EVIDENCE ON EVA

EVA has attracted considerable attention as an alternative to traditional accounting earnings for use in both valuation and incentive compensation. With a host of consultants now marketing related metrics, numerous claims have been made—most based on anecdotal evidence or in-house studies. This paper summarizes the authors' independent evidence regarding EVA's alleged advantages.
The authors begin by reviewing the theory that links the underlying concept of residual income to shareholder value. Second, they discuss how Stern Stewart modifies residual income to produce its proprietary EVA metric and show how median EVA compares with residual income, net income, and operating cash flows over the period 1988–97. Third, they examine the claim that EVA is more closely associated with stock returns and firm value than is net income. Their evidence indicates that EVA does not dominate net income in associations with stock returns and firm values. Fourth, they examine a second claim that compensation plans based on residual income motivate managers to take actions consistent with increasing shareholder value. Here the evidence (from a study by Wallace) suggests that managers do respond to residual income-based incentives by, for example, increasing asset sales, cutting capital expenditures, repurchasing stock, and producing higher levels of residual income. The authors conclude by arguing that a metric such as EVA can be effective for internal incentive purposes even if it conveys little news to market participants regarding the firm's valuation.     

EVA IN THE E&P INDUSTRY: THE CASE OF NUEVO ENERGY

This article presents a case study illustrating some aspects of the new business model discussed in the roundtable above. Continuing a major theme in the roundtable, the authors begin by arguing that the long‐run failure of the E&P industry to create shareholder wealth stems to a large degree from weak or distorted incentives held out to the top executives and managers of most large, publicly traded companies. This article traces the incentive problem to the lack of an effective wealth creation metric to guide the financial management process. Although the industry employs a variety of accounting‐based performance measures, none is a reliable measure of wealth creation. In place of traditional financial metrics such as earnings, annual cash flow, and return on capital, this article recommends a performance evaluation and incentive compensation system that is tied to the use of a “reserve‐adjusted” EVA measure—one that exhibits a strong statistical correlation with changes in shareholder wealth in the E&P business. The greater explanatory power of this new measure reflects the reality that changes in the value of reserves in the ground can greatly outweigh changes in annual earnings or cash flows. As the focal point of a compensation plan, EVA has advantages over stock options in that it can be calculated at various levels in the organization, even at the level of a single well, whereas stock prices only exist for the company as a whole. For this reason, an EVA incentive system permits a clearer “line of sight” between pay packages and the performance of the part of the business for which managers are directly accountable. Perhaps even more important, EVA can be calculated (using an “internal hedging” mechanism) in a way that removes the impact of changes in oil prices on the incentive outcome. And, as demonstrated in the case study of Nuevo Energy, such internal hedging allows companies to give their employees a much greater share of wealth created with far less cost than by simply granting stock or stock options.     

EVA AND THE "NEW ECONOMY"

Some have observed that the new economy means the end of the EVA performance measurement and incentive compensation system. They claim that although the EVA system is useful for oldline companies with heavy investments in fixed assets, the efficient management of investor capital is no longer an imperative for newage firms that operate largely without buildings and machinery–and, in some cases, with negative working capital. This article argues that EVA is not only suitable for the emerging companies that lead the new economy, but even more important for such firms than for their “rust belt” predecessors. While there may be a new economy in terms of trade in new products and services, there is no new economics– the principles of economic valuation remain the same. As in the past, companies will create value in the future only insofar as they promise to produce returns on investor capital that exceed the cost of capital. It has made for sensational journalism to speak of companies with high valuations and no earnings, but this is in large part the result of an accounting framework that is systematically flawed. New economy companies spend much of their capital on R&D, marketing, and advertising. By treating these outlays as expenses against current profits, GAAP accounting presents a grossly distorted picture of both current and future profitability. By contrast, an EVA system capitalizes such investments and amortizes them over their expected useful life. For new economy companies, the effect of such adjustments on profitability can be significant. For example, in applying EVA accounting to Real Networks, Inc., the author shows that although the company reported increasing losses in recent years, its EVA has been steadily rising–a pattern of profitability that corresponds much more directly to the change in the company's market value over the same period. Thus, for stock analysts that follow new economy companies, the use of EVA will get you closer to current market values than GAAP accounting. And for companies intent on ensuring the right level of investment in intangibles– neither too much nor too little– EVA is likely to send the right message to managers and employees. The recent decline in the Nasdaq suggests that stock market investors are starting to look for the kind of capital efficiency encouraged by an EVA system.     

