instructions they might have to execute, banks stop sending payments to a counterparty which is unable to make payments. Using a non-parametric method, we find that this prediction is supported by the data, implying that banks effectively contain the disruption caused by the operational outage: payment flows between healthy banks remain unaffected.     

The Federal Home Loan Bank System: The Lender of Next‐to‐Last Resort?

The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System is a large cooperatively owned government‐sponsored liquidity facility that lends predominately to U.S. depository institutions. This paper documents the significant role played by the FHLB System at the outset of the recent financial crisis and provides evidence on the uses of FHLB funding by member banks and thrifts during that time. We then compare lending activity by the FHLB System and the Federal Reserve during 2007 and 2008, discuss the types of institutions seeking government‐sponsored liquidity at various times, and identify the trade‐offs faced by borrowers eligible to tap liquidity from both facilities.     

Why Does the Interest Rate Decline Over the Day? Evidence from the Liquidity Crisis

We provide a simple model, able to explain why the overnight (ON) rate follows a downward intraday pattern, implicitly creating a positive intraday interest rate. While this normally reflects only some frictions, a liquidity crisis introduces a new component: the chance of an upward jump of the ON rate, which must be compensated by an intraday decline of the ON rate. By analyzing real time data for the e-MID interbank market, we show that the intraday rate has increased from a negligible level to a significant one after the start of the liquidity crisis in August 2007, and even more so since September 2008. The intraday rate is affected by the likelihood of a dry-up of the ON market, proxied by the 3M Euribor—Eonia swap spread. This evidence supports our model and it shows that a liquidity crisis impairs the ability of central banks to curb the market price of intraday liquidity, even by providing free daylight overdrafts. Such results have implications for the efficiency of the money market and of payment systems, as well as for the operational framework of central banks.     

Money and liquidity in financial markets

We argue that there is a connection between the interbank market for liquidity and the broader financial markets, which has its basis in demand for liquidity by banks. Tightness in the market for liquidity leads banks to engage in what we term “liquidity pull-back,” which involves selling financial assets either by banks directly or by levered investors. Empirical tests on the stock market are supportive. Tighter interbank markets are associated with relatively more volume in more liquid stocks; selling pressure, especially in more liquid stocks; and transitory negative returns. We control for market-wide uncertainty and in the process also contribute to the literature on portfolio rebalancing. Our general point is that money matters in financial markets.     

Bank-specific shocks and the real economy

Governments often justify interventions into the financial system in the form of bail outs or liquidity assistance with the systemic importance of large banks for the real economy. In this paper, we analyze whether idiosyncratic shocks to loan growth at large banks have effects on real GDP growth. We employ a measure of idiosyncratic shocks which follows Gabaix (forthcoming). He shows that idiosyncratic shocks to large firms have an impact on US GDP growth. In an application to the banking sector, we find evidence that changes in lending by large banks have a significant short-run impact on GDP growth. Episodes of negative loan growth rates and the Eastern European countries in our sample drive these results.     

The Intraday Price of Money: Evidence from the e‐MID Interbank Market

We provide empirical evidence, based on tick‐by‐tick data for the e‐MID euro area interbank market covering 2003 and 2004, that the overnight interest rate shows a clear downward pattern throughout the operating day. Thus, a positive hourly interest rate (half basis point) implicitly emerges from the intraday term structure of the overnight rate. Such a pattern was not detected in the mid‐1990s: we explain this evolution as an outcome of the recent trend toward real‐time settlement. The estimated intraday interest rate is lower than in the United States: this is due to the different cost of central bank daylight credit.     

Responding to a Shadow Banking Crisis: The Lessons of 1763

In August 1763, northern Europe experienced a financial crisis with numerous parallels to the 2008 Lehman episode. The crisis affected merchant banks that were funded by short‐term credit instead of deposits. We use archival data to show that these “shadow” banks suffered a sudden loss of funding after the failure of a major bank. The central bank at the hub of the crisis, the Bank of Amsterdam, responded by broadening the range of collateral it accepted. The data also show how this emergency liquidity helped to contain the crisis, by preventing the collapse of at least two other major banks.     

