Growth with many agents and wages paid ex ante

In this paper, we consider a one-sector model of economic growth with several infinitely-lived heterogeneous agents, who are endowed with diverse discount factors as well as preferences over consumption. In line with the classical Ramsey model, agents are not allowed to borrow against future income. Unlike the traditional assumption of ex post wage payment, wages are paid ex ante in our model. We first explain the difference between the assumptions of wages being paid ex ante and wages being paid ex post in the framework of a simple illustrative two-class model. Our main result shows that in contrast to the many-agent Ramsey model with ex post wage payment, the capital stock sequence converges to the steady state stock irrespective of production technology employed by the firms. Further, all impatient agents own zero capital stock, whereas the most patient agent owns the entire capital stock from some time onward. Thus, we have shown that a slight modification in the timing of wage payment in growth models can lead to significant changes in the stability properties of equilibrium dynamics.     

Uncertainty,Learning and Heterogeneity in International Environmental Agreements

This paper concerns the formation of International Environmental Agreements under uncertainty about environmental damage with different models of learning (complete learning, partial learning or no learning). The results of the existing literature are generally pessimistic: the possibility of either complete or partial learning generally reduces the level of global welfare that can be achieved from forming an IEA relative to no learning. That literature regards uncertainty as a parameter common to all countries, so that countries are identical ex ante as well as ex post. In this paper we extend the literature to the case where there is no correlation between damage costs across countries; each country is uncertain about a particular parameter (in our case the benefit-cost ratio) drawn from a common distribution but, ex post, each country’s realized parameter value is independently drawn. Consequently, while countries remain identical ex ante, they may be heterogeneous ex post. We show that this change reinforces the negative conclusions about the effects of partial learning on international environmental agreements, but, under certain conditions, moderates the negative conclusions about the effects of complete learning.     

累积创新中的内生许可证

This paper analyzes the endogeneity of licensing arrangements in cost-reducing cumulative innovation. There exists the following results. First, for the first-generation patentee, ex post licensing matters for rent extraction while ex ante licensing matters for efficiency. Second, if the second-generation innovator does not exit, then the firms’ profits as well as social welfare are all irrelevant to whether ex ante licensing is allowed. Third, costly litigation can occur on the equilibrium path and its occurrence is also irrelevant to ex ante licensing. Interestingly, the conditional probability of the first-generation patentee winning litigation first decreases and then increases in patent breadth. Fourth, optimal patent breadth depends on the tradeoff between litigation costs and antitrust effect. Translated from Shijie Jingji Wenhui 世界经济文汇 (World Economic Papers), 2006, (6): 1–29     

Hybrid Contests

This paper examines hybrid contests where participants commit two types of resources to improve their probability of winning the prize. The first type is forfeited ex ante, before the prize is allocated, by winners and losers alike, while the second is committed ex ante by all contenders but expended ex post, after the prize is allocated, and only by the contestant that wins the prize. The model yields a number of interesting results. Among them is the finding that, as the number of contestants increases, the ex ante expenditures of individual contestants decrease while the ex post expenditure increases. Even more interesting, the total of the ex ante and ex post expenditures by the contenders in a hybrid contest may decrease with the number of competitors. The study also finds that there is no rent overdissipation, and compares the total expenditures in the contest and “all‐pay” allocation mechanisms.     

Fiscal Policy in Real Time*

In this paper, I estimate the ex ante or intentional cyclical stance of fiscal policy in OECD countries. I use the fiscal plans reported at the time of budgeting, together with other information available to fiscal policy‐makers in real time. Indeed, fiscal plans might be significantly different from ex post outcomes because governments do not have complete control over their implementation, which is influenced by several exogenous factors. When fiscal‐policy rules are estimated using real‐time data, I show in this paper that OECD countries have often planned a counter‐cyclical fiscal stance, especially during economic expansions. This contrasts with conventional findings based on actual data, which tend to point towards a‐cyclicality or pro‐cyclicality. Forecast errors for the government structural balance and the output gap play a central role in explaining the differences between estimates based on ex ante and ex post data.     

A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem

A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to individual preferences over sure objects. Ordinal efficiency implies (is implied by) ex post (ex ante) efficiency. A simple algorithm characterizes ordinally efficient assignments: our solution, probabilistic serial (PS), is a central element within their set. Random priority (RP) orders agents from the uniform distribution, then lets them choose successively their best remaining object. RP is ex post, but not always ordinally, efficient. PS is envy-free, RP is not; RP is strategy-proof, PS is not. Ordinal efficiency, Strategyproofness, and equal treatment of equals are incompatible. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D61, D63.     