EVA® FOR BANKS: VALUE CREATION, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND PROFITABILITY MEASUREMENT

This article presents a complete ranking of America's 100 largest bank holding companies according to their shareholder value added. This research, the first of its kind for the banking industry, defines an EVA measurement for banks and presents evidence of EVA's stronger correlation with bank market values than traditional accounting measures like ROA and ROE. Besides developing EVA and MVA as analytical tools for viewing the economic performance of the organization from a shareholder perspective, the authors also present a framework for calculating EVA at all levels of the organization, including lines of business, functional departments, products, customer segments, and customer relationships. The implementation of an EVA profitability measurement system at the business unit (or lower) level requires methods for three critical tasks: (1) transfer pricing of funds; (2) allocation of indirect expenses; and (3) allocation of economic capital. Although solutions to the first two are fairly straightforward, the allocation of capital to business units is a major challenge for banks today. In contrast to the complex, “bottom-up” approach used by a number of large banks in implementing their RAROC systems, the authors propose a greatly simplified, “top-down” approach that requires calculation of only the volatility of a business's operating profit (or NOPAT). The advantage of using NOPAT volatility is that it allows EVA analysis at any level of the organization in a way that captures the volatility effects from all sources of risk (credit, interest rates, liquidity, or operations). While such a top-down approach is clearly not meant to take the place of a comprehensive, bottom-up RAROC analysis, it is intended to provide a complement–a high-level “check” on the detailed, bottom-up risk management procedures and controls now in place at most banks. Moreover, for those banks that have developed extensive funds transfer pricing, cost allocation, and RAROCstyle capital allocation systems, the EVA financial management system can either be integrated with those systems or serve as an independent economic assessment of the bank's business risks and returns.     

What Companies Need to Know About International Cross‐Listing

This article addresses four questions about cross‐listing by non‐U.S. companies on a U.S. stock exchange: Why do companies cross‐list? Does a U.S. listing increase firm value? If so, what are the sources of the increased valuation? And finally, how has the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) affected the value of a U.S. listing? Both managerial surveys and academic research show that companies list in the U.S. to increase visibility and share liquidity, to broaden their shareholder base, to gain access to cheaper financing and reduce the cost of capital, and, in some cases, to implement a global business strategy. Foreign companies also typically cross‐list after periods of strong market performance and experience a positive valuation effect around the time of listing, but then underperform the market in the period after the cross‐listing. On average, cross‐listed companies exhibit higher valuations than their home‐market peers, but with significant variation based on firm characteristics: The valuation premiums are larger for smaller companies with higher past sales growth, higher ROAs, and lower financial leverage. In the long run, the companies that show a permanent increase in valuation are those that succeed in expanding their U.S. shareholder base and improving their levels of shareholder protection. Finally, the evidence suggests that SOX, while perhaps deterring some would‐be overseas listings, has not seriously eroded the net benefits of a U.S. listing.     

EVA, ACCOUNTING PROFITS, AND CEO TURNOVER: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION, 1985–1994

A growing number of companies use EVA or related measures of economic profits as metrics for corporate planning and executive compensation. Unlike traditional accounting measures of performance, EVA attempts to measure the value that firms create or destroy by subtracting a capital charge from the cash returns they generate on invested capital. For this reason, EVA is seen by its proponents as providing the most reliable year-to-year indicator of a market based performance measure known as market value added, or MVA. Although EVA and MVA have received considerable attention in recent years, there has been little empirical study of these performance measures—and what studies have been produced have provided mixed results. This study joins the debate over EVA vs. conventional accounting measures by asking a different question: Which performance measures do the best job of explaining not only stock returns, but the probability that a CEO will be dismissed for poor performance? Using a sample of 452 firms during the period 1985–1994, the authors report that EVA has a somewhat stronger correlation with stock price performance than conventional accounting measures such as ROE and ROA. But, of greater import, EVA appears to be a considerably more reliable indicator of CEO turnover than conventional accounting measures.     

HOW TO USE EVA IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY

The use of EVA in the oil industry has lagged behind that in most other industries because the accounting information reported by oil and gas concerns does such a poor job of representing management's effectiveness in adding value for shareholders. The essence of the problem is that the exploration activities of oil companies create assets whose changes in value are recognized by the stock market long before they are reflected on income statements or balance sheets. As a result, all accountingbased performance measures, including generic measures of EVA (which are derived from accounting information), fail to provide meaningful goals, decision tools, or compensation benchmarks.
This article provides a new, EVAbased framework for performance measurement and incentive compensation for oil and gas firms—and for companies in extractive industries in general. The authors show that, when adjusted by a publicly available measure of hydrocarbon reserve value known as "SEC-10," EVA's ability to explain annual stock returns rises from under 10% to almost 50%. Moreover, because SEC-10 has several important limitations as a measure of reserve value, there is considerable additional room for improving EVA's explanatory power. And the actual implementation of an EVA financial management system for an individual oil company can and should be based on more precise estimates of reserve value than those provided by SEC-10.
To this end, the authors provide an approach to hydrocarbon reserve valuation that captures the "real option" value of undeveloped reserves. By incorporating real option values, this new EVA financial management system for oil companies aligns management's incentives with the goal of creating shareholder wealth by rewarding managers for creating real option value as well as current cash flow—and by forcing managers to consider the optimal "exercise" of such strategic options.     

EVA AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT

Both TQM and EVA can be viewed as organizational innovations designed to reduce “agency costs”—that is, reductions in firm value that stem from conflicts of interest between various corporate constituencies. This article views TQM programs as corporate investments designed to increase value by reducing potential conflicts among non-investor stakeholders such as managers, employees, customers, and suppliers. EVA, by contrast, focuses on reducing conflicts between managers and shareholders by aligning the incentives of the two groups. Besides encouraging managers to make the most efficient possible use of investor capital, EVA reinforces the goal of shareholder value maximization in two other ways: (1) by eliminating the incentive for corporate overinvestment provided by more conventional accounting measures such as EPS and earnings growth; and (2) by reducing the incentive for corporate underinvestment provided by ROE and other rate-of-return measures. At a superficial level, EVA and TQM seem to be in direct conflict with each other. Because of its focus on multiple, non-investor stakeholders, TQM does not address the issue of how to make value-maximizing trade-offs among different stakeholder groups. It fails to provide answers to questions such as: What is the value to shareholders of the increase in employees' human capital created by corporate investments in quality-training programs? And, given that a higherquality product generally costs more to produce, what is the value-maximizing quality-cost combination for the company? The failure of TQM to address such questions may be one of the main reasons why the adoption of TQM does not necessarily lead to improvements in EVA. Because a financial management tool like EVA has the ability to guide managers in making trade-offs among different corporate stakeholders, it can be used to complement and reinforce a TQM program. By subjecting TQM to the discipline of EVA, management is in a better position to ensure that its investment in TQM is translating into increased shareholder value. At the same time, a TQM program tempered by EVA can help managers ensure that they are not under investing in their non-shareholder stakeholders.     

Why Capital Efficiency Measures Are Rarely Used in Incentive Plans, and How to Change That

Despite the wide acceptance of DCF valuation and its corollary that value is created only by earning more than the cost of capital, very few companies use performance measures that focus on corporate efficiency in using capital—measures such as return on capital (ROC) or economic value added (EVA)—as the main basis for their top management incentive programs. In this article, the authors begin by documenting the surprisingly limited use of such measures in management incentive plans. Next they analyze three often cited problems—difficulty in retaining managers, discouragement of growth investment, and complexity—that could account for the limited use of such measures. Third and last, they suggest a number of adjustments to standard capital efficiency measures that are designed to address these problems and, in so doing, to give corporate directors more confidence in using measures like EVA to reward and hold managers accountable for value-adding performance.
In illustrating the problems encountered when using such performance measures, the article uses case studies of three long-time "EVA companies"—Briggs & Stratton, Herman Miller, and Manitowoc—to highlight the difficulty of using a "bonus bank" (or "clawback") system to hold managers fully accountable for earning a minimum return on capital. After presenting empirical data that shows "delayed productivity" of invested capital, the authors suggest that conventional capital efficiency measures can discourage value-increasing growth.
The article concludes by recommending that although measures like EVA used in combination with negative bonus banks provide the right incentives, EVA capital charges should be phased in gradually to reflect the delayed productivity of capital. At the same time, corporate boards should consider providing bonus bank "relief" when market and industry factors have excessively large negative effects on the performance measures and bonus awards.     

Expectations‐Based Management

The authors begin by summarizing the results of their recently published study of the relation between stock returns and changes in several annual performance measures, including not only growth in earnings and EVA, but changes during the year in analysts' expectations about future earnings over three different periods: (1) the current year; (2) the following year; and (3) the three‐year period thereafter. The last of these measures—changes in analysts' expectations about three‐ to five‐year earnings—had by far the greatest explanatory “power” of any of the measures tested. Besides being consistent with the stock market's taking a long‐term, DCF approach to the valuation of companies, the authors' finding that investors seem to care most about earnings three to five years down the road has a number of important implications for financial management: First, a business unit doesn't necessarily create shareholder value if its return on capital exceeds the weighted average cost of capital—nor does an operation that fails to earn its WACC necessarily reduce value. To create value, the business's return must exceed what investors are expecting. Second, without forecasting returns on capital, management should attempt to give investors a clear sense of the firm's internal benchmarks, both for existing businesses and new investment. Third, management incentive plans should be based on stock ownership rather than stock options. Precisely because stock prices reflect expectations, the potential for prices to get ahead of realities gives options‐laden managers a strong temptation to manipulate earnings and manage for the short term.     

10 ways to create shareholder value

Executives have developed tunnel vision in their pursuit of shareholder value, focusing on short-term performance at the expense of investing in long-term growth. It's time to broaden that perspective and begin shaping business strategies in light of the competitive landscape, not the shareholder list. In this article, Alfred Rappaport offers ten basic principles to help executives create lasting shareholder value. For starters, companies should not manage earnings or provide earnings guidance; those that fail to embrace this first principle of shareholder value will almost certainly be unable to follow the rest. Additionally, leaders should make strategic decisions and acquisitions and carry assets that maximize expected value, even if near-term earnings are negatively affected as a result. During times when there are no credible value-creating opportunities to invest in the business, companies should avoid using excess cash to make investments that look good on the surface but might end up destroying value, such as ill-advised, overpriced acquisitions. It would be better to return the cash to shareholders in the form of dividends and buybacks. Rappaport also offers guidelines for establishing effective pay incentives at every level of management; emphasizes that senior executives need to lay their wealth on the line just as shareholders do; and urges companies to embrace full disclosure, an antidote to short-term earnings obsession that serves to lessen investor uncertainty, which could reduce the cost of capital and increase the share price. The author notes that a few types of companies--high-tech start-ups, for example, and severely capital-constrained organizations--cannot afford to ignore market pressures for short-term performance. Most companies with a sound, well-executed business model, however, could better realize their potential for creating shareholder value by adopting the ten principles.     

The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Trend

Corporate Social Responsibility, or “CSR,” has recently become a subject of study by financial economists. While there is no shortage of anecdotal evidence to support all variety of positions, broad‐based statistical evidence about the CSR movement is in short supply. This article presents some new empirical evidence that aims to answer three related questions about CSR: First, are corporations increasing their “investment” in what is considered socially responsible behavior? Second, does corporate investment in social responsibility affect a company's financial performance and shareholder value? Third, why do companies invest in CSR: to increase shareholder value, or to uphold a “moral” commitment to non‐investor stakeholders and “society”? Using a social responsibility metric that measures the net CSR strengths (i.e., strengths less concerns) of each S&P 500 and Domini 400 company, the authors report that the average net CSR for both indexes decreased during the 15‐year period (1991‐2005) of the study—though the Domini 400, as might be expected, experienced a smaller decline. The authors also report that corporate strengths have increased, on average, but at a slower rate than the “concerns,” which suggests that corporate CSR efforts may be aimed at a moving target with steadily rising expectations and requirements. Second, the authors report that companies with more CSR strengths or fewer CSR weaknesses produced higher ROA over the same 15‐year period. The authors' findings here suggest a “circular” causality in which profitable companies are more likely to invest in CSR initiatives to begin with, but then find their performance further improved by such investment. Third, the authors' findings suggest that most companies devote resources to CSR initiatives as a means of maximizing long‐run value rather than out of a prior commitment to stakeholders. More specifically, the study shows that companies appear to invest more heavily to build CSR strengths than to eliminate CSR concerns. And as the authors conclude, this behavior is consistent with a strategy of using CSR as a form of “risk management” that promotes corporate strengths in order to limit the potential negative effects of—perhaps by diverting attention from—their weaknesses.     

WHY HEDGE? SOME EVIDENCE FROM OIL AND GAS PRODUCERS

Despite the prevalence of corporate risk management, there are no widely accepted explanations for why companies hedge or how shareholders benefit from hedging. This article provides some evidence on these issues by reporting the results of a study of the risk management policies of 100 oil and gas producers from 1992 to 1994.
The first notable finding is the considerable variety of the hedging policies of the oil and gas producers. For example, in 1993 slightly more than half of the companies did not hedge, while a quarter of the firms in the sample hedged more than 28' of their production, and some firms hedged almost 100'. The second main finding was that the extent of hedging was related to a variety of factors, largely those related to financing costs. In particular, companies with higher leverage—and thus presumably facing greater difficulties in accessing the capital markets—tended to hedge a larger fraction of their output than firms with lower leverage ratios. This result is consistent with the idea that corporations manage risks to help ensure they have sufficient capital to finance their investment opportunities and to reduce the likelihood that low oil and gas prices will push them into financial distress. Under either of these interpretations, financial theory would suggest that corporate hedging increases shareholder value. Whether it actually does so is a matter for future research.     

中国式经济增加值考核是否会导致投资不足

以央企控股上市公司为样本,研究发现经济增加值不仅没有导致企业投资不足,而且起到了抑制作用。研究结果表明,经济增加值为核心的业绩评价方式对当前央企构建价值投资理念和实现股东价值最大化经营目标具有重要正向作用。     

Save the Buyback,Save Jobs

In response to a recent New York Times op‐ed by Senators Schumer and Sanders deploring the effects of stock buybacks on workers and the economy, the authors explain the role of buybacks in increasing corporate productivity and in recycling “excess capital” from mature companies with limited growth and employment opportunities to the next generation of Apples and Amazons. Some companies, as Schumer and Sanders charge, are guilty of repurchasing shares in the name of “shareholder value maximization” instead of pursuing job‐creating investments. But as the authors argue, well‐run companies increase shareholder value not by boosting EPS through buybacks, but mainly by earning competitive returns on capital and investing in their long‐run “earnings power.” And by paying out capital they have no productive uses for, such companies give their own shareholders the opportunity to reinvest in other companies with promising prospects for growth and jobs. But the authors go on to note the tendency of companies to buy back shares not when their stock prices are low, but instead when the companies are flush with cash and nearer the top than the bottom of the business cycle. The result of this tendency, as research by Fortuna Advisors (the authors' firm) shows, is that fully three quarters of companies doing large buybacks during the period 2013‐2017 failed to produce an adequate “Buyback ROI,” a metric developed by Fortuna that indicates management's effectiveness in “timing” its stock repurchases. Given the usefulness of buybacks in recycling capital, the authors conclude that the most reliable solution to the corporate short termism and underinvestment problem is for companies to adopt better financial performance measures—including Buyback ROI—to guide their capital allocation. And when management determines that it has significantly more capital than value‐adding investments, but wants to avoid committing to unsustainable dividend increases, it should consider buybacks—but only if management is convinced that its stock price has not outpaced performance.     

EVA Momentum: The One Ratio That Tells the Whole Story

Virtually all corporate managers use ratios like profit margin, earnings growth, and return on equity to set goals, analyze operations, and measure success or failure. Yet all ratios are wrong in the sense that every one of them can make it appear that operations are improving when a business actually is faltering, and vice versa .
In this article, one of the pioneers of the modern economic profit school of financial management claims to have discovered a new ratio that accurately consolidates all the pluses and minuses of decisions and operations into a single reliable overall measure that cannot be increased without truly creating value. "EVA Momentum," as the measure is called, is the change in a company's economic profit (or EVA) in a given period divided by its sales in the prior period. In other words, it is the size-adjusted change in economic profit.
The author goes on to demonstrate why most companies can use EVA Momentum as both their overarching financial target and the best way to keep score for multiple business lines. The article also shows why EVA Momentum is a better performance measure than ROI and that, as a diagnostic and management tool, it provides a more effective alternative to the popular DuPont ROI formula. Unlike the DuPont formula, EVA Momentum reflects the contributions to overall performance of important factors such as profitable growth, strategic retrenchment, and the quality of resource allocation decisions in general. At the same time, it provides a more accurate and informative means of examining performance, weighing tradeoffs, identifying investment opportunities, and prioritizing initiatives—all on the basis of their expected impact on a company's market value.     

The Keys to Success in Spinoffs

Corporate restructurings accomplished through spinoffs have long been a key tool for management to unlock shareholder value. In 2016, global spinoff volume reached $117 billion, and spinoff activity continues to unfold at a similar pace in 2017, with Hilton, Xerox, Alcoa, Johnson Controls, and Danaher all recently completing major transactions. Spinoffs are often designed to increase strategic focus and discipline in the allocation of capital, enabling companies to respond more effectively to opportunities that create shareholder value, including transformational M&A. And intensifying shareholder activist pressure, along with favorable debt market conditions, has provided significant momentum to spinoff activity. In fact, almost 20% of the companies that announced spinoffs in the past five years were subject to some form of prior activist engagement. Moreover, part of the impetus for such activism can be traced to the record M&A volume of the past few years, which has added to investor demand for many acquisitive companies to consider shedding businesses that are no longer a strategic fit. But even with all this M&A activity, opportunities for unlocking value through spinoffs have not been as abundant or readily identified as in the past owing to the general reduction in corporate business diversification that has taken place during the last decade or so. And perhaps reflecting this development, the average longer‐run shareholder returns from spinoffs have actually turned negative during the past five years, while the dispersion of spinoff returns has increased, representing greater downside risk for restructurings undertaken without an effective strategy and rationale for increasing efficiency and value. Nonetheless, more than half of all spinoffs over the past five years have generated share price outperformance despite the overall decline in spinoff performance. The authors devote the second half of the article to identifying several key characteristics of the post‐separation entities that indicate the potential for such a restructuring to deliver share price outperformance. The main attributes of value‐increasing spinoffs are size and organic growth, and increases in business focus and capital efficiency; but such transactions have also produced companies that maintain the financial flexibility to pursue M&A along with a dividend policy that is both attractive and sustainable.     

An Investor Perspective on the Black Box of Corporate Social Responsibility

In summarizing the findings of their recent study, the authors report findings that suggest that not all socially responsible corporate policies are likely to have the same effect on a company's ownership and value. Using environmental policy as their proxy for CSR activities, the authors classify corporate environmental practices into two categories: (1) actions that reduce the likelihood of harmful outcomes by reducing the corporate exposure to environmental risk; and (2) actions that enhance companies' perceived ‘greenness’ through investments that go beyond both legal requirements and any conceivable risk management rationale. Although both groups of environmental practices are likely to be viewed as socially beneficial, corporate expenditures that reduce a firm's environmental risk exposure are more likely to benefit shareholders by limiting the risk of losses arising from environmental accidents, lawsuits, and fines—and possibly thereby reducing the firm's cost of capital. By contrast, corporate expenditures that enhance the firm's perceived greenness by going beyond legal requirements and risk management rationales could actually reduce shareholder value. Consistent with this hypothesis, the authors find that institutional investors tend to own smaller than average percentages of both companies the authors identify as ‘toxic’ and make limited efforts to manage their environmental risk, and companies they label ‘green’ with low environmental risk exposure but relatively high CSR spending on the environment. At the same time, such investors hold larger‐than‐average positions in ‘neutral’ companies with relatively low, or effectively managed, environmental risk exposures and limited investment in ‘greenness’ programs. The authors also find that both toxic and green companies have lower (Tobin's Q) valuations than neutral companies, and that otherwise toxic companies that effectively manage their environmental risk exposures have higher valuations.     

EVA,not EBITDA: A New Financial Paradigm for Private Equity Firms

Private equity firms have boomed on the back of EBITDA. Most PE firms use it as their primary measure of value, and ask the managers of their portfolio companies to increase it. Many public companies have decided to emulate the PE firms by using EBITDA to review performance with investors, and even as a basis for determining incentive pay. But is the emphasis on EBITDA warranted? In this article, the co‐founder of Stern Stewart & Co. argues that EVA offers a better way. He discusses blind spots and distortions that make EBITDA highly unreliable and misleading as a measure of normalized, ongoing profitability. By comparing EBITDA with EVA, or Economic Value Added, a measure of economic profit net of a full cost‐of‐capital charge, Stewart demonstrates EVA's ability to provide managers and investors with much more clarity into the levers that are driving corporate performance and determining intrinsic market value. And in support of his demonstration, Stewart reports the finding of his analysis of Russell 3000 public companies that EVA explains almost 20% more than EBITDA of their changes in value, while at the same time providing far more insight into how to improve those values.     

Employee stock ownership and the cost of capital

This paper investigates the relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of capital, the main determinant of shareholder value creation computed through economic value added (EVA). By reducing agency conflicts within the firm, we hypothesize that employee share ownership reduces the firm’s cost of capital by affecting its two components, i.e. the cost of equity and the cost of debt. We test this hypothesis in France, a leading country in terms of employee ownership, based on a panel of the 120 largest listed companies for the 2000–2011 period. We find: (i) no significant relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of equity; (ii) a negative curvilinear relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of debt; (ii) a negative curvilinear relationship between employee stock ownership and the weighted average cost of capital. These results suggest debtholders regard ESO as positive as long it is moderate because it shifts risk from them to employees and that this effect is still perceptible in the weighted average cost of capital.