Reconciling Bagehot and the Fed's Response to September 11

Bagehot (1873) states that to prevent bank panics a central bank should provide liquidity at a "very high rate of interest." In contrast, most of the theoretical literature on liquidity provision suggests that central banks should lend at an interest rate of zero. This is broadly consistent with the Federal Reserve's behavior in the days following September 11, 2001. This paper shows that both policies can be reconciled. With commodity money, as in Bagehot's time, liquidity is scarce and a high price allows banks to self-select. In contrast, the Fed has a virtually unlimited ability to temporarily expand the money supply so self-selection is unnecessary.     

Interest rate smoothing and financial stability

Central banks smooth fluctuations in interest rates based on a belief that this policy promotes financial stability. This belief is based on a presumption that the direct effect of less interest rate volatility on a bank's likelihood of insolvency is the predominant effect of this policy. The main point of this paper is that these policies also give rise to indirect effects that lower financial stability. These indirect effects occur because the policy itself alters bank behavior. In effect, if the central bank provides (liquidity) insurance (at zero premia), it may introduce a classic moral hazard problem that encourages risk taking by banks. As a result, to maintain a given degree of financial stability, a bank regulator may, in fact, need to impose a higher prudential capital requirement when an interest rate smoothing policy is in place. The paper concludes that the link between interest rate smoothing policy and financial stability may be more complicated than is generally recognized.     

Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability

We develop a macroeconomic model in which commercial banks can offload risky loans to a “shadow” banking sector, and financial intermediaries trade in securitized assets. The model can account both for the business cycle comovement between output, traditional bank, and shadow bank credit, and for the behavior of macroeconomic variables in a liquidity crisis centered on shadow banks. We find that following a liquidity shock, stabilization policy aimed solely at the market in securitized assets is relatively ineffective.     

Banks and markets in a monetary economy

Modern financial sectors consist of banks, asset markets and a central bank. This paper builds a model where these institutions provide different financial services, and their interaction supports efficient allocations. When one institution is missing equilibria are, by construction, inefficient. The paper analyzes how interest rates and asset prices depend on the structure of the financial sector and characterizes the central bank policy that supports efficient allocations. The analysis relies on the difference between liquidity and real shocks, and relates the notion of liquidity used in this paper to the one adopted in other studies.     

The interbank market after the financial turmoil: Squeezing liquidity in a “lemons market” or asking liquidity “on tap”

After August 2007 the plumbing system that supplied banks with wholesale funding, the interbank market, failed because toxic assets obstructed the pipes. Banks were forced to squeeze liquidity in a “lemons market” or to ask for liquidity “on tap” from central banks. This paper disentangles the two components of the 3-month Euribor–Eonia swap spread, credit and liquidity risk and then evaluates the decomposition. The main finding is that credit risk increased before the key events of the crisis, while liquidity risk was mainly responsible for the subsequent increases in the Euribor spread and then reacted to the systemic responses of the central banks, especially in October 2008. Moreover, the level of the spread between May 2009 and February 2010 was influenced mainly by credit risk, suggesting that European banks were still in a “lemons market” and relied on liquidity “on tap” even before sovereign debt crisis unfolded in Europe.     

Examining the Relationships between Capital,Risk and Efficiency in European Banking

This paper analyses the relationship between capital, risk and efficiency for a large sample of European banks between 1992 and 2000. In contrast to the established US evidence we do not find a positive relationship between inefficiency and bank risk‐taking. Inefficient European banks appear to hold more capital and take on less risk. Empirical evidence is found showing the positive relationship between risk on the level of capital (and liquidity), possibly indicating regulators' preference for capital as a mean of restricting risk‐taking activities. We also find evidence that the financial strength of the corporate sector has a positive influence in reducing bank risk‐taking and capital levels. There are no major differences in the relationships between capital, risk and efficiency for commercial and savings banks although there are for co‐operative banks. In the case of co‐operative banks we do find that capital levels are inversely related to risks and we find that inefficient banks hold lower levels of capital. Some of these relationships also vary depending on whether banks are among the most or least efficient operators.     