Risk sharing and industrial specialization in China

We investigate how risk sharing shapes industrial specialization across prefecture-level cities in China. By unbundling the mechanisms of risk sharing, we find that ex ante risk sharing generates a first-order stimulant effect on the geographical concentration of manufacturing industries, particularly for non-state-owned enterprises and cyclical industries. Ex post risk sharing matters only for state-owned enterprises. This result remains robust to instrument variable estimation and controlling for other determinants of industrial specialization. Finally, we show that interregional labor migration (special fiscal transfers) plays an important role in promoting interregional ex ante (ex post) risk sharing. The study implies that much more risk sharing and efficiency gains from industrial specialization would be achieved if capital markets and credit markets are better developed.     

Status Quo Bias in Bargaining: An Extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem with an Application to the Coase Theorem

We generalize the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem to study inefficiencies in bilateral bargaining over a divisible good, with two-sided private information on the valuations. For concave quasi-linear preferences, the ex ante most efficient Bayes equilibrium of any mechanism always exhibits a bias toward the status quo. If utility functions are quadratic every Bayes equilibrium is ex post inefficient, with the expected amount of trade biased toward the disagreement point. In other words, for the class of preferences we study, there is a strategic advantage to property rights in the Coase bargaining setup in the presence of incomplete information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D23, D62, D82.     

Ex Post Welfare under Alternative Health Care Systems

The implications of a societal aversion to inequality for the optimal structure of the health care system are studied. The agents are assumed to be ex ante identical, but to differ ex post in the state of their health. Inequality aversion is introduced by postulating a strictly concave ex post social welfare function. It is shown that the optimal public health care system allocates health care differently than would private health insurance; specifically, people who are relatively unhealthy with and without treatment receive more health care, and people who are relatively healthy with and without treatment receive less health care. The aggregate quantity of health care under the optimal public health care system can be either greater or smaller than under private health care insurance. If the public health care system is optimally designed, allowing agents to purchase supplementary private health care insurance cannot raise social welfare and is likely to decrease it.     

Are you hiring Johnny Football or Johnny Doe? Uncertain labour quality and the measurement of monopsony in college football

I assess monopsony in the college football labour market as it relates to both typical and elite performers, while also accounting for the uncertain performance quality of prospective players who are in this labour market. Existing studies suggest that the marginal revenue product (MRP) of elite collegiate players later drafted into the National Football League (NFL), significantly exceeds their compensation. These comparisons overstate monopsony rents because schools don’t know ex ante which prospects will become these elite performers. Using financial data spanning 2004–2011 from 114 major schools, I estimate the MRP of players sorted into three ex post quality tiers, and find that while eventual NFL draftees generate revenue that significantly exceeds their compensation, a majority of scholarship players do not. Then, using Rivals.com talent ratings of 6,604 prospective players recruited from 2002–2008, I estimate the probability that prospects will reach each ex post quality tier given their ex ante ratings. MRP estimates are adjusted by these conditional probability estimates to reflect the expected MRP of prospects, which allows more appropriate assessment of monopsony rents. I find that schools possess substantially less monopsony power than unadjusted MRP estimates suggest.     

MEASURING VARIATIONS IN LIFETIME WELFARE EX ANTE AND EX POST: SOME EXPLORATORY CALCULATIONS

Whereas longevity‐adjusted consumption measures have become increasingly used as indicators of lifetime standards of living, it remained unnoticed that those measures, by relying on period – rather than cohort – life tables, constitute indicators of expected – rather than actual – lifetime standards of living. In order to estimate the actual gap between ex ante and ex post measures of lifetime welfare, this paper computes, for 19th‐century European economies, longevity‐adjusted consumption measures based on period and cohort life tables. It is shown that the gap between ex ante and ex post measures is statistically significant, and that attempts to reduce it are likely to be unsuccessful, because standards of living tend to exhibit, over temporal horizons as long as a human life, structural breaks, which make the ex ante measurement of lifetime welfare highly speculative.     

Optimal Universal and Categorical Benefit Provision with Classification Errors and Imperfect Enforcement

We determine the optimal combination of a universal benefit and categorical benefit when individuals differ in their ability to work and, if able to work, their productivity. The categorical benefit is conditioned ex ante on applicants being unable to work and ex post on recipients not working. The awards test makes Type I/II errors. If the ex post condition is (i) not enforced, the optimal categorical benefit is positive only if the awards test has discriminatory power, while maximum welfare falls with both error propensities; but if (ii) fully enforced, the optimal categorical benefit is positive always and maximum welfare can increase with the Type II error propensity.     

Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments Within an Incomplete Contract Framework

This paper compares three different legal means—no environmental policy (the pollutee pays), full liability (the polluter pays), and pollution standards—to reduce and regulate neighborhood externalities within an incomplete contract framework. It turns out that the relative efficiency of these instruments depends, in general, on details. However, moderate standards are preferable to no environmental policy and tight (but not too tight) standards dominate liability. This provides under the given assumptions (neighborhood externalities, incomplete contracts) a justification for “sensible” standards for three reasons. First, unilateral allocations of property rights are biased that distort allocations even if ex post bargaining takes place. Second, a standard is superior in the following sense: if it is set equal to the outcome under any allocation of rights, it will be improved in the process of ex post bargaining. Third, unilateral property rights encourage strategic ex ante investments up to the point that committing to no bargaining would be beneficial (if possible).     

Optimal pricing and capacity choice for a public service under risk of interruption

We develop rules for pricing and capacity choice for an interruptible service that recognize the interdependence between consumers’ perceptions of system reliability and their market behavior. Consumers post ex ante demands, based on their expectations on aggregate demand. Posted demands are met if ex post supply capacity is sufficient. However, if supply is inadequate all ex ante demands are proportionally interrupted. Consumers’ expectations of aggregate demand are assumed to be rational. Under reasonable values for the consumer’s degrees of relative risk aversion and prudence, demand is decreasing in supply reliability. We derive operational expressions for the optimal pricing rule and the capacity expansion rule. We show that the optimal price under uncertainty consists of the optimal price under certainty plus a markup that positively depends on the degrees of relative risk aversion, relative prudence and system reliability. We also show that any reliability enhancing investment—though lowering the operating surplus of the public utility—is socially desirable as long as it covers the cost of investment.     

Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry

Summary. The paper extends Diamond's (1984) analysis of financial contracting with information asymmetry ex post and endogenous “bankruptcy penalties” to allow for risk aversion of the borrower. The optimality of debt contracts, which Diamond obtained for the case of risk neutrality, is shown to be nonrobust to the introduction of risk aversion. This contrasts with the costly state verification literature, in which debt contracts are optimal for risk averse as well as risk neutral borrowers. Received: December 7, 1998; revised version: June 9, 1999     

REALIZED COST‐BASED SUBSIDIES FOR STRATEGIC R&D INVESTMENTS WITH EX ANTE AND EX POST ASYMMETRIES*

We discuss stochastic cost‐reducing R&D investments and examine efficient subsidies. We discuss a two‐stage duopoly model in which each firm chooses R&D levels (innovation size and probability of success) in the first stage and competes à la Cournot in the second stage. We find that simple subsidies depending on the realized cost differences induce the efficient levels of R&D with respect to the innovation size and probability of success by two firms regardless of ex ante and ex post asymmetries between the two firms.     

Exploring causal relationships in an innovation program with Robust Portfolio Modeling

Many countries seek to foster the commercial exploitation of science-based research results through selective policy instruments. Typically, these instruments involve processes of follow-up data collection where the results of ex ante and ex post assessments are systematically recorded. Yet, several factors – such as the presence of multiple objectives, predominance of qualitative data and missing observations – may complicate the use of such data for adjusting the management practices of these instruments. With the aim of addressing these challenges, we adopt Robust Portfolio Modeling¹ (RPM) as an evaluation framework to the analysis of longitudinal data: specifically, we (i) determine subsets of outperforming and underperforming projects through the development of an explicit multicriteria model for ex post evaluation, and (ii) carry out comparative analyses between these subsets, in order to identify which ex ante interventions and contextual characteristics may have contributed to later performance. We also report experiences from the application of RPM-evaluation to a Finnish innovation program and outline extensions of this approach that provide further decision support to the managers of innovation programs.     

The impossibility of compromise: some uniqueness properties of expected utility preferences

Summary. We focus on the following uniqueness property of expected utility preferences: Agreement of two preferences on one interior indifference class implies their equality. We show that, besides expected utility preferences under (objective) risk, this uniqueness property holds for subjective expected utility preferences in Anscombe-Aumann's (partially subjective) and Savage's (fully subjective) settings, while it does not hold for subjective expected utility preferences in settings without rich state spaces. Indeed, when it holds the uniqueness property is even stronger than described above, as it needs only agreement on binary acts. The extension of the uniqueness property to the subjective case is possible because beliefs in the mentioned settings are shown to satisfy an analogous property: If two decision makers agree on a likelihood indifference class, they must have identical beliefs. Received: November 15, 1999; revised version: December 29, 1999     

Vertical integration and transaction-specific sunk costs

The purpose of this paper is to analyze vertical integration, long-term contracts and spot markets as institutional alternatives when transaction-specific investments are involved. Firm activities are divided into two periods. In the first period (the ex ante world), decisions on the amount of transaction-specific sunk costs are made, whereas after realization of a random state of the world, short-run production decisions are made (in the ex post world). The problem analyzed is to determine what form of organizations and/or contracts will emerge between upstream and downstream firms in the ex ante world to regulate their ex ante transaction-specific investments, if any, as well as their ex post production decisions and the distribution of resulting profits.