Repo market – A tool to manage liquidity in financial institutions

Central Bank Repo (Repurchase Agreement) is widely used as an indirect instrument of monetary policy and the same is implemented in India by institutionalizing a mechanism called Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) which allows banks and primary dealers to manage their liquidity requirement on day to day basis. Liquidity stress in the market has an impact on the short-term interest rate. Entities not having adequate securities balances borrow funds from inter-bank uncollateralized call market and the call rates are prone to liquidity shocks in the system. The spread between call and repo rates is likely to widen when there is liquidity stress in the market. The study tried to find the determinant of the spread. It found that LAF window activity as well as total money market activity has an impact on the spread. In order to understand if the spread behaves in a different manner when the system has excess liquidity vis-à-vis shortage of liquidity, a regime switching model using Goldfeld and Quandt’s D-method for switching regression was used. The tests found that the monetary policy is stable in both the regimes and the effectiveness of monetary policy in both the regimes is not statistically different.     

The conditioning role of performance on the bank risk-taking channel of monetary policy: Evidence from a multiple-tool regime

The study investigates how monetary policy affects bank risk-taking under a multiple-tool regime of Vietnam during 2007–2018. Particularly, we also consider the conditioning role of bank performance, broken down by bank profitability and cost efficiency, in this nexus. Using both dynamic and static panel models, we show that the liquidity injection initiated by the central bank’s asset purchases induces banks to take more risks, captured by the traditional Z-score and two alternative measures of credit risk. However, monetary policy easing through decreased interest rates is beneficial to the credit portfolio and financial stability of banks, which therefore challenges the functioning of the bank risk-taking channel. This startling result is robust across three different interest rate measures, including lending rates, refinance rates and rediscount rates. Further analysis reveals that our observed effects are alleviated for banks with higher performance — i.e., more profitable and efficient banks. This in-depth finding offers more insights into the “search for yield” incentive, based on the theory of information asymmetry and the two competing hypotheses of “bad management” and “cost skimping”.     

Credit lines as monitored liquidity insurance: Theory and evidence

We propose a theory of credit lines provided by banks to firms as a form of monitored liquidity insurance. Bank monitoring and resulting revocations help control illiquidity-seeking behavior of firms insured by credit lines. The cost of credit lines is thus greater for firms with high liquidity risk, which in turn are likely to use cash instead of credit lines. We test this implication for corporate liquidity management by identifying exogenous shocks to liquidity risk of firms in corporate bond and equity markets. Firms experiencing increases in liquidity risk move out of credit lines and into cash holdings.     

Risk and concentration in payment and securities settlement systems

What drives the intraday patterns of settlement in payment and securities settlement systems? Using a model of the strategic interaction of participants in these systems to capture some stylized facts about the Federal Reserve's Fedwire funds and securities systems, this paper identifies three factors that influence a participant's decision on when to send transactions intraday: cost of intraday liquidity, extent of settlement risk, and system design. With these factors, the model can make predictions regarding the impact of policy on the concentration of transactions, amount of intraday overdrafts, central bank credit exposure, costs to system participants, and other risks.     

The eurosystem money market auctions: A banking perspective

This paper analyzes the individual bidding behavior of German banks in the money market auctions conducted by the ECB from the beginning of 2000:IIIQ to the end of 2001:IQ. Our approach takes a variety of characteristics of the individual banks into account, particularly variables that capture the different use of liquidity and the different attitude towards liquidity risk of the individual banks. It turns out that these characteristics are reflected in banks’ bidding behavior. Thus, our study contributes to a deeper understanding of the way liquidity risk is managed in the banking sector.     

Daytime Is Money

Based on trade data from the Swiss franc overnight interbank repo market, we gain valuable insights into the daytime value of money. In analogy to Baglioni and Monticini (2008) , we provide evidence that an implicit intraday money market exists. We further show that the introduction of foreign exchange settlement system, Continuous Linked Settlement, increased the implicit value of intraday liquidity during settlement cycle hours, thus providing further evidence of the cost of immediacy. Finally, we provide evidence that during the financial market turmoil the implicit intraday interest in a secured money market was less affected than that in an unsecured money